Summa contra Gentiles3.59 Chapter LIX. How those who see the divine substance see all things

Now forasmuch as the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have proved;? and since the appetite of everything that has 1-Ch. I. 2 1 Ethic. ix. echo obtained its last end, is at rest: it follows that the natural appetite of the intellectual substance that sees the divine of things, and the whole order of the universe: as is evident the things mentioned above. Again. Intellect and sense differ, as is clear from 3 De weaker objects: whereas the intellect, through not being destroyed or weakened by its object, but only perfected not less but more able to understand other intelligibles. Now the highest in the genus of intelligibles is the divine substance. Consequently the intellect which by the divine light is raised to see the substance of God, is a fortiori perfected by the same light so as to see all other intelligibles in the universe. ‘ Besides. Intelligible being is not of less, but may be of greater extent than physical being; for the intellect is naturally adapted to understand all the things in the universe, tions and privations. Consequently anything required for the perfection of physical being, that and even more is required for the perfection of intelligible being. Now the perfection of intelligible being is when the intellect has reached its last end: even as the perfection of physical being consists in the very making of a thing. Therefore God makes known to the intellect, which sees Him, all the things that He has made for the perfection of the universe. Moreover. Although of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another, as we have shown,” yet each one sees Him so perfectly that all his natural capacity is filled:

proved above.? Therefore everyone that sees the divine iv. 5. 2 Ch. Iviii. SuChe di.

substance must needs know in the divine substance all the things to which his natural capacity extends. Now the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowledge of all general species, and the order of things. Therefore every one that sees God will know these things in the divine substance.

Wherefore the Lord answered Moses’ request to see the divine substance (Exod. xxxiii. 19): I will show thee all good; and Gregory says (Dial. iv. 33): What know they not who know Him that knows all?

If we consider carefully the foregoing, it is clear that those who see the divine substance, in one sense see all things, and in another sense, donot. For if by al/ we understand those things that belong to the perfection of the universe, it is evident from what has been said that those who see God see all things, as the arguments just adduced prove. Because, as the intellect is, in a sense, all things, whatever belongs to the perfection of nature, belongs also to the perfection of intelligible being: wherefore according to Augustine (2 Super Gen. ad lit., viii.), all things made by the Word of God that they might subsist in their respective natures, were made likewise in the angelic intelligence so as to be understood by the angels. Now, to the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, their properties and forces: because the intention of nature is directed to the specific natures, since individuals are for the sake of the species. Consequently it belongs to the perfection of an intellectual—substance to know the nature, forces and proper accidents of every species: and therefore it will obtain this through the vision of the divine essence.—Moreover through its knowledge of natural species the individuals also, contained in these species, are known by the intellect that sees God, as may be gathered from what has been already said of the divine and angelic knowledge.

On the other hand if by all we understand all that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intellect sees all things in the divine substance, as we have shown.”

This may be considered in respect of several things.

First, as to those things which God can make, but neither has made nor ever will make. For all such things cannot be known without comprehending His power, which is impossible for any created intellect, as we have proved.' Hence it is said (Job xi. 7, segg.): Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. ‘For these things are said, not as though God were great in dimensive quantity: but because His power is not limited to all that seems great, so that He be unable to make greater still. Secondly, as to the reasons of things made: which reasons cannot all be known by an intellect without its compre- hending the divine goodness. Because the reason for every thing made is taken from the end which the maker has in view. Now the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: wherefore the reason for things made is that the divine goodness may be spread abroad in things. So that /a man would know all the reasons of created things, if he knew every good that can accrue to things according to the order of divine wisdom: and this would be to comprehend the divine goodness and wisdom, which is impossible to any created intellect. Wherefore it is said (Eccles. viii. 17): I understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God, Thirdly, as.to those things which depend on God’s will alone: such as predestination, election and justification, and whatever belongs to the’ creature’s sanctification. Hence it is said (r Cor. ii. 11): No? man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of