NEGLIGENCE. - In diligence (v.), and is carelessness of the will in one’s own duty and actions. It has implications in the moral, juridical-penal, and ascetical spheres.
I. UNDER THE MORAL ASPECT
It indicates either lack of solicitude in the performance of duty or its total omission (Sum. Theol., 2ᵃ-2ᵃᵉ, q. 54, a. 1 ad 3). 1) Duty is its principal matter; but free actions too do not escape it, insofar as, once the intellect has known and weighed what is best, no effort is made to stir and direct the will, together with the other faculties, toward execution. Its cause is carelessness, ill will, or contempt. In its specific sense negligence is essentially an internal act of the intellect, which does not act upon the will; and herein lies the distinguishing feature separating it from other similar defects, such as sloth, which properly denotes postponing an action beyond the prescribed time; torpor, which takes concrete form in deferred execution; and inconstancy, whereby the will withdraws because of external impediments. Under this aspect negligence is a specific sin against prudence, to which it is opposed by defect (praecipiendi), and is in itself venial, for the reason that failure promptly to carry out what is known to be practicable arises from some less rightly ordered affection; it is a mortal sin when it concerns things necessary for eternal salvation or proceeds from a will that despises spiritual things, wholly withdrawing from the charity of God (ibid., a. 3). In any event, it is one of the most deplorable moral infirmities, productive of miseries of every kind in individual, family, and social life.Its manifestations help to determine clearly the moral extent of negligence. Whoever, without a proportionate cause, omits or postpones his duty is negligent. The fact may relate either to a single case or to several successive ones; in the former hypothesis negligence entails a single responsibility against the virtue proper to the commanded act. But if negligence becomes habitual through several successive acts, responsibility, in accordance with the doctrine of human acts, is twofold. First of all, the omission, foreseen at least indistinctly, entails responsibility; moreover, each time the agent becomes aware of his own negligence and does not exercise the necessary care to overcome it, he incurs a distinct responsibility in its cause. This habitual negligence is to be considered especially in professionals and in those who have undertaken specific commitments, when they fail to keep themselves up to date or do not respond to legitimate requests. But the general body of people is not exempt from II. Today, in religious and ethical matters, prejudices, superficiality, etc., are widespread: one of their principal causes is the common neglect of religious duties (instruction, etc.). To establish the limits of the gravity of negligence, however, is difficult, all the more so since, in order to incur a distinct culpability, awareness of it is required.
II. FROM THE PENAL-LAW PERSPECTIVE
Here too the principle holds that the external aspect reflects the agent’s psychological state; hence the law gives n. the specific character of omission of due diligence in the observance of one’s duty, by failing in it or causing harm through lack of appropriate precautions.The CIC speaks only of omission of due diligence, whereas the Italian Penal Code also speaks of imprudence, incompetence, and failure to observe laws, regulations, etc.; canonically, these elements may be included under n. The CIC, while in doctrinal contexts (cann. 2199, 2203 § 1, 2229 § 3, 2°) speaking of omission of due diligence, uses the term n. and its derivatives in applications.
N., when the necessary conditions are present, is punished in proportion to the relative degree of culpability. The CIC places it, together with ignorance, among the causes of a culpable offense (or quasi-offense: can. 2199); the Italian Penal Code (art. 43) inserts the preterintentional offense between the intentional and culpable offenses: a distinction which, without substantially altering the concepts, serves to determine more precisely an individual’s responsibility.
N. gives rise to civil and criminal liability (CIC, can. 2210 § 1; Italian Civil Code, art. 2043): 1) in the voluntary omission of duty, 2) in the omission of appropriate precautions in cases involving harm. Foreseeability of the harm is not necessary; culpable failure to observe the precautions is sufficient. The doctrine of human acts applies: if an unlawful effect is intended by the agent, there is direct voluntariness (in criminal law, an intentional offense); if the agent did not intend it, but performs an action from which he ought to foresee that it will result, there is voluntariness in the cause (a culpable offense). If the agent, although not intending the unlawful effect, foresaw it, the culpability approaches intentional wrongdoing (CIC, can. 2203 § 1).
The basis of liability in the case of omission lies in violation of the law; in the case of lack of diligence, it lies in neglect of the general obligation inherent in every law: to avoid not only every unlawful action, but also to use appropriate means so as not to cause harm.
The measure of n. is the diligence that has been lacking. According to the classical expression, in actions the diligence of a «good head of a family» is required (CIC, can. 1523; Italian Civil Code, art. 1176). Two degrees of n. may be distinguished: 1) grave, when the diligence ordinarily used in important affairs is omitted; 2) slight, when all the diligence that could have been used is not employed. Ancient canonists spoke of very slight n. Only grave n., or n. that externally appears to be such, is legally imputable (can. 2218 § 2), without prejudice to can. 2222; once an external transgression has been established, however, whoever invokes slight n. must prove II.
N., like other causes, excuses from latae sententiae penalties when the law requires full knowledge and deliberation with the terms «praesumperit, temerarie, scienter», etc.; otherwise it does not excuse (can. 2229).
N. is subject to sanctions insofar as it signifies delay in fulfilling one’s own duty or in the exercise of one’s rights (cann. 188, 2°; 274, 5; 343 § 1; 410 § 3; 432; 512 § 2, 1°; 1457 ff.; 1634 § 1; 1881 etc., 1902, 2°; 1895; 2398; in general, can. 35), total or partial omission of duty (cann. 617; 2182-85, in relation to can. 2382; 2348; 2403), negligent performance (cann. 2182-85; 2383; 2378), or contempt of authority (can. 2393).