Summa contra Gentiles3.7 Chapter VII. That evil is not an essence

is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, Again. A thing has being in respect of its essence. Now in so far as it has being, it has a share of good: for if good is what all desire, being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore a thing is good in so far as it hasanessence. But good and evil are opposed to each other.

Therefore no essence is evil. Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be 1 Ch, vi. 2 Aristotle, 3 Metaph. ii. 8. 2 Ch iil.

natural to that substance: although perchance it may not be natural to some other substance; thus heat is natural to fire, whereas it is not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself, cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil, since it is the privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore no essence is evil in itself.

Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form: since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the ratio of goodness: for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends; and is the act whereby whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Further. Being is divided into act and potentiality. Now act, as such, is a good: because, in so far as a thing is in act, it is perfect. Again potentiality is a good: for potentiality tends to act, as clearly may be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary thereto. Moreover it is in the same genus as act. Also privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore everything that is, in whatever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is a good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Again. It has been proved in the Second Book? of this work, that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God: and we have shown in the First Book” that God is perfect goodness. Since, then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hence it is that it is said (Gen. i. 31): God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good: and (Eccles. iii. 11): He hath made all things good in their time: and (1 Tim. iv. 4): Every creature of God ts good.

Again Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil is not a thing that exists, per se to wit, nor is it something in things that exist, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature.