Summa contra Gentiles1.19 Chapter XIX. That in God there is nothing violent or beside nature

Hence the Philosopher concludes that in God there cannot be anything violent or outside nature. For whatever has in itself anything violent or beside nature, has something added to itself: since that which belongs to a thing's essence cannot be violent or beside nature. Now no simple thing has in itself anything that is added, for this would argue its being composite. Since then God is simple, as shown above, there can be nothing in Him that is violent or beside nature.

Further. The necessity resulting from compulsion is a necessity imposed by another. Now in God there is no necessity imposed by another, for He is necessary of Himself, and the cause of necessity in other things. Therefore nothing is compulsory in Him.

Moreover. Wherever there is violence, there can be something besides what belongs to a thing by its very nature: since violence is contrary to that which is according to nature. But it is not possible for anything to be in God that does not belong to Him according to His nature, since by His very nature He is necessary being, as shown above. Therefore there can be nothing violent in Him.

Again. Everything that is compelled or unnatural has a natural aptitude to be moved by another: because that which is done by compulsion has an external principle, without any concurrence on the part of the patient. Now God is altogether immovable, as shown above. Therefore nothing in Him can be violent or unnatural.