Summa contra Gentiles3.141 Chapter CXLI. Of the difference and order of punishments

Since, then, as we have shown, a reward is something proposed to the will, as an end whereby it is urged to do well, and on the other hand punishment, as an evil to be avoided, is set before the will, to withdraw it from evil; just as it is essential to a reward that it be a good in harmony with the will, so is it a necessary condition of punishment, that it be an evil, and in opposition to the will. Now, evil is the privation of good. Consequently, the difference and order of punishments must be in keeping with the difference and order of goods.

Now, the sovereign good is man’s beatitude, which is his last end: and the nearer a thing approaches to this end, the higher must it be placed as a good of man. The nearest thing to that end is virtue, and everything else that is of use to man in well-doing, whereby he attains to beatitude. After this comes the right disposition of reason, and of the powers subject thereto. And after this the well-being of the body, which is requisite for facility of action. Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ as helps to virtue.

Accordingly man’s greatest punishment will be his exclusion from beatitude. After this, privation of virtue, and of any perfection of the soul’s natural powers, that conduces to well-doing: then, disorder in the natural powers of the soul: then, injury to the body: lastly, loss of external goods.

But as it is a necessary condition of punishment to be not only the privation of a good, but also opposed to the will: and as not every man’s will appreciates goods at their true value: it happens sometimes that the privation of a greater good is less opposed to the will, and for this reason seems to be less penal. Hence it is that many people who esteem higher and know better sensible and bodily goods than intellectual and spiritual goods, fear corporal punish- 1 Ch. cxl. 2 i Ethic, ix.

ment more than spiritual. And in the estimation of such men the order of punishments is apparently the reverse to that given above. For to these, injuries to the body and loss of external goods seem the greatest punishment: while they think little or nothing of the disorder of their soul, the decay of virtue, and the loss of the divine fruition, wherein man’s ultimate beatitude consists.

Hence it is that th think that God punr'1' not the sins of man: because they see that sinners for the most part are sound of body, and outwardly prosperous, while virtuous men sometimes are none of these things.

But this should not be a matter of surprise to anyone who considers the matter aright. For since external goods are directed to internal, and the body to the soul; external and bodily goods are so far good for man, as they are conducive to the good as appointed by reason: while, in so far as they stand in the way of reason’s good, they become, for man, evil. Now God the disposer of things, knows the measure of human power. Wherefore at times he apportions bodily and external goods to a virtuous man as a help to virtue, and in this he bestows a favour on him. But sometimes he withdraws those things from him, because he sees them to be a hindrance to virtue and to his enjoyment of God: since for this reason external goods become evil for man, as we have stated; so that, for the same reason, their loss becomes a good for man. If, then, every punishment is an evil; and if it is not an evil for man to be deprived of external and bodily goods, according as this is expedient for his advance in virtue: it will be no punishment for a virtuous man if he be deprived of external goods, to the profit of virtue. On the other hand, for the wicked it will be a punishment if they be granted external goods whereby they are incited to evil-doing. Hence it is said (Wis. xiv. 11), that the creatures of God are turned to an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men, and a snare to the feet of the unwise.—Since, however, it belongs to punishment not only to be an evil, but to be opposed to the will; the loss of bodily and external goods, even when it profits man unto virtue, and is not an evil for him, is called a punishment, by a misuse of the term, because it is opposed to the will.

The result of man being out of order is that he does not appreciate things at their true value, and prefers the things of the body to those of the soul. This disorder is either sinful, or arises from a preceding sin. Hence it is clear that punishment is not in man, even as contrary to the will, without some preceding fault.

Another reason proves this. Because things good in themselves, would not become evil for men by their abuse, unless some disorder already existed in man.

Again, that man needs to be deprived, for the good of virtue, of what the will accepts because it is naturally good, arises from some disorder in man, which is either a sin, or results from sin. For it is evident that the preceding sin produces a certain disorder in man’s affective faculty, so that he is afterwards more easily inclined to sin. Therefore, we must suppose some sin in man if he needs to be assisted towards the good of virtue, by means of something, in a sense, penal to him, inasmuch as it is contrary to his will, although sometimes it is voluntary, inasmuch as his reason looks to the end. However, we shall speak further on of this disorder that affects human nature on account of original sin. But for the present be it clearly understood that God punishes men for their sins, and that He punishes not unless there be a fault.