Prayer, the Great Means of Salvation and of PerfectionChapter IV. God gives all men the grace to pray if they choose, as the ‘sufficient grace” which is common to all men is by itself enough for prayer

The Principal Theologians who teach this Doctrine.

Assuming, then, that God wills all men to be saved, and that, as far as he is concerned, he gives to all the graces necessary for their salvation, we must say that all men have given to them the grace to enable them actually to pray (without needing a further grace); and by prayer to obtain all further aid necessary for the observance of the commandments and for salvation. But it must be remarked that when we say “without needing a further grace,” we do not mean that the common grace gives the power of prayer without the aid of assisting grace, since, in order to exercise any act of piety, besides the exciting grace, there is doubtless required the assisting or co-operating grace. But we mean that the common grace gives every man the power of actual prayer, without a further preventing grace, which, physically or morally, determines the will of man to exercise the act of prayer. We will first mention the names of the famous theologians who teach this opinion as certain, and then we will prove it by authorities and arguments.

It is held by Isambert, Cardinal du Perron, Alphonsus le Moyne, and others whom we shall presently quote, and at greater length as a set proposition by Honoratus Tourneley. All these authors prove that every man, by means of the ordinary sufficient grace alone, can actually pray, without need of further aid; and by prayer can obtain all the graces requisite for the performance of the most difficult things.

It was also held by Cardinal Noris, who proves the proposition, that man, when the commandment urges (urgendo il precetto), can pray if he will; and he proves it thus: “It is clear that the power to pray should be proximate in the just man or the faithful; for if the faithful has only a remote power for a simple act of prayer (1am not here speaking of fervid prayer), he will not have another proximate power to obtain the grace of prayer, otherwise the series would be infinite.” * Assuming that, in order to keep the commandments and to be saved, prayer is necessary, as we proved in the beginning, when we spoke of the necessity of prayer, this learned author says well that every one has the proximate power of prayer, in order that by prayer he may obtain the proximate power to do good; and therefore all can pray with only the ordinary grace, without other assistance. Otherwise, if, in order to obtain the proximate power for the act of prayer we required another power, we should still want another power of grace to obtain this power, and so on ad infinitum, and it would no longer be in the power of man to co-operate in his salvation,

The same author in another place maintains this doctrine more clearly: “Even in the state of fallen nature the assistance sine quo (z.e., the sufficient grace which is common to all) is given, though Jansenius denies it; and this assistance produces in us weak acts, namely, prayer

1 “Manifestum est potentiam ad orandum debere esse proximam in justo sive fideli; nam, si fidelis sit in potentia remota ad simpliciter orandum (non enim hic loquor de fervida et diuturniore oratione), non habetis aliam potentiam proximam pro impetranda oratione; alias procederetur in infinitum.”—Jans. err. cal. subl. c. 2, § 1. not very fervid, for fulfilling the commandments; but for the actual observance of these, the assistance sine quo is only a remote help, by which we can, however, obtain by prayer the assistance quo, or efficacious grace, by which the commandments are fulfilled.”” So that Cardinal Noris held it as certain that in the present state all men have the assistance sine quo, t.é., ordinary grace, which, without need of further assistance, produces prayer, by which we can then obtain efficacious grace to enable us to observe the law. And hence we can easily understand the axiom universally received in the schools: “To him who does what in him lies, God does not refuse his grace.”” That is, to the man who prays, and thus makes good use of the sufficient grace which enables him to do such an easy thing as prayer, God does not refuse the efficacious grace to enable him to execute difficult things.

Thus, also, Louis Thomassin, who expresses astonishment at those who say that “sufficient assistance” is not enough to do any actual good work, nor to avoid any sin: “For if,” he says, “this assistance is truly assistance, and gives proximate power, how is it that, out of the innumerable quantity of men who are thus assisted, none keep the commandments? Or how is it truly sufficient, if, besides it, efficacious grace is necessary? That man has not a sufficient power who wants a necessary assistance which is not in his own power.” * He means that “sufficient grace,” to be really sufficient, ought to give a man the proximate and ready power to execute a good act; but since, in order to perform such an act, another grace—namely, efficacious grace—is wanted, unless a man has (at least mediately) this efficacious grace which is necessary for salvation, how can it be said that the “sufficient grace” gives this proximate and ready power? Since, says St. Thomas, “God does not neglect to do that which is necessary to salvation.”’ On the one hand, it is true that God is not bound to give us his grace, because what is gratts is not of obligation; but, on the other hand, supposing that he gives us commandments, he is obliged to give us the assistance necessary for observing them. And as God obliges us actually to observe every precept whenever it applies, so ought he also actually to supply us (at least mediately or remotely) with the assistance necessary for the observance of the precept, without the necessity of a further grace, which is not common to all. Hence Thomassin concludes, that in order to reconcile the proposition that “sufficient grace” is enough for a man’s salvation with the statement that efficacious grace is requisite to observe the whole law, it is necessary to say that sufficient grace is enough to pray, and to perform similar easy acts, and that by means of these we then obtain efficacious grace to fulfil the difficult acts. And this is without doubt in conformity with the doctrine of St. Augustine, who teaches: “By the very fact that God is most firmly believed not to command impossibilities, we are admonished both what to do in easy things, and in difficult things what to ask for.”? On this sufficients sunt, si praeterea gratia efficax est necessaria? Non is habet potestate sufficientes cui deest aliud auxilium necessarium, quod in ejus potestate non est.” —Cons. susc. de gr. tr. 3, c. 8. passage Cardinal Noris observes, “Therefore, we are able to do easy or less perfect works without asking God for further help; for which, however, we must pray in more difficult works.” * Thomassin also brings forward the authority of St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others on this subject, and says, “All these considered the sufficient grace to be truly sufficient, whether the will consents to it or not.”? And this he demonstrates in four parts of his book, adducing the authorities of the school men for a long series of years, beginning from the year 1100,

Habert, Bishop of Vabres and Doctor of the Sorbonne, who was the first to write against Jansenius, says: “We think, first, that ‘sufficient grace’ has only a contingent or mediate connection with the actual effect of the complete consent. ... We think, further, that ‘sufficient grace’ is a grace that disposes for efficacious grace, since from a good use of it God afterwards grants to the created will the grace that performs the complete effect.” ® He had said before that “all Catholic Doctors, of all schools, have professed, and do profess, that a real inward grace is given, which is capable of persuading the will to consent to good, though, on account of the free resistance of the will, it sometimes does not persuade it thus sibilia non pracipere, hic admonemur, et in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus,”—De Wat. et Gr. c. 69.

3 “Censemus primo, quod immediate cum ipso effectus consensus completi (gratia) sufficiens non habet habitudinem, nisi contingenter vel mediate. . . . Arbitramur proinde gratia sufficientes else gra-tiam dispositionis ad efficacem, utpote ex cujus bono usu Deus postea gratia complete effect us effectivam creatae voluntati concedat,”— Theol. Gr. Pair. \. 2, c. 15. to consent,” * and for this doctrine be quotes Gamaches, Duval, Isambert, Perez, Le Moyne, and others. Then he goes on: “The assistance, therefore, of sufficient grace disposes us for the reception of efficacious grace; and is in some sort efficacious, namely, of an incomplete effect, obtained first remotely, then more nearly, and at last proximately—such as is an act of faith, hope, love, and, mixed with these, one of prayer. Hence the famous Alphonsus Le Moyne taught that this sufficient grace was the grace of asking, or of prayer, of which St. Augustine so often speaks.”* So that, according to Habert, the difference between efficacious and sufficient grace is, that the former produces its effect completely, while the latter produces it either contingently (z.e., sometimes, but not always) or mediately (ze, by means of prayer). Moreover, he says that sufficient grace, according to the good use we make of it, prepares us to obtain efficacious grace; hence he calls sufficient grace “in some sort efficacious” (secundum quid), because of its effect commenced but not completed. Lastly, he says that sufficient grace is the grace of prayer, of which it is in our power to avail ourselves, as St. Augustine teaches. So that a man has no excuse if he does not do that which he already has sufficient grace to enable him to perform; by which grace, without further assistance, he may either act, or at least obtain more help to enable him to act. And Habert

Charles du Plessis d’Argentré, another theologian of the Sorbonne, quotes more than a thousand theologians who teach directly that with sufficient grace easy works are accomplished; and that a man who makes use of it obtains thereby a more abundant assistance for his thorough conversion. And precisely in this sense, as we said before, he says the celebrated axiom of the schools is to be understood: “To those who do what is in their power” (that is, by means of sufficient grace) “God does not deny grace;” that is, more ‘abundant and efficacious grace,

The learned Dionysius Petavius proves at great length that man works with simple sufficient grace; and he even asserts that it would be monstrous to say otherwise; and that this is the doctrine not only of theologians, but also of the Church. Hence he says that the grace of observing the precepts follows prayer; and that the gift of prayer is given by God at the time when he imposes the precept: “This gift, by which God grants us power to do justly, follows the act of prayer; and this act is given contemporaneously with the law.” * So that as the law is imposed upon all, so the gift of prayer is given to all.

The author of the Theology for the Use of the Seminary of Peterkau says that with sufficient grace alone “a man can do well, and sometimes does so;” so that “there is nothing to hinder that, of two persons furnished with the same assistance, one should very often perform the mere acts (which precede full conversion), the other not.”’ And this, he says, is in conformity with the doctrine of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and of his first disciples, especially of Father Bartholomew Medina, who says, “Sometimes a man is converted only with sufficient grace.” * And I find that also Father Louis of Granada asserts this to be the common doctrine of theologians: “Theologians reckon two kinds of assistance—one sufficient, the other more than sufficient; by the former of which men are sometimes converted, sometimes refuse to be converted.” * And, shortly afterwards, “And theologians define how universally this assistance is open to men.”⁷ Hence Petrocorensis says: “So man can do some acts of piety, such as to pray to God with humility with the sufficient grace only, and sometimes actually does them, and so prepares himself for further graces.” * This, he says, is the order of God’s Providence with regard to graces, “that the succeeding should follow the good use of the former.” ° And he concludes that thorough conversion and final perseverance “are infallibly obtained by prayer, for which the sufficient grace which is given to every one abundantly suffices.”

The same is held by Cardinal d’Aguirre, who in all things follows St. Augustine.’

Father Antonio Boucat, of the order of St. Francis of Paula, defends the position that every one is now able, without new assistance, to obtain by prayer the grace of conversion. And after quoting Gamaches, Duval, Habert, Le Moyne, he cites in favor of this opinion Peter of Tarantasia, Bishop of Tulle, Godert de Fonté, and Henry of Ghent, Doctors of the Sorbonne, together with the Regius Professor Lygné, who, in his tract De Gratia, demonstrates that “sufficient grace” not only gives prayer, as Le Moyne and Professor Elias said, but also gives the power to do some works that are not difficult.

Gaudenzio Bontempi in like manner demonstrated that sufficient grace obtains efficacious grace by means of prayer, which is given to all who will avail themselves of it.

Cardinal Robert Nullo asserts two kinds of grace—one always victorious, the other one by which man sometimes works, sometimes does not: “The other by the assistance of which man can do which he chooses of these two things, either to co-operate with grace, or to despise it, and to continue sinning.”’

Father Fortunate da Brescia is also of the same opinion, and holds that all men have the mediate grace of prayer to enable them to observe the precepts; and has no doubt that St. Augustine held the same.

Richard of St. Victor similarly teaches that there is a sufficient grace which a man sometimes consents to, sometimes resists.

Dominic So to asks, “Why of two persons whom God

! Theol. S. Ant. t. 3, d. 125, 126, 127. is most ready and desirous to convert, one is drawn by grace, and not the other?’ And he answers: “No other reason can be given, except that one consents and co-operates, while the other does not co-operate.”’

Matthias Felicio, who wrote against Calvin, thus defines ordinary or sufficient grace: “It is a divine motion, or instinct, which moves a man to good, and is denied to none. Men behave differently to this instinct; for some acquiesce in it, and are disposed de congruo for habitual grace; for we believe that God will not desert those who do what they can. Others, on the contrary, oppose it.” *

Andreas Vega likewise says: “These helps, which are given to all men, are by most called inefficacious, because they do not always produce their effect, but are sometimes frustrated by sinners.” * Therefore, sufficient grace sometimes produces its effect, and sometimes does not.

Cardinal Gotti in one place of his Theology apparently agrees with us; for where he discusses the difficulty, how a man can persevere if he will, when it is not in his power to have the special assistance which is requisite for perseverance, he answers that although this special assistance is not in a man’s power, “yet it is said to be in a man’s power, because he can by the grace of God ask for it and obtain it; and in this way it may be said to be in a man’s power to have the assistance necessary for perseverance, because it can be obtained by prayers.”’ So, to verify the proposition that it is in a man’s power to persevere, it is necessary to grant both that he can, without needing any further grace, obtain by prayer the assistance requisite for perseverance; and, also, that with only the sufficient grace common to all, without need of any special grace, he can actually pray, and by prayer obtain perseverance; otherwise it could not be said that every man had the grace necessary for perseverance, at least remotely or mediately, by means of prayer. ;

But if Cardinal Gotti did not mean this, at any rate St. Francis de Sales did, when he said that the grace of actual prayer is given to every one who will avail himself of it, and thence deduced that perseverance is in the power of everybody. The saint says this clearly in his Theotimus, where, after proving that constant prayer is necessary to obtain from God the gift of final perseverance, he adds: “Now, since the gift of prayer is freely promised to all those who will consent to the heavenly inspirations, consequently it is in our power to persevere.”

Cardinal Bellarmine teaches the same thing: “An assistance, then and there, sufficient for salvation, is given mediately or immediately to all men. . . . We say mediately or immediately, because to those who have the use of reason we believe that holy inspirations are given by God, and that by this they have immediately the exciting grace; by which, if they will acquiesce in it, they can be disposed to be justified, and at last to obtain salvation.” *

Ii.

Authority upon which this Doctrine is based.

Let us now proceed to examine the proofs of this doctrine. It is proved, first from authority. We shall cite Scripture, the Council of Trent, and the Holy Fathers.

I. Holy Scripture.

We have first the authority of the Apostle, who assures us that God is faithful, and will not permit us to be tempted beyond our strength, since he always gives us assistance (whether immediate or mediate, by means of prayer) to resist the assaults of our enemies: God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will make with the temptation issue, that ye may be able to bear it.” Jansenius says that this text refers only to the predestinate, but this comment of his is completely unfounded; for St. Paul is writing to all the faithful of Corinth, all of whom he certainly did not consider to be predestinate. So that St. Thomas has good reason for understanding it generally of all men, and for saying that God would not be faithful if he did not grant us (so far as in him lies) those graces by means of which we can obtain salvation: “But he would not appear to be faithful were he to refuse us (so far as he is concerned) those things which are requisite to enable us to come to him.”¹⁵ It is proved, moreover, by all those texts in which God exhorts us to convert ourselves, and to have recourse to him to ask him for the graces necessary for our salvation, and promises to hear us when we have recourse to him. Wisdom preacheth aloud, ... saying, O children, how long will ye love childishness, and fools covet those things which are hurtful to themselves, etc.? Turn ye at My reproof.: behold, I will utter My Spirit to you... . Because 1 called, and you refused, etc., L also will laugh in your destruction, and will mock at you.” This exhortation, Turn ye, would be simple mockery, says Bellarmine, if God did not give to sinners at least the mediate grace of prayer for their conversion. Besides, we find in the passage mention made of the internal grace by which God calls sinners, and gives them actual assistance for conversion, if they will accept it, in the words, Behold, / will bring forth My Spirit to you.’ Come to Me, all you that labor and are heavy laden, and IL will refresh you.’ Come, and accuse me, saith the Lord; if your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow.> Ask, and it shall be given you.’ And so in hundreds of other texts already quoted. Now, if God did not give every one grace actually to have recourse to him, and actually to pray to him, all these invitations and exhortations, Come all,and [will refresh you; seek, and it shall be given you, would be vain.

2. The council of trent.

It is clearly proved by the passage of the Council of Trent so often quoted." I beg the reader to give his best attention to this proof; which, if I am not mistaken, is perfectly decisive. There were innovators who said that as man was deprived of free-will by the sin of Adam, the will of man at present does nothing in good actions, but is induced to receive them passively from God, without producing them itself; and hence they inferred that the observance of the commandments was impossible to those who are not efficaciously moved and predetermined by grace to avoid evil and to do good. Against this error the Council pronounced sentence in words borrowed from St. Augustine: “God does not command impossible things; but by commanding, admonishes you both to do what you can, and to pray for what you cannot do; and he helps you, so that you may be able.””

The Council, then, in order to prove against the heretics that God’s commandments are not impossible to any one, has declared that all men have assistance to enable them to do good, or at least have the grace of prayer whereby to obtain greater assistance. The meaning of this is, that every man can, by means of the common grace, do easy things (such as pray) without need of further extraordinary grace; and can by prayer obtain strength to do difficult things, according to the teaching of St. Augustine, already quoted: “By the very fact that we most firmly believe that the good and just God could not have commanded impossible things, we are admonished in easy matters what to do, and in difficult matters what to pray for.” * So that, according to the Council, the divine precepts are possible to all men, at least by means of prayer, by which greater help may be obtained to enable us to observe them. If, therefore, God has imposed his commands on all men, and has rendered their observance possible to all, at least mediately by means of prayer, we must necessarily conclude that all men have the grace to enable them to pray; otherwise, the commandments would not be possible to him who was without this grace. And as God grants to prayer actual grace to do good, and thereby renders all his commandments possible, so also he gives all actual grace to pray; otherwise, if there were any man who had not actual grace to pray to him, the commandments would be impossible, as he could not even by means of prayer obtain the assistance necessary for their observance.

This being settled, it is of no use to say that the words, “God admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot do,” are only to be understood of possible, not of actual, prayer;. because, we reply, if the common and ordinary grace gave only possible and not actual prayer, the Council would not have said, “He admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot do;”²³ but, “‘He admonishes you that you can do, and that you can pray.”²⁴ Moreover, if the Council had not intended to declare that every one can observe the precepts, or can pray to obtain grace to observe them, and had not meant to speak of actual grace, it would not have said “He admonishes,” because this word properly refers to actual operation, and imports not the instruction of the mind, but the movement of the will to do that good which it can actually do. When, therefore, it said, “He admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot do,” it most clearly expressed, not only possible operation and possible prayer, but actual operation and actual prayer. For if man had need of another extraordinary grace, which as yet he has not, in order actually to work or to pray, how could God admonish him to do or to ask that which he cannot actually either do or ask without efficacious grace? Father Fortunate Brescia speaks wisely on this point: If the actual grace of prayer were not given to all, but if for prayer we had need of efficacious grace, which is not common to all. prayer would be impossible to the great number who are without this efficacious grace; so that it could not be said with propriety that “God admonishes you to ask for that which you cannot do,” because he would then admonish us to do a thing requiring a grace which we did not possess. So that God’s admonition to work and to pray must be understood of actual operation and prayer, without need of a further extraordinary grace. And this is exactly what St. Augustine means: “Hence we are admonished in easy things what to do, and in difficult things what to pray for;”²⁵ because he supposes that though all have not grace to enable them to do difficult things, all have at least grace to pray, prayer being an easy thing for everybody, as he also propounds in the words afterwards adopted by the Council of Trent, “God admonishes you to do what you can, and to ask for what you cannot do.”

To recapitulate the argument: the Council says that God does not impose impossible commands, because he either gives assistance to observe them, or gives the grace of prayer to obtain this assistance, which he always grants when it is prayed for. Now, if it could ever be true that God does not give all men grace, at least the mediate grace of prayer, actually to observe all his precepts, Jansenius’ proposition would be true, that even the just man is without grace to enable him not to observe some of the commandments.

I do not know how else the text of the Council of Trent can be understood and explained, unless the “sufficient grace” gave to all men the power of actually praying without the “efficacious grace” which our opponents suppose to be necessary for the actual performance of any pious work. And supposing this necessity of a further grace for actual prayer, I cannot understand how this other text of the same Council can be true: “God does not leave those who have been once justified without grace, unless they first leave him.” If, I say, the ordinary sufficient grace would not be enough for actual prayer, but if for this purpose efficacious grace, which is not common to all men, would be required, it would be true that when the just man would be tempted to commit his first mortal sin, and God would not give him efficacious grace at least to enable him to pray, and so to obtain strength to resist, then his succumbing to temptation might rather be said to result from the just man being abandoned by God before he had abandoned God, and from being left without the efficacious grace necessary to enable him to resist. Ll

Our opponents object to us a passage of St. Augustine where he appears to maintain that the grace of prayer is not granted to all men: “Is not our prayer itself at times so tepid, or rather so cold, and almost null—so null, indeed, that we do not notice its nullity with any sorrow; for if this coldness is against our will, it does not prejudice our prayer?’* But Cardinal Sfondrati well replies, “It is one thing to say that sinners do not pray, another to say that they have not grace to enable them to pray.”* St. Augustine does not say that any persons are without grace to pray as they ought, but only that at times our prayer is so cold as to be almost null, not for want of God’s assistance to enable us to pray better, but simply through our fault, which renders our prayer null, Tourneley answers in the same way, where he says of the first condemned proposition of Jansenius: “The just do not always pray as they ought. It is their own fault that they do not pray so, since they have by grace sufficient strength to pray. St. Augustine says that our prayer is sometimes cold and almost null; but he does not say that we have not grace to enable us to pray more fervently.” * Moreover, Cardinal Noris observes on this same passage, that by means of tepid prayer we can at least obtain grace to pray more fervently, and then by this we obtain efficacious grace to keep the commandments: “I conclude that even: tepid

“*Alind est peccatores non orare, aliud non habere gratia qua or are possint.”—Wod. pred. p. 1, § 2.

Nor can a valid objection be drawn from St. Augustine’s observation on the text of St. Paul: “The Spirit beseeches for us with groans not to be uttered,” * that it is the Holy Spirit that makes us intercede, and inspires us with the disposition to intercede,²⁷ since the saint here simply says, against the Pelagians, that no one can pray without grace. And thus he himself explains it in his commentary on Ps. lii., where he says, “‘What thou doest by His gift, He is said to do; because without Him thou couldst not do it.” *

3. The Holy fathers.

In the third place, our opinion is proved by the sayings of the holy Fathers. ,

St. Basil says: “When, however, any one is allowed to fall into temptation, it happens that he may be able to endure it, and to ask in prayer that the will of God may be done.” ’²⁹ The saint then says that when God permits a man to be tempted, he does it in order that the man may resist by asking for God’s will, ze. the grace to overcome. He therefore supposes that when a man has not sufficient assistance to overcome the temptation, he at least has the actual and common grace of prayer, by which he may obtain whatever further grace he needs.

St. John Chrysostom says, “He gave a law which might make their wounds manifest, in order that they might desire a physician.”* And again: “Nor can any one be excused who, by ceasing to pray, has voluntarily abstained from overcoming his adversary.* If such a man had not the grace necessary for actual prayer, whereby he might obtain grace to resist, he might excuse himself when he is overcome.

So also St. Bernard: “Who are we, or what is our strength? This is what God wanted, that we, seeing our weakness, and that we have no other help, should, with all humility, have recourse to his mercy.”* God, then, has imposed on us a law impossible to our own strength, in order that we should go to him, and by prayer obtain strength to observe it; but if any one were without the grace of actual prayer, to him the law would be utterly impossible. “Many persons,” says the same

St. Bernard, “complain that they are deserted by grace; but grace could much more justly complain of being deserted by them.”’ God has much more reason to complain of us for not corresponding to the grace he gives us, than we have to complain of not having grace to which we may correspond.

But no Father is more clear on this point than St. Augustine in several places. In one he says: “The Pelagians think themselves very knowing when they say, God would not command that which he knows man could not do. Who is ignorant of this?, But God does command some things that we cannot do, in order that we might know that for which we ought to ask him.””

Again, “It is not reckoned your fault, if you are ignorant without wishing to be so; but only if you neglect to inquire into that of which you are ignorant; nor that you do not cure your wounded members, but that you despise him who is willing to heal you. These are your own sins; for no man is deprived of .the knowledge of how to seek with advantage.”³⁰ So that, according to St. Augustine, no one is deprived of the grace of prayer, whereby he may obtain help for his conversion; otherwise, if this grace were wanting, it could not be his fault if he were not converted.

Again: ‘What else, then, is shown us, but that it is God who gives us power both to ask, and to seek, and to knock, who commands us to do these things ?”?

Again: ‘Once for all, receive this and understand it. Art thou not yet drawn? Pray that thou mayest be drawn.”?

Again: “That the soul, then, knows not what it ought to do comes from this, that it has not yet received it; but it will receive this also, if it has made a good use of what it has received; and it has received power to seek piously and diligently if it will.” °

Mark the words “it has received power to seek diligently and piously.”’ Every one, then, has the grace necessary for prayer; and if he makes a good use of this, he will receive grace to do that which before he was unable to do immediately. Again: “Let the man who is willing, but cannot do what he wills, pray that he may have such a measure as suffices for fulfilling the commandments; for he is so far assisted as to be able to do what is commanded.” * Again: “Free will is admonished by command to seek the gift of God; but it would be admonished without fruit to itself, unless it had first received some little love, to induce it to seek such aid as would enable it to fulfil what was commanded.” °

Mark the words, “some little love ;” this means “sufficient grace” whereby man is able to obtain by prayer actual grace to keep the commandments, whereby “he is induced to seek such aid as would enable him to fulfil what was commanded.”’

Again: “He gives us commandments for this reason, that when we have tried to do what we are commanded, and are wearied through our infirmity, we may know how to ask the help of grace.” Here the saint supposes that with ordinary grace we are not able to do difficult things, but can by means of prayer obtain the aid necessary to accomplish them. Hence he goes on to say, The Law entered that sin might abound, when men do not implore the aid of God’s grace; but when, by God’s vocation, they understand to whom they must groan, and thereupon invoke him, the succeeding words will be fulfilled: Where sin abounded, grace superabounded.³⁴ Here, as Petavius says, we see in express terms the want of abundant grace; and, on the other hand, the presence of ordinary and common grace which enables men to pray, and which St. Augustine here calls “God's vocation.”

In another place he says: “Free-will is left to man in this mortal life, not to enable him to fulfil justice when he pleases, but to enable him to turn with pious supplications to Him by whose gift he can fulfil it.”* When, acciperet aliquid dilectionis, ut add i sibi quereret unde, quod jubebatur, impleret.”—De Gr. et Lib. Arb. c. 18.

1 Ut addi sibi quaereret unde, quod jubebatur, impleret.” therefore, Augustine says that man is unable to fulfil the whole law, and that prayer is the only means given him to obtain help to fulfil it, he certainly supposes that God gives every man the grace of actual prayer, without need of a further extraordinary aid, not common to all men; otherwise, where this special aid was wanting, “nothing would be left to the will” to observe all the commandments, or at least the more difficult of them. And when the saint speaks thus, he certainly cannot mean that “sufficient grace” gives only the power, not the act of prayer; for so far as relates to power, it is certain that “sufficient grace” gives power for even the most difficult works. Hence the holy Father evidently means (as he teaches elsewhere) that easy things, such as prayer, may well be actually accomplished by any man with the “sufficient grace;” and difficult things with the help which is obtained by means of prayer.

But there are two texts of St. Augustine which are peculiarly to the point.

The first is this: “It is certain that we can keep the commandments if we will; but since the will is prepared by God, we must ask him that we may have such a will as is sufficient to enable us to perform what we will.”? Here he says that it is certain we could observe the law if we would; on the other hand, he says that in order to will to do so, and actually to do so, we must pray. Therefore all men have grace given them to pray, and by prayer to obtain the abundant grace which makes us keep the commandments; otherwise, if for actual prayer, efficacious grace, which is not common to all, were requisite, those to whom it was not given would not be able to keep the commandments, nor to have the will to keep them.

The second text is that where the holy Doctor answers the monks of Adramyttium, who said that “if grace was necessary, and if we can do nothing without it, why blame when we cannot work, and have not grace to do so? You should rather pray God for us, that he would give us this grace.” St. Augustine answers: You must be blamed, not because you do not work when you have not strength, but because you do not pray to obtain strength: “He who will not be admonished, and says, Do you rather pray for me, must on that very account be admonished to do it (e., to pray) for himself.”* Now if the saint had not believed that every man has grace, to pray (if he will) without need of further aid, he never could have said that these people were to be blamed for not praying; for they could have answered, that if they were not to be blamed for not working, when they had not special grace to enable them to work, in like manner they could not be blamed for not praying, when they had not special grace for actual prayer. This is what St. Augustine elsewhere says: “Let them not deceive themselves who say, why are we commanded to abstain from evil and do good, if it is God who works in us both to will and to do it?”? And he answers, that when men do good they should thank God for it, who gives them strength to do it; and when they do it not, they should pray to have the strength which they lack: “But when they do it not (these are his words), let them pray that they may receive that which as yet they have not.” ® Now, if these people had not even the grace for the act of prayer, they might answer, “Why are we commanded to pray, if God does not work in us to make us pray ?”? How are we to will to pray, if we do not receive the grace necessary for actual prayer?

St. Thomas does not speak expressly of prayer, but assumes the certainty of our proposition, when he says, “It belongs to God's Providence to provide every individual with what is necessary for salvation, provided he puts no impediment in the way.”³⁷ Since, then, it is true, on the one hand, that God gives to all men the graces necessary for salvation, and, on the other, for prayer,—we require the grace which enables us actually to pray, and thereby to obtain further and greater assistance to enable us to do that which we cannot compass with ordinary grace,—it follows, necessarily, that God gives all men sufficient grace actually to pray if they will, without need of efficacious grace.

Here we may add the answer of Bellarmine to the heretics, who inferred from the text, No one can come to Me, unless My Father draw him,’ that no one could go to God who was not properly drawn by him. “We answer,” he says, “that the only conclusion from this text is, that all men have not the efficacious grace to make them really believe; but we cannot conclude that all men have not at least assistance which confess the possibility of believing, or, at any rate, the possibility of asking for grace.’ *
Reasons that justify this Doctrine.

Let us now proceed, in the third and last place, to examine the reasons of this opinion. Petavius, Duval, and other theologians ask why God imposes on us commands which we cannot keep with the common and ordinary grace? Because, they answer, he wishes us to have recourse to him in prayer, according to the general consent of the Fathers, as we have seen above. Hence they infer that we ought to hold it to be certain that every man has grace actually to pray, and by prayer to obtain greater grace to enable him to do that which is impossible to him with the ordinary grace; otherwise God would have imposed an impossible law.

This reason is very strong; another is, that if God imposes on all men the duty of actual observance of his commandments, we must necessarily suppose that he also gives to all men the grace necessary for this actual observance, at least mediately, by means of prayer. In order, therefore, to uphold the reasonableness of the law, and the justice of the punishment of the disobedient, we must hold that every man has sufficient power, at least mediately, by means of prayer, for the actual satisfaction of the law; and that at times he prays without need of an unusual and additional grace; otherwise, if he had not this mediate or remote power of actually keeping the commandments, it could never be said that all men had from God sufficient grace for the actual observance of the law.

Thomassin and Tourneley accumulate many other reasons for this opinion; but I pass them over to attend to one that seems to me demonstrative. It is founded on the precept of hope, which obliges us all to hope in God with confidence for eternal life; and I say that if we were not certain that God gives us all grace to enable us actually to pray, without need of another particular and unusual grace, no one without a special revelation could hope for salvation as he ought. But I must first explain the grounds of this argument,

The virtue of hope is so pleasing to God that he has declared that he feels delight in those who trust in him: The Lord taketh pleasure in them that hope in His mercy." And he promises victory over his enemies, perseverance in grace, and eternal glory, to the man who hopes, because he hopes: Because he hoped in Me, I will deliver him; I will protect him... . I will deliver him and I will glorify him. Preserve me, for I have put my trust in Thee He will save them, because they have hoped in Him" No one hath hoped in the Lord, and hath been confounded.’ And let us be sure that the heaven and earth will fail, but the promises of God cannot fail: Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away.” St. Bernard, therefore, says that all our merit consists in reposing all our confidence in God: ‘This is the whole merit of man, if he places all his hope in him.”’ The reason is, that he who hopes in God honors him much: Call upon Me in the day of trouble, I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify Me.” He honors the power, the mercy, and the faithfulness of God; since he believes that God can and will save him; and that he cannot fail in his promises to save the man who trusts in him. And the Prophet assures us that the greater is our confidence, the greater will be the measure of God’s mercy poured out upon us: Let Thy mercy, O Lord, be upon us, as we have hoped in Thee."

Now, as this virtue of hope is so pleasing to God, he has willed to impose it upon us by a precept that binds under mortal sin, as all theologians agree, and as is evident from many texts of Scripture. Trust in Him, all ye congregations of people.” Ye that fear the Lord, hope in Him. Hope in thy God always.’ Hope perfectly for that grace which is offered to you.’ Then this hope of eternal life ought to be sure and firm in us, according to the definition of St. Thomas: “Hope is the certain expectation of beatitude.® And the sacred Council of Trent has expressly declared, “All men ought to place and repose a most firm hope in the help of God; for God, unless they fail to correspond to his grace, as he has begun the good work, so will he finish it, working in them both to will and to perform.” And long before St. Paul had said of himself: I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep what I have committed to Him.” And herein is the difference between Christian and worldly hope. Worldly hope need only be an uncertain expectation: nor can it be otherwise; for it is always doubtful whether a man who has promised a favor may not hereafter change his mind, if he has not already changed it. But the Christian hope of eternal salvation is certain on God's part; for he can and will save us, and has promised to save those who obey his law, and to this end has promised us all necessary graces to enable us to obey this law, if we ask for them. It is true that hope is accompanied by fear, as St. Thomas says; but this fear does not arise from God’s part, but from our own; since we may at any time fail, by not corresponding as we ought, and by putting an impediment in the way of grace by our sins. Reasonably, then, did the Council of Trent condemn the innovators, who, because they entirely deprive man of free will, are obliged to make every believer have an infallible certitude of perseverance and salvation. This error was condemned by the Council; because, as we have said, in order to obtain salvation, it is necessary for us to correspond; and this correspondence of ours is uncertain and fallible. Hence God wills that we should, on the one hand, always fear for ourselves, lest we should fall into presumption, in trusting to our strength; but, on the other, that we should be always certain of his good will, and of his assistance to save us; provided always that we ask him for it; in other words, that we might always have a secure confidence in his goodness. St. Thomas says that we ought to look with certainty to receive from God eternal happiness, confiding in his power and mercy, and believing that he can and will save us. “Whoever has faith, is certain of God’s power and mercy.”

Now, as the hope of our salvation by God ought to be certain (as St. Thomas defines it), “the certain expectation of beatitude,” * consequently the motive of our hope must also be certain; for if the foundation of our hope were uncertain, and admitted a doubt, we could not with any certainty hope and expect to receive salvation, and the means necessary for it, from the hands of God. But St. Paul will have us to be nothing less than firm and immovable in our hope, if we would be saved: /If so ye continue in the faith, grounded, and settled, and immovable from the hope of the Gospel, which you have heard.* In another place he repeats that our faith ought to be as immovable as an anchor securely fixed; since it is grounded on the promises of God, who cannot lie: And we desire that every one of you should show forth the same carefulness to the accomplishing of hope unto the end. .°. . That by two immutable things, in which it is impossible for God to lie, we may have the strongest comfort, who have fled for refuge to hold fast the hope set before us, which we have as an anchor of the soul, sure and firm.’ Hence St. Bernard says that our hope cannot be uncertain, as it rests on God’s promises: “Nor does this expectation seem to us vain, or this hope doubtful, since we rely on the promises of the eternal truth.”* In another place he says of himself that his hope depends on three things,—the love which induced God to adopt us as his children, the truth of his promises, and his power to fulfil them: “Three things I see in

« “Neque enim anceps non est haec expectatio, aut dubia sees videtur, innixa nimirum aeternae promissionibus Veritatis.”—/xz Ps. xc. s. 7. which my hope consists,—the love of adoption, the truth of promise, the power of performance.”⁴⁷

And therefore the Apostle St. James declares that the man who desires the grace of God must ask for it, not with hesitation, but with the confident certainty of obtaining it: Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.’ For if he asks with hesitation, he shall obtain nothing: For he that wavereth is like a wave of the sea, that is moved and carried about by the wind; therefore, let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord.” And St. Paul praises Abraham for not doubting God’s promise; as he knew that when God promises, he cannot fail to perform: In the promise, also, of God, he staggered not by distrust; but was strengthened in faith, giving glory to God; most fully knowing that whatsoever He has promised, He is able also to perform. Hence, also, Jesus Christ tells us that we shall then receive all the graces that we desire when we ask them with a sure belief of receiving them: Therefore I say to you, all things whatsoever you ask when ye pray, believe that you shall receive them, and they shall come unto you.’ In a word, God will not hear us, unless we have a sure confidence of being heard.

Now let us come to the point. Our hope of salvation, and of receiving the means necessary for its attainment, must be certain on God’s part. The motives on which this certainty are founded, as we have seen, are the power, the mercy, and the truth of God; and of these the strongest and most certain motive is God’s infallible faithfulness to the promise which he has made to us, through the merits of Jesus Christ, to save us, and to give us the graces necessary for our salvation; because, though we might believe God to be infinite in power and mercy, nevertheless, as Giovenino well observes, we could not feel confident expectation of God’s saving us, unless he had surely promised to do so. But this promise is conditional, if we actively correspond to God’s grace and pray, as is clear from the Scriptures: Ask, and ye shall receive; if ye ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you. He will give good things to those that ask Him. We ought always to pray. Ye have not, because ye ask not. If any one wanteth wisdom, let him ask of God; and many other texts which we have quoted before. For this cause the Fathers and theologians, as we showed in Part I., Chapter I., maintain that prayer is a necessary means of salvation.

Now, if we were not certain that God gives to all men grace to enable them actually to pray, without need of a further, special, and unusual grace, we could have no certain and firm foundation for a certain hope of salvation in God, but only an uncertain and conditional foundation. When I am certain that by prayer I shall obtain eternal life, and all the graces necessary to attain it; and when I know that God will not deny me the grace of actual prayer, if I will (because he gives it to all men), then I have a sure foundation for hoping in God for salvation, unless I fail on my part. But when I am in doubt whether or not God will give me that particular grace which he does not give to all, but which is necessary for actual prayer, then I have not a certain foundation for my hope of salvation, but only a doubtful and uncertain one; since I cannot be sure that God will give me this special grace, without which I cannot pray, since he refuses it to so many. And in this case the uncertainty would not be only on my part, but also on God’s part; and so Christian hope would be destroyed, which, according to the Apostle, ought to be immovable, firm, and secure. I really cannot see how a Christian can fulfil the precept of hope—hoping, as he ought, with sure confidence for salvation from God, and for the graces necessary for its attainment-unless he holds it as an infallible truth that God commonly gives to every individual the grace actually to pray, if he chooses, without need of a further special assistance.

So that, to conclude, our system or opinion (held by so many theologians, and by our humble Congregation) well agrees, on the one hand, with the doctrine of grace intrinsically efficacious, by means of which we infallibly, though freely, act virtuously.

It cannot be denied that God can easily, with his omnipotence, incline and move men’s hearts freely to will that which he wills, as the Scriptures teach: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will, He shall turn it; I will put My Spirit in the midst of you, and I will cause you to walk in My commandments? My counsel shall stand, and all My will shall be done; He changeth the heart of the princes of the people of the earth;⁵¹ May the God of peace make you perfect in every good work, that you may do His will; working in you that which is well-pleasing in His sight, through Jesus Christ.

And it cannot be denied that St. Augustine and St. Thomas have taught the opinion of the efficaciousness of grace in itself, by its own nature. This is evident from many passages, and specially from the following:

St. Augustine says: ‘Yet God did not this, except by the will of the men themselves; since he, no doubt, has the most almighty and absolute power of inclining the hearts of men.” ? Again: “Almighty God works in the hearts of men, that he may do by their means that which he has determined to do.”⁵² Again: ‘Although they all do what is right in the service of God, yet he causes them to do what he commands.”⁵³ Again: “It is certain that we act when we act; but he causes us to act, by bestowing most efficacious powers on the will, according to his words, I will make you to walk in my justifications.’ Again, on the text For it is God that worketh in you, both, to will and accomplish according to His good will, he says “We therefore will; but God worketh in us, both to will and to perform.” *® Again: “As the will is prepared by God, we must pray that we may have as much will as is sufficient to make us act when we will.”* Again: “God knows how to work in men’s hearts, not so as to make them believe against their will, which is impossible, but so as to make them willing instead of unwilling.” Again: “He works in men’s hearts, not only true revelations, but also good-will.” * Again: “Our acts of will have just so much power as God chooses them to have.” * Again: “The wills which preserve the system of creation are in such sort in God’s power, that he makes them incline where he will and when he will.”*° So St. Thomas: “God infallibly moves the will by the efficacy of the moving power, which cannot fail.”° Again: “Love has the character of impeccability, from the power of the Holy Spirit, who infallibly works whatever he will; hence it is impossible that these two things should be at the same time true,—that the Holy Spirit wills to move a person to an act of love, and that at the same time the person should lose love by an act of sin.””

On the other hand, our opinion is quite consonant to the doctrine of truly sufficient grace being given to all, by corresponding to which a man will gain efficacious grace; while by not corresponding, but resisting, he will deservedly be refused this efficacious grace. And thus all excuse is taken away from those sinners who say that they have not strength to overcome their temptations; because if they had prayed, and made use of the ordinary grace which is given to all men, they would have obtained strength, and would have been saved. Otherwise, if a person does not admit this ordinary grace, by which every one is enabled at least to pray (without needing a further special and unusual grace), and by prayer to obtain further assistance to enable him to fulfil the law, I do not know how he can explain all those texts of the Scripture, in which souls are exhorted to return to God, to overcome temptation, and to correspond to the divine call: Return, ye transgressors, to the heart;” Return and live; Be converted, and do penance; Loose the bonds from off thy neck;⁵⁵ Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened;’ Resist, strong in faith,⁵⁶ Walk whilst you have the light." I cannot tell, I say, supposing it were true that the grace of prayer were not given to all, to enable them thereby to obtain the further assistance necessary for salvation, how these texts could be explained, and how the sacred writers could so forcibly exhort all men, without any exception, to be converted, to resist the enemy, to walk in the way of virtue, and, for this end, to pray with confidence and perseverance—if the grace of doing well, or at least of praying, were not granted to all, but only to those who have the gift of efficacious grace. And I cannot see where would be the justice of the reproof given to all sinners without exception, who resist grace and despise the voice of God: You always resist the Holy Ghost; Because I called and you refused; I stretched out my hand, and there was none that regarded; you have despised all my counsel, and have neglected my reprehensions.” If they were without even the remote but efficacious grace of prayer, which our opponents consider necessary for actual prayer, I cannot tell how all these reproofs could be justly made against them.⁵⁸

Conclusion.

I have done. Some, perhaps, will wish that I had given more space to the distinct examination of the question so much controverted, wherein consists the effi- 1 “Vos semper Spiritus Sancto resistitis.”—Acts, vii. 51.

2? “Quia vocavi, et renuistis; extendi manum meam, et non fuit qui aspiceret,. Despexistis omne consilium meum, et increpationes meas neglexistis.”—Prov. i. 24. caciousness of grace, and which the systems of different schools attribute to a physical premotion, to congruous grace, to concomitant grace, to a delectation which overcomes by reason of a moral action, or to a delectation which overcomes by reason of its superiority in degree. But for this, such a book as this, which I deliberately intended should be small and easily readable, would not have been enough. To explore this vast sea, many volumes would have been required. But this work has been sufficiently performed by others, and, moreover, it was beside my purpose. Still, I wished to establish the point treated of in my second'part, for the honor of God’s providence and goodness, and to be of assistance to sinners, to prevent them from giving themselves up to despair, because they think themselves deprived of grace; and also to take from them all excuse, if they say that they have not strength to resist the assaults of the senses and of hell. I have shown them, that of those who are lost, no one is damned for the original sin of Adam, but solely for his own fault, because God refuses which we may find ourselves. ‘There are also difficult things which we cannot do without a special grace that is not common to all, but surely granted to every one that asks for it as he should by means of the common grace which is never wanting to any one.

This is conformable to the celebrated saying of St. Augustine, adopted and sanctioned by the Council of Trent: ‘' Deus impossibilia non jubet, sed jubendo mones, et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis; et adjuvat ut possis” (pages 30, 214). “God does not command impossible things: but by commanding, admonishes -you both to do what you can, and to pray for what you cannot do; and he helps you, so that you may be able.” God, who is just, in imposing his law, joins to it the necessary grace—light and force—that admonishes the conscience and furnishes the means: Jubendo mones. We must therefore admit a first grace given to all men:--a grace that makes them capable of doing easy things: Facere quod possis. and, consequently, to think of praying and to wish to pray. Now, as soon as we wish to pray, we are already united with God, we have already begun to ask and to obtain: Petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis, In this all is contained.—Eb. to no one the grace of prayer, whereby we may obtain his assistance to overcome every concupiscence, and every temptation.

For the rest, my principal intention was to recommend to all men the use of prayer as the most powerful and necessary means of grace, in order that all men should more diligently and earnestly attend to it, if they wish to be saved; for many poor souls lose God’s grace, and continue to live in sin, and are finally damned, for this very reason, that they do not pray, nor have recourse to God for assistance. The worst of the matter is (I cannot help saying so), that so few preachers and so few confessors have any definite purpose of indoctrinating their hearers and penitents with the use of prayer, without which it is impossible to observe the law of God, and to obtain perseverance in his grace.

Having observed that so many passages, both of the Old and the New Testament, assert the absolute necessity of prayer, I have made it a rule to introduce into all the missions, as given by our Congregation for several years, a sermon on prayer; and I say, and repeat, and will keep repeating as long as I live, that our whole salvation depends on prayer; and, therefore, that all writers in their books, all preachers in their sermons, all confessors in their instructions to their penitents, should not inculcate anything more strongly than continual prayer. They should always admonish, exclaim, and continually repeat, Pray, pray, never cease to pray; for if you pray, your salvation will be secure; but if you leave off praying, your damnation will be certain. All preachers and directors ought to do this; because, according to the opinion of every Catholic school, there is no doubt of this truth, that he who prays, obtains grace and is saved; but those who practise it are too few, and this is the reason why so few are saved.