Summa contra Gentiles3.76 Chapter LXXVI. That God’s providence cares for all individuals immediately

St Thomas Aquinas († 1274) · Summa contra Gentiles (Liber de veritate catholicae fidei contra errores infidelium) · c. 1259-1265

Chapter LXXVI. That God’s providence cares for all individuals immediately

Now some have granted that divine providence reaches these individual things, but ‘through certain intermediary causes, For Plato, according to Gregory of Nyssa,’ posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme god, who cares first and foremost for his own, i.e. spiritual and intellectual beings, and consequently for the whole i.e, the heavenly bodies. The second consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato to him, are in charge of human actions. Yet, according to Plato, the second and third providence depend on the first, because the supreme god appointed those of the second and third class as governors.

This opinion accords with the Catholic Faith, in so far as But it would seem contrary to the Faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down.

For God has immediate knowledge of individuals, as knowing them not merely in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the First Book. Now it would seem unreasonable if, knowing individuals, He did not desire their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is the source of all goodness. Consequently even as He knows individuals immediately, so does He establish order among them immediately., Again. The order established by providence in the things governed, is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor: even as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one subordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God: in fact all perfections proceed from Him into other things in descending order, as we proved above.” And the order of things must be in the governors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual: else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more therefore is the order of individuals under the control of divine providence.

Besides. In things ruled by human providence it is to—be observed that someone is placed at the head, who has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them: while he himself does not trouble about the order portance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God: for He knows all individual things, nor does He require labour or time in order to understand them; since by understanding Himself, He knows all other things, as we proved above.’ Therefore He Himself devises the order of all individuals: and His providence is concerned about all individuals immediately.

Moreover. In human affairs the inferior officials by their all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intellect by the supreme God: nor can any intellect understand except in so far as it acts by God’s power. Therefore God Himself cares for all things immediately by His providence:

Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower the commander in chief; who gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Consequently if there be other governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, He gives general rules and laws or particular.—If He gives them general rules, since general rules are not always applicable to particular cases, especially in matters that are subject to movement and change, it would be necessary for these 1 Bk, II., ch. xlvi. api. ch. xi; Bk TM ch. ixvil:

governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently they would exercise judgement on the rules given to them, as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them: which is impossible, because such a judgement belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and dispensation from their observance belong to Him who made the law. Accordingly judgement concerning general rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief: and this would not be possible unless he concerned himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, he should be the immediate governor of such things.—If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes immediately from divine providence.

Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the arrangements made by the lower governors, whether they be fitting or not. Consequently if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor: it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them: which would be impossible if God considered not the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore He personally cares for individuals by Himself.

Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by Himself; this is either because He despises them or, as some say, lest His dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is unreasonable. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things, than operating in them. Consequently if God works in all things, as was proved above,’ and this far from being derogatory to His dignity, on the contrary, belongs to His all pervading and supreme power, it is nowise contemptible in Him, nor does it besmirch His dignity, if His providence extends to these individual things immediately.

Further. Every wise man who uses his power providently, moderates that use in his actions, by directing the purpose divine providence, in its operations, extends to the lowest things. Consequently divine providence directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they Therefore God Himself by His providence, immediately plans the ordering of all things.

Hence it is said (Rom. xiii. 1): Those that are, ave ordained of God, and (Judith ix. 4): Thou hast done the things of old, and hast devised one thing after another, and what thou hast designed hath been done,

the English Dominican Fathers (Laurence Shapcote, O.P.) (1864–1947), London: Burns Oates & Washbourne: First Book 1924, Second Book 1923, Third Book 1928 (Fourth Book, 1929, not included). Digital text: OCR of Internet Archive scans, corrected: Book I summacontragenti01thomuoft; Book II chapter by chapter from the cleaner of summacontragenti02thomuoft and summacontragenti0002unse; Book III part I summacontragenti0000lond; Book III part II summacontragenti0000unse_l9e4. Public domain in the US and Canada: published in London 1923-1928 (before 1931); translator Laurence Shapcote died 1947. The Latin is not included.

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