Summa contra Gentiles1.65 Chapter LXV. That God knows singulars

Accordingly, we shall prove first that God cannot be lacking in the knowledge of singulars.

For it has been shown that God knows other things in as much as He is their cause. Now God's effects are singular things: because God causes things in the same way as He makes them to be actual; and universals are not subsistent, but have their being only in singulars, as is proved in 7 Metaph. Therefore God knows things other than Himself not only in the universal but also in the singular.

Again. As soon as one knows the constituent principles of a thing's essence, one must needs know that thing: thus knowledge of the rational soul and of such a body implies knowledge of man. Now the essence of a singular is made up of signate matter and an individual form: thus the essence of Socrates is made up of this particular body and this particular soul, even as the essence of man in 1 Ch. xlix. 8 D. 6. xiii., xiv.

general is made up of soul and body, as stated in 7 Metaph. Wherefore, since the latter are included in the definition of man in general, so would the former be included in the definition of Socrates, if he could be defined. Hence whoever has knowledge of matter, and of those things whereby matter is designated, and of the form individualized by matter, cannot be lacking in knowledge of the singular. Now God's knowledge reaches to matter, individualizing accidents, and forms. For, since His act of understanding is His essence, it follows that He understands all that is in any way whatever in His essence: wherein are virtually, as in their first origin, all that have being in any way whatever, forasmuch as He is the first and universal principle of being; and among these we must include matter and accident, since matter is being in potentiality, and accident, being in another. Therefore God lacks not knowledge of singulars.

Moreover. The nature of a genus cannot be known perfectly unless its first differences and proper passions be known: thus the nature of number would not be perfectly known if odd and even were unknown. Now universal and singular are differences or proper passions of being. Therefore if God, in knowing His essence, knows perfectly the common nature of being, it follows that He knows perfectly the universal and the singular. But, just as He would not know the universal perfectly, if He knew the intention of universality without knowing the thing in the universal, such as man or animal, so too He would not know the singular perfectly if He knew the nature of singularity without knowing this or that singular thing. Therefore God must needs know singulars.

Again. Just as God is His very being, so is He His own act of knowledge, as we have proved. Now from the fact that He is His own being it follows that in Him are all the perfections of being as in the first source of being, as we have shown above.' Therefore it follows that every perfection of knowledge is found in His knowledge, as in the first fount of knowledge. But this would not be if He were lacking in the knowledge of singulars: since the perfection of some knowers consists in this. Therefore it is impossible for Him not to have knowledge of singulars.

Further. In every order of powers it is universally found that the higher power extends to more things and yet is but one, whereas the lower power extends to fewer things, and yet is multiple in relation to them. This appears in the imaginative power and sense; for the one power of imagination extends to all the things of which the five senses take cognizance, and to more besides. Now the cognitive power in God is higher than in man. Therefore whatever man knows by various powers, his intellect namely, imagination, and sense, God considers it by His one simple intellect. Therefore He knows singulars, which we apprehend by sense and imagination.

Moreover. God's intellect does not derive its knowledge from things as ours does, rather is He the cause of things by His knowledge, as we shall prove further on wherefore His knowledge of other things is after the manner of practical knowledge. Now practical knowledge is not perfect unless it extend to singulars: because the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is about singulars. Therefore the divine knowledge of other things extends to singulars.

Again. The first movable is moved by a motor that moves by intellect and appetite, as was shown above. Now a motor by intellect cannot cause movement unless it knows the movable as naturally inclined to local movement, and that is as existing here and now, and consequently as a singular. Wherefore the intellect that is the motor of the first movable knows the first movable as a singular. But this motor is either supposed to be God, and thus our point is proved, or else it is something beneath God. And if the intellect of this motor is able by its own power to know a singular which our intellect is unable 1 Bk. II., xxiv. 2 Ch. xliv.

to know, much more will the divine intellect be able to do so.

Again. The agent is more excellent than the patient and the thing done, as act is more excellent than potentiality. Wherefore a form of lower degree cannot by its action transmit its likeness to a higher degree, whereas a higher form is able by its action to transmit its likeness to a lower degree: thus corruptible forms are produced in this lower world by the incorruptible agency of the stars, while a corruptible agency cannot produce an incorruptible form. Now all knowledge is the result of assimilation between knower and known: yet there is this difference, that in human knowledge assimilation is brought about by the action of sensible things on the human cognitive powers, whereas contrariwise in God's knowledge it arises from the action of the form of the divine intellect on things known. Accordingly the form of a sensible object, being individualized by its materiality, is unable to transmit the likeness of its singularity to that which is altogether immaterial, and it can only reach those powers which use material organs; but it is transmitted to the intellect by virtue of the active intellect, in so far as it is wholly stripped of material conditions: and so the likeness of the singularity of a sensible form cannot reach as far as the human intellect. On the other hand the likeness of the form in the divine intellect, since it extends to the smallest details to which His causality extends, reaches to the singularity of a sensible and material form. Therefore the divine intellect can know singulars, whereas the human intellect cannot.

Further. If God knows not singulars which even men know, this would involve the absurdity which the Philosopher urges against Empedocles, namely that God is most foolish.

The truth which we have established is confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is written (Heb. iv. 13):

Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight. The contrary error is rejected (Ecclus. xvi. 16): Say not: I shall be hidden from God, and who shall remember me from on high?

From what we have said it is also clear how the objection raised in the contrary sense does not conclude aright. For that which the divine intellect understands, although immaterial, is nevertheless the likeness of both the matter and the form, as the first productive principle of both.