Summa contra Gentiles3.92 Chapter XCII. How a man may be said to be fortunate, and how he is assisted by higher causes

It may be seen from what has been said how a man is said to be fortunate.

For a man is said to have good luck when something good happens to him beside his intention: for instance when a man, while digging in a field, finds a treasure which he was not seeking. Now a man, while working, may do something beside his own intention, yet not beside the intention of someone above him: for instance, if a master send a servant to a place whither he had already sent another servant without the knowledge of the former, the finding of the latter is unintentional to the former, but not to the master who sent him: and therefore although in relation to this servant the meeting is fortuitous and casual, it is not so in relation to the master, but is intentional. Since then man, as to his body, is subordinate to the heavenly bodies; as to his intellect, to the angels; and as to his will, to God: it is possible for something to happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the influence of the angels or even of God. And although God’s action alone has a direct bearing on man’s choice, nevertheless the angel’s action has a certain bearing on man’s choice by way of persuasion; and the action of a heavenly body by way of disposition, insomuch as the corporeal impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose us to choose in certain ways. Accordingly when, through the influence of higher causes, in the aforesaid manner, a man is led to choose such things as turn to his profit without his being aware of the utility by his own reason; and besides this, his understanding is enlightened from the light of intellectual substances to the effect of doing those same things; and through the divine operation his will is inclined so as to choose that which is profitable to him, without knowing why it is so; he is said to be fortunate; and on the contrary he is said to be unfortunate, when through the influence of higher causes his choice is inclined to contrary things; as it is said of someone (Jer. xxii. 30): Write this man barren, a man that shall not prosper in his days.

Yet herein we must observe a difference. For the impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the body. Consequently from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, one is said not only to be fortunate or unfortunate, but also to have a good or a bad natural disposition, in which sense the Philosopher says (Magn. Moral., loc. cit.), that to be fortunate is to have a good natural disposition. For it is inconceivable that the fact of one person choosing what is useful and another what is hurtful, without their knowing it, be due to these people differing in understanding, since the nature of understanding and will is the same in all: because a formal difference would cause a specific difference, and a material difference causes a difference of individuals. Consequently forasmuch as the human intellect is enlightened for the purpose of operation, or the will instigated by God, a man is not said to be well disposed by nature, but to be well guarded or well governed.

Again, another difference is to be observed here. For the operation of an angel and of a heavenly body merely disposes a man to choose, whereas the operation of God gives completion to his choice. And since the disposition arising from a quality affecting the body, or from the persuasion of the intellect, does not necessitate his choice, man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines him: whereas he always chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to Jer. li. 9: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: and much more so the influence of heavenly bodies: whereas divine providence never fails.

Yet another difference must be observed. For since a heavenly body does not dispose a man to choose, except forasmuch as it makes an impression on our bodies, so that a man is influenced in his choice, in the same way as he is led by his passions to choose; every disposition towards choosing resulting from the influence of the heavenly bodies, is by way of a passion, as when one is led to make a certain choice, through hate, love, or anger and the like.—On the other hand, a man is disposed by an angel to make a certain choice, by way of intellectual consideration, without passion. And this happens in two ways. Sometimes man’s understanding is enlightened by an angel so as to know only that a certain thing is good to do,without being instructed as to the reason for its being good, which reason depends on the end. Consequently sometimes a man thinks it good to do a certain thing, and yet were he asked why, he would answer that he did not know. Hence when he achieves the useful end, to which he had given no thought, it will be fortuitous for him. Sometimes he is instructed by the angel who enlightens him, both as to the goodness of a thing to be done, and as to the reason why it is good, which reason depends on the end. And so, when he achieves the end to which he looked forward, it will not be fortuitous.—It must also be noted that the active force of a spiritual nature surpasses that of a corporeal nature in being wider in its scope even as it is higher in its kind. Consequently the disposition caused by a heavenly body does not extend to all those things that come under the scope of man’s choice.

Again. The power of the human soul or even of an angel is restricted in comparison with the divine power, which extends universally to all beings. Hence some good can happen to a man both beside his intention, and beside the influence of heavenly bodies, and beside the angelic enlightenment, but not beside divine providence which is the governor, even as it is the maker of being qua being, wherefore it must hold all things in its power. Consequently some good or evil may happen to a man by chance both in relation to himself, and in relation to heavenly bodies, and in relation to the angels, but not in relation to God. Because in relation to God not only in human affairs but in all things whatsoever, there then can be nothing fortuitous or unforeseen.

And since fortuitous things are those which are unintentional: and moral goods cannot be unintentional, because they are founded on choice, in their respect no man can be described as fortunate or unfortunate, although in their respect one may say that he has by nature a good or evil disposition, when through the natural dispositions of his body he is inclined to the choice of virtue or vice. With regard to external goods, which can accrue to man beside his intention, he may be described both as having a natural disposition for them, and as having good fortune, and as governed by God, and as guarded by the angels.

Man receives yet another assistance from the higher causes, with regard to the performance of his actions. For whereas man has the faculty to choose and to prosecute his choice, in either case he is sometimes helped by higher causes, and sometimes hindered. With regard to his choice, as we have said, in so far as a man is either disposed to choose a certain thing through the influence of heavenly bodies, or enlightened as it were through the guardianship of angels, or led through the operation of God.—With regard to the execution, in so far as man receives from some higher cause strength and efficiency to accomplish his choice. These things may come not only from God and the angels, but even from heavenly bodies, in so far as the aforesaid efficiency may be seated in the body. For it is evident that even inanimate bodies receive certain forces and efficiencies from heavenly bodies, even besides those which result from the active and passive qualities of the elements, which qualities, without any doubt, are subject to the heavenly bodies; thus that the magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a heavenly body, and in the same way certain stones and plants have occult powers. Wherefore there is no reason why one man should not receive through the influence of a heavenly body, a certain efficiency for certain corporeal effects, that is not possessed by another man: for instance, a physician for healing, a farmer for planting, a soldier for fighting. But this efficiency is bestowed on man by God much more perfectly for the purpose of accomplishing His works. Accordingly, as regards the first kind of assistance, which man receives in choosing, God is said to direct him: and as to the second, He is said to strengthen him. These two assistances are indicated in the Psalms, where it is said, in reference to the first: The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear? and in reference to the second: The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid?

There is, however, a twofold difference between these two assistances. The first is that by the first man is assisted both in things subj ect to his skill, and in others: whereas the second assistance extends only to such things for which man’s skill is available. Thus if a man while digging a grave, find a treasure, this does not result from any skill of his: wherefore with a view to such a result a man may be assisted through being instigated to seek where the treasure is, but not by receiving the skill for finding treasures. But that a physician heal, or that a soldier conquer in battle, may result both from assistance received in the choice of means adopted to the end, and from skill received from a higher cause for the success of their actions. Hence the first assistance is more universal.—The other difference is that the second assistance is given for the purpose of accomplishing what one intends to do. Wherefore since the fortuitous is unintentional, a man cannot properly speaking be said to be fortunate through receiving such assistance, as he can through receiving the former kind of assistance, as we have shown above. Now, a man is fortunate or unfortunate sometimes when he acts alone, as when he finds a hidden treasure while he is digging: and sometimes through the concurrent action of another cause, as when a man while going to market intent on buying, meets a debtor whom he did not expect to meet. In the first instance the man was assisted to his good fortune, solely in that he was directed in the choice of something to which a profit was accidentally attached beside his intention. In the second instance both agents need to be directed to choose an action or movement resulting in their mutual encounter.

There is yet another observation to be made about the foregoing. For it has been said that the happening of good or bad fortune to a man, both is from God, and may be from a heavenly body: inasmuch as man is led by God to choose a thing to which some advantage or disadvantage is attached without being considered by the chooser; and in so far as he is disposed by a heavenly body to make such a choice. This advantage or disadvantage, in reference to man’s choice, is fortuitous; in reference to God, it is no longer fortuitous, whereas it is so in reference to the heavenly body. This is proved as follows. An event does not cease to be fortuitous until it is referred to its per se cause. Now, the power of a heavenly body is an active cause, not by way of understanding or choosing, but by way of nature: and it is proper to nature to tend to one thing. Accordingly if a certain effect is not one thing, no natural power can be its per se cause. And when two things are united together accidentally, they are one not really, but only accidentally. Wherefore no natural cause can be the per se cause of such a conjunction. Suppose then that the man in question is led through the impression of a heavenly body, as by a passion, as we said before, to dig a grave. Now the grave and the place of the treasure are not one thing save accidentally, because they have no mutual connection. Consequently the power of the heavenly body cannot cause an inclination per se to this effect considered as a whole, namely that the man in question should dig a grave and a place where a treasure is. Whereas one that acts through the intellect can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelligent being to direct many things to one. It is also plain that a man who knew the treasure to be there, might send another who knew it not, to dig a grave in the same place, so that he might find the treasure unintentionally. Accordingly such fortuitous events when referred to the divine causality, cease to be fortuitous, but not when they are referred to a heavenly cause.

The same argument shows that a man cannot be fortunate in every possible way through the influence of a heavenly body, but only in this or that respect. When I say in every way, I mean that a man is not by nature such that through the influence of a heavenly body, he chooses always or nearly always, those particular things to which some advantage or disadvantage is accidentally connected. For nature is directed to one thing only: and the things in regard to which man is fortunate or unfortunate are not reducible to one, but are indeterminate and infinite in number; as the Philosopher says (2 Phys. v.), and is evident to any one with sense. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to be of such a nature as invariably to choose those things which have some advantage incidental to them. But one may be inclined by a heavenly body to choose something to which an incidental advantage is attached, and by some other inclination, to choose something else, and by yet a third inclination, to choose yet another thing, but not by one inclination to choose them all. Whereas man can be directed to all things by the one divine disposition.