CONSERVATORE, GIUDICE. — Designation given to a particular category of delegated judges, whom the supreme pontiff would customarily grant to juridical persons and pious institutions (especially religious orders, universities, colleges of doctors, chapters, hospitals, and associations of the poor), with the task of defending them against “manifest injuries and acts of violence,” that is, when, owing to the notoriety of the wrongful act, an ordinary judicial inquiry was not required. By this means the institution was removed from the jurisdiction of the ordinary judge.
The regular clergy made extensive use of this institution to safeguard their privileges and exemptions, and it was subsequently extended in their favor through further papal indults (c. secundum privilegium), in derogation of the grant as it existed under common law (c. secundum iura).
The conservator judges certainly already existed before the thirteenth century. They were appointed by means of the litterae conservatoriae,
which generally determined the duration of their office and indicated their powers. Popes Innocent IV (c. 1, I, 14 in VI) and Boniface VIII (c. 15, I, 14 in VI) were the first to regulate their jurisdiction and functions.
From the 14th century onward, each religious order had its own c., and the privilege of appointing them, granted by Sixtus IV to certain mendicant orders, subsequently became universal by extension. Various regulations, mostly restrictive, were then issued by Leo X at the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–17), by the Council of Trent (sess. VII, c. 14 de ref.; sess. XIV, c. 5 de ref.), by Clement VIII (constitution Sanctissimus, 19 March 1592), Gregory XV (constitution Sanctissimus, 20 September 1621), and, lastly, by Clement XIII (constitution Cum Omnium, 23 April 1762). Subsequently, even among the religious orders, the practice prevailed of seeking protection of their rights by direct appeal to the Holy See. At present, the institution may be regarded as abrogated through desuetude.
The jurisdiction of the c. was limited to judging only de manifestis et notoriis, thus excluding doubtful and contestable cases in which ordinary judicial investigation was necessary (c. 1, I, 14, in VI). They could not act criminaliter, although they were empowered, when necessary, to employ censures.