Summa contra Gentiles3.73 Chapter LXXIII. That divine providence does not exclude free will

Wherefore it is clear that providence does not exclude free will.

For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfection of the things governed, as regards its attainment, increase or preservation. Therefore whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence rather than what savours of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, the contingency of causes arises from imperfection and deficiency: because by their nature they are determined to one effe¢t, which they always produce, unless there be an impediinent due either to weakness of power, or some extrinsic agency, or indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result, but more often produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not confined to one effect, and it is in its power to produce this effect or that, so that it is indifferent to either. Therefore it belongs to divine providence to preserve the freedom of the will, more than contingency in natural causes.

Moreover. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their mode. And the mode of a thing’s action is in keeping with its form which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: because the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect, since the apprehended good moves the will objectively; and the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms; so that the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude freedom of the will.

Again. The things governed are brought to a becoming end by the government of providence: wherefore Gregory of Nyssa’ says of divine providence that it is God’s will from which all existing things receive a fitting end. Now the last proved above.” It would therefore be inconsistent with divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God’s likeness in that he acts freely: for we have does not deprive the will of liberty.

Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore any thing that would deprive things of many good things does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of freedom, if man acted not freely: there would be no justice in rewardbe of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore it would be inconsistent with providence to deprive the will of liberty.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. xv. 14): God made man from the again (ibid., 18): Before man 1s life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him.

all things happen of necessity according to the order of” infallible causes, which order the Greeks called eiwappévy.