CONTRIITION. – It is the principal act of the virtue of penance, by which the sinner, under the influence of the grace of God, disposes himself to the remission of sin.
OUTLINE:
I. Notion
II. Necessity
III. Division
IV. Efficacy.I. NOTION
According to the definition of the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, cap. 4), contrition consists in a sorrow of the soul and a detestation of the sin committed, joined to the purpose of sinning no more for the future. Contrition therefore implies three elements: detestation, which is the act of the will by which one hates the sin already committed, and therefore would wish never to have committed it and seeks to undo its consequences; sorrow, which adds to detestation a sadness of the soul arising from the fact that the sinful act, in its effects, is perceived as an evil present; and the purpose, which indicates the firm will not to sin again in the future.This notion of contrition faithfully reflects the teaching of Holy Scripture; the same Tridentine Council points this out, citing several passages from the Old Testament (Ezek. 18:31; Ps. 50:6; 6:7; Isa. 38:15). It is also the constant doctrine of the Fathers, summed up in the well-known saying of St. Gregory the Great: «Paenitentia est perpetrata mala plangere, et plangenda non perpetrare» (Hom. in Evang., II, 34, 15; PL 76, 1256), which justifies the Catholic notion of contrition. Moreover, it is in the very nature of things that the very idea of penance involves, together with the will to renew oneself for the future, the effective retraction of the offense already committed.
II. NECESSITY
«This movement of contrition has been necessary at all times to obtain the forgiveness of sins.» With these words the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, cap. 4) teaches the necessity of contrition for obtaining salvation. And already before, with regard to the virtue of penance, of which contrition is the formal act, it had written: «for all men who had stained themselves with any grave sin, penance was always necessary to obtain grace and justification» (ibid., cap. 1).This doctrine represents nothing more than the particular application of the universal principle, established by the same Tridentine Council (sess. VI, cap. 5), concerning the necessity for man to prepare himself, under the influence of grace, for justification. Indeed, in describing the way in which such preparation is effected (ibid., cap. 6), among other dispositions, the Council lists hatred and detestation of the sin committed, together with the purpose of beginning a new life and of observing God’s law.
This doctrine is founded both in Holy Scripture (Tob. 2:12 ff.; Luke 13:3-5; Acts 3:19; cf. Ezek. 18:21 ff.; Jer. 18:8; Ecclus. 2:22), in which God’s forgiveness is conditioned upon the detestation of one’s faults and the will to bring forth fruits of penance; and in the constant teaching of the Fathers, who, taking up the admonition of Holy Scripture, have inculcated for every remission, whether baptismal or post-baptismal, the necessity of turning to God in hatred of sin and in the purpose of a new life, and have devoted special treatises or pamphlets to this end (cf. Tertullian, De paenitentia; Cyprian, De lapsis; Ambrose, De paenitentia; Pacian, Epist. contra tractatus Novatianorum and Paranesis ad paenitentiam; Chrysostom, De paenitentia). Contrition must therefore be considered absolutely necessary for obtaining justification.
III. DIVISION
A first division of contrition is into formal and virtual. Formal contrition is present when the sin is explicitly detested; virtual contrition, on the other hand, is present when the sin is not explicitly and formally detested because at present it is not remembered; yet the disposition of the will is such that, if it were to come to mind, it would certainly detest it: this is the contrition contained in the act of perfect charity that is elicited without any memory in the subject of the sins committed. This division is relevant to the matter of the sacrament of Penance (v.), inasmuch as it is debated whether the contrition required in the sacrament must be formal or whether virtual contrition suffices.A second division, much more important historically, is that of perfect contrition or contrition simply. This division seems to appear for the first time in the Regulae de sacra theologia (reg. 85: PL 210, 665) of Alain of Lille (d. 1202). It is used, though not frequently, by the Scholastics and by St. Thomas; it then became common among theologians, especially after the Council of Trent.
It is based on the different efficacy attributed to attrition and to perfect contrition with regard to the remission of sin. Since contrition is destined to remove sin, that contrition is called perfect which, by reason of its disposition, obtains this effect of itself and therefore achieves justification even before receiving the sacrament, albeit with the desire for it; whereas imperfect contrition is that which of itself is not sufficient to obtain this effect. It is precisely in reference to this different efficacy that the Tridentine Council recalls the said distinction (sess. XIV, cap. 4); and the same line of thought can be discerned in the doctrine of St. Thomas, as also in the preceding Scholastic tradition (cf. P. De Vooght, La justificatio, dans le sacrement de Pénitence d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin, in Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses, 5 [1928], p. 232).
Nevertheless, since, as with every act of virtue, the different efficacy ultimately depends on the different formal object, theologians ask with what different formal object the distinction between attrition and perfect contrition is to be connected.
On this point the Tridentine teaching (loc. cit.), which seems to be in line with the thought of the Angelic Doctor (cf. P. De Vooght, article cited, p. 249), is sufficiently clear and precise: it is to this that the common teaching of theologians is linked. The Council, namely, while assigning to attrition all the motives that are not perfect charity toward God and that are commonly concretized either in the consideration of the turpitude of sin, or in the fear of hell, or in the fear of punishments, reserves to perfect contrition the single motive of love toward God. Perfect contrition is therefore present when sin is detested for the sake of perfect charity, of love toward God; that is, as L. Billot explains, when sin is detested «quia est offensivum Dei propter se et super omnia appetitae dilecti» (De Ecclesiae Sacramentis, II, Rome 1918, p. 133); whereas in all other cases there is attrition.
There have, however, been some theologians, mentioned by G. De Lugo (De Paenitentia, disp. 5, sect. 1), who have sought to extend to other motives, besides perfect charity, the possibility of giving rise to perfect contrition. That is, perfect contrition would also be present if the detestation of sin were determined by the virtues of obedience, religion, or gratitude toward God. Among modern authors, Palmieri, Ballerini, Schiffini, and Hurter have accepted this possibility, at least insofar as it concerns the love of God as our good and our happiness. As De Lugo noted, underlying this opinion is a practical concern, which has then been clothed in doctrinal or authoritative arguments: namely, the fear that detestation determined by pure love of God might prove too difficult for the sinner, and that he might therefore be deprived of the salutary effects of contrition precisely when he has the greatest need of them.
It does not, however, seem possible to accept such a judgment: both because of the manner already noted in which the Council of Trent proceeded (loc. cit.), which, while assigning perfect charity as the sole motive for contrition, attributed all other motives to attrition; and because only contrition determined by perfect charity produces that disposition of detestation of sin as the supreme evil and conversion to God as the supreme good, which grounds the suitability of God’s granting forgiveness.
IV. EFFICACY
The proper efficacy of any contrition, insofar as it is placed under the influence of grace, is to dispose one to justification. Indeed, as has already been seen, contrition, in its threefold element of sorrow, detestation, and purpose of amendment, is enumerated by the Council of Trent among the acts by which the sinner prepares for justification. From this it follows that contrition must be supernatural, supreme, and universal.The efficacy of perfect contrition, moreover, consists in reconciling the sinner with God immediately, even before the reception of the sacrament. This efficacy is clearly taught by the Council of Trent (sess. XIV, cap. 4) and was later confirmed by the condemnation of certain propositions of Baius (31, 32, 33, and 70), in which it was asserted that an act of perfect charity or perfect contrition could coexist with mortal sin in the soul. It is further demonstrated by those texts of Sacred Scripture, both from the Old and New Testaments (Prov. 8:17; Lk. 10:27-28; Jn. 14:21-23; 1 Pt. 4:8; 1 Jn. 4:7), in which it is said that friendship with the Lord, the remission of sins, and all other consequent goods are united to the love of God, from which contrition proceeds.
Finally, it is illustrated by the constant patristic tradition: both inasmuch as it teaches the efficacy of the Baptism of desire, which is to say the efficacy of the act of charity in which the desire for Baptism is implicit (cf. Ambrose, *De obitu Valentiniani*, 51-53: PL 16, 1374-75; Augustine, *De Baptism.*, IV, 21, 78: PL 43, 172-74); and inasmuch as it explicitly attributes to the act of charity such virtue and perfection as to blot out sin and restore friendship between the sinner and God (cf. Chrysostom, *In S. Romanum mart.*, hom. I, 1: PG 50, 607; Augustine, *In I Ioan.*, Tract. V, 10: PL 35, 2017; Peter Chrysologus, *Serm.*, 94: PL 52, 465-66; Gregory the Great, *Hom. in Evang.*, II, 33, 4: PL 76, 1241).
The theologians, for their part, while admitting as certain the efficacy of perfect contrition, have rather sought to investigate its intimate nature and the specific causality it exercises with regard to justification. Although some uncertainty and hesitation have not been lacking, it is now agreed that perfect contrition concurs in justification, first of all as a disposing material cause, inasmuch as, by removing as an efficient cause the impediment of the offense against God, it becomes the ultimate and immediate disposition for the infusion of grace. It also concurs as a meritorious cause “de congruo infallibiliter,” inasmuch as, given God’s will to remit sin whenever man does with the help of grace what lies within his power, to perfect contrition, which fulfills this condition, grace and the remission of sin are infallibly united.
Nevertheless, as the Council of Trent teaches, for contrition to avail in reconciling one with God, it must contain the desire, at least objectively implicit, to receive the sacrament. This, moreover, is evident. For one could not truly love God if at the same time one were not disposed to fulfill what He has established regarding the confession of sins. Precisely after the institution of the sacrament of Penance, it is God’s positive will that all sins committed after Baptism be submitted to the priest. And it is to satisfy this will that the desire is ordained, and not certainly to obtain through future confession the remission of sins that has already been received in the act of contrition.
Theologians, however, ask whether such a desire exerts a positive influence in the remission of sins, or whether it should rather be considered a mere condition for contrition to exercise its proper efficacy (cf. F. Suárez, *De paen.*, disp. 17, sect. 3; D. Palmieri, *Tractatus de paen.*, Rome 1879, pp. 106-109). Opinions are not in agreement, though it seems certain that St. Thomas favors the first hypothesis (cf. J. Perrinelle, *L'attrition d'après le Concile de Trente et d'après t. Thomas d'Aquin*, Le Saulchoir 1927, p. 101; P. De Vooght, article cited, p. 238). All, however, agree in asserting that the desire contained in contrition has as its object not the confession of one’s sin as soon as possible—for this is prescribed only for the priest when, under urgent necessity, he celebrates without prior confession but only an act of perfect contrition (cf. Council of Trent, sess. XIII, cap. 7); rather, it is to confess when, for other reasons pressing the obligation of confession, one must accuse one’s sins to the priest. As is well known, this obligation, besides in danger of death, presses upon all the faithful once a year by virtue of the precept of the Church; it also presses, and solely by reason of the positive law of the Church (cf. Council of Trent, sess. XIII, cap. 7), when one is to receive the sacrament of the Eucharist.
The described efficacy of perfect contrition has been restricted by some authors, such as Baius and his followers, to determine exceptional circumstances. Perfect contrition, namely, justifies only when it is made in the case of death, martyrdom, or, in general, necessity. Something similar, though in a more mitigated form, was also maintained by Estius (*In IV Sent.*, d. 17, § 2). Baius’s opinion, however, was justly condemned by Pius V (prop. 71: for neither in Sacred Scripture nor in tradition is there any indication to restrict the efficacy of contrition to extraordinary cases; whereas the teaching of Trent is clear that whenever an act of perfect contrition is made, reconciliation with God is always obtained (sess. XIV, cap. 4). It is evident, moreover, and needless to remark, that such an act of contrition cannot be conceived in one who, as St. Augustine had already noted (*De Bapt.*, IV, 22, 29), does not approach the sacrament either out of contempt or culpable negligence.
Other theologians have attributed the said efficacy only to the act of contrition that possesses a particular intensity, either by the vehemence with which the will detests sin or by the participation of the sensitive appetite in such detestation. These are the so-called “contritionist” theologians (v. ATTRIZIONE): who, presupposing that for the remission of sins in the sacrament of Penance perfect contrition is required, albeit initial and remiss, conclude that only when such contrition is intense can it justify outside the sacrament. Given, however, the very wide range of degrees of contrition, it would remain to determine what degree is required for the act of contrition to achieve the effect of justification. On this point, however, these theologians are not in agreement with one another (cf. H. Merkelbach, *Quaestiones de partibus paenitentiae*, Liège 1937, p. 30). And already this very disagreement discredits this opinion. Moreover, it has no support in the teaching of the Church: both inasmuch as the Council of Trent simply states, without any distinction of degree of intensity, that reconciliation with God is joined to perfect contrition; and inasmuch as, by condemning the propositions of Baius according to which perfect charity is not always joined to the remission of sin (prop. 31, 32, 33, and 70), the Church has implicitly affirmed that contrition, provided it proceeds from perfect charity, always effects justification.