Summa contra Gentiles1.32 Chapter XXXII. That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things

From the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that whereby the agent acts, cannot receive in a univocal sense the name derived from that form: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things whereof God is cause do not attain to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally. It is evident therefore that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.

Further. If an effect attain to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally unless it receive the same specific form according to the same mode of being: for house in art is not univocally the same as house in matter, since the form of house has an unlike being in the one case and in the other. Now other things, even though they should receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: because there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above, which does not apply to other things. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or proper accident. Now nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above, and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to Him, as was shown above, and consequently nothing is predicated of God, either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows therefore that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally.

Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate the genus, and the individual the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows therefore that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, for instance substance in the definition of accident considered as a being. If therefore we were to say being univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance: which is clearly impossible. Now nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority: since all predicates of God are essential, for He is called being because He is very essence, and good because He is goodness itself: whereas predicates are applied to others by participation; thus Socrates is said to be a man, not as though he were humanity itself, but as a subject of humanity. Therefore it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things.