Probabiliorism

PROBABILIORISM. - From the Latin comparative probabilior (more probable); it denotes the moral system which, in doubt about the lawfulness of an action, holds that it is lawful to follow the opinion favorable to freedom only if it is more probable than the one favorable to the law. The greater probability (v.) must come from positive arguments. However, the supporters of the system do not agree on the degree of probability required for the lawfulness of the action. Some demand a notable and manifest probability approaching moral certainty. For others, on the other hand, it is sufficient that the reasons be in fact stronger than the opposing ones.

I. HISTORICAL NOTES

In the Decretals (c. 3, X, III, 43; c. 3, X, IV, 1; cc. 12, 18, X, V, 12; c. 5, X, V, 27; c. 44, X, V, 39; c. 1, V, 11 in Clem.) the principle in dubis pars tutior sequenda est is often affirmed; likewise in many Scholastics. By others the maxim is invoked only as a practical rule valid in determinate circumstances. However, probabiliorism as a moral system dates only from the second half of the 17th century and dominates until the first half of the following century, as an attempt to stem laxism without falling into tutiorism. Foreshadowed by a few theologians, it was favored by Alexander VII and much more by Innocent XI (v. PROBABILISMO); by Clement XI and by Benedict XIV, who imposed the use of the text of moral theology of Fr. G. Antoine (v.) in the Institute of Propaganda Fide. Accepted as the official moral system by some religious Orders (the Estinis, Dominicans; only in 1762 also the Franciscans), it was widespread and remained dominant in a good part of the French clergy. The Jesuits remained generally opposed. It had famous supporters among the Jesuits: M. Elizalde, T. Gonzalez; among the Dominicans: V. Baron, C. R. Billuart, D. Concina, G. V. Contenson, G. B. Gonet, A. Noel, V. Patuzzi, P. Fagnani, G. Cassabut, G. Pontas, S. Saettler and the Ballerini brothers (v.). Recently it counts supporters especially in the Dominican Order. As a moral system it is not reproved by the Church, even though it has lost much influence after St. Alphonsus, who however in his youth was a valiant supporter of it; but contact with practical life in popular missions persuaded him to combat it as pernicious for the good of souls.

II. DOCTRINAL VALUE OF THE SYSTEM

1) Examined in itself, the system does not have much doctrinal consistency and has little practicality. Its arguments can be summarized as follows: a) just as in doubt about a truth the intellect must adhere to the opinion that comes closest to the truth in order to avoid as much as possible the danger of erring, so too one must act in doubt about the honesty of an action; b) by virtue of the principle of possession, the law retains its obligatory favor, binding on the will of the subject, by a kind of precedence, until its right is invalidated by stronger reasons in favor of liberty. The proofs, however, do not have much consistency. The first argument suffers from begging the question. It presupposes knowledge of the truth, since it claims to judge whether one opinion is closer to the truth than another, when the truth itself is unknown. Furthermore, it affirms the principle of possession in favor of the law, without proving it apodictically. 2) Applying the probabiliorist principle creates an effect greater than the cause (from mere probability a certain obligation is derived). Greater probability does not always destroy lesser probability, especially if one starts from distinct principles. 3) The p. also makes practical life impossible: the serious probability of the opposite opinion always makes the action dangerous, unless the principle that lex dubia non obligat were true; therefore there is no choice: either probabilism or rigorism. The degree of probability is subjective, in general, even among profound authors; therefore it is difficult to judge greater or lesser probability. In practice, with this system, a ridiculous and odious situation could arise in confession. The confessor, on the basis of the p., subjectively evaluating things, would have to deny absolution in cases in which, on the basis of the p., the penitent would objectively have a right to it. The p. then confuses counsel with precept and, in the intent of the greater good, draws souls away from the good. The example adduced (one who had to go to Rome, faced with two unknown roads, prudently chooses the safer one) does not reproduce the moral situation: faced with a necessary end, with a harm to be necessarily avoided, one must be tuziorist; but not in the case of a doubtful law.

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