Summa contra Gentiles3.113 Chapter CXIII. That the rational creature is directed to its action by God not only in its relation to the species, but also in its relation to the individual

Hence it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God, with due regard not only to the species, but also to the individual. For, seemingly, everything is on account of its operation: since operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing. Wherefore each thing is directed to its action by God, according as it stands under divine providence. Now, the rational creature stands under divine providence as being governed and cared for, on its own account, and not, as other corruptible creatures, on account of the species only: because the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species, is not governed for its own sake; whereas the rational creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear. Accordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake, not only of the species, but also of the individual.

Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species, have not the power to act or not to act: since whatever results from the species, is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species; and we have no choice about natural things. Hence if man were directed in his actions in reference only to the demands of the species, he would not have the power to act, or not to act, and he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their actions, with regard not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Moreover. As we proved above, divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least. Therefore whatever things have actions outside the inclination of nature, must needs in such actions receive from divine providence a direction besides that which regards the species. Now, many actions are apparent in the rational creature, for which the inclination of the species is not sufficient: and a sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore the rational creature must needs be directed to its actions by God, with reference not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity: for He made each creature such that He knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through being governed 1 Ch. cxii. 2 Ch. lxxv. seqq.

by Him. Now, the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual: because it has intellect and reason, so as to be able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times, and places. Therefore the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual.

Besides. The rational creature is subject to divine providence in such a way, that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence: so that it is capable of providence and government in respect of others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they only participate in providence by being subject to it. Now, through being capable of providence, a man can direct and govern his own actions also. Therefore the rational creature participates in divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing: for it governs itself in its own actions, and other things too. Now, every lower providence is subj ect to divine providence as supreme. Therefore the government of a rational creature’s acts, as personal acts, belongs to divine providence.

Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore the actions of a rational creature are directed by divine providence, not only in the point of their belonging to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal.

Hence it is that, though all things are subject to divine providence, yet Holy Writ ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner; according to Ps. viii. 5: What is man that thou art mindful of him? and 1 Cor. ix. 9: Doth God take care of oxen? These things are said because God watches over man’s actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts.