PROBABILIORISMO

**PROBABILIORISM**

From the Latin comparative *probabilior* (more probable); it denotes the moral system which, in doubt regarding the lawfulness of an action, holds that it is permissible to follow the opinion favoring liberty only if it is more probable than that favoring the law. The greater probability (v.) must derive from positive arguments. However, supporters of the system do not agree on the degree of probability required for the lawfulness of the action. Some demand a notable and manifest probability that approaches moral certainty, while others consider it sufficient if the reasons in favor are in fact stronger than those opposed.

I. HISTORICAL NOTES

In the Decretals (c. 3, X, III, 43; c. 3, X, IV, 1; c. 12, 18, X, V, 12; c. 5, X, V, 27; c. 44, X, V, 39; c. 1, V, 11 in Clem.), the principle is often affirmed: *in dubiis pars tutior sequenda est*; this is likewise found in many Scholastics. Others invoke this principle only as a practical rule valid under certain circumstances. However, probabiliorism as a moral system dates only from the second half of the 17th century and dominated until the first half of the following century, as an attempt to curb laxism without falling into rigorism. Promoted by a few theologians, it was favored by Alexander VII and much more by Innocent XI (v. PROBABILISM); by Clement XI and Benedict XIV, who imposed the use of the moral theology textbook of Fr. G. ATTONE (v.) at the Institute of the Propaganda Fide. Accepted as the official moral system by some religious orders (the Theatines, Dominicans; only in 1762 also the Franciscans), it spread and remained dominant among much of the French clergy. The Jesuits generally remained opposed. It had notable supporters among the Jesuits: M. Elizalde, T. Gonzalez; among the Dominicans: V. Baron, C. R. Billuart, D. Concina, G. V. Contenson, G. B. Gonet, A. Noel, V. Patuzzi, P. Fagnani, G. Cassabut, G. Pontas, S. Saettler, and the Ballerini brothers (v.). Recently it has found supporters especially within the Dominican Order. As a moral system it has not been condemned by the Church, even though it has lost much influence since St. Alphonsus, who, however, in his youth was a strong supporter; but his experience in practical life during popular missions convinced him to oppose it as harmful to the good of souls.

II. DOCTRINAL VALUE OF THE SYSTEM

1) Examined in itself, the system lacks solid doctrinal consistency and practical utility. Its arguments may be summarized as follows: a) just as in doubt regarding a truth the intellect must adhere to the opinion that most closely approaches the truth in order to avoid the danger of error as much as possible, so too one must act in doubt regarding the honesty of an action; b) by virtue of the principle of possession, the law retains its obligatory force, compelling the subject’s will by a kind of precedence, until its right is outweighed by stronger reasons in favor of liberty. However, these proofs lack solid foundation. The first argument commits the fallacy of begging the question, since it presupposes knowledge of the truth, claiming to judge whether an opinion is closer to the truth than another when the truth itself is unknown. Moreover, it asserts the principle of possession in favor of the law without providing apodictic proof. 2) By applying the probabilistic principle, an effect greater than the cause is created (from mere probability a certain obligation is derived). Greater probability does not always destroy lesser probability, especially when starting from distinct principles. 3) Probabiliorism renders practical life impossible: the serious probability of the opposing opinion always renders the action dangerous, unless the principle *in dubiis non obligat* is true; thus no choice exists: either probabiliorism or rigorism. The degree of probability is generally subjective, even among profound authors; hence it is difficult to judge greater or lesser probability. In practice, this system could create a ridiculous or odious situation in confession. The confessor, evaluating matters subjectively on the basis of probabiliorism, would have to deny absolution in cases where, objectively according to probabiliorism, the penitent would be entitled to II. Probabiliorism also confuses counsel with precept and, in the pursuit of greater good, leads souls away from the good. The example adduced (one who must go to Rome and faces two unknown roads, prudently choosing the safer one) does not reproduce the moral situation: before a necessary end, a harm that must necessarily be avoided pertains to rigorism, not to the case of a doubtful law.

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