Summa contra Gentiles1.82 Chapter LXXXII. Objections against the statement that God wills not of necessity things other than himself, in that it involves impossibilities

Nevertheless it would seem to lead to impossibilities if God does not necessarily will the things that He wills.

For if God's will is not determined in respect of certain things that He wills, it would seem that He is indifferent.

Now every power that is indifferent is somewhat in potentiality: since the indifferent is a species of possible contingency. Therefore God's will would be in potentiality: and consequently it would not be God's substance, wherein there is no potentiality, as we have shown above.

Again. If a potential being as such is naturally changeable, since what is possible to be, is possible to not-be, it follows also that the divine will is changeable.

Further. If it is natural for God to will something concerning His effects, it is necessary. Now nothing can be in Him that is not natural to Him, for nothing accidental or violent can be in Him, as we have proved above.

Again. If that which is indifferent to either of two alternatives does not tend to the one rather than to the other unless it be determined by something else, it follows that either God wills none of the things to which He is indifferent—the contrary of which has been proved above3—or else He is determined to one alternative by something else. And thus something will be before Him that determines Him to one thing.

Now none of these consequences follow of necessity. For indifference may befit a power in two ways: first, on the part of the power itself; secondly, in respect of that to which it is said to be indifferent. On the part of the power itself, when it has not yet reached its perfection whereby it is determined to one thing. Wherefore this argues imperfection in the power, and potentiality is proved to be in it: as may be seen in the intellect of one who doubts, for it has not yet acquired the principles by which it may be determined to one alternative. On the part of the thing to which it is said to be indifferent, a power is found to be indifferent to either alternative, when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, and yet either is possible: even as an art which can use various instruments that are equally adapted to perfect its work. Now this does not argue imperfection in the power, rather does it pertain to its perfection: in as much as it transcends both alternatives, 1 Ch. xvi. 2 Ch. xix. 3 Ch. lxxv.

and for this reason is determined to neither, being indifferent to both. It is thus with God's will in regard to other things than Himself: since its end depends on none of these other things, whereas it is most perfectly united to its end. Therefore it does not follow that there must be potentiality in the divine will.

Likewise neither does it follow that there is changeableness. For if there is no potentiality in God's will, the reason why, in His effects, He does not of necessity give preference to the one alternative, is not because He is considered to be indifferent to either alternative, so as to be at first potentially willing either, and afterwards willing actually (whereas He is always actually willing whatsoever He wills, with regard not only to Himself but also His effects); but it is because the thing willed is not necessarily related to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will; in the same way in which we say that an enunciation is not necessary but possible where the predicate is not necessarily related to the subject. Hence when we say: God wills this effect, this statement is clearly not necessary but possible, in the same way as a thing is said to be possible, not in reference to a potentiality, but because it is neither necessary nor impossible for it to be, as the Philosopher teaches (6 Metaph.). Thus the statement that a triangle has two equal sides is possible, yet not in reference to a potentiality, since in mathematics there is neither potentiality nor movement. Therefore the exclusion of the aforesaid necessity does not remove the unchangeableness of the divine will, to which Holy Writ bears witness (1 Kings xv. 29): The Triumpher in Israel... will not be moved to repentance.

Yet although God's will is not determined to its effects, it does not follow that He wills none of them, or that He is determined by something outside to will them. For, since the apprehended good determines the will as the latter's proper object, while God's intellect is not outside His will, because each is His essence; if God's will is determined by the will of His intellect to will something, the determination of the divine will is not effected by something outside. For the divine intellect apprehends not only the divine being which is His goodness, but also other goods, as we proved above. And it apprehends these as likenesses of the divine goodness, not as principles thereof. Wherefore the divine will tends to them as according with His goodness, not as necessary thereto. It is the same with our will, because when it tends to something as simply necessary to an end, it is moved by a kind of necessity towards it: whereas when it tends to something merely on account of some fittingness, it does not tend thereto of necessity. Therefore neither does the divine will tend necessarily to its effects.

Nor does it follow on account of what has been said, that we must admit the existence in God of something not natural. For His will, by the one and same act, wills Himself and other things. Now His relation to Himself is necessary and natural; whereas His relation to other things is by way of a kind of fittingness, not necessary and natural, nor violent and unnatural, but voluntary: since what is voluntary, must needs be neither natural nor violent.