A Treatise on Nature and Grace 63
63 Does God Create Contraries? PL 44, 277
He next endeavours, by much quotation from the apostle, about which there is no controversy, to show “that the flesh is often mentioned by him in such a manner as proves him to mean not the substance, but the works of the flesh.” What is this to the point? The defects of the flesh are contrary to the will of man; his nature is not accused; but a Physician is wanted for its defects. What signifies his question, “Who made man’s spirit?” and his own answer thereto, “God, without a doubt?” Again he asks, “Who created the flesh?” and again answers, “The same God, I suppose.” And yet a third question, “Is the God good who created both?” and the third answer, “Nobody doubts it.” Once more a question, “Are not both good, since the good Creator made them?” and its answer, “It must be confessed that they are.” And then follows his conclusion: “If, therefore, both the spirit is good, and the flesh is good, as made by the good Creator, how can it be that the two good things should be contrary to one another?” I need not say that the whole of this reasoning would be upset if one were to ask him, “Who made heat and cold?” and he were to say in answer, “God, without a doubt.” I do not ask the string of questions. Let him determine himself whether these conditions of climate may either be said to be not good, or else whether they do not seem to be contrary to each other. Here he will probably object, “These are not substances, but the qualities of substances.” Very true, it is so. But still they are natural qualities, and undoubtedly belong to God’s creation; and substances, indeed, are not said to be contrary to each other in themselves, but in their qualities, as water and fire. What if it be so too with flesh and spirit? We do not affirm it to be so; but, in order to show that his argument terminates in a conclusion which does not necessarily follow, we have said so much as this. For it is quite possible for contraries not to be reciprocally opposed to each other, but rather by mutual action to temper health and render it good; just as, in our body, dryness and moisture, cold and heat,—in the tempering of which altogether consists our bodily health. The fact, however, that “the flesh is contrary to the Spirit, so that we cannot do the things that we would,” is a defect, not nature. The Physician’s grace must be sought, and their controversy must end.
Dialogismus. Deinde multis verbis Apostoli conatur ostendere, unde non est controversia, « quod caro ab illo ita saepe « nominetur, ut velit intelligi, non substantiam, sed opera carnis. » Quid hoc ad rem? Vitia carnis contraria sunt voluntati hominis: non natura accusatur; sed vitiis medicus quaeritur. Quid est quod interrogat, « Quis fecit homini spiritum? » et respondet sibi, « Sine dubio Deus. » Et item interrogat, « Carnem quis creavit? » itemque respondet, « Idem, credo, Deus. » Interrogat tertio, « Bonus est qui utrumque creavit Deus? » respondet, « Nulli dubium est. » Adhuc interrogat, « Et utrumque quod bonus auctor creavit, bonum est? » et ad hoc respondet, « Confitendum est. » Deinde concludit, « Si igitur et spiritus bonus est, et caro bona, ut a bono auctore condita; qui fieri potest ut duo bona possint sibi esse contraria? » Omitto dicere quia tota hujus ratiocinatio turbaretur, si quis ab eo quaereret, Aestum et frigus quis fecit? responderet enim, Sine dubio Deus. Non ego multa interrogo: ipse concludat, utrum aut ista possint dici non bona, aut non appareant inter se esse contraria. Hic forte dicit, « Qualitates sunt istae substantiarum, non substantiae. » Ita est, verum est; sed qualitates naturales, et ad Dei creaturam sine dubio pertinentes: substantiae quippe non per se ipsas, sed per suas qualitates, sicut aqua et ignis, dicuntur sibi esse contrariae. Quid, si ita sunt caro et spiritus? quod quidem non affirmamus; sed ut ratiocinationem ejus non necessaria illatione conclusam ostenderemus, hoc diximus. Possunt enim et contraria non invicem adversari, sed ex alterutro temperari et bonam valetudinem reddere: sicut in corpore siccitas et humiditas, frigus et calor, quorum omnium temperatione bona corporalis valetudo consistit. Sed quod contraria est caro spiritui, ut non ea quae volumus faciamus; vitium est, non natura: gratia medicinalis quaeratur, et controversia finiatur.