Summa contra Gentiles3.139 Chapter CXXXIX. That neither merits nor sins are equal

It is clear from what has been said that neither all good deeds, nor all sins, are equal. For a counsel is only about a greater good. Now, counsels in the divine law, are about poverty, continence and the like, as stated above. Hence these things are better than the use of marriage, and the possession of earthly goods: and yet with these one may live a virtuous life, if one keep within the bounds of reason, as we have proved. Therefore acts of virtue are not all equal.

Again. Acts take their species from their objects. Therefore the better the object, the more virtuous too will the act be in its species. Now, the end is better than the things directed to the end: and of these one is better than another, the nearer it is to the end. Consequently, the best of human acts is that one which is directed to the last end, namely God, immediately. After this, the act will be so much the better in its species, according as its object is nearer to God.

Besides. In human acts the good depends on their being regulated by reason. Now, it happens that some acts are more akin to the reason than others: forasmuch as acts of the reason itself have a greater share in reason’s good, than the acts of the lower powers, which reason commands. Therefore some human acts are better than others.

Also. The precepts of the law are best fulfilled through love, as stated above. Now a man may happen to fulfil an obligation through greater love than another man does. Hence one virtuous act will be better than another.

Further. If a man’s actions are made good by virtue; and since the same virtue is more intense in one than in another: it follows that one human act is better than another.

Moreover. If human acts are made good by virtues, the better act must needs be that which proceeds from the better virtue. Now we see that one virtue is better than another: as magnificence than liberality, and magnanimity than moderation. Thus one human act will be better than another.

Hence it is said (1 Cor. vii. 38): He that giveth his virgin in marriage, doth well: and he that giveth her not doth better.

The same reasons show that all sins are not equal: since by one sin a man strays more from his end than by another:

and the order of reason is more subverted: and a greater harm done to one’s neighbour.

Hence it is said (Ezech. xvi. 47): Thou hast done... more wicked things than they in all thy ways.

Hereby we refute the error of those who say that all merits and sins are equal.

However there seemed to be some reason for saying that all virtuous acts are equal, because every act is virtuous that tends to the end of the good. Hence, if all good actions have the same good as their end, they must all be equally good.

But, though there is one last end of the good, the acts which derive their goodness from it, receive various degrees of goodness. Because there is a difference of degrees in the goods that are directed to the last end, forasmuch as some are better than others, and approach nearer to the last end. Hence both in the will and in its acts there will be degrees of goodness, according to the diversity of goods that are the term to which the will and its acts are directed, although the last end is the same.

In like manner, there would seem to be reason for asserting that all sins are equal, because in human acts sin results only through someone transgressing the rule of reason. Now, one transgresses the rule of reason by deviating therefrom slightly just as by doing so greatly. Seemingly, then, the sin is equal, whether one sin in small or in great things.

This argument is, apparently, confirmed by the practice in human judgement. For if a person is forbidden to go beyond a certain limit, it makes no difference to the judge whether he goes beyond it little or much: thus it matters not, as soon as the boxer goes outside the ring, whether he go yet further. Therefore from the moment that one transgresses the rule of reason, it matters not whether one transgress little or much.:

Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, wherever perfection and good consist in a certain balance, the greater the deviation from the requisite balance, the greater the evil. Thus, health consists in a proper balance of the humours Iii. ii 11 beauty in due symmetry of members: truth in equation between thought or word and thing. And it is clear that the greater the disproportion in the humours, the greater the disease; and the greater the lack of symmetry in the members, the more unsightly the deformity: and the greater the deviation from the truth, the greater the falsehood: for there is not so much falsity in thinking three to be five, as in thinking it to be a hundred. Now, the virtuous good consists in a certain proportion, for it is the mean, according to the due modification of circumstances, set between contrary vices. Consequently the greater the divergence from this harmony, the greater the malice.

There is no comparison between transgressing a virtue and transgressing the bounds appointed by a judge. Because virtue is a good in itself: wherefore transgression of a virtue is an evil in itself: and consequently a greater deviation from virtue is a greater evil. But to break the particular bounds appointed by a judge, is not an evil in itself, but accidentally because, to wit, it is forbidden. Now when one thing is predicated accidentally of another, it does not follow of necessity, if A be predicated of simply, that more A should be predicated of more B, but only when the predication is per se: for it does not follow, if a white being is a musical being, that what is more white is more musical: whereas it does follow, if white dazzles the sight, that more white dazzles the sight yet more.

There is, however, this difference to be observed among sins, that some are mortal, and some venial. Mortal sin is that which deprives the soul of spiritual life. What this life consists in may be gathered from two things, by comparing it with natural life. For the body lives naturally through being united to the soul which is the principle of its life: and the body, quickened by the soul, is moved of itself: whereas a dead body either remains without movement, or is moved only by an extrinsic cause. So too, the human will is not only alive when, by its right intention, it is united to its last end,—which union is its object and, as it were, 1 2 Ethic, vi. 2 5 Topic, viii.

its form,—but also is moved by an intrinsic principle to do what is right—when by love man adheres to God and his neighbour. But without the intention of the last end and without love, the soul is dead, as it were: since it is not moved of itself to do what is right, but either leaves off so doing altogether, or is only instigated to do so by some extrinsic principle, namely the fear of punishment. Therefore all sins that are opposed to the intention of the last end, and to love, are mortal. On the other hand, if a man, without detriment to these, fails in a particular right order of the reason, it will not be a mortal, but a venial sin.