Summa contra Gentiles3.27 Chapter XXVII. That human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures

From what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex.

It has been shown that according to nature’s order, Wherefore if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above, are not the last end: for they are directed to certain manifest ends; eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of children. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them.

Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite: for it moves it, as stated above.” But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved.’

Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite.

Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man: for it is an abuse of terms to speak of dumb animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are common to man and beast. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them.

Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now these pleasures consist in man being united through his senses to things beneath him, namely certain sensible objects. Therefore we must not assign happiness to suchlike pleasures.

Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate, is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate: for otherwise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures is good essentially, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore suchlike pleasures are not man’s supreme good, which is happiness.

Again. In all per se predications, if A be predicated of simply, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B: thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing heats most. Accordingly if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much is very good. But this is clearly false: because it is considered sinful to use them too much: besides it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not per se man’s good: and human happiness does not consist in them.

Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being directed to happiness.’ If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue: for the act of temperance is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures; whence that act takesitsname. Therefore man’s happiness is not in these pleasures.

Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above.! We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things, and consequently withdraw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans who ascribed man’s happiness to pleasures of this kind: in their person Solomon says (Eccles. y. 17) /This therefore hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labour... and this is his portion: and (Wis. li. 9): Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy: for this 1s our portion, and this is our lot.

The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted: for they pretended that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table: wherefore they are called ‘Chiliastae,’ or believers in the Millennium.

The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted: who pretend that the reward of the righteous consists in suchlike pleasures: for happiness is the reward of virtue.