Summa contra Gentiles3.28 Chapter XXVIII. That happiness does not consist in honours

From the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man’s supreme good, or happiness, consist in honours. For man’s ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect 1 Ch. xvii. 2 Augustine, De Haeres., haer. viii.

operation, as we have shown above.!' But man’s honour does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him honour. Therefore man’s happiness must not be placed in honours.

Again. That which is on account of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured, except on account of some other good in him. For this reason do men seek to be honoured, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them: so that they rejoice more in being honoured by the great and the wise.?, Therefore we must not assign man’s happiness to honours.

Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, else they were not praiseworthy. Therefore happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man’s power to secure honour, rather is it in the power of the man who pays honour. Therefore happiness is not to be assigned to honours.

Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honour: and yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honoured. Therefore it is better to become worthy of honour, than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not man’s supreme good.

Furthermore. The supreme good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore that which is in possession of the supreme good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honour. Therefore honour is not man’s supreme good.