The Ascent of Mount CarmelChapter XXIII. Of the third kind, sensible goods. Their nature and varieties

The regulation of the will with respect to them.

I HAVE now to speak of joy in sensible goods, wherein the will rejoices. By sensible goods I mean all that is cognisable by the senses, of sight, of hearing, of smell, of taste and of touch, and of the interior working of the imaginative powers; all of which belong to the interior and exterior bodily senses. In order to render the will blind to, and purified from, all joy in sensible objects, directing it to God, we must take for granted this truth, namely, that the sense of man’s lower nature is not, and cannot be, as I have said more than once, * capable of knowing or comprehending God, as He is. The eye cannot see Him, or anything that resembles Him; the ear cannot hear His voice, nor any sound that resembles it; the smell cannot perceive any odours so sweet, the palate cannot taste any savour so delicious, nor can the touch feel any contact so exquisite and thrilling, nor anything like unto Him, and the thoughts and imagination also cannot conceive any form or shape which can possibly be any representation of Him. ‘From the beginning of the world they have not heard, nor perceived with the ears: the eye hath not seen, O God, beside Thee; the eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man.’ f

2. Now sweetness and delight enter into the senses in two ways; either from the mind through some interior

“See Bk. rich. vii. § Is. lxiv. 4; 1 Cor. ii. 9.

divine communication, or from outward objects represented to them. But according to the text just quoted, our lower nature cannot know God either in the way of the spirit or in the way of sense; for having no capacity for so great a matter, it receives that which is of the mind and spirit in the senses only. Therefore to occupy the will with the joy that has its sources in any of these apprehensions, will be at the least but vanity, and a hindrance in the way of employing the strength of the will upon God, by rejoicing in Him alone. This is what the soul can never wholly do unless it purifies itself from and makes itself blind to joy in the things of sense, for if it should rejoice herein at all, that, as I have said,¹ will be but vanity. When the soul does not rest here, but instantly, as soon as the will becomes conscious of any joy in any object of sense, raises itself upwards unto God—that joy supplying motives thereto and power—it is well with it, and then it need not suppress such movements, but may profit by them, and even ought to do so, so as to accomplish so holy an act; for there are souls whom sensible objects greatly influence in the way of God. Such souls, however, must be very cautious, and watch the issues of this conduct, for very often many spiritual persons indulge themselves in these sensible recreations, under the pretence of giving themselves to prayer and to God. Now what they do should be called recreation, not prayer, and their pleasure in this is their own rather than God’s. Though their intention be directed to God, yet the effect is sensible recreation, and the fruit of it is weakness and imperfection rather than the quickening of the will, and the surrender of it into the hands of God.

3. I propose here to lay down a rule by which we may know when sensible sweetness is profitable, and when it is not. Whenever, in hearing music, or other agreeable sounds, in smelling sweet odours, in tasting what is delicious, in touching what is soothing, the affections of the will rise consciously in an instant unto God, and that movement gives us more pleasure than the sensible occasion of it, and when we have no pleasure in that cause, but because of its effects, that is a sign of profit, and that the objects of sense minister unto the spirit. In this way we may use them, for now they subserve that end for which God hath made them; namely, that He may be the better known and loved on their account. Observe, too, that he, in whom sensible objects produce this purely spiritual effect, does not for that reason seek them, nor make any account of them, though they excite in him this sense of God; neither is he solicitous about them; and when they are present, the will passes instantly beyond them and abandons them, fixing itself upon God.

4. The reason why he attaches no importance to these motives, although they keep him in the way of God, is that the mind is so prompt, in and through all, to fly upwards to God, so filled, pre-occupied, and satiated with the Spirit of God as to want or desire nothing more: and if it should desire anything for that end, it immediately passes on beyond it, forgets it, and thinks nothing more about it. -—

&. On the other hand, he who is not conscious of this liberty of spirit, amid sensible objects and sweetness, but whose will rests and feeds upon them, ought to make no such usage of them, for they will be hurtful to him. For though such an one may employ his reason about them, and in that way labour to make them subserve his spiritual advancement; still, because the appetite delights in them in the way of sense, and because the effect corresponds always with the pleasure which they minister, it is certain that they are a greater hindrance than help, a greater evil than benefit. And when he sees that the spirit of these recreations reigns over him, he ought to mortify it; for the stronger it grows, the greater will be his imperfections and weakness.

6. Every satisfaction, therefore, whether accidental or designed, which proceeds from the senses, the spiritual man must use only for God, carrying up unto Him that joy of his soul, so that it may be profitable and perfect; remembering that every joy, which is not founded on the denial and annihilation of all joy whatever, however noble it may seem to be, is vanity and without profit, and a hindrance to the union of the will with God.