NEGLIGENCE. – In general it is opposed to diligence (q.v.) and consists in a willful neglect of one’s duty and actions. It has implications in the moral, juridical-penal, and ascetical spheres.
I. Under the moral aspect
It denotes either a lack of promptness in fulfilling a duty or its total omission (Sum. Theol., 2a-2ae, q. 54, a. 1 ad 3). 1) The duty is the principal matter; yet even free actions do not escape it, inasmuch as, once the intellect has recognized and weighed what is best, it does not take pains to stir and direct the will with the other faculties toward execution. The cause is either carelessness, ill will, or contempt. In its specific concept, negligence is essentially an internal act of the intellect, which does not act upon the will; and here lies the distinguishing mark from similar defects such as laziness, which properly indicates postponing work beyond the prescribed time, torpor, which is concretized in remiss execution, and inconstancy, whereby the will recedes on account of external impediments. Under this aspect, negligence is a specific sin against prudence, to which it is opposed by defect (praecipiendi), and is venial in itself, for the reason that failing to carry out promptly what is known to be feasible arises from some less upright affection; it is a mortal sin when it pertains to matters necessary for eternal salvation or proceeds from a will that despises spiritual things, totally withdrawing from the charity of God (ibid., a. 3). It is, in any case, one of the most deplorable moral infirmities, prolific of every kind of misery in individual, family, and social life.To properly gauge the moral gravity of negligence, one must examine its manifestations. Whoever, without proportionate cause, omits or postpones his duty is negligent. The act may refer to a single instance or to several in succession; in the first hypothesis, negligence entails a single responsibility against the virtue proper to the commanded act. But if negligence becomes habitual through repeated acts, the responsibility, in keeping with the doctrine of human acts, is doubled. First, the omission, foreseen at least confusedly, entails responsibility; moreover, each time the agent perceives his negligence and fails to take the necessary care to overcome it, he incurs a distinct responsibility. This habitual negligence is especially to be considered in professionals and those who have assumed specific duties, when they do not keep themselves up to date or fail to respond to legitimate requests. But the masses are not exempt. Today, in matters of religion and ethics, prejudice and superficiality are widespread: one of the principal causes is the common negligence of religious duties (instruction, etc.). Yet it is difficult to fix the limits of the gravity of negligence, all the more so because to incur a distinct guilt, one must have knowledge of II.
II. Under the juridical-penal aspect
Here too the principle holds that the external reflects the psychological state of the agent; therefore the law gives to negligence the specific character of an omission of the due diligence in fulfilling one’s duty, failing or causing harm through lack of appropriate precautions.The CIC speaks only of omission of due diligence, while the Italian Penal Code also mentions imprudence, inexperience, and non-observance of laws, regulations, etc.: canonically these elements may be subsumed under negligence. The CIC, while in doctrinal context (cann. 2199, 2203 § 1, 2229 § 3, 2°) speaks of omission of due diligence, in its applications uses the term negligence and its derivatives.
Negligence, given the necessary elements, is punished in proportion to the relative guilt. The CIC places it, along with ignorance, among the causes of culpable delict (or quasi-delict: can. 2199); the Italian Penal Code (art. 43), between intentional and culpable delict, inserts the preterintentional: a distinction which, without substantially altering the concepts, serves to better determine an individual’s responsibility.
Negligence gives rise to civil and penal responsibility (CIC, can. 2210 § 1; Italian Civil Code, art. 2043): 1) in the voluntary omission of duty, 2) in the omission of appropriate precautions in case of harm. The foreseeability of the harm is not necessary; culpable non-observance of precautions suffices. The doctrine of human acts applies: if an unlawful effect is intended by the agent, there is direct voluntariness (in penal law, intentional delict); if the agent did not intend it but performs an act from which he should have foreseen the cause, there is voluntariness in cause (culpable delict). If, however, the agent, though not intending the unlawful effect, foresees it, the fault borders on dolus (CIC, can. 2203 § 1).
The foundation of responsibility in case of omission lies in the violation of the law; in case of lack of diligence, it lies in the neglect of the general obligation, inherent in every law, to avoid not only every illicit action but also to use the appropriate means to prevent harm.
The measure of negligence is the lack of due diligence. According to the classical expression, in actions the diligence of the “good father of a family” is required (CIC, can. 1523; Italian Civil Code, art. 1176). Two degrees of negligence may be distinguished: 1) grave, if diligence ordinarily used in important matters is omitted; 2) light, if not all the diligence that could be used is employed. Ancient canonists spoke of very light negligence. Only grave negligence, or that which appears externally as such, is juridically imputable (can. 2218 § 2), except for can. 2222; but once external transgression is established, whoever invokes light negligence must prove II.
Negligence, like other causes, excuses from latae sententiae penalties if the law requires full knowledge and deliberation with terms such as “praesumpserit,” “temerarie,” “scienter,” etc.; otherwise it does not excuse (can. 2229).
Negligence is liable to sanctions insofar as it indicates delay in fulfilling one’s duty or in exercising one’s rights (cann. 188, 2°; 274, 5; 343 § 1; 410 § 3; 432; 512 § 2, 1°; 1457 ff.; 1634 § 1; 1881 ff., 1902, 2°; 1895; 2398; in general, can. 35), total or partial omission of duty (cann. 617; 2182-8, in relation to can. 2382; 2348; 2403), careless execution (cann. 2182-8; 2383; 2378), contempt of authority (can. 2393).