DISACCORD
### I. DEFINITION
Disaccord is not merely a divergence of opinions nor simply a dispersion of efforts in achieving common goals; properly speaking, it is a formal divergence between two or more wills concerning the same good. This good may be either free or obligatory.
A divergence of wills concerning the same free good is not yet a sin of disaccord, which requires the divergence of two or more wills that are obligated to love the same good. This obligatory nature consists in the necessity of the same means for the same ends, common to many, and may present itself either as charity toward God or toward one's neighbor, or as justice, or another virtue. It should be noted, however, that the malice of disaccord does not lie merely in the fact that one will diverges from another; rather, it lies in the fact that one will refuses to love that necessary good which the other accepts.
While a divergence of opinions does not constitute disaccord, it may be its source; yet the most frequent source is the will to assert one's own will in the face of others, whether or not personal advantages are in view. Almost always, disaccord produces strong dispersion and conflict in action; then the private and public damages may be grave, according to the word of Jesus Christ: *«Omne regnum contra se divisum desolabitur»* (Mt. 12, 25).
### II. MORALITY
Disaccord offends that virtue by which the same good is obligatory for the wills; generally, charity. But it may also be justice, when the disaccord is between persons having common interests, or another virtue, such as piety, if the disaccord operates among the members of the same family. In practice, the responsibilities of disaccord easily escape the conscience of the guilty party, both due to the illusion of being on the side of good rather than others, and because the evil consequences of disaccord become apparent only later, when they are already mingled with the influences of many external factors. Therefore, to promote the union of the good, it is more useful to insist on the advantages of peace and concord than on the responsibilities and damages of disaccord. This does not apply to the sowers of disaccord, in whom the guilt is always present and is rarely not grave or unjust.