**RESIGNATION (CANON LAW).** – It is a form of manifesting the power of disposing of rights. It consists in a pure and simple abandonment of a subjective right, without, however, the intention of transferring it to another. When such an intention does not exist, there is therefore true resignation, which is contrasted, as *abdicative* resignation, with that which entails or renders possible the acquisition of the same right by another and which is termed *translative* resignation.
The holder of the power of resignation is the holder of the subjective right which is the object of the resignation itself, and the conditions or prerequisites for the exercise of that power are the existence of the subjective right and its belonging to the holder of the power of resignation.
In the ecclesiastical system, the institution of resignation primarily concerns benefice and procedural law.
1) Among other things, an ecclesiastical benefice (or office) becomes vacant by virtue of resignation, which is the voluntary declaration by its holder to relinquish the benefice, accepted by the ecclesiastical authority (can. 189 § 1). This authority—which is usually the one that conferred the benefice—cannot accept a resignation that is not based on a just and proportionate cause and must give a response to the resigning party within the space of one month; the resignation will take effect after acceptance. If the resignation is conditional, it will not take effect unless the condition is fulfilled, which in this matter is always considered suspensive. In particular, for cardinals, ordinaries, and exempt prelates, the pope is competent to accept the resignation; for others, it is the order and the prelate with episcopal jurisdiction. The resignation must be made either in writing or orally before two witnesses; it may also be effected through a proxy holding a special mandate.
Moreover, the *Codex Iuris Canonici* expressly provides in can. 188 cases of presumed or tacit resignation. These are: religious profession, failure to take possession of the office within the prescribed time, apostasy, marriage—even merely civil—voluntary assumption of military service, abandonment of the ecclesiastical habit, violation of the obligation of residence, and acceptance of a benefice incompatible with the previous one (v. INCOMPATIBILITY OF BENEFICES). For a resignation to be lawful, it must be free, i.e., not vitiated by violence or grave and unjust fear, substantial error, or deceit. Every beneficiary, provided he is *compos sui*, and unless expressly forbidden by law (can. 184), is competent to exercise the power of resignation.
Any ecclesiastical benefice may be the object of resignation, regardless of whether it is simple or curate, major or minor, collative or elective, provided that the resignation does not prejudice acquired rights. It should be noted, however, that a cleric in sacred orders cannot resign a benefice that constitutes the canonical title for his ordination unless he substitutes another title for it or demonstrates that he possesses other means of support.
2) In the procedural field, the most important resignation is that of the instance. This occurs when the plaintiff declares his intention to terminate the proceedings without obtaining a judgment on the merits (can. 1740 § 1). The most notable difference between peremption and resignation lies in the fact that in the case of resignation, the party withdrawing remains liable to the other party for the costs of the proceedings. Both peremption and resignation of the instance bring the proceedings to an end but not the action itself, and thus they are distinguished from resignation of the action, which in turn does not require acceptance and precludes any future proceedings. Likewise, resignation of the instance can only indirectly affect the substantive relationship in dispute, inasmuch as the substantive effects of the claim cease with the resignation. Resignation, where the institution exists, is subjectively divisible.
The conditions that must be observed for a valid resignation of the instance or of acts in general are: a) that it be made by a person capable of disposing of his rights, so that those who act in court on behalf of others (whether natural or juridical persons) cannot resign the instance unless the forms relating to authorization to act in court are observed (can. 1648 and following) and, in any case, subject to compliance with those prescribed by law for acts exceeding ordinary administration, while proxies require a special mandate (can. 1740 § 2; cf. can. 1648, 1649, 1653, 1736, and 1741); b) that it be accepted, at least tacitly, by the fact that it is not contested by the opposing party and admitted by the judge; c) that the resignation be made by a written act signed by the party or by his special proxy (a requirement demanded *ad solemnitatem*).
Resignation may be made at any stage and degree of the cause.