Summa contra Gentiles3.16 Chapter XVI. That the end of everything is a good

Accordingly if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above,” it follows that good is the end of each thing.

For everything is directed by its action to some end; since ACh. od. a Cin vite S1Ch ox, @ Chaix:

either the action itself is an end; or the end of the action is also the end of the agent: and this is its good.

Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good: for the Philosopher defines good as the object of all appetite. Therefore the end of everything is a good.

Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and wherein it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection, is moved towards it, as far as in it lies: and if it have that perfection, itreststherein. Therefore the end ofa thing isits perfection. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore everything is directed to good as its end.

Further. Things that know the end, and things that do not know the end, are equally directed to the end: although those which know the end are moved thereto per se; whereas those which do not know it, tend thereto as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end, are always directed to a good as their end; because the will which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore also those things that do not know the end, are directed to a good as their end. Therefore the end of all is a good.