Summa contra Gentiles3.75 Chapter LXXV. That divine providence is concerned with singular contingencies

From what we have proved it is evident that divine providence reaches to each individual among things subject to generation and corruption.

For apparently the only reason for excluding such things from providence would be their contingent nature, and the fact that many of them are chance or lucky occurrences: since in this alone do they differ from incorruptibles and from the universals of corruptible things, with which it is said that providence is concerned. Now providence is not inconsistent with contingency, chance and luck, as neither is it with voluntary action, as we have proved.!' There is no reason therefore why providence should not be about such things, even as it is about incorruptibles and universals.

Besides. If God’s providence does not extend to these singular things, this is either because He knows them not, or because He is unable or unwilling to care for them. But it cannot be said that God does not know singulars, since we have proved that He has knowledge of them.?, Nor can it be said that God is unable to care for them, since His power is infinite, as we proved above:? nor that these singulars are incapable of being governed; since we see them to be governed by the purposeful activity of reason, as evidenced in man, or by natural instinct, as evidenced in bees and many dumb animals, which are governed by a kind of natural instinct. Nor can it be said that God is unwilling to govern them: since His will is the universal cause of all good: and the good of things governed consists chiefly in the order of government. Therefore it cannot be said that God has no care for these singulars.

Besides. Every secondary cause, by the mere fact of its being a cause, attains to a likeness to God, as was proved above.’ It is to be universally observed that things which are productive, have the care of the things they produce, thus animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care of the things whereof He is the cause. Now He is the cause even of these singulars, as was proved above.” Therefore He has care of them.

Further. It was proved above’ that God acts on created things, not from natural necessity, but by His will and intellect. Now things that are done by will and intellect are subject to providence, which apparently consists in ruling things by the intellect. Consequently the things done by God are subject to His providence. But it has been proved? that God works in all second causes, and that all effects of things are to be referred to God as their cause: so that whatever is done in these individuals is His own work. Consequently these individual things, their movements and operations, are subject to divine providence.

Again. A man’s providence is foolish if he cares not for those things without which the things he cares for cannot be. Now it is clear that if all individuals ceased to exist, their universals would likewise cease. Wherefore if God cares only for universals, and neglects these individuals altogether, His providence will be foolish and imperfect.—If, however, someone say that God cares for these individuals so far as to preserve them in existence, but no further; this is quite impossible: since whatever else happens in regard to individuals concerns their preservation or corruption. Consequently, if God cares for individuals as to their preservation, he cares also for whatever happens to them.—Yet someone might say that the mere care of universals suffices for the preservation of individuals in existence; since each species is provided with the means of self-preservation for each individual of that species: thus animals were given—organs for taking and digesting food, and horns for self-protection: and the use of these organs does not fail except in the minority, since that which is of nature produces its Moreover. The order of things in relation to the end is such that accidents are for the sake of substances, in order ness, for the sake of which all things were made, as’ we proved above.! Hence it is evident that the individual is there are not many individuals of one species, as exemplified inthemoonandsun. Nowsince providence has the ordering of things to their end, it follows that to providence belong both the ends and things directed to the end. Therefore not only universals but also individuals are subject to divine providence.

Again. The difference between speculative and practical knowledge is that speculative knowledge and things connected with it are perfected in the universal, whereas things pertaining to practical knowledge are perfected in the particular: because the end of speculative knowledge is truth which consists first and of its very nature in immaterial and universal things: whereas the end of practical knowledge is operation which is about individual things: hence the physician does not heal a man in general, but this particular man, and the whole of medical science is directed to this. Now it is clear that providence belongs to practical knowledge, since it directs things to their end. Therefore God’s providence would be imperfect, if it extended no further - than universals and reached not the individual.

Besides. Speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are known better than individuals: wherefore the knowledge of the most universal principles is common to all. Yet the more perfect in speculative knowledge is he who possesses not only universal but also proper knowledge of things; since he who knows a thing merely in general, knows it only potentially: for which reason the disciple is led from the general knowledge of principles to the proper knowledge of conclusions, by the master who is possessed of both knowledges, just as a thing is brought from potentiality to act by that which is in act. A fortiori therefore the more perfect in practical knowledge is he who directs things to act not only in general but also in particular. Consequently divine providence, being supremely perfect, extends to individuals.

Moreover. Since God is the cause of being as such, as we proved above,’ it follows that His providence must care for being as such; since He governs things inasmuch as He is their cause. Therefore whatever exists, no matter in what way it exists, is subject to His providence. Now individuals are beings, and more so than universals: because universals do not exist by themselves, but only in individuals. Therefore divine providence is concerned about individuals also.

Further. Creatures are subject to divine providence, as being directed thereby to their end, which is the divine goodness. Therefore participation in the divine goodness by creatures is the work of divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. Therefore divine providence must extend to them also.

Hence it is said (Matth. x. 29): Ave not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father, etc., and (Wis. viii. 1): She reacheth... from end to end mightily, that is from the highest creatures to the lowest. Moreover (Ezech. ix. 9) the opinion is refuted of some who said: The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not, and (Job xxii. 14) of those who asserted: He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven.

Hereby is refuted the opinion of some who maintained that divine providence does not extend to these individual things: an opinion ascribed by some to Aristotle, although it cannot be gathered from his words,