Probabiliorism

PROBABILIORISM. — From the Latin comparative probabilior (more probable); it denotes the moral system which, when there is doubt about the licitness of an action, maintains that it is lawful to follow the opinion favorable to freedom only if it is more probable than that favorable to the law. probability (v.) must derive from positive arguments. Nevertheless, proponents of the system do not agree on the degree of probability required for the licitness of the action. Some require a notable and manifest probability approaching moral certainty. For others, it is sufficient that the reasons be in fact stronger than the opposing ones.

I. HISTORICAL OUTLINE

In the Decretals (c. 3, X, III, 43; c. 3, X, IV, 1; cc. 12, 18, X, V, 12; c. 5, X, V, 27; c. 44, X, V, 39; c. 1, V, 11 in Clem.), the principle dubis pars tutior sequenda est is often affirmed; likewise among many Scholastics. Others invoke the maxim only as a practical rule applicable in particular circumstances. However, probabiliorism as a system of moral theology dates only from the second half of the seventeenth century and dominated until the first half of the following century, as an attempt to curb laxism without falling into tutiorism. Foreshadowed by a few theologians, it was favored by Alexander VII and still more by Innocent XI (v. PROBABILISMO); by Clement XI and Benedict XIV, who imposed the use of the moral theology text by the p. G. Antoine (v.) at the Institute of Propaganda Fide. Accepted as an official moral system by certain religious

Orders (l'estini, Dominicans; only in 1762 also the Franciscans), it spread and remained dominant among a considerable part of the French clergy. The Jesuits generally remained opposed to II. It had celebrated supporters among the Jesuits: M. Elizalde, T. Gonzalez; among the Dominicans: V. Baron, C. R. Billuart, D. Concina, G. V. Contenson, G. B. Gonet, A. Noel, V. Patuzzi, P. Fagnani, G. Cassabut, G. Pontas, S. Saettler, brothers (v.). More recently, it has had supporters especially in the Dominican Order. As a moral system, it has not been condemned by the Church, although it lost much of its influence after s. Alfonso, who nevertheless was a vigorous supporter of it in his youth; contact with practical life during the popular missions, however, persuaded him to combat it as pernicious to the good of souls.

II. DOCTRINAL VALUE OF THE SYSTEM

1) Considered in itself, the system has little doctrinal consistency and little practicality. Its arguments may be summarized as follows: a) just as, when there is doubt about a truth, the intellect must adhere to the opinion that comes closest to the truth, in order to avoid as far as possible the danger of error, so too one must act when there is doubt about the honesty of an action; b) by virtue of the principle of possession, the law retains its obligatory force, compelling the will of the subject, by a kind of precedence, until this right of its has been invalidated by stronger reasons in favor of freedom. The proofs, however, have little substance. The first argument is guilty of petitio principii. It in fact presupposes knowledge of the truth, since it claims to judge whether one opinion is closer to the truth than another, while the truth itself is unknown. Moreover, it asserts the principle of possession in favor of the law without proving it apodictically. 2) Applying the probabiliorist principle, an effect greater than its cause is produced (a certain obligation is derived from mere probability). Greater probability does not always destroy lesser probability, especially when one starts from distinct principles. 3) Probabiliorism also makes practical life impossible: the serious probability of the opposing opinion always renders the action dangerous, unless the principle that lex dubia non obligat is true; hence there is no choice: either probabilism or rigorism. The degree of probability is generally subjective, even among profound authors; it is therefore difficult to judge whether something is more or less probable. In practice, this system could create a ridiculous and odious situation in confession. On the basis of probabiliorism, the confessor, subjectively evaluating matters, would have to deny absolution in cases in which, on the basis of probabiliorism, the penitent would objectively have a right to II. Probabiliorism then confuses counsel with precept and, in seeking the greater good, turns souls away from the good. The example given (someone who, having to go to Rome, prudently chooses the safer of two unknown roads) does not reproduce the moral situation: when faced with a necessary end or with harm that must necessarily be avoided, one must be a tutiorist; but not in the case of a doubtful law.