Summa contra Gentiles3.71 Chapter LXXI. That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things

From the foregoing it is also clear that divine providence, which governs things, does not prevent corruption, defects ASCH, eel and evil from being in the world. For the divine government whereby God works among things, does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown.? Now, a fault may occur in an effect through a fault in the secondary active cause, without there being any fault in the first agent: thus there may be a fault in the work of a crafts- ‘man who is perfect in his craft, on account of some defect in the instrument: even so, a man with strong motive power may limp, through no fault in the motive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found on account of defects in the secondary agents, although there is no defect in God.

_ Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things, unless there were degrees of goodness, so that, to wit, there be some things better than, others: else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the absence of multitude, since it is by reason of things differing from one another that one is better than another: for instance, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently if there were absolute equality among things there would be but one created good, which is clearly derogatory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness; and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Wherefore the perfection of the universe requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things governed. Therefore it does not belong to the providence of God entirely to exclude from things the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility: because that which aes SLD) sal bo: & can fail, at times does fail; and this very deficiency of the good is evil, as we have proved.!_ Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to ward off evil entirely from things. Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed, according to their mode: for in this consists the justice of the régime. Consequently even as it would be contrary to the right notion of human rule, if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties,—except perhaps for the time being, on account of some particular urgency,—so would it be contrary to the notion of God’s government, if He did not allow creatures to act in accordance with their respective natures. Now through creatures acting thus, corruption and evil result in things; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether. Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil, except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above.?, Nowit does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good, to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good: for thus many goods would be banished from the universe: thus if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like, a consequence of which is this evil, namely the burning of combustible things; the good consisting in fire being generated and preserved in its species would be done away. Therefore it is not part of divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things. Further. Thereare in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils: thus there would be no patience of the righteous, if there were no ill-will of the persecutors; nor would there be any place for vindictive justice, were there no crimes; even in the physical order there would be no generation of one thing, unless there were corruption of another. Consequently if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good 1 Ch. vii. 2 Ch. iv.

in goodness, than evil is in malice, as was shown above.

Again. The good of the whole is of more account than governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole: thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground, that the whole would be much diminished; since its beauty results from the Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, good health is; and they, too, are more keen about it than Hence it is said (Isa. xlv. 7): I make peace and create evil:

Lord hath not done?

Hereby we refute the error of those who through observing the presence of evil in the world, said that there is no God. Thus Boethius (I. de Consol.) introduces a philosopher who asks: If there be a God, whence comes evil? On the contrary, he should have argued: If there is evil, there is a God. For there would be no evil, if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil: and there would be no such order, if there were no God. ‘ Moreover by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that divine providence extends to this corruptible world, because they observed that many evils occur init. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God’s providence, because no defects and no evils are to be found in them.

Also we remove an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place in the providence of a good God.

Also the doubt is solved of some, namely whether evil deeds are from God. For since we proved' that every agent produces its action in so far as it acts by the power of God, and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions: and since again we proved” that evil and defect in things ruled by divine providence, result from the condition of the secondary causes, which may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes: but in so far as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God: even as a limp is from the motive power, in so far as it has movement; but in so far as it has a defect, it is from the crookedness of the leg.