Summa contra Gentiles1.72 Chapter LXXII. That in God there is will

After discussing the matters concerning the knowledge of the divine intellect it remains for us to consider the divine will.

For from the fact that there is intelligence in God it follows that in Him there is will. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now understood indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows therefore of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: for since He is perfectly intelligent, as shown above, He understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore in Him there is will.

Again. Whatever has a form, is thereby related to things actually existing: thus white timber by its whiteness is like some things and unlike others. Now in intelligent and sentient subjects there is the form of the thing understood and sensed, because all knowledge is through some likeness. Therefore there must be a relation in the intelligent or sentient subject to the things understood or sensed according as the latter actually exist. Now this is not due to the fact that they understand or sense, because in this respect rather is there a relation in things to the intelligent or sentient subject, since intelligence and sensation depend on things being in the intellect and sense, according to the respective modes of each. But the sentient and the intelligent subject have by the will and appetite a relation to things outside the mind. Wherefore every sentient and intelligent subject has an appetite and will, although properly speaking, will is in an intellect. Since then God is intelligent, it follows that He has a will.

Moreover. That which is consequent upon every being, belongs to being as such: and a thing of this kind must needs be found especially in that which is the first being. Now it is competent to every being to desire its own perfection and the preservation of its being: and to each one this is competent according to its mode, to intelligent beings by will, to animals by sensitive appetite, to those that are devoid of sense by natural appetite: to those however who have it otherwise than to those who have it not: for those who have it not, by the appetitive power of their genus tend with desire to acquire what is lacking to them, whereas those who have it are at rest therein. Wherefore this cannot be lacking to the first being, which is God. Since, then, He is intelligent, there is will in Him, whereby His being and His goodness are pleasing to Him.

Again. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful is it to the one who understands. Now God understands, and His act of understanding is most perfect, as was proved above. Therefore to understand is to Him most delightful. But intellectual delight is by the will, even as sensitive delight is by the appetite of concupiscence. Therefore there is will in God.

Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. Wherefore the speculative intellect does not move; nor does the sole imagination without the estimative power. Now the form of the divine intellect is the cause of being and movement in other things, for God moves things by His intellect, as we shall prove further on.” Therefore it follows that He has a will.

Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will: because the will applies every power to its act: for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. And the will has this because its object is the end—although the intellect, not by way of efficient and moving cause, but by way of final, cause-, moves the will, by putting its object before it, which object is the end. " 1 Chs. xliv., xlv. 2 Bk. II., ch. xxiv.

Therefore it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will.

Further. The free is that which is its own cause and so the free has the aspect of that which is of itself. Now liberty of action is seated primarily in the will, for in so far as one acts voluntarily, one is said to perform any action whatever freely. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first agent should act by will, since to Him it is most competent to act of Himself.

Moreover. The end and the agent intending the end are always of the same order in things: wherefore the proximate end which is proportionate to the agent, is of the same species as the agent, in works both of nature and of art: for the form of the art whereby the craftsman works is the species of the form that is in matter, and is the end of the craftsman; and the form of the generating fire, whereby the fire acts, is of the same species as the form of the fire generated, which form is the end of the generation. Now nothing is co-ordinate with God as though it were of the same order, except God Himself, otherwise there would be several first beings, and we thave shown the contrary to be the case. He is therefore the first agent intending an end which is Himself. Therefore He not only is a desirable end, but also desires Himself, so to speak, as an end; and, since He is intelligent, He desires Himself by intellectual appetite; and this is will. Therefore in God there is will.

Holy Writ bears witness to this will of God. For it is said in the psalm: Whatsoever the Lord willed, He hath done: and (Rom. ix. 19): Who resisteth His will?