Summa contra Gentiles

Books I-III only: the Fourth Book (1929) of this translation is not on the Internet Archive and is not included. Footnotes (references to Aristotle etc.) omitted; the translator's preface omitted. Where the translation prints two chapters under one heading (e.g. I, 51-52 'Chapters LI and LII') the division takes the first number. English only: the Leonine Latin (1918-1930) exists only as scans.

1. First Book: God
2. 1.1 Chapter I. In what consists the office of a wise man
3. 1.2 Chapter II. The author's intention in this work
4. 1.3 Chapter III. In what way it is possible to make known the divine truth
5. 1.4 Chapter IV. That the truth about divine things which is attain- able by reason is fittingly proposed to man as an object of belief
6. 1.5 Chapter V. That those things which cannot be investigated by reason are fittingly proposed to man as an object of faith
7. 1.6 Chapter VI. That it is not a mark of levity to assent to the things that are of faith, although they are above reason
8. 1.7 Chapter VII. That the truth of reason is not in opposition to the truth of the Christian faith
9. 1.8 Chapter VIII. In what relation human reason stands to the truth of faith
10. 1.9 Chapter IX. Of the order and mode of procedure in this work
11. 1.10 Chapter X. Of the opinion of those who aver that it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God, since this is self-evident
12. 1.11 Chapter XI. Refutation of the foregoing opinion and solution of the aforesaid arguments
13. 1.12 Chapter XII. Of the opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be proved, and that it is held by faith alone
14. 1.13 Chapter XIII. Arguments in proof of God's existence ' v **
15. 1.14 Chapter XIV. That in order to acquire knowledge of God it is neces- sary to proceed by the way of remotion
16. 1.15 Chapter XV. That God is eternal
17. 1.16 Chapter XVI. That in God there is no passive potentiality
18. 1.17 Chapter XVII. That in God there is no matter
19. 1.18 Chapter XVIII. That in God there is no composition
20. 1.19 Chapter XIX. That in God there is nothing violent or beside nature
21. 1.20 Chapter XX. That God is not a body
22. 1.21 Chapter XXI. That God is his own essence
23. 1.22 Chapter XXII. That in God existence and essence are the same
24. 1.23 Chapter XXIII. That there is no accident in God
25. 1.24 Chapter XXIV. That the divine being cannot be specified by the addi- tion of any substantial difference
26. 1.25 Chapter XXV. That God is not in any genus
27. 1.26 Chapter XXVI. That God is not the formal being of all things
28. 1.27 Chapter XXVII. That God is not the form of a body
29. 1.28 Chapter XXVIII. Of the divine perfection
30. 1.29 Chapter XXIX. Of the likeness of creatures
31. 1.30 Chapter XXX. What terms can be predicated of God
32. 1.31 Chapter XXXI. That the divine perfection and the plurality of divine names are not inconsistent with the divine simplicity
33. 1.32 Chapter XXXII. That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things
34. 1.33 Chapter XXXIII. That not all terms applied to God and creatures are purely equivocal
35. 1.34 Chapter XXXIV. That terms applied to God and creatures are employed analogically
36. 1.35 Chapter XXXV. That the several names predicated of God are not synonymous
37. 1.36 Chapter XXXVI. How our intellect forms a proposition about God
38. 1.37 Chapter XXXVII. That God is good
39. 1.38 Chapter XXXVIII. That God is goodness itself
40. 1.39 Chapter XXXIX. That no evil can be in God
41. 1.40 Chapter XL. That God is the good of every good3
42. 1.41 Chapter XLI. That God is the sovereign good
43. 1.42 Chapter XLII. That God is one
44. 1.43 Chapter XLIII. That God is infinite
45. 1.44 Chapter XLIV. That God is an intelligent being
46. 1.45 Chapter XLV. That God's act of intelligence is his essence
47. 1.46 Chapter XLVI. That God understands by nothing else than his essence
48. 1.47 Chapter XLVII. That God understands himself perfectly
49. 1.48 Chapter XLVIII. That God knows only himself first and per se
50. 1.49 Chapter XLIX. That God knows things other than himself
51. 1.50 Chapter L. That God has proper knowledge of all things
52. 1.51 Chapter LI and LII. Reasons for inquiring how there is a multitude of things understood in the divine intellect
53. 1.53 Chapter LIII. Solution of the foregoing doubt
54. 1.54 Chapter LIV. How the divine essence, though one and simple, is a proper likeness of all things intelligible
55. 1.55 Chapter LV. That God understands all things at the same instant
56. 1.56 Chapter LVI. That God's knowledge is not a habit
57. 1.57 Chapter LVII. That God's knowledge is not discursive
58. 1.58 Chapter LVIII. That God does not understand by composition and division
59. 1.59 Chapter LIX. That God is not ignorant of the truth of enunciations
60. 1.60 Chapter LX. That God is truth
61. 1.61 Chapter LXI. That God is the most pure truth
62. 1.62 Chapter LXII. That the divine truth is the first and supreme truth
63. 1.63 Chapter LXIII. The arguments of those who would deny to God the knowledge of singulars
64. 1.64 Chapter LXIV. Order of the things to be said about the divine knowledge
65. 1.65 Chapter LXV. That God knows singulars
66. 1.66 Chapter LXVI. That God knows the things that are not
67. 1.67 Chapter LXVII. That God knows future contingent singulars
68. 1.68 Chapter LXVIII. That God knows the movements of the will
69. 1.69 Chapter LXIX. That God knows infinite things
70. 1.70 Chapter LXX. That God knows trivial things
71. 1.71 Chapter LXXI. That God knows evil things
72. 1.72 Chapter LXXII. That in God there is will
73. 1.73 Chapter LXXIII. That God's will is his essence
74. 1.74 Chapter LXXIV. That the principal object of God's will is the divine essence
75. 1.75 Chapter LXXV. That God in willing himself wills also other things
76. 1.76 Chapter LXXVI. That God, by the one act of his will, wills himself and other things
77. 1.77 Chapter LXXVII. That the multitude of things willed is not incon- sistent with the divine simplicity
78. 1.78 Chapter LXXVIII. That the divine will extends to particular goods
79. 1.79 Chapter LXXIX. That God wills even the things that are not yet
80. 1.80 Chapter LXXX. That God necessarily wills his being and his goodness
81. 1.81 Chapter LXXXI. That God does not necessarily will other things than himself
82. 1.82 Chapter LXXXII. Objections against the statement that God wills not of necessity things other than himself, in that it involves impossibilities
83. 1.83 Chapter LXXXIII. That God wills something other than himself by a necessity of supposition
84. 1.84 Chapter LXXXIV. That God's will is not of things impossible in themselves
85. 1.85 Chapter LXXXV. That the divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor impose absolute necessity on them
86. 1.86 Chapter LXXXVI. That a reason of the divine will can be assigned
87. 1.87 Chapter LXXXVII. That nothing can be the cause of the divine will
88. 1.88 Chapter LXXXVIII. That in God there is free-will
89. 1.89 Chapter LXXXIX. That the passions of the appetite are not in God
90. 1.90 Chapter XC. That in God are delight and joy, nor are they incom- patible with the divine perfection
91. 1.91 Chapter XCI. That in God there is love
92. 1.92 Chapter XCII. How virtues are to be ascribed to God
93. 1.93 Chapter XCIII. That in God there are the moral virtues which are about actions
94. 1.94 Chapter XCIV. That the contemplative virtues are in God
95. 1.95 Chapter XCV. That God cannot will evil
96. 1.96 Chapter XCVI. Ie hatred of any that God hates nothing, nor can the hatred of any- thing be ascribed to him
97. 1.97 Chapter XCVII. That God is a living being
98. 1.98 Chapter XCVIII. That God is his own life
99. 1.99 Chapter XCIX. That God's life is eternal
100. 1.100 Chapter C. That God is happy
101. 1.101 Chapter CI. That God is his own happiness
102. 1.102 Chapter CII. That God's happiness is perfect and singular, sur- passing all other happiness
103. Second Book: Creation
104. 2.1 Chapter I. Connection of the foregoing with the sequel
105. 2.2 Chapter II. That the consideration of creatures is useful for building up our faith
106. 2.3 Chapter III. That the knowledge of the nature of creatures avails for refuting errors against God
107. 2.4 Chapter IV. That the Philosopher and the theologian treat of creatures in different ways
108. 2.5 Chapter V. Order of the things to be said
109. 2.6 Chapter VI. That it becomes God to be the source of being to other things
110. 2.7 Chapter VII. That in God there is active power
111. 2.8 Chapter VIII. THAT god's power IS HIS SUBSTANCE
112. 2.9 Chapter IX. THAT god's power IS HIS ACTION
113. 2.10 Chapter X. In what way power is ascribed to God
114. 2.11 Chapter XI. That something is said of God in relation to creatures
115. 2.12 Chapter XII. That relations said of God in reference to creatures are not really in God
116. 2.13 Chapter XIII and XIV. How the aforesaid relations are predicated of God
117. 2.15 Chapter XV. That God is to all things the cause of being
118. 2.16 Chapter XVI. That God brought things into being out of nothing
119. 2.17 Chapter XVII. That creation is neither movement nor change
120. 2.18 Chapter XVIII. How to solve the objections against creation
121. 2.19 Chapter XIX. That in creation there is no succession
122. 2.20 Chapter XX. That no body can create
123. 2.21 Chapter XXI. That it belongs to God alone to create
124. 2.22 Chapter XXII. That God can do all things
125. 2.23 Chapter XXIII. That God does not act of natural necessity
126. 2.24 Chapter XXIV. That God works according to his wisdom
127. 2.25 Chapter XXV. How the almighty is said to be unable to do certain things
128. 2.26 Chapter XXVI. That the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects
129. 2.27 Chapter XXVII. That the divine will is not confined to certain effects
130. 2.28 Chapter XXVIII and XXIX. How there is anything due in the production of things
131. 2.30 Chapter XXX. How there can be absolute necessity in created things
132. 2.31 Chapter XXXI. That it is not necessary for creatures to have been always
133. 2.32 Chapter XXXII. Arguments of those who wish to prove the eternity of the world from God's side of the question
134. 2.33 Chapter XXXIII. Arguments of those who would prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of creatures
135. 2.34 Chapter XXXIV. Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making
136. 2.35 Chapter XXXV. Solution of the foregoing arguments, and first of those that were taken from the standpoint of God
137. 2.36 Chapter XXXVI. Solution of the arguments produced on the part of the things made
138. 2.37 Chapter XXXVII. Solution of the arguments taken from the making of things
139. 2.38 Chapter XXXVIII. Arguments by which some endeavour to prove that the world is not eternal
140. 2.39 Chapter XXXIX. That the distinction of things is not from chance
141. 2.40 Chapter XL. That matter is not the first cause of the distinction of things
142. 2.41 Chapter XLI. That the distinction of things is not on account of a contrariety of agents
143. 2.42 Chapter XLII. That the first cause of the distinction of things is not the order of secondary agents
144. 2.43 Chapter XLIII. That the distinction among things does not result from some secondary agent introducing various forms into matter
145. 2.44 Chapter XLIV. That distinction among things did not result from the diversity of merits or demerits
146. 2.45 Chapter XLV. What is in truth the first cause of the distinction of things
147. 2.46 Chapter XLVI. That for the perfection of the universe it was necessary that there should be some intellectual creatures
148. 2.47 Chapter XLVII. That intellectual substances are capable of willing
149. 2.48 Chapter XLVIII. That intellectual substances are of free-will in acting
150. 2.49 Chapter XLIX. That the intellectual substance is not a body
151. 2.50 Chapter L. That intellectual substances are immaterial
152. 2.51 Chapter LI. That the intellectual substance is not a material form
153. 2.52 Chapter LII. That in created intellectual substances there is a difference between being and what is
154. 2.53 Chapter LIII. That in created intellectual substances there is act and potentiality
155. 2.54 Chapter LIV. That composition of substance and being is not the same as composition of matter and form
156. 2.55 Chapter LV. That intellectual substances are incorruptible
157. 2.56 Chapter LVI. In what way it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body
158. 2.57 Chapter LVII. The opinion of Plato concerning the union of the intellectual soul with the body
159. 2.58 Chapter LVIII. That the nutritive, sensitive, and intellective faculties in man are not three souls
160. 2.59 Chapter LIX. THAT man's possible INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE
161. 2.60 Chapter LX. That man derives his species n'ot from the passive, but from the possible intellect
162. 2.61 Chapter LXI. That the aforesaid opinion is contrary to that of Aristotle
163. 2.62 Chapter LXII. Against the opinion of Alexander about the possible intellect
164. 2.63 Chapter LXIII. That the soul is not a temperament, as Galen asserted
165. 2.64 Chapter LXIV. That the soul is not a harmony
166. 2.65 Chapter LXV. That the soul is not a body
167. 2.66 Chapter LXVI. Against those who say that intellect and sense are the same
168. 2.67 Chapter LXVII. Against those who say that the possible intellect is the imagination
169. 2.68 Chapter LXVIII. How an intellectual substance can be the form of the body
170. 2.69 Chapter LXIX. Solution of the arguments by which it was proved above that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body as its form
171. 2.70 Chapter LXX. That according to the words of Aristotle vte must say that the intellect is united to the body as its form
172. 2.71 Chapter LXXI. That the soul is united to the body immediately
173. 2.72 Chapter LXXII. That the whole soul is in the whole body and in each part thereof
174. 2.73 Chapter LXXIII. That there is not one possible intellect in all men
175. 2.74 Chapter LXXIV. Of the opinion of Avicenna, who asserted that intel- ligible forms are not preserved in the possible intellect
176. 2.75 Chapter LXXV. Solution of the arguments which would seem to prove the unity of the possible intellect
177. 2.76 Chapter LXXVI. That the active intellect is not a separate substance but part of the soul
178. 2.77 Chapter LXXVII. That it is not impossible for the possible and active intellect to concur in the one substance of the soul
179. 2.78 Chapter LXXVIII. That Aristotle's opinion concerning the active intellect was not that it is a separate substance, but rather that it is part of the soul
180. 2.79 Chapter LXXIX. That the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted
181. 2.80 Chapter LXXX and LXXXI. Arguments to prove that the soul is corrupted when the body is corrupted
182. 2.82 Chapter LXXXII. That the souls of dumb animals are not immortal
183. 2.83 Chapter LXXXIII. That the human soul begins to exist with the body
184. 2.84 Chapter LXXXIV. Solution of the foregoing arguments
185. 2.85 Chapter LXXXV. That the soul is not made of God*s substance
186. 2.86 Chapter LXXXVI. That the human soul is not transmitted with the semen
187. 2.87 Chapter LXXXVII. That the human soul is brought into being through creation by God
188. 2.88 Chapter LXXXVIII. Arguments for proving that the human soul is formed from the semen
189. 2.89 Chapter LXXXIX. Solution of the foregoing arguments
190. 2.90 Chapter XC. That an intellectual substance is united as a form to no other than the human body
191. 2.91 Chapter XCI. That there are some intellectual substances which are not united to bodies
192. 2.92 Chapter XCII. Of the great number of separate substances
193. 2.93 Chapter XCIII. That there are not several separate substances of one species
194. 2.94 Chapter XCIV. That the separate substance and the soul are not of one species
195. 2.95 Chapter XCV. How we are to understand genus and species in separate substances
196. 2.96 Chapter XCVI. That separate substances do not gather their knowledge from sensibles
197. 2.97 Chapter XCVII. That the intellect of a separate substance always understands actually
198. 2.98 Chapter XCVIII. How one separate substance understands another
199. 2.99 Chapter XCIX. That separate substances know material things
200. 2.100 Chapter C. That separate substances know singulars
201. 2.101 Chapter CI. Whether separate substances know all things at the same time by their natural knowledge
202. Third Book: Providence
203. 3.1 Chapter I. Foreword
204. 3.2 Chapter II. That every agent acts for an end
205. 3.3 Chapter III. That every agent acts for a good
206. 3.4 Chapter IV. That evil is unintentional in things
207. 3.5 Chapter V and VI. Arguments that would seem to prove that evil is not beside the intention
208. 3.7 Chapter VII. That evil is not an essence
209. 3.8 Chapter VIII and IX. Arguments whereby seemingly it is proved that evil is a nature or a thing
210. 3.10 Chapter X. That the cause of evil is a good
211. 3.11 Chapter XI. That the subject of evil is a good
212. 3.12 Chapter XII. | that evil does not entirely destroy good
213. 3.13 Chapter XIII. That evil has a cause of some kind
214. 3.14 Chapter XIV. That evil is an accidental cause
215. 3.15 Chapter XV. That there is no sovereign evil
216. 3.16 Chapter XVI. That the end of everything is a good
217. 3.17 Chapter XVII. That all things are directed to one end, which is God
218. 3.18 Chapter XVIII. How God is the end of things
219. 3.19 Chapter XIX. That all things tend to be like unto God
220. 3.20 Chapter XX. How things imitate the divine goodness
221. 3.21 Chapter XXI. That things have a natural tendency to be like God forasmuch as he is a cause
222. 3.22 Chapter XXII. How things are directed in various ways to their respective ends
223. 3.23 Chapter XXIII. That the movement of the heaven is from an intellective principle
224. 3.24 Chapter XXIV. How even things devoid of knowledge seek the good
225. 3.25 Chapter XXV. That to know God is the end of every intelli- gent substance
226. 3.26 Chapter XXVI. Does happiness consist in an act of the will?
227. 3.27 Chapter XXVII. That human happiness does not consist in carnal pleasures
228. 3.28 Chapter XXVIII. That happiness does not consist in honours
229. 3.29 Chapter XXIX. That man’s happiness consists not in glory
230. 3.30 Chapter XXX. That man’s happiness does not consist in wealth
231. 3.31 Chapter XXXI. That happiness consists not in worldly power
232. 3.32 Chapter XXXII. That happiness consists not in goods of the body
233. 3.33 Chapter XXXIII. That human happiness is not seated in the senses
234. 3.34 Chapter XXXIV. That man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in acts of moral virtue
235. 3.35 Chapter XXXV. That ultimate happiness does not consist in the act of prudence
236. 3.36 Chapter XXXVI. That happiness does not consist in the practice of. Art
237. 3.37 Chapter XXXVII. That man’s ultimate happiness consists in contemplating God
238. 3.38 Chapter XXXVIII. That human happiness does not consist in the know- ledge of God which is possessed generally by the majority
239. 3.39 Chapter XXXIX. That man’s happiness does not consist in the know- ledge of God acquired by demonstration
240. 3.40 Chapter XL. That man’s happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God by faith
241. 3.41 Chapter XLI. Is it possible for man, in this life, to understand separate substances by the study and inquiry of speculative sciences?
242. 3.42 Chapter XLII. That in this life we are unable to know separate substances in the manner proposed by alex- ander?
243. 3.43 Chapter XLIII. That we cannot understand separate substances in this life, in the manner suggested by Averroes!
244. 3.44 Chapter XLIV. That man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of separate substances as pretended by the aforesaid opinions
245. 3.45 Chapter XLV. That it is impossible in this life to understand separate substances
246. 3.46 Chapter XLVI. That in this life the soul does not understand itself by itself
247. 3.47 Chapter XLVII. That in this life we are unable to see God in his essence
248. 3.48 Chapter XLVIII. That man’s ultimate happiness is not in this life
249. 3.49 Chapter XLIX. That separate substances do not see God in his essence through knowing him by their own essences
250. 3.50 Chapter L. That the natural desire of the separate substances is not set at rest in the natural knowledge they have of God
251. 3.51 Chapter LI. How God may be seen in his essence
252. 3.52 Chapter LII. That no created substance can by its natural power arrive at seeing God in his essence
253. 3.53 Chapter LIII. That the created intellect needs a ray) of) the divine light in order to see God in his essence
254. 3.54 Chapter LIV. Arguments that would seem to prove that God cannot be seen in his essence; and the solution thereof
255. 3.55 Chapter LV. That the created intellect does not comprehend the divine substance
256. 3.56 Chapter LVI. That no created intellect, in seeing God, sees all that can be seen in him
257. 3.57 Chapter LVII. That every intellect of any degree can participate in the divine vision
258. 3.58 Chapter LVIII. Than another
259. 3.59 Chapter LIX. How those who see the divine substance see all things
260. 3.60 Chapter LX. That those who see God see all in him at once
261. 3.61 Chapter LXI. That by seeing God a man is made a partaker of eternal life
262. 3.62 Chapter LXII. That those who see God will see him for ever
263. 3.63 Chapter LXIII. How in that ultimate happiness man’s every desire is fulfilled
264. 3.64 Chapter LXIV. That God governs things by his providence
265. 3.65 Chapter LXV. That God preserves things in existence
266. 3.66 Chapter LXVI. That nothing gives existence except in so far as it acts by God’s power
267. 3.67 Chapter LXVII. Their operating
268. 3.68 Chapter LXVIII. That God is everywhere
269. 3.69 Chapter LXIX. Concerning the opinion of those who withdraw from natural things their proper actions
270. 3.70 Chapter LXX. How the same effect is from God and from the natural agent
271. 3.71 Chapter LXXI. That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things
272. 3.72 Chapter LXXII. That divine providence does not exclude contingency from things
273. 3.73 Chapter LXXIII. That divine providence does not exclude free will
274. 3.74 Chapter LXXIV. That divine providence does not exclude chance or luck
275. 3.75 Chapter LXXV. That divine providence is concerned with singular contingencies
276. 3.76 Chapter LXXVI. That God’s providence cares for all individuals immediately
277. 3.77 Chapter LXXVII. Out by secondary causes
278. 3.78 Chapter LXXVIII. That by means of intellectual creatures other creatures are/ ruled by God
279. 3.79 Chapter LXXIX. That the lower intellectual substances are ruled by the higher
280. 3.80 Chapter LXXX. Of the order between one angel and another
281. 3.81 Chapter LXXXI. Of the ordering of men among themselves and to other things
282. 3.82 Chapter LXXXII. That the inferior bodies are ruled by God by means of the heavenly bodies
283. 3.83 Chapter LXXXIII. Conclusion of the foregoing
284. 3.84 Chapter LXXXIV. That the heavenly bodies do not impress on our intellect
285. 3.85 Chapter LXXXV. That the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing
286. 3.86 Chapter LXXXVI. That corporeal effects in this lower world do not result of necessity from the action of the heavenly bodies
287. 3.87 Chapter LXXXVII. That the movement of a heavenly body is not the cause of our choosing by virtue of its soul moving us, as some say
288. 3.88 Chapter LXXXVIII. That created substances cannot be the direct causes of our acts of choosing and willing, but God alone
289. 3.89 Chapter LXXXIX. That the movement of the will, and not only the power of the will, is caused by God
290. 3.90 Chapter XC. That human choice and will are subject to divine providence
291. 3.91 Chapter XCI. How human affairs may be referred to higher causes
292. 3.92 Chapter XCII. How a man may be said to be fortunate, and how he is assisted by higher causes
293. 3.93 Chapter XCIII. Is there such a thing as fate, and what is it?
294. 3.94 Chapter XCIV. Of the certainty of divine providence
295. 3.95 Chapter XCV and XCVI. That the unchangeableness of divine providence does not exclude the usefulness of prayer
296. 3.97 Chapter XCVII. How there is a reason for divine providence
297. 3.98 Chapter XCVIII. How it is possible, and how it is impossible, for God to do something outside the order of his providence
298. 3.99 Chapter XCIX. That God can work outside the order imposed on things, by producing effects without their proxi- mate causes
299. 3.100 Chapter C. That what God does beside the order of nature is not contrary to nature
300. 3.101 Chapter CI. Of miracles
301. 3.102 Chapter CII. That God alone works miracles
302. 3.103 Chapter CIII. That spiritual substances do wonders which, how- ever, are not miracles properly speaking
303. 3.104 Chapter CIV. That the works of magicians result not only from the influence of heavenly bodies
304. 3.105 Chapter CV. Whence the works of magicians derive their efficacy
305. 3.106 Chapter CVI. That the intellectual substance which gives efficacy to the practices of magic is not good according to virtue
306. 3.107 Chapter CVII. That the intellectual substance whose assistance is employed in the magic arts is not evil in its nature
307. 3.108 Chapter CVIII. Arguments that would seem to prove. That there can be no sin in the demons
308. 3.109 Chapter CIX. That sin is possible in the demons, and how
309. 3.110 Chapter CX. Solution of the aforesaid arguments
310. 3.111 Chapter CXI. That rational creatures are subject to divine provi- dence in a special manner
311. 3.112 Chapter CXII. That rational creatures are governed for their own sake, and other creatures, as directed to them
312. 3.113 Chapter CXIII. That the rational creature is directed to its action by God not only in its relation to the species, but also in its relation to the individual
313. 3.114 Chapter CXIV. That laws are given by God to man
314. 3.115 Chapter CXV. That the divine law directs man chiefly to God
315. 3.116 Chapter CXVI. That the end of God’s law is the love of God
316. 3.117 Chapter CXVII. That we are directed by the divine law to the love of our neighbour
317. 3.118 Chapter CXVIII. That the divine law binds men to the true faith
318. 3.119 Chapter CXIX. That our mind is directed to God by certain sensible things
319. 3.120 Chapter CXX. That the worship of latria is due to God alone
320. 3.121 Chapter CXXI. That the divine law directs man according to reason as regards things corporeal and sensible
321. 3.122 Chapter CXXII. How, according to the divine law, simple fornication is a sin I and that matrimony is natural
322. 3.123 Chapter CXXIII. That matrimony should be indissoluble
323. 3.124 Chapter CXXIV. That matrimony should be the union of one man with one woman
324. 3.125 Chapter CXXV. That marriage should not be contracted between relatives
325. 3.126 Chapter CXXVI. That not all carnal intercourse is sinful
326. 3.127 Chapter CXXVII. That no food is in itself sinful for one to take
327. 3.128 Chapter CXXVIII. How by the divine law man is directed to his neighbour
328. 3.129 Chapter CXXIX. That some human acts are right by nature, and not because they are prescribed by law
329. 3.130 Chapter CXXX. Of the counsels given in the divine law
330. 3.131 Chapter CXXXI. Concerning the error of those who condemn voluntary poverty
331. 3.132 Chapter CXXXII. Of the ways of life followed by those who embrace voluntary poverty
332. 3.133 Chapter CXXXIII. How poverty is good
333. 3.134 Chapter CXXXIV. Solution of the arguments given above against poverty
334. 3.135 Chapter CXXXV. Solution of the objections urged against the various ways of life followed by those who embrace voluntary poverty
335. 3.136 Chapter CXXXVI and CXXXVII. Concerning the error of those who condemn perpetual continence
336. 3.138 Chapter CXXXVIII. Against those who condemn vows
337. 3.139 Chapter CXXXIX. That neither merits nor sins are equal
338. 3.140 Chapter CXL. That man’s actions are punished or rewarded by God
339. 3.141 Chapter CXLI. Of the difference and order of punishments
340. 3.142 Chapter CXLII. That punishments and rewards are not all equal
341. 3.143 Chapter CXLIII. Of the punishment due to mortal and venial sin in relation to the last end
342. 3.144 Chapter CXLIV. That by mortal sin man forfeits his last end for eternity
343. 3.145 Chapter CXLV. That sins are punished also by the sinner being subjected to some kind of pain
344. 3.146 Chapter CXLVI. That it is lawful for judges to inflict punishments
345. 3.147 Chapter CXLVII. That man needs the divine assistance in order to obtain beatitude
346. 3.148 Chapter CXLVIII. That the assistance of divine grace does not compel man to virtue
347. 3.149 Chapter CXLIX. That man is unable to merit the divine assistance
348. 3.150 Chapter CL. That this same assistance is called grace; and what is meant by sanctifying grace
349. 3.151 Chapter CLI. That sanctifying grace causes in us the love of God
350. 3.152 Chapter CLII. That grace causes faith in us
351. 3.153 Chapter CLIII. That divine grace causes hope in us
352. 3.154 Chapter CLIV. Of the gifts of gratuitous grace: wherein it is treated of the divinations of demons
353. 3.155 Chapter CLV. That man needs the divine aid in order to persevere in good
354. 3.156 Chapter CLVI. That he who falls away from grace by sin, can recover again by means of grace
355. 3.157 Chapter CLVII. That man cannot be freed from sin save by grace
356. 3.158 Chapter CLVIII. How man is freed from sin
357. 3.159 Chapter CLIX. That, although man cannot be converted to God without God’s grace, yet it is reasonably im- puted to him, if he be not converted
358. 3.160 Chapter CLX. That a man who is in sin cannot avoid sin without grace
359. 3.161 Chapter CLXI. That God delivers some from sin, and leaves some in sin
360. 3.162 Chapter CLXII. That God is not the cause of any man sinning
361. 3.163 Chapter CLXIII. Of predestination, reprobation, and the divine election