Summa contra Gentiles3.134 Chapter CXXXIV. Solution of the arguments given above against poverty

Keeping these observations before our mind, we shall easily solve the foregoing arguments whereby poverty was impugned. For though man has a natural desire to gather together the necessaries of life, as the first argument stated, this does not imply that each individual must be occupied in so doing. In fact, neither is every bee occupied in the same duty: but some gather honey, some build their dwelling with wax, while the queens do none of these things: and it must needs be so likewise with man. For as many things are needed for man’s livelihood, for which one man is not sufficient by himself, it is necessary for different things to be done by different men: for instance, that some cultivate the land, that some have charge of animals, that some build houses, and so forth. And since man’s life demands not only goods of the body, but also, and still more, goods of the soul, it is necessary for some to be busy about spiritual things for the betterment of others: and such must needs be exempt from the care of temporal things. This division of divers duties among divers persons is made by divine providence, according as some are more inclined to one duty than to others.

It is thus clear that those who renounce temporal goods, do not deprive themselves of a livelihood: as the second argument contended. For they still have the probable hope of maintenance, either from their own work, or from the kindness of others, whether in the shape of common property, or as their daily bread. For even as that which is possible by means of our friends, is possible, in a sense, to ourselves as the philosopher says, so what our friends have is, in a sense, ours.

Now among men there should be that mutual friendship whereby they assist one another either in spiritual or in earthly duties. Again, it is better to help another in spirituals than in temporals: forasmuch as spirituals are more excellent than temporals, and more necessary for the attainment of that end which is beatitude. Hence the man who by voluntary poverty deprives himself of the possibility of helping others in temporal things, that he may obtain spiritual things, whereby he can be of more useful service to others, does not, as the third argument concluded, counteract the good of human society.

From the foregoing it is clear that riches are a good of man forasmuch as they are directed to the rational good, but not in themselves. Wherefore nothing prevents poverty from being better, if by it a man is directed to a more perfect good. Thus the fourth argument is answered. And since neither wealth nor poverty, nor anything external is in itself man's good, but only forasmuch as it is directed to reason’s good; nothing prevents them from being a source of sin, when they are not employed by man according to reason’s rule. And yet they are not therefore to be reckoned as simply evil, but only when they are put to an evil use. Hence neither is poverty to be condemned on account of certain vices that are sometimes occasioned thereby: as the fifth argument endeavoured to prove. Wherefore we must also observe that the mean of virtue does not depend on the quantity of external goods employed, but on the rule of reason. So that it happens sometimes that what is an extreme in point of quantity of an external thing, is the mean according to reason’s rule. For neither does anyone tend to greater things than the magnanimous man, nor surpass in amount the magnificent man’s expenditure. Wherefore they follow the mean not by the quantity of expenditure, or the like, but by not exceeding or falling short of the rule of reason. This rule, in fact, measures not only the quantity of the thing used, but also'the condition of the person, and his intention, the fitness of place and time, and such things that are required in acts of virtue. Consequently a man through voluntary poverty does not frustrate virtue, even if he renounce all things. Nor is he prodigal in so doing: since he does it for a due end, and observing other due circumstances. For it is more to expose oneself to death,—which nevertheless a man does through the virtue of fortitude, observing the due circumstances,—than to renounce all one’s goods for a due end. Thus the sixth argument is answered.

The words quoted from Solomon are not in contradiction with this. For it is clear that he speaks of compulsory poverty, which is wont to be the occasion of theft.