Summa contra Gentiles3.31 Chapter XXXI. That happiness consists not in worldly power

_ In like manner neither can worldly power be man’s supreme happiness: since in the achievement thereof chance can effect much. Again it is unstable; and is not subject to man’s will; and is often obtained by evil men. These are incompatible with the supreme good, as already stated.” “Again. Man is said to be good especially according as he approaches the supreme good. But in respect to his having power, he is not said tg be either good or evil: since not everyone who can do good deeds is good, nor is a person evil because he can do evil deeds. Therefore the supreme good does not consist in being powerful.

Besides. Every power implies reference to something else. But the supreme good is not referred to anything further. Therefore power is not man’s supreme good.

- Moreover. Man’s supreme good cannot be a thing that one can use both well and ill: for the better things are those that we cannot abuse. But one can use one’s power both well and ill: for rational powers can be directed to contrary objects. Therefore human power is not man’s supreme good. Further. If any power be man’s supreme good, it must be most perfect. Now human power is most imperfect: for it is based on human will and opinion, which are full of inconsistencies. Also the greater a power is reputed to be, the greater number of people does it depend on: which again conduces to its weakness, since what depends on many, is in many ways destructible. Therefore man’s supreme good does not consist in worldly power. Consequently man’s happiness consists in no external good: for all external goods, which are known as goods of chance, are contained under those we have mentioned.