Summa contra Gentiles2.34 Chapter XXXIV. Arguments to prove the eternity of the world from the point of view of the making

Again, other arguments may be taken from the point of view of the making, in order to prove the same conclusion.

For what is asserted by all in common cannot possibly be entirely false: because a false opinion is a weakness of the understanding, even as a false judgment about its proper sensible results from a weakness of the sense. Now defects are accidental, since they are beside the intention of nature. And what is accidental cannot be always and in everything: for instance, the judgment given by all tastes about savours cannot be false. Consequently the judgment given by all about a truth cannot be erroneous. Now it is the common opinion of all philosophers that from nothing, naught is made. Wherefore this must be true. Hence if a thing is made, it must be made from something: and if this also is made, it must also be made from something. But this cannot go on indefinitely, for then no generation would be completed, since it is not possible to go through an infinite number of things. Therefore we must come to some first thing that was not made. Now every thing that has not always been, must have been made. Therefore the thing from which all things were first made, must be eternal. But this is not God, since He cannot be the matter of a thing, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it follows that something beside God is eternal, namely primary matter.

Moreover. If a thing is not in the same state now and before, it must be, in some way, changed, for to be moved is not to be in the same state now as before. Now everything that begins to be anew, is not in the same state now as before. Therefore this must result from some movement or change. But every movement or change is in a subject, for it is the act of a movable. Now, since movement precedes that which is made by movement, for movement terminates therein, it follows that before anything made there pre-exists a movable subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must necessarily come to some first subject that begins not anew but always has been.

Again. Whatever begins to be anew, it was possible, before it was, that it would be. For if not, it was impossible for it to be and necessary for it not to be: and so it would always have been a non-being and it never would have begun to be. Now that for which it is possible to be is a subject potentially a being. Therefore before everything that begins to be anew, there must pre-exist a subject which is a potential being. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must suppose some first subject which did not begin to be anew.

Again. No permanent substance is while it is being made: for it is made in order that it may be, wherefore it would not have to be made if it were already. But while it is being made, there must be something that is the subject of the making: since a making, seeing that it is an accident, cannot be without a subject. Therefore whatever is made has a pre-existing subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, it follows that the first subject was not made, but is eternal. Whence it also follows that something beside God is eternal, because He cannot be the subject of making or movement.

Accordingly these are the arguments, through clinging to which as though they were demonstrations some people say that things created have necessarily been always.

Wherein they contradict the Catholic faith, which affirms that nothing beside God has always been, and that all things have begun to be, save the one eternal God.