Summa contra Gentiles3.99 Chapter XCIX. That God can work outside the order imposed on things, by producing effects without their proxi- mate causes

It remains to be proved that he can act outside the order imposed on things by himself.

For the order imposed on things by God is that lower things be moved by higher, as was shown above. Now God can act independently of this order: in other words he can himself produce an effect in inferior things, without a higher agent doing anything towards that effect. For the agent that works by natural necessity differs from the agent that acts by will, in that the effect cannot result from the former except according to the mode of its active power; so that the agent which has very great power cannot produce immediately a small effect, but produces an effect proportionate to its power. In this effect, however, there will be sometimes less power than in its cause, so that at length through many intermediaries a small effect results from the highest cause. But it is not so in the agent that acts by its will. Because the agent that acts by its will can at once without any intermediary produce any effect that does not surpass its power: thus the most perfect craftsman can produce a work such as an imperfect craftsman would produce.

Now God works by his will, and not by necessity of nature, as we proved above. Therefore he can produce minor effects, that are produced by inferior causes, immediately without their proper causes.

Again. The divine power is compared to all active powers as a universal power to particular powers, as is clear from what has been said above. Now an active universal power may be determined to the production of a particular effect, in two ways. First, by a particular intermediary cause: thus the active power of a heavenly body is determined to the effect which is the begetting of a man, by the particular power seated in the semen: and thus again, the power of the general proposition in a syllogism is determined to a particular conclusion, by the application of a particular proposition. Secondly, by an intellect which apprehends a particular form and produces it in the effect. Now the divine intellect knows not only its own essence which is like a universal active power; and not only universal and first causes, but also all particular causes, as we have proved above. Therefore God can produce immediately every effect that is produced by any particular agent.

Further. Since accidents result from the essential principles of a thing, it follows that he who is the immediate cause of the essence, is able to produce in a thing whatever results from its essence: for the generator which gives the form, gives likewise all the resultant properties and movements.

Now, we have shown that God, in the original production of things, brought all things into being immediately by creation. Therefore he can cause an effect to result in anything whatsoever independently of middle causes.

Besides. The order of things emanates from God into things according to the forecast of His intelligence: thus in human affairs we see that the head of the state imposes on the citizens the order preconceived by him. Now the divine intellect is not necessarily confined to this particular order, so as to be unable to conceive any other: since even we are able by our intellect to apprehend another order: for it is intelligible to us that God might make a man of earth and not of seed. Therefore God can produce an effect without the inferior causes to which that effect is proper.

Moreover. Although the order imposed on things by divine providence reflects the divine goodness according to its mode, yet it does not reflect it perfectly: since the creature’s goodness does not reach to an equality with the goodness of God. Now, that which is not perfectly represented by one copy, can be represented again in some other way besides. And the representation of the divine goodness in things is the end of their production by God, as above stated. Therefore God’s will is not confined to this particular order of causes and effects, as though he could not choose to produce an effect in lower things immediately and independently of other causes.

Further. All creatures are more subject to God, than man’s body is to his soul: for the soul is proportionate to the body as its form, whereas God surpasses all proportion to the creature. Now, sometimes when the soul imagines a thing and is strongly drawn towards it, there results a change in the body in the direction of health or sickness, independently of any action on the part of those bodily principles, whose natural function is to cause sickness or health in the body. Much more, therefore, by the divine will can an effect be produced in creatures, independently 1 Bk. II., ch. xxi. 2 Ch. xix.

of the causes which in the course of nature produce that effect naturally.

Further. According to the order of nature, the active forces of the elements are subordinate to the active powers of heavenly bodies. Now, sometimes the power of a heavenly body produces an effect proper to elemental forces without the action of an element: thus the sun heats without the action of fire. Much more therefore can the power of God produce the effects of created causes without any action on their part.

If, however, anyone were to say that since God has implanted this order in things, he cannot produce in them effects apart from their proper causes without a change in himself: he can be answered by referring to the very nature of things. For the order imposed on things by God is in keeping with that which is wont to occur in things for the most part, but it is not everywhere in keeping with what always occurs: because many natural causes produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since sometimes, though seldom, it happens otherwise, whether on account of a defect in the power of the agent, or through indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency: as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man.

Yet the order of providence does not therefore fail or change: because the very fact that the natural order, established according to what happens for the most part, happens at times to fail, is subject to divine providence. Wherefore if it be possible for the natural order to be changed by a created power from that which is of frequent to that which is of rare occurrence, v/ithout any change in divine providence, much more can the divine power at times work apart from the order assigned by God to nature, without prejudice to His providence. In fact He does this sometimes in order to manifest His power. For by no other means can it better be made manifest that all nature is subject to the divine will, than by the fact that sometimes He works independently of the natural order: since this shows that the order of things proceeded from Him, not of natural necessity, but of His free will.

Nor should it be deemed a paltry reason, that God should produce something in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men: since it was shown above that all corporeal creatures are in some way directed to an intellectual nature as their end; while the end of the intellectual creature itself is the knowledge of God, as we have proved. It is not strange, then, if some change be wrought in a corporeal substance, in order to bring the intellectual nature to the knowledge of God.