Prayer, the Great Means of Salvation and of PerfectionChapter II. God commonly gives to all the just the grace necessary for the observance of the commandments, and to all sinners the grace necessary for conversion

If then God wills all to be saved, it follows that he gives to all that grace and those aids which are necessary for the attainment of salvation, otherwise it could never be said that he has a true will to save all. “The effect of the antecedent will,’ says St. Thomas, “by which God wills the salvation of all men, is that order of nature the purpose of which is our salvation, and likewise those things which conduce to that end, and which are offered to all in common, whether by nature or by grace.” It is certain, in contradiction to the blasphemies of Luther and Calvin, that God does not impose a law that is impossible to be observed. On the other hand, it is certain, that without the assistance of grace the observance of the law is impossible; as Innocent I. declared against the Pelagians when he said, “It is certain, that as we overcome by the aid of God, so without his aid we must be overcome.”*? Pope Celestine declared the same thing. Therefore, if God gives to all men a possible law, it follows that he also gives to all men the grace necessary to observe it, whether immediately, mediately, by means of prayer, as the Council of Trent has most clearly defined: “God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding he admonishes you both to do what you can, and to ask for that which it is beyond your power, and by his help enables you to do it.” Otherwise, if God refused us both the proximate and remote grace to enable us to fulfil the law, either the law would have been given in vain, or sin would be necessary, and if necessary would be no longer sin, as we shall shortly prove at some length. I. TEACHING OF THE FATHERS OF THE GREEK CHURCH.

And this is the general opinion of the Greek Fathers:

St. Cyril of Alexandria says: “But if a man endowed as Others, and equally with them, with the gifts of divine grace, has fallen by his own free will, how shall Christ be said not to have saved even him, since he delivered the man, since he gave him the necessary aid to avoid sin.”? How, says the saint, can that sinner, who has received the assistance of grace equally with those who remained faithful, and has of his own accord chosen to sin, how can he blame Jesus Christ, who has, as far as he is concerned, delivered him by means of the assistance granted to him? St. John Chrysostom asks: “How is it that some are vessels of wrath, others vessels of mercy ?”

“*Quod si (quis), perinde atque alii, et ex quo cum ipsis divine gratia opibus praditus, propria voluntate delapsus est, quomodo non eum servasse dicitur Christus, qui, quantum ad cavendi peccati auxilia concessa pertinet, hominem liberavit?”—J/xz Jo. 1. 11. ¢. 21. And he answers, “Because of each person’s free will; for, since God is very good, he manifests equal kindness to all.” * Then, speaking of Pharaoh, whose heart is said in Scripture to have been hardened, he adds, “If Pharaoh was not saved, it must all be attributed to his will, since no less was given to him than to those who were saved.”³ And in another place, speaking of the petition of the mother of Zebedee’s sons, on the words, “/¢ zs° not mine to give, etc.,”* he observes: “By this Christ wished to show that it was not simply his to give, but that it also belonged to the combatants to take; for if it depended only on himself, all men would be saved.” *

St. Isidore of Pelusium: “For God wills seriously, and in all ways, to assist those who are wallowing in vice, that he may deprive them of all excuse.” ®

St. Cyril of Jerusalem: “God has opened the gate of eternal life, so that, as far as he is concerned, all may gain it without anything to hinder them.” °

But the doctrine of these Greek Fathers does not suit Jansenius, who has the temerity to say that they have spoken most imperfectly on grace: “None have spoken in grace more imperfectly than the Greeks.” In matters of grace, then, are we not to follow the teaching of the Greek Fathers, who were the first masters and columns of the Church? Perhaps the doctrine of the Greeks, especially in this important matter, was different from that of the Latin Church? On the contrary, it is certain that the true doctrine of faith came from the Greek to the Latin Church; so that, as St. Augustine wrote against Julian, who opposed to him the authority of the Greek Fathers, there can be no doubt that the faith of the Latins is the same as that of the Greeks. Whom, then, are we to follow? Shall we follow Jansenius, whose errors have already been condemned as heretical by the Church; who had the audacity to say that even the just have not the grace requisite to enable them to keep certain precepts; and that man merits and demerits, even though he acts through necessity, provided he is not forced by violence; these and all his other errors springing from his most false system of the delectation relatively victorious, of which we shall speak at length when we confute him in chapter iii 2. TEACHING OF THE FATHERS OF THE LATIN CHURCH.

But since the Greek Fathers do not satisfy Jansenius, let us see what the Latins say on this subject. But they in no wise differ from the Greeks.

St. Jerome says, “Man can do no good work without God, who, in giving free will, did not refuse his grace to aid every single work.”⁴ Mark the words “did not refuse his grace for every single work.” St. Ambrose: “He would. never come and knock at the door, unless he wished to enter; it is our fault that he does not always enter.” * St. Leo: “Justly does he insist on the command, since he furnishes beforehand aid to keep it.”? St. Hilary: ‘Now the grace of justification has abounded through one gift to all men.”⁵ Innocent I.: “He gives to man daily remedies; and unless we put confidence in them and depend upon them, we shall never be able to overcome human errors.”®

St. Augustine: “It is not imputed to you as a sin if you are ignorant against your will, but if you neglect to learn that of which you are ignorant. Nor is it imputed as a sin that you do not bind up your wounded limbs, but (mark this) that you despise him who is willing to cure you. These are your own sins; for no man is deprived of the knowledge of how to seek with benefit to himself.” In another place: “Therefore if the soul is ignorant what it is to do, it proceeds from this, that it has not yet learned; but it will receive this knowledge if it has made a good use of what it has already received; for it has received in this that it can piously and diligently seek, if it will; (mark the words) “it has received power to seek piously and diligently.” * So that every one receives at least the remote grace to seek; and if he makes good use of this, he will receive the proximate grace to perform that which at first he could not do. St. Augustine founds all this on the principle, that no man sins in doing that which he cannot help; therefore, if a man sins in anything, he sins in that he might have avoided it by the grace of God, which is wanting to no man: “Who sins in that which cannot in any way be helped? but a man does sin, therefore it might have been helped.”? “But only by his aid, who cannot be deceived.” * An evident reason, by which it becomes quite clear (as we shall have to show further on, when we speak of the sin of the obstinate), that if the grace necessary to observe the commandments were wanting, there would be no sin.

St. Thomas teaches the same in several places. In one place, in explaining the text, Who wills all men to be saved,’ he says, ‘and therefore grace is wanting to no man, but (as far as God is concerned) is communicated to all; as the sun is present even to the blind.”⁶ So that as the sun sheds its light upon all, and only those are deprived of it who voluntarily blind themselves to its rays, so God communicates to all men grace to observe the law; and men are lost simply because they will not avail themselves of it. In another place: “It belongs to divine Providence to provide all men with what is necessary to salvation, if only there be no impediment on man’s part.”⁷ If, then, God gives all men the graces necessary for salvation, and if actual grace is necessary to overcome temptations, and to observe the commandments, we must necessarily conclude that he gives all men either immediately or mediately actual grace to do good; and when mediately, no further grace is necessary to enable them to put in practice the means (such as prayer) of obtaining actual proximate grace. In another place, on the words of St. John’s Gospel, Wo man cometh to Me, etc.,’ he says, “If the heart of man be not lifted up, it is from no defect on the part of Him who draws it, who as far as He is concerned, never fails; but from an impediment caused by him who is being drawn.” ?

Scotus says the same: ‘God wills to save all men, so far as rests with him, and with his antecedent will, by which he has given them the ordinary gifts necessary to salvation.”⁸ The Council of Cologne in 1536: “Although no one is converted except he is drawn by the Father, yet let no one pretend to excuse himself on the plea of not being drawn. He stands at the gate, and knocks by the internal and the external Word.” *

3. Testimony of Holy Scripture.

Nor did the Fathers speak without warrant of the Holy Scriptures; for God in several places most clearly assures us that he does not neglect to assist us with his grace, if we are willing to avail ourselves of it either for perseverance, if we are in a state of justification, or for conversion, if we are in sin. I stand at the gate and knock; if any man shall hear My voice and open to Me the gate, I will come in to him.’ Bellarmine reasons well on this text, that our Lord who knows that man cannot open without his grace, would knock in vain at the door of his heart, unless he had first conferred on him the grace to open when he will. This is exactly what St. Thomas teaches in explaining the text; he says that God gives every one the grace necessary for salvation, that he may correspond to it if he will: “God by his most liberal will gives grace to every one that prepares himself: Behold I stand at the door and knock.’ And therefore the grace of God is wanting to no one, but communicates itself to all men, as far as it is concerned.” * In another place he says, “It is the business of God’s Providence to provide every one with what is necessary to salvation.” So that as St. Ambrose says: The Lord knocks at the gate, because he truly wishes to enter; if he does not enter, or if after entering he does not remain in our souls, it is because we prevent him from entering, or drive him out when he has entered: “Because he comes and knocks at the door, he always wishes to enter; but it is through us that he does not always go in, nor always remain.” *

What is there that [ ought to do more to My vineyard that f have not done to it? Was it that I expected that it should bring forth grapes, and it hath brought forth wild grapes ?¹¹ Bellarmine says on these words, “If he had not given the power to bring forth grapes, how could God say, J expected?¹⁴ And if God had not given to all men the grace necessary for salvation, he could not have said to the Jews, What is there that I ought to have done more? for they could have answered, that if they had not yielded fruit, it was for lack of necessary assistance. Bellarmine says the same on the words of our Lord: How often would I have gathered together thy children, and thou wouldst not ?? “How did he wish to be sought for by the unwilling unless he helps them that they may be able to be willing ?”? :

We have received Thy mercy, O God, in the midst of Thy temple.¹⁵ On this St. Bernard observes: “‘Mercy is in the midst of the temple, not in any hole and corner, because there is no acceptance of persons with God;° it is placed in public, it is offered to all, and no one is without it, except he who refuses it.’ °

Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness? Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" You see that it is through his own malice that the sinner is not converted, because he despises the riches of the divine goodness which calls him, and never ceases to move him to conversion by his grace. God hates sin; but at the same time never ceases to love the sinful soul while it remains on earth, and always gives it the assistance it requires for salvation: But Thou sparest all, because they are Thine, O Lord, who lovest souls.” Hence we see, says Bellarmine, that God does not refuse grace to resist temptations to any sinner, however obstinate and blinded he may be: “Assistance to avoid new sin is always at hand for all men, either immediately or mediately (¢.e., by means of prayer), so that they may ask further aid from God, by the help of which they will avoid sin.”? Here we may quote what God says by Ezechiel: As J dive, saith the Lord God, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live.’ St. Peter says the same: He beareth patiently for your sakes, not willing that any should perish, but that all should return to penance.’ If, therefore, God wishes that all should actually be converted, it must necessarily be held that he gives to all the grace which they need for actual conversion.

Ii.

Obstinate or Hardened Sinners, and the Abandonment of
Them by God.

I know well that there are theologians who maintain that God refuses to certain obstinate sinners even sufficient grace. And, among others, they avail themselves of a position of St. Thomas, who says: “But although they who are in sin cannot through their own power avoid putting or interposing an obstacle to grace, unless they are prevented by grace. as we have shown; nevertheless, this also is imputed to them as a sin, because this defect is left in them from previous sin—as a drunken man is not excused from murder committed in that drunkenness which was incurred by his own fault. Besides, although he who i sin sin has not this in his own power that he altogether avoid sin, yet he has power at this present moment to avoid this or that sin, as has been said; so that whatever he commits, he commits voluntarily; and therefore it is properly imputed to him as sin.”’ From this they gather that St. Thomas intends to say that sinners can indeed avoid particular sins, but not all sins; because in punishment for sins previously committed they are deprived of all actual grace.

But we answer that here St. Thomas is not speaking of actual, but of habitual or sanctifying, grace, without which the sinner cannot keep himself long from falling into new sins, as he teaches in several places.” And that he means the same in the passage just quoted is clear ° from the context, which we must here transcribe, in order to understand the true meaning of the saint.

In the first place, the title of chapter clx., where the quotation occurs, is as follows: ““That man, when he is in sin, cannot avoid sin without grace.” The very title shows that St. Thomas intended no more than he has said in the other places which we have referred to.

Moreover, in the course of the chapter he says: “For when the mind of man has declined from the state of uprightness, it is manifest that it has fallen from its relation, ‘order’ (or do), to its true end. . . . Whensoever, therefore, anything shall have occurred to the mind conducive to the inordinate end, but improper for the true end, it will be chosen, unless the mind be brought back to its due relation, so as to prefer its true end to all others; and this is the effect of grace. But while anything repugnant to our last end is the object of our choice, it puts a hindrance in the way of the grace which conducts us to that end; whence it is manifest that, after sinning, man cannot altogether abstain from sin, before he is brought back by grace to the due order. And hence the opinion of the Pelagians is shown to be absurd, that man, being in sin, can without grace avoid (fresh) sin.”²¹ And then he goes on with the sentence quoted above: “But although they,”? etc., of which our opponents make use.

So that, in the first place, the intention of St. Thomas is

‘Cum enim mens hominis a statu rectitudinis declinaverit, manifestum est quod recessit ab ordine debiti finis. . . . Quandocumque igitur occurrerit aliquid conveniens inordinate fini, repugnans fini debito, eligetur, nisi reducatur ad debitum ordinem. ut finem debitum omnibus praeferat, quod est gratia effect us; dum autem eligitur aliquid quod repugnat ultimo fini, impedimentum prestat gratia, quae dirigit in fine. Unde manifestum est quod, post peccatum, non potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato, antequam per gratia ad debitum ordinem reducatur. . . . Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant hominem, in peccato existentem, sine gratia posse vitare peccata.” lot to prove that some sinners are deprived of all actual grace, and therefore, being unable to avoid all sin, they do commit sin, and are worthy of punishment; but his intention is to prove against the Pelagians that a man who remains without sanctifying grace cannot abstain from sinning. And we see that he is here certainly speaking of sanctifying grace, for this is that which alone brings the soul back to the right order. It is of this same sanctifying grace that he intends to speak, when he says immediately after, “Except he be prevented by the assistance of grace;” by. which he means that if the sinner is not prevented—that is, is not previously informed (¢2formato)—by grace, and brought back to the right order of holding God to be his last end, he cannot avoid committing fresh sins. And this is the meaning of the Thomists—for instance, of Ferrariensis (Silvestre) and Father Gonet—in their comments on this passage. But, without having recourse to other authors, it is quite clear from what St. Thomas himself says in his Summa, where he discusses the same point, and brings forward the identical reasons in the same words as in the 160th chapter of his book Contra Gentes; and there he expressly says that he is only speaking of habitual or sanctifying grace.

And it is impossible that the holy Doctor could have meant otherwise, since he elsewhere teaches that, on the one hand, God’s grace is never wanting to any one, as he says in his commentary on St. John: “But lest you might suppose that this effect was consequent on the removal of the true light, the Evangelist, to obviate this opposition, adds, that was the true light which enlightens every man. For the Word enlightens, so far as he is concerned, because on his part he is wanting to no one, but wishes all men to be saved. But if any one is not enlightened, this is the fault of the man who turns himself away from the light that would enlighten him.”* And, on the other hand, he teaches that there is no sinner so lost and abandoned by grace as not to be able to lay aside his obstinacy, and to unite himself to the will of God, which he certainly cannot do without the assistance of grace: “During this life there is no man who cannot lay aside obstinacy of mind, and so conform to the divine will.”? In another place he says, “So long as the use of free will remains to a man in this life .. . he can prepare himself for grace by being sorry for his sins.” * But no one can make an act of sorrow for sin without grace. In another place he says, “No man in this life can be so obstinate in evil but that it is possible for him to co-operate to his own deliverance.” “To co-operate” necessarily implies grace to co-operate with.

In another place he observes, on the text of St. Paul, He wills all to be saved.’ “Therefore the grace of God is wanting to no man; but, as far as it is concerned, it communicates itself to all.”° Again, on the same words,

“In statu viae, nullus est qui mentis obstinationem non possit deponere, et sic divine voluntati conformari.”—In 1 Sent. d. 48, q. 1, 2. 3.

° “Omnes homines vult (De us) salvos fieri.”

® “Tdeo gratia Dei null i deest, sed omnibus, quantum in se est, se communicat.” “God, so far as he is concerned, is prepared to give grace to all men... . Those, therefore, only are deprived of grace who permit a hindrance to grace to exist in themselves; and, therefore, they cannot be excused if they sin.” * And when St. Thomas says, “God is prepared to give grace to all,’²³ he does not mean actual grace, but only sanctifying grace.

Cardinal Gotti justly contradicts those who say that God keeps ready at hand the aids necessary for salvation, but in matter of fact does not give them to all. Of what use would it be to a sick man (says this learned author) if the physician only kept the remedies ready, and then would not apply them? Then he concludes (quite to the point of our argument) that we must necessarily say, “God not only offers, but also confers on every individual, even on infidels and hardened sinners, help sufficient to observe the commandments, whether it be proximate or remote,”

For the rest, St. Thomas says that it is only the sins of the devils and the damned that cannot be wiped out by penance; but, on the other hand, “to say that there is any sin in this life of which a man cannot repent is erroneous ... because this doctrine would derogate

from the power of grace. If grace were wanting to any one, certainly he could not repent. Moreover, as we have already seen, St. Thomas expressly teaches in several places, and especially in his comment on Heb. i. De his, quantum in se est, paratus est omnibus gratia dare. ... Illi (ego) soli gratia privantur, qui in seipsis gratia impedimentum praestant.’—Contra Gent. 1.3, c. 159. xii., that God, as far as he is concerned, refuses to no man the grace necessary for conversion: “The grace of God is wanting to no man; but, as far as it is concerned, communicates itself to all.’ So that the learned author of the Theology for the use of the seminary of Peterkau says, “It is a calumny to impute to St. Thomas that he taught that any sinners were totally deserted by God.” *

Bellarmine makes a sound distinction on this point, and says that for avoiding fresh sins every sinner has at all times sufficient assistance, at least mediately: “The necessary and sufficient assistance for the avoidance of sin is given by God’s goodness to all men at all times, either immediately or mediately. . . . We say or mediately because it is certain that some men have not that help by which they can immediately avoid sin, but yet have the help which enables them to obtain from God greater safeguards, by the assistance of which they will avoid sins.” * But for the grace of conversion, he says that this is not given at all times to the sinner; but that no one will be ever so far left to himself “as to be surely and absolutely deprived of God’s help through all this life, so as to have cause to despair of salvation,” #

And so say the theologians who follow St. Thomas— thus Soto: “I am absolutely certain, and I believe that all the holy Doctors who are worthy of the name were always most positive, that no one was ever deserted by God in this mortal life.”²⁶ And the reason is evident; for if the sinner was quite abandoned by grace, either his sins afterwards committed could no longer be imputed to him, or he would be under an obligation to do that which he had no power to fulfil; but it is a positive rule of St. Augustine that there is never a sin in that which cannot be avoided: “No one sins in that which can by no means be avoided.”® And this is agreeable to the teaching of the Apostle: But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able; but will also make with the temptation issue, that you may be able to bear it. The word “issue” means the divine assistance, which God always gives to the tempted to enable them to resist, as St. Cyprian explains it: “He will make with the temptation a way of escape.” * And Primasius more clearly: ‘He will so order the issue that we shall be able to endure; that is, in temptation he will strengthen you with the help of his grace, so that ye may be able to bear it.”° St. Augustine and St. Thomas go so far as to say that God would be unjust and cruel if he obliged any one to a command which he could not keep. St. Augustine says, “It is the deepest injustice to reckon any one guilty of sin for not doing that which he could not do. * And St. Thomas: ‘God is not more cruel than man; but it is reckoned cruelty in a man to oblige a person by law to do that which he cannot fulfil; therefore we must by no means imagine this of God.”²⁷ “It is, however, different,” he says, “when it is through his own neglect that he has not the grace to be able to keep the commandments,” * which properly means, when man neglects to avail himself of the remote grace of prayer, in order to obtain the proximate grace to enable him to keep the law, as the Council of Trent teaches: “God does not command impossibilities; but by commanding admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for that which is beyond your power; and by his help enables you to do it.’ *

St. Augustine repeats his decision in many other places that there is no sin in what cannot be avoided. In one he says, “Whether there be iniquity or whether there be justice, if it was not in the man’s power, there can be no just reward, no just punishment.”’® Elsewhere he says, “Finally, if no power is given them to abstain from their works, we cannot hold that they sin.”²⁸ Again, “The devil, indeed, suggests; but with the help of God it is in our power to choose or to refuse his suggestions. And so, when by God’s help it is in your power, why do you

Other Fathers have taught the same doctrine. So St. Jerome, “We are not forced by necessity to be either virtuous or vicious; for where there is necessity, there is neither condemnation nor crown.”* Tertullian: “For a law would not be given to him who had it not in his power to observe it duly.”* Marcus the Hermit: “Hidden grace assists us; but it depends on us to do or not to do good according to our strength.” * So also St. Irenaeus, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Chrysostom, and others.

Nor is there any difficulty in what St. Thomas says, that grace is denied to some persons, in punishment of original sin: “To whomsoever the assistance of grace is given, it is given through simple mercy; but from those to whom it is not given, it is withheld justly in punishment of previous sin, or at least of original sin, as Augustine says.” For, as Cardinal Gotti well observes, St. Augus- tine: “Dat quidem ille (damon) consilium; sed, Deo auxiliante, nostrum est eligere vel repudiare quod suggerit; et ideo, cum per Dei adjutorium in potestate tua sit, quare non magis Deo quam ipsi obtemperare deliberas ?”—Serm. 253, f. B. App.

“Nemo vituperatione dignus, qui id non facit quod facere non potest."—-De Duab, An. c. 11.

® “Occulta nobis opitulatur gratia; verum in nobis situm est agere vol non agere bonum pro potestate.”—De Just. ex fid. c. 56.

Nor could it be understood otherwise; for if it were true that any had sinned for want of even remote sufficient grace, withheld through original sin being imputed to them as a fault, it would follow that the liberty of will, which by a figure of speech we are said to have had in the sin of Adam, would be sufficient to make us actual sinners. But this cannot be said, as it is expressly condemned in the first proposition of Michael Baius, who said, “That liberty which caused sin to be voluntary and free in its cause—namely, in original sin, and in the liberty of Adam when sinning—is sufficient to (cause) formal sin (in us), and to make us deserve punishment.” ?” Against this proposition we may make use of what Bellarmine said,²⁹ that to commit a personal sin distinct from the sin of Adam a new exertion of free will is requisite, and a free will distinct from that of Adam, otherwise there is no distinct sin; according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, who teaches, “For a personal sin, absolute personal liberty is requisite.’ Further, with respect to the baptized, the Council of Trent has declared that in them there remains nothing to condemn: “God hates nothing in the regenerate; for there is no condemnation to them who are truly buried with Christ by baptism unto death.” * And it is added that concupiscence is not left in us as a punishment, “but for our trial; and it cannot harm those who do not consent to it.”³¹ On the contrary, the concupiscence left in us would do exceedingly great harm to man, if, on account of it, God denied him even the remote grace necessary to obtain salvation.

From all this, several theologians conclude that to say that God refuses to any one sufficient help to enable him to keep the commandments would be contrary to the faith, because in that case God would oblige us to impossibilities. So says F. Nufiez: “God never refused aid sufficient to keep the commandments, otherwise they could not be in any way fulfilled; and thus we should have the heresy of Luther back again, that God has obliged men to impossibilities.”³² And in another place, “It is of faith, so that the opposite doctrine is a manifest heresy, that every man, while he is alive, can do penance for his sins.”° And Father Ledesma, “It is a certain truth of faith, that that is not sin which is not in the free power of man.” *

Giovenino says that the sinner becomes guilty through the exercise of free will, in choosing voluntarily this or that sin; though at the time he is necessitated to sin, because he is without actual grace sufficient to deliver him from all sin. But this doctrine, that a man when fallen sins, not having liberty to do otherwise than to choose what sin he will commit, and is necessitated to commit some sin, justly offends Monseigneur de Saléon, Archbishop of Vienne, who, in his book Jansenismus Redivivus, writes as follows: “Who will endure to hear that a man once fallen, being deprived of grace, can enjoy no other liberty than that of choosing one sin rather than another, being necessitated to sin in some way.”? So that a criminal condemned to death, who has no other liberty allowed him than to choose whether he will die by the sword, by poison, or by fire, may be said, when he has made his choice, to die a voluntary and free death. And how can sin be imputed to a man who mus³³ sin in some way or another? The 67th of the condemned Propositions of Baius is as follows: “Man sins damnably even in that which he does through necessity.”* How can there be liberty, where there is necessity to sin? Jansenius answers, that the liberty of will, which by a figure of speech we are said to have had in Adam’s sin, is sufficient to make us sinners. But this too was condemned in Baius’ first proposition, “That liberty;” etc., as we have seen above.

Our opponents go on to say that though the sinner abandoned by grace cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively, yet he can avoid each sin distributively, or individually, “by a simple suspension or negation of activity,” * as they say. But this cannot be admitted, for several reasons. First, because when a vehement temptation is assailing us, which it requires much strength to resist, it cannot morally be overcome (as all theologians agree) except by the assistance of grace, or else by yielding to another, but opposite, vicious passion; so that a sinner deprived of grace would be irremediably necessitated to sin in one or the other way; which it is horrible to affirm, as we have already shown. Secondly, when we are urged by a great concupiscence to sin in a particular way, there is not always—nay, it seldom happens that there is—another improper motive urging us to the contrary course, of sufficient force to hinder us from committing the first sin; so that, when this second motive is absent or weak, then it would be necessary for the sinner to commit that particular sin to which he feels inclined. Thirdly, this abstaining from sin “by a simple negation of activity,”³⁴ as they say, can hardly be imagined in sins against the negative precepts; but, as Tourneley and Gotti well observe, is altogether impossible in cases where a positive precept obliges us to do some supernatural act; as, for instance, to make an act of faith, hope, love, and contrition: for as these acts are supernatural, they necessarily require the supernatural assistance of God to enable us to perform them. So that, at any rate in this case, if grace were wanting, man would be necessitated to sin, by not satisfying the positive precept, although he was unable to avoid the sin. But to assert this is, as F. Bannez observes, contrary to faith: “A man cannot sin without having first actually received an inspiration of divine grace. We assert this conclusion to be certainly of faith; because no one sins in not doing that which he cannot do, as it is certain de fide; but a man to whom nothing more is given than the bare faculties of human nature has no power to act above nature, and therefore does not sin in omitting to perform a supernatural act.”’*

Nor will it do to say that if the sinner is deprived of grace, he is deprived of it by his own fault; and therefore, though he is deprived of grace, yet he sins. For Cardinal Gotti well replies to this, that God can justly punish the sinner for his previous faults, but not for his future transgressions of precepts which he is no longer able to fulfil. If a servant, he says, were sent to a place, and if he, through his own fault, fell into a pit, his master might punish him for his carelessness in falling, and even for his subsequent disobedience, if means (such as a rope or ladder) were given him to get out of the pit, and he would not avail himself of them; but supposing that his master did not help him to get out, he would be a tyrant if he ordered him to proceed and punished him for not proceeding. Hence he concludes, “When, therefore, a man has by sin fallen into the ditch, and become unable to proceed on his way to eternal life, though God may punish him for this fault, and also if he refuses the offer of grace to enable him to proceed; yet if God chose to leave him to his own weakness, he cannot without

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Quotiescumque aliquis peccat, necesse est ut ille de facto receperit aliquam divinam inspirationem. . . . Haec conclusio asseritur a nobis certa secundum fidem; quia nemo peccat propter quod non facit quod facere non potest, ut certum est secundum fidem; sed homo, cui nihil aliud datum est qua quod ad naturam humanam pertinet, non habet unde possit operari supra naturam; ergo non peccat non operando aliquid supernaturale.”—J/» P. 1, q. 23, a. 3, concl, 3. injustice oblige him to proceed on the way, nor punish him if he does not proceed.” *

Moreover, our opponents adduce many texts of Scripture where this abandonment is apparently expressed: Blind the heart of this people .. . lest they see with their eyes... and be converted, and I heal them” We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed; let us forsake her.³⁵ Add thou iniquity upon their iniquity, and let them not come into Thy justice.’ For this cause God delivered them up to shameful affections. He hath mercy on whom He will; and whom He will He hardeneth;’ and others similar. But it is usually and easily answered’to all these in general, that in the Holy Scriptures God is often said to do what he only permits; so that if we would not blaspheme with Calvin, and say that God positively destines and determines some persons to sin, we must say that God permits some sinners, in penalty of their faults, to be on the one hand assailed by vehement temptations (which is the evil from which we pray God to deliver us when we say, Lead us not into temptation);’ and, on the other hand, that they remain morally abandoned in their sin; so that their conversion, and the resistance they should make to temptation, although neither impossible nor desperate,

3 ‘¢Curavimus Babylonem, et non est sanata; derelinquamus earn.” —Jer. li. 9. is yet, through their faults and their bad habits, very difficult; since, in their laxity of life, they have only very rare and weak desires and motions to resist their bad habits, and to regain the way of salvation. And this is the imperfect obstinacy of the hardened sinner which St. Thomas describes: “He is hardened who cannot easily co-operate in his escape from sin; and this is imperfect obstinacy, because a man may be obstinate in this life, if he has a will so fixed upon sin, that no motions towards good arise, except very weak ones.” On one side, the mind is obscured, the will is hardened against God’s inspirations, and attached to the pleasures of sense, so as to despise and feel disgust for spiritual blessings; the sensual passions and appetites reign in the soul through the bad habits that have been acquired; on the other side, the illuminations and the callings of God are, by its own fault, rendered scarcely efficacious to move the soul, which has so despised them, and made so bad a use of them, that it even feels a certain aversion towards them, because it does not want to be disturbed in its sensual gratifications, All these things constitute moral abandonment; and when a sinner has once fallen into it, it is only with the utmost difficulty that he can escape from his miserable state, and bring himself to live a well-regulated life.

In order to escape, and pass at once from such disorder to a state of salvation, a great and extraordinary grace would be requisite; but God seldom confers such a grace on these obstinate sinners. Sometimes he gives it, says St. Thomas, and chooses them for vessels of mercy, as the Apostle calls them, in order to make known his goodness; but to the rest he justly refuses it, and leaves them in their unhappy state, in order to show forth his justice and power: “Sometimes,” says the Angel of the Schools, “out of the abundance of his goodness he prevents with his assistance even those who put a hindrance in the way of his grace, and converts them, etc. And as he does not enlighten all the blind, nor cure all the sick, so neither does he assist all who place an impediment to his grace, so as to convert them... . This is what the Apostle means when he says that God, to show forth His anger, and to make His power, known, endured with much patience the vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that He might show the riches of His glory upon the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory.” ' Then he adds, “But since out of the number of those who are involved in the Same sins, there are some to whom God gives the grace of conversion, while others he only endures, or allows to go on in the course of things, we are not to inquire the reason why he converts some and not others. For the Apostle says, “hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same mass one vessel to honor, and another to dishonor 2?” *

We do not then deny (to bring this point to a conclusion) that there is such a thing as the moral abandonment of some obstinate sinners, so that their conversion is morally impossible; that is to say, very difficult. And this concession is abundantly sufficient for the laudable object which our opponents have in defending their opinion, which is to restrain evil-doers, and to induce them to consider, before they come to fall into such a deplorable state. But then it is cruelty (as Petrocorensis well says) to take from them all hope, and entirely to shut against them the way of salvation, by the doctrine that they have fallen into so complete an abandonment as to be deprived of all actual grace to enable them to avoid fresh sins, and to be converted; at any rate, mediately by means of prayer (which is not refused to any man while he lives, as we shall prove in the last chapter), whereby they can afterwards obtain abundant help for placing themselves in a state of salvation: since the fear of total abandonment would not only lead them to despair, but also to give themselves more completely to their vices, in the belief that they are altogether destitute of grace; so that they have no hope left of escaping eternal damnation.