Summa contra Gentiles3.133 Chapter CXXXIII. How poverty is good

In order to elucidate the truth about what we have been saying, we must form our judgement of poverty, by considering riches. External riches are necessary for the good of virtue: since by them we support the body, and help others. Now, things directed to an end must take their goodness from that end. Consequently external riches must be a good of man; not his chief, but, as it were, his secondary, good: because the end is a good principally; and other things, according as they are directed to the end. For this reason some have thought that virtues are man’s greatest good, and external riches, goods of least account. Now, things directed to an end, must take their measure from the exigency of the end. Wherefore riches are good forasmuch as they serve the use of virtue: and if this measure be exceeded, so that they hinder the practice of virtue, they are no longer to be reckoned as a good but as an evil. Hence it happens that the possession of riches is good for some who use them for virtue: while to others it is an evil, because they are withdrawn thereby from virtue, through being either too anxious about them, or too much attached to them, or self-conceited about them.

Whereas, however, there are virtues of the active and of the contemplative life, both need external riches in different ways. For the contemplative virtues need them only for the support of nature: whereas the active virtues need them both for that purpose, and to support others who share the same life. Hence the contemplative life is the more perfect in that it has fewer needs. To this life indeed it would seem to belong that man occupy himself wholly with divine things: and this perfection Christ’s teaching counsels to man. Consequently those who seek this perfection are content with a minimum of external riches, as much, to wit, as suffices to support nature. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. vi. 8): Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.

Accordingly, poverty is commendable so far as it frees man from those vices in which some are enmeshed through wealth. In so far as it removes the anxiety that is occasioned by riches, it is useful to some, those namely who are disposed to occupy themselves with the better things: but it is harmful to some, who being freed from this anxiety, betake themselves to worse occupations. Hence Gregory says (6 Moral, xxxvii): It often happens that people who are busy in doing well while living as men are used to live, are slain by the sword of retirement.—In so far as poverty removes the good resulting from riches, namely the assistance of others, and one’s own support, it is simply an evil: except, forasmuch as the assistance whereby one’s neighbour is relieved in temporal things, may be compensated by a greater good, in that a man, through lacking wealth, can more freely give himself to the affairs of God and his soul. But the good of one’s own support is so far necessary, that it cannot be compensated by any other: for man should not deprive himself of his livelihood for the sake of obtaining any other good.

Such poverty is therefore commendable when a man being freed thereby from worldly solicitude, is enabled more freely to occupy himself with divine and spiritual things; yet so as to retain the possibility of lawfully supporting himself, for which purpose not many things are needful. And according as the manner of living in a state of poverty demands less solicitude, so much the more is poverty to be commended: but not according as the poverty is greater. For poverty is not good in itself: but in so far as it frees a man from that which hinders him from being intent on spiritual things. Hence its measure of goodness depends on how far it frees man from the aforesaid obstacles.—In fact this applies to all external things in common, that they are so far good as they are serviceable to virtue, but not in themselves.