Against the Epistle of Manichæus, Called Fundamental 38
38 Nature Made by God; Corruption Comes from Nothing PL 42, 200
44. In this way, though corruption is an evil, and though it comes not from the Author of natures, but from their being made out of nothing, still, in God’s government and control over all that He has made, even corruption is so ordered that it hurts only the lowest natures, for the punishment of the condemned, and for the trial and instruction of the returning, that they may keep near to the incorruptible God, and remain incorrupt, which is our only good; as is said by the prophet, "But it is good for me that I keep near to God." And you must not say, God did not make corruptible natures: for, as far as they are natures, God made them; but as far as they are corruptible, God did not make them: for corruption cannot come from Him who alone is incorruptible. If you can receive this, give thanks to God; if you cannot, be quiet and do not condemn what you do not yet understand, but humbly wait on Him who is the light of the mind that thou mayest know. For in the expression "corruptible nature" there are two words, and not one only. So, in the expression, God made out of nothing, "God" and "nothing" are two separate words. Render therefore to each of these words that which belongs to each, so that the word "nature" may go with the word "God,"and the word "corruptible" with the word "nothing." And yet even the corruptions, though they have not their origin from God, are to be overruled by Him in accordance with the order of inanimate things and the deserts of His intelligent creatures. Thus we say rightly that reward and punishment are both from God. For God’s not making corruption is consistent with His giving over to corruption the man who deserves to be corrupted, that is, who has begun to corrupt himself by sinning, that he who has wilfully yielded to the allurements of corruption may, against his will, suffer its pains.
Restat ut quaeratis (nam ipsa solet esse vox ultima) unde sint illa mala, quae mihi quoque displicere dicebam. Respondebo fortasse, si vos prius dixeritis unde sint illa bona, quae vos quoque laudare cogimini, si absurdissimi cordis esse non vultis. Sed quid ego istud quaeram, cum utrique fateamur, omnia quaecumque et quantacumque bona sunt, ab uno Deo esse, qui summe bonus est? Resistite ergo vos ipsi Manichaeo, qui tot et tanta bona quae commemoravimus justeque laudavimus, pacem concordiamque partium in unaquaque natura, salutem valentiamque animantium, et caetera quae repetere jam piget, ita in terra commentitia tenebrarum esse arbitratus est, ut ab illo Deo quem bonorum omnium fatetur auctorem, alienare conaretur. Non enim ea bona vidit, dum hoc solum attendit quod displiceret: tanquam si quispiam leonis fremitu exterritus, et eum intuens trahentem ac dilaniantem pecorum aut hominum corpora quaecumque apprehendisset, puerili quadam infirmitate animi tanto timore percelleretur, ut solam feritatem leonis intuens atque saevitiam, caetera ejus negligens omnino atque praeteriens, naturam illius animantis, non tantum malum, sed magnum malum esse clamaret, tanto scilicet exaggeratius, quanto timidius. At si edomita feritate duci leonem mansuetum videret, praesertim si nunquam antea fuisset de illa bestia territus, tunc vacaret securo atque intrepido leonis pulchritudinem considerare atque laudare. De quo ego nihil dicam, nisi quod ad rem maxime pertinet, fieri posse ut aliqua natura offendat ex aliquo, et in totam nascatur odium: cum manifestum sit multo meliorem esse speciem verae ac vivae bestiae, etiam cum terret in silvis, quam imitatae atque simulatae cum in pariete picta laudatur. Hoc ergo errore ille nos non decipiat, nec caecos faciat ad considerandas naturarum species, cum quaedam in eis ita reprehendit, ut omni ex parte cogat displicere, quod omni ex parte reprehendere non potest: atque hoc modo animum ad aequum judicium componentes, quaeramus jam unde sint cum illis bonis mala, quae me quoque improbare dicebam. Quod facilius videbimus, si in unum nomen potuerimus cuncta conferre.