Summa contra Gentiles1.89 Chapter LXXXIX. That the passions of the appetite are not in God

From the foregoing we may conclude that the passions of the appetite are not in God.

For there is no passion in the intellective appetite, but only in the sensitive, as is proved in 7 Phys. Now no such appetite can be in God, since He has no knowledge through senses, as clearly results from what has been said. Therefore it follows that no passion of the appetite is in God.

Further. Every passion of the appetite is accompanied by a bodily change, for instance in respect of the contraction and dilatation of the heart or something of the kind.

But none of these can possibly happen in God, since He is not a body nor a power in a body, as we have shown above. Therefore there is no passion of the appetite in Him.

Again. In every passion of the appetite the patient is somewhat drawn outside its ordinary, even, or connatural disposition: a sign of which is that these passions if they become intense cause an animal's death. But it is impossible for God to be in any way drawn outside His natural disposition, since He is utterly unchangeable, as was shown above. It is therefore evident that these passions cannot be in God.

Moreover. Every emotion that is accompanied by a passion, has one definite object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. For a passion has an impulse to some one thing, even as nature has: and on this account it needs to be curbed and ruled by reason. Now the divine will is not in itself determined to one in things created, except by the ordering of His Wisdom, as was proved above. Therefore there is no emotional passion in Him.

Again. Every passion is in a subject that is in potentiality. But God is altogether free of potentiality, since He is pure act. Therefore He is agent only, and in no way can passion take place in Him.

Accordingly all passion by reason of its genus is absent from God.

Some passions, however, are absent from God not only by reason of their genus, but also on account of their species. For every passion takes its species from its object. Wherefore a passion whose object is wholly unbefitting God is absent from God on account of its proper species. Such a passion is sorrow or pain: for its object is an actually inherent evil, just as the object of joy is a good present and possessed. Sorrow, therefore, and pain by their very nature cannot be in God.

Again. The formality of a passion's object is taken not only from good or evil, but also from the fact that a person 1 Ch. xx. 2 Ch. xiii. 3 Ch. lxxxii. * Ch. xvi.

is referred in some mode to the one or the other: for thus it is that hope and joy differ. Wherefore if the mode in which a person is referred to the object—that mode being essential to the passion—is not becoming to God, neither can the passion itself be becoming to God, and this by reason of its proper species. Now although hope has a good for its object, this is a good not already acquired, but to be yet obtained. And this cannot be competent to God, on account of His perfection, which is so great that nothing can be added to it. Hope therefore cannot be in God, even by reason of its species: nor again desire of anything not possessed.

Moreover. Just as the divine perfection excludes from God the potentiality of acquiring any additional good, so too and much more it excludes the potentiality to evil. Now fear regards evil that may be imminent, even as hope regards a good to be acquired. Wherefore fear by reason of its species is absent from God on two counts: both because it is befitting only one that is in potentiality, and because its object is an evil that can become present.

Again. Repentance denotes a change in the appetite. Wherefore the idea of repentance is inapplicable to God, both because it is a kind of sorrow, and because it implies a change of will.

Further. Without error in the cognitive power, it is impossible for that which is good to be apprehended as evil. Nor does it happen that the evil of one can be the good of another, save in particular goods, wherein the corruption of one is the generation of another: while the universal good is nowise impaired by any particular good, but is reflected by each one. Now God is the universal good, and by partaking of His likeness all things are said to be good. Hence no one's evil can be to Him a good. Nor is it possible for Him to apprehend as evil that which is good simply, and is not evil to Him: because His knowledge is without error, as we have proved above. Hence envy cannot possibly be in God, even according to the nature of its species; not only because envy is a kind of sorrow, but because it grieves for the good of another, and thus looks upon another's good as its own evil.

Again. To grieve for a good is like desiring an evil: for the former results from a good being deemed an evil, while the latter results from an evil being deemed a good. Now anger is the desire of another's evil in revenge. Therefore anger is far removed from God according to its specific nature; not only because it is an effect of sorrow, but also because it is a desire for revenge on account of sorrow arising from a harm inflicted.

Also, whatsoever passions are species or effects of the above, are equally removed from God.