Enciclopedia Cattolica

ETÀ

Age

Volume V · p. 407 · 1950

English translation · Testo originale italiano

Machine translation of the 1948–1954 Italian original. The original text is authoritative.

AGE. -

I. Canon Law

In general, age is a natural cause that influences both legal capacity and the capacity to act (v. CAPACITY): while the former—the suitability to be a subject of rights—is acquired by every human being at birth and may be explicitly limited by law in individual cases, the latter—the suitability to perform juridical acts and exercise one's rights—is normally acquired by the subject upon reaching majority, with the exception of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

The Code of Canon Law (CIC) establishes the attainment of majority, with the exception of the majority of those rights for whose exercise the law sets a specific age.

Alongside mental maturity, it also admits the celebration of marriage upon reaching puberty. There was disagreement between the two schools of jurists, the Proculeians and the Sabinians, regarding the proof of the existence of puberty in men, as the latter deemed physical inspection necessary, while the Proculeians held that legal and juridical puberty was attained upon completing the fourteenth year for men and the twelfth for women; a thesis that was later accepted by Justinian.

It was customary among the Germanic peoples to contract marriage at a mature age, but from ancient laws it cannot be inferred whether there was a fixed age. In the Visigothic laws, the prohibition of contracting marriage if the man were younger than the woman was sanctioned. King Liutprand forbade marriage to minors of either sex. Among the Anglo-Saxons, the same norms governing age for entering the religious state applied.

In the early centuries, the Church adhered to traditional norms, establishing that the capacity to contract marriage was attained upon reaching puberty. However, serious difficulties arose with the spread of the practice of betrothing children at a tender age with future or present espousals: Alexander III sought to curb this practice by distinguishing between legitimate age for espousals and that for marriage, adopting for the latter the Roman limit of reaching puberty and for the former the completion of the seventh year, and establishing the principle that present espousals of minors were to be presumed, by legal presumption, as future espousals. With the spread of Christianity in the East, the Church, faced with differing customs of those peoples, applied its law with prudence, without issuing new norms.

This impediment is of ecclesiastical law: it is, in fact, independent of reaching puberty. Regardless of the capacity to give consent, in natural law there is no fixed age for contracting marriage, also because the capacity to generate is not required for the validity of the bond. Thus, if a marriage celebrated before the canonical age is invalid, even if the capacity to generate is already present, after reaching that age, the marriage contracted by someone who, at the time of celebration, was not yet capable of generating due to a delay in normal development (not due to a physical anomaly) is valid (v. IMPOTENCE).

In ancient law, until the CIC, the attainment of legal puberty was required, set at different ages for men and women due to the differing onset of generative capacity in each: in women, it is indeed earlier, but also disappears sooner than in men, who, being later in onset, retain it until a more advanced age. However, the onset and persistence of this capacity do not depend solely on age, but also on other factors, among which climate, temperature, and the activity of individuals are paramount.

Before the CIC in the Latin Church, and before the motu proprio *Cumbae allatae* of 22 February 1949 in the Eastern Church, the impediment (diriment, except in the law of the Maronites) existed until the completion of 14 years for men and 12 for women: however, it was conditional upon the actual lack of discretion or generative capacity (*nisi malitia suppletae aetatem*), so that the impediment did not exist and the subject, even if not yet having reached the established age, possessed sufficient judgment and generative capacity.

In current law, the age of 16 years completed for men and 14 for women is required for the validity of marriage (can. 1067 § 1 of the CIC = can. 57 § 1 of the aforementioned motu proprio, in AAS, 41 [1949], p. 101).

This is not only to ensure greater psychological maturity and physiological puberty, but for many other moral, social, and hygienic reasons: indeed, the variation between the thirteenth and seventeenth year for men and between the twelfth and fifteenth for women in the attainment of generative capacity, the physical development required for healthy reproduction, the mental maturity necessary for a full understanding of the obligations arising from marriage, and the working capacity for honest family support have convinced the legislator not only to set the legal age at a more advanced stage than that at which puberty is legally presumed, but also to add a serious admonition: pastors of souls must strive to dissuade young people from marrying who have not yet reached the age at which, according to local customs, marriage is usually contracted (can. 1067 § 2 of the CIC and can. 57 § 2 of the aforementioned motu proprio).

For marriages of non-believers, the principle holds that the marriage contracted by both unbaptized spouses is valid, provided they possess the maturity of reason and provided there are no impediments of natural or divine law (Resp. S. C. S. Uffizio, 3 Aug. 1886) or of civil law (which binds non-believers).

If one of the two contracting parties is baptized and the other is not, the impediment exists only in the case that the baptized party has not attained the required age (*età*) of stability in the Church, or that the unbaptized party lacks the discretion of judgment necessary for marriage.

The impediment ceases upon the attainment of the age required by law. A marriage contracted before such age is null, and the nullity is not cured by the attainment of the required age.

The impediment may also be dispensed, provided that the contracting parties possess sufficient reasoning ability to understand that marriage is a permanent society between man and woman for the procreation of children (can. 1082 § 1). Without this maturity of reasoning, the impediment is no longer of ecclesiastical law but of natural law, and as such cannot be dispensed.

However, even if such psychological development is present, the Church does not usually grant a dispensation to those who are not at least of puberal age. Once a dispensation is granted, the spouses are forbidden from cohabiting until they are capable of intercourse, on account of the danger of incontinence arising from cohabitation. The Holy Office has ruled that, in mission territories, in the case of children married while still prepubescent and converted to Christianity with their families, if the marriage is valid, missionaries should, by means of persuasion, bring about not only separation of bed but also of dwelling until puberty is attained (Resp. 2 May 1866).

Dispensation is rarely granted: a public cause is required, such as the reconciliation of a kingdom, a city, or two families divided by deep hatred. In danger of death, dispensation may also be granted for a private cause.

III. ITALIAN LAW

The Italian Civil Code sets the attainment of majority at the completion of the twenty-first year, and with it the capacity to perform all acts for which a different age is not established (art. 2). For example, it is upon completion of the eighteenth year that a minor may engage in work, enter into the relevant contracts, and exercise the rights and actions arising therefrom, subject to special laws that establish a lower age (art. 3).

For marriage, the Code of 1865 set the completion of the eighteenth year for men and the fifteenth for women; the current code, following Article 1 of Law No. 847 of 27 May 1929, has aligned itself with canon law, establishing the completion of the sixteenth year for men and the fourteenth for women, and admitting dispensation for grave reasons to contract marriage after the completion of the fourteenth year for men and the twelfth for women (art. 84).

ETÀ — ETAM

BIBL.: T. Sanchez, *De matrimonio*, Venice 1614, I. I, d. 16, n. VII; A. Reiffenstuel, *Ius canonicum universum*, Macerata 1746, I. II, p. 46; F. X. Verna, *Ius dotale*, IV, Prato 1672, p. 105; R. De Ruggiero, *Istituzioni di diritto civile*, Naples 1725, p. 310; G. Cheddi, *Ius matrimoniale in vitam C. I. C.*, Trento 1921, p. 65; Vermeersch-Vidal, V (1933), p. 225; J. Delmaire, s.V. *Âge*, in *DDC*, I, cols. 315-18, and bibliography cited therein; A. Vermeersch-J. Creusen, *Epitome iuris canonici*, Rome 1927; P. Gasparri, *De matrimonio*, Vatican City 1933, p. 289; F. M. Cappello, *De matrimonio*, Rome 1939, pp. 35-48; H. De Mesmaker, *Tractatus de actibus humanis*, 5th ed., Malines 1939, pp. 70-73; F. Marco, *Delle persone fisiche*, in *Commentario del libro del Codice civile*, directed by M. D'Amelio, Florence 1940, pp. 91 and 277.