Summa contra Gentiles3.38 Chapter XXXVIII. That human happiness does not consist in the know- ledge of God which is possessed generally by the majority
Chapter XXXVIII. That human happiness does not consist in the know- ledge of God which is possessed generally by the majority
consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowfact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book:? or, as seems nearer to the truth, without a cause of order—men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who arranges in order the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration: even so, when we see a man in motion, and performing other works, we perceive that in him there is a cause of these operations, which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of soul, but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question.
Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness.
For the operation of the happy must be without any defect: and this knowledge is subject to an admixture of many errors. Some believed that there is no other ordainer of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; wherefore they said that the heavenly bodies are gods.—Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they deemed the movements and natural operations thereof, not to be due to another ordainer, and the order in other things to be caused by them.—Some, deeming human acts not to be subject to any but a human ordinance, declared that men who cause order in other men are gods.—Accordingly this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.
Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as their end: indeed, it is in everyone almost from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God.
Again. Nooneappears to be blamed for lacking happiness: nay, those who have it not and seek it are praised. Whereas he who lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God, is seemingly very much to be blamed: since it is a very clear sign of a man’s dullness of perception, if he fail to perceivesuch evident signs of God’s existence: even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, understood not that he has a soul, Hence it is said in the Psalm (xiii. 1: li. 1): The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.
Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in respect of a property thereof, is most imperfect; for instance knowledge of man from the fact that he is moved, for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only potentially: because the proper is only potentially contained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man’s supreme good must needs be in respect of what he is actually, and not in respect of what he is only potentially: since potentiality perfected by act has the aspect ofa good. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness.
Citato nell'enciclopedia: FINE ULTIMO