MARSILIO DA PADOVA. – Political writer, born in Padua between 1275 and 1280 to Bonnatteto dei Mainardini, a notary of the University, died in 1342–43 at the imperial court in Munich. Until 1312 he resided in his native city, obtaining the title of doctor and participating in the political struggles aroused by the descent of Henry VII into Italy and the ambitious conquests of Cangrande della Scala. He was certainly influenced by Peter of Abano and was a friend of the historian and poet Albertino Mussato, from whom we have the few biographical details about his Paduan sojourn.
Between September 1312 and May 1313 he was master and then rector at the University of Paris (H. Denifle, *Chart. Univers. Paris.*, II, Paris 1892, p. 158), where he formed an intimate friendship with John of Jandun. He later went to the University of Orléans (*Defensor pacis*, II, cap. 18, § 6) and to the papal curia in Avignon (*ibid.*, cap. 24, § 17). Upon his return home, he obtained two ecclesiastical benefices from John XXII, by bulls dated 16 October 1316 and 5 April 1318. Yet this did not prevent him from lending his full support to the anti-papal struggle of the Ghibelline party led by Matteo Visconti; and it is perhaps to him that the Pope’s lament in the *Breve ad Jordanum de Insula* of 29 April 1319 refers (L. Guérard, *Archives de la Guaçonne*, 2nd series, fasc. II, p. 135). It is likely that in this year he outlined the fundamental features of his political-ecclesiastical system, which bears the strong imprint of the free Italian communes, especially nearby Venice. When Matteo Visconti’s policy failed, he judged it wiser to return to Paris, where he divided his time between the practice of medicine and theological studies. John of Jandun proved an invaluable aid in acquainting him with the latest French political trends, in refining his thought, and in gathering the vast theological and scriptural material that the controversy of the Franciscan Spirituals had already elaborated. Thus, when he learned of the papal condemnation of Louis the Bavarian, it was not difficult for Marsilio to draft, in a few months, the definitive text of the *Defensor pacis* (M. Goldast, *Monarchia S. Romani Imperii*, II, Hanover and Frankfurt 1610, pp. 154–312; C. W. Previté-Orton, Cambridge 1928; R. Scholz, in *MGH, Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui in usum schol.*, VIII, Hanover 1932–33: critical ed.). The manuscript was completed on 24 June 1324 (*Defensor pacis*, III, cap. 3, end); the author’s name was barely concealed under the pseudonym “Anthenorides” (*ibid.*, I, cap. 1, § 6), indicating his Paduan origin (cf. Virgil, *Aeneid*, I, 242). The title was meant to convey the book’s purpose and content: “inasmuch as it sets forth the causes on which the preservation of peace and tranquility in the state depends, and the reasons why conflicts arise, are prevented, and are removed” (*Defensor pacis*, III, cap. 3, beginning). The work, divided into three *Dictiones*, besides expounding a philosophical doctrine of the state, presented a vigorous polemic against the thesis of papal supremacy. For about two years, however, it went unnoticed, so that in 1326 Marsilio was able to teach Sacred Scripture. But in the summer of the same year, he and Jandun—also accused of being the book’s author—were forced to flee. The two took refuge in Nuremberg to seek protection from Louis, to whom the work had been dedicated. After some cautious hesitation, the King received them as counsellors and took them with him on his Italian campaign (1327–28). In Rome Marsilio was appointed ecclesiastical vicar of the city, and he had the satisfaction of seeing the principles of the *Defensor pacis* put into practice in the popular election of the Emperor, the deposition of John XXII, and the elevation of the antipope. The report that he was named archbishop of Milan is unfounded.
After the unhappy conclusion of the Italian campaign, Marsilio lived until his death at the imperial court in Munich as counsellor and physician. In 1341–42 he took part in the controversy over imperial jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, occasioned by the Emperor’s son’s marriage. His death must have occurred shortly thereafter, since Pope Clement VI referred to him in a discourse of 10 April 1343 as already deceased. Marsilio incurred various ecclesiastical condemnations as a heretic, both before and after his death (Denz.-U., 495 ff.).
Marsilio also wrote: *De translatione Romani Imperii* (M. Goldast, op. cit., II, pp. 147–53), immediately following the *Defensor pacis*, which it foreshadows (II, cap. 30, § 7); it is nothing more than an anti-papal reworking of the homonymous treatise by Landolfo Colonna; *De iurisdictione Imperatoris in causis matrimonialibus* (M. Goldast, op. cit., II, pp. 1286–91): a brief memorandum on the controversy over the Emperor’s son’s marriage, written in 1341–42; *Defensor minor* (N. Valois, *Comptes rendus de l’Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*, Paris 1903, pp. 601 ff.; C. K. Brampton, Birnleghman 1922): a vigorous reaffirmation of the *Defensor*’s principles, clarifying certain points, including jurisdiction in matrimonial matters, which suggests it was composed in 1342, perhaps using earlier material.
The fundamental idea of the *Defensor pacis* is that Church and State belong to two entirely distinct spheres: the former to pure spirituality and inwardness directed toward the eternal end, the latter to natural and outward interests likewise ordered to the eternal end (I, cap. 19; II, cap. 2). Theoretically, therefore, there is a clear and essential separation; but in practice the Church is completely subordinate to the State, since it must fulfill its spiritual mission within the framework of earthly life. Before Christianity, pagan priesthood was merely a state function, arising from the need to feign a divine authority that would secure more complete obedience to the laws of the state (I, cap. 5, §§ 10–13). After Christ, the priesthood continued to represent this state function, but rendered more effective by divine Revelation (I, cap. 6). The Church’s claim to be arbiter of the earthly life of states is the cause of all grave social disorder (I, cap. 19).
The State is an organism which, through the harmonious cooperation of its functional parts, is capable of providing citizens with the full self-sufficiency of a perfect human life on this earth (I, ch. 4). Social matter has gradually differentiated itself under the pressure of natural exigencies; the formal cause, however, derives from reason, which unifies all wills to determine social matters in relation to the common good (I, ch. 7 and 17, § 8-11). This unifying will is expressed concentrically in a public assembly, composed of citizens or their “pars valentior,” and becomes law, which is the form or soul of the state organism (I, ch. 15, § 6-7). Since law is essentially coercive (I, ch. 11), the assembly must also elect an absolutely unitary power to execute and defend it (potestas coactiva seu iudicialis). Thus arises the figure of the principans or monarch, as the first and fundamental functional part of the state organism: his authority is from the people and is always subject to the judgment of the people (I, ch. 14-18). His first task is to bring forth the other functional parts necessary for the self-sufficiency of the State and then to ensure their harmonious cooperation for the good of the whole (I, ch. 15, § 8-10). These parts are: the military, the financial, and the priestly (liberal arts), the agricultural and the artisan (servile arts; I, ch. 5). The doctores, on the other hand, constitute the essential element or “pars valentior” of the social body.
The Church is the society of all Christians, who, through the interior observance of the revealed divine law, tend toward the eternal end (II, ch. 2). Jesus Christ instituted the priesthood, giving it the mandate to teach this law, to perform the Eucharistic transubstantiation, and to exercise the “potestas clavium” (II, ch. 6): yet He conferred upon it no coercive power over the faithful (II, ch. 3-4); and from it He demands perfect evangelical poverty (II, ch. 11-14). All priests are essentially equal, with no real distinction between bishops and priests and no territorial limits to their ministry (II, ch. 15-17). Saint Peter had no primacy over the other Apostles, and it is highly doubtful that he ever came to Rome (II, ch. 16). Wherever the Church must live on earth, it has necessarily had to give itself an organization or economy. Since this was not established by Christ, it must be carried out according to the norms of reason. It is therefore the assembly of all Christians or general council that belongs to the authentic interpretation of revealed law, and also to establish the fundamental norms of ecclesiastical economy (II, ch. 20-21). Thus arose the division into particular Churches, and, in view of special merits, the conferral of a pastoral primacy upon the Roman Church (II, ch. 18, § 22). The local council of each Church appoints the bishop, who likewise holds a purely pastoral primacy (II, ch. 17, § 22, § 6).
As for the relations between Church and State, all Christians—and particularly priests—are subject, in their external acts, to the coercive power of the state principantes, even if these are unbelievers (II, ch. 4-5). Since the Church has received no coercive power even over its own members, it must rely on the State for its survival. The state principans has the duty to convoke councils, direct their proceedings, and execute their deliberations; it also has the task of administering benefices, which serve to support Churches and the poor (II, ch. 22). Its coercive power pertains only to external acts, and thus it cannot persecute unbelievers and heretics unless they pose a threat to public tranquility (II, ch. 8, 10); it must, however, extend its control over all priests, determining who, how many, and in what manner they are to exercise their ministry, so that this may remain in perfect equilibrium with the other state functions (II, ch. 15-17).
In these doctrines, the author claims to see a benefit for the spiritual freedom of the Church. The Church, through its doctores, indeed influences the very formulation of state law; and the legislative body, composed of Christians (the situation is graver for the Church in non-Christian regions), always has the right to oversee the actions of the principans. The ecclesiastical council and the earthly legislative body composed of the faithful thus come in practice to be identified (II, ch. 171, 187, 21). The doctrine of the “plenitudo potestatis papalis” represents the culmination of the clergy’s usurpation of the State, begun since the time of Constantine: it is necessary that the Church be made subject once more to the State, so that the latter may have peace (the meaning of the Defensor pacis) and the Church may represent a true instrument for the spiritual elevation of men toward their eternal end (II, ch. 22-30; III, ch. 1-3).
The full understanding of Marsilius’s thought cannot be achieved without situating it within its historical context. With the definitive disappearance of the medieval unitary political conception, of which Dante had been the last and anachronistic exponent a few years earlier, individual States were arising, tending to find in themselves their full self-sufficiency and therefore to subordinate the Church and its spiritual, political, and economic power to their own control. Marsilius succeeded in delineating the features of this new state organism that was asserting itself and thus became a precursor of the secular conception of the State. Even though in him the Aristotelian and earlier medieval sources are evident, his political theory contains entirely new emphases that foreshadow modern positions.
His ecclesiological doctrines fall within the realm of true heresy, and, though not highly original, they gained great resonance because of their systematic force, directly influencing William of Ockham (v.), Wyclif, Hus, and the development of conciliar theories.