WEALTH. – Things are called wealth when they are useful, limited, and material. The usefulness and limitation of a thing are understood subjectively, in relation to the needs of the individual. Unlimited things, however useful, are not wealth.
I. ECONOMIC-SOCIAL ASPECT
The notion of wealth has undergone profound changes over the centuries, in relation to the predominant economic system.
Essentially, these changes can be reduced to three main phases. In the Greco-Roman age, the rudimentary state of productive technique confers the character of wealth only upon the possession of immovable goods (houses and land) and that particular form of human capital constituted by slaves. The attribution of the character of wealth to land, as an economic good capable of spontaneously producing other goods, extends throughout the entire medieval period. In the centuries closer to the modern age, however, the spread of artisanal manufacturing, with increasingly advanced techniques for processing natural products, brings about an initial change in the notion of wealth; it comes to include also instrumental goods, i.e., tools capable of producing or transforming other goods, as well as the materials necessary for man.
In the modern age, finally, the gradual and total industrialization and mechanization of the productive process, and the wide profit margins connected with such activity, largely transfer the notion of wealth from the possession of land to that of financial capital.
This occurs all the more decisively insofar as said capital is confirmed and endowed with higher profitability in relation to its power of control and supremacy in the market. In this sense, one speaks of the concentration of wealth as a characteristic aspect of capitalist economy. Such concentration is an inevitable product of the successive industrial revolutions, from the eighteenth century to the present, which have required an ever-greater availability of financial means, their risky immobilization, and a progressive elimination of those holding minimal shares in favor of the strongest monopolists.
The means invoked and put into practice to remedy these negative outcomes of the economic order are varied and often conflicting. It is generally held, however, that in order to contain, neutralize, or eliminate such outcomes, there must be an orientation toward social control over the economic activity that employs and produces wealth. This control is exercised either by public authorities or by the economic and professional groups of citizens.
The extreme position of this critical stance is found in Marxist doctrine, with its consequences (PROPERTY).
It is nevertheless possible (and historically attested) to assist in a process of formation, distribution, and employment of wealth that minimizes negative outcomes. This occurs when individual and national income (i.e., the flow of goods and services annually produced by a community and expressed in money, which is precisely the most current notion of wealth) is formed and distributed within the framework of a rationalization of economic life. The cornerstones of this rationalization, according to Christian social doctrine, are the continual reform of customs and structures: that is, the search for ever more perfect instruments and techniques for the production, distribution, and use of goods and services (structural reforms and reforms within a given structure), and the guidance of men toward using these goods and services for the greatest advantage of the human person (reform of consciences).
Here, with regard to reforms within structures and of the structures themselves, all the problems of productivity recur (from the standardization of products to human relations; to various forms of incentive, group, and proportional wages; profit-sharing, etc.), as well as the reform of the enterprise, whether through the inclusion of workers in the ownership of the company (workers' shares, etc.), or through the transfer of ownership to workers (various forms of cooperation, capital loans, etc.), or through the initiation of associative forms (e.g., capital-labor associations); moreover, all the problems of reforming the market economy itself, with the transition from economic liberalism to directed economy (planned economy in its various meanings); and finally, all the problems of the distribution of produced wealth, both at the company level (equitable distribution of wealth among those who contributed to its production) and at the national level (problems of national income distribution, tax issues, social security issues, etc.), and at the international level (problems of raw materials, exchange of information, depressed areas, etc.).
With regard to the reform of consciences, the problem of the demands of natural law and revealed law returns (problems of the development of social doctrine and moral theology), along with all the means established by Christian tradition and offered by ongoing human progress. Therefore, “it will be easy to see,” as Pius XII says (Radio Message for the Fiftieth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum), “that the economic wealth of a people does not properly consist in the abundance of goods, measured according to a purely material computation of their value, but rather in the fact that such abundance truly and effectively provides the material basis sufficient for the proper development of its members. If such a just distribution of goods were not achieved or were only imperfectly attained, the true purpose of the national economy would not be achieved; for even if an abundance of available goods were to exist, the people, not called to participate, would not be economically rich, but poor.”
II. RELIGIOUS-MORAL ASPECT
Here two points seem to be of greatest interest regarding the problem of wealth: the connection between wealth and moral life in the Old and New Testaments (doctrine of retribution in Christian Revelation); the moral value of wealth.
1) The idea of retribution in the early books of the Old Testament tends to assume an immediate and earthly character; the affirmation that good will be rewarded and evil punished tends to translate into the following: good will be rewarded immediately, in this life, indeed even materially; evil will be punished immediately, in this life, indeed even materially. See, for example, Lev. 26:3-4 and Deut. 28: “If you walk in my statutes and observe my commandments and put them into practice, I will send rain in its season, and the land will yield its produce...” (cf. also the story of Job and Wis. 3:1-4). Hence a singular association of poverty and wealth, as if the former were proof of an internal immorality and the latter, in turn, proof of inner moral goodness: the poor tend to be identified with the wicked and abandoned by God; the rich tend to be identified with the good and protected by God.
Things change considerably as one approaches the New Testament and, in any case, with II. The idea of correspondence between good and reward, evil and unhappiness is strongly emphasized; not, however, necessarily in the sense of immediate correspondence, let alone material correspondence (cf., for example, the parable of Lazarus and the rich man; the former does good and yet suffers in this life; the latter does evil and yet lacks nothing in this life: Lk. 16:20 ff.). Thus the idea of wealth as a reward for good deeds and poverty as a punishment for evil deeds is gradually abandoned: both are presented as conditions that can accompany both virtue and vice, situations that can be used and abused.
To clarify the relationship between wealth and morality, it is necessary to define the concept of wealth more precisely and then examine the historical behavior of the rich. Wealth can be defined either in terms of the quantity of goods one possesses—today usually translated into monetary terms—or in terms of the utility derived from those goods by the owner. In the first sense, wealth is identified with a substantial mass of goods; in the second, it is identified with an abundance of economic resources. This abundance of economic resources consists of two components: a) the amount of income received over a given period (e.g., a month, a year); b) the ability to maintain this income over time.
The second component is the more important one. Even a very large income does not constitute wealth if it is not founded on a basis that will not last at all or only with great difficulty; conversely, even a modest income can represent genuine wealth if there is moral certainty of its long-term security. Speaking concretely, wealth, in the sense described, behaves substantially in the following ways:
a) It more easily and frequently encourages idleness than work. That this is truly the case is amply demonstrated by history; why this is so follows obviously from the state of wealth itself. What incentive to work can the rich man have? Whatever the circumstances, since his income is secure, he will always have more than necessary. Why should he wear out his life increasing his estate and income? Nor should the figure of the worker be opposed here, with his insatiable desire to accumulate goods; first, because such a figure does not represent the rule but the exception; and second, because he acts in this way precisely because (due to illness or fault) he does not consider himself secure enough—that is, he is not rich. His attitude stems from the conviction that he is not rich, not from any different behavior of wealth itself than that described.
In another way, it could be said that wealth strongly stimulates the pursuit and enjoyment of pleasure (cf. Lk 12:17-19). And it is inevitable that in the pursuit of pleasure, the attraction of earthly delights is stronger (cf. Mt 13:17-22);
b) It often serves as an incentive to vice and a tool for oppressing the freedom of others. Those who possess a great deal of gold can open almost any door. Thus, speaking concretely and historically, wealth allows one to do what morality and laws do not always permit. Moreover, for the same reason, wealth can sometimes dominate another’s will, easily bending it to one’s own desires;
c) It makes trustful confidence in God more difficult. It is well known that trust in God is easier for the poor precisely because of their greater awareness of their own insufficiency. Proof of this can be seen in the greater religiosity of children compared to adults, of primitive peoples compared to civilized ones, and in moments of individual danger (e.g., illness) or collective danger (e.g., war) compared to times of tranquility. The same can be said of economic conditions. Those who do not have life secured are more inclined to recognize that everything depends on God, that we can do nothing without His help and protection. For the rich, however, the necessary and even the superfluous arrive with fixed regularity—often in the form of banknotes or checks, almost with the regularity of atmospheric phenomena and the certainty of physical laws—so that the future seems to be in their hands. The counter-proof is seen in a certain religiosity that emerges among the possessors of wealth when clouds appear on the horizon and no other means seems available to avert danger except divine intervention: then religious sentiment is reborn, and invocation of God becomes almost spontaneous.
It can therefore be said that, while not evil in itself, wealth in fact constitutes, concretely and statistically speaking, an occasion of evil. In particular, wealth behaves antithetically to the motives for which the institution of private property is defended in the Christian tradition. It does not embody this institution but rather corrupts II.
Since wealth is a danger to moral life and an incentive to neglect one’s duties, everyone must avoid falling into it; one must strive, as far as possible, to escape it, and when there are reasons not to do so, one must seek in every way to neutralize the evil consequences that wealth normally brings with II. This must be said especially of those who find themselves in wealth without personal effort, by virtue of more or less fortuitous events (social upheavals, wars, inheritance, etc.): they, in particular, must remember that if they are in a condition that is “humanly” enviable, they are “Christianly” in a dangerous condition.
In this sense, the frequent warnings of Christ against wealth must be understood. Jesus lived within an economic and social structure based on private property and did not condemn it; indeed, He condemned theft (cf. Mt 19:18 and parallels). He repeatedly taught that wealth can be an instrument of good and of eternal life (cf. the parable of the ten talents, the episode of the Magdalene, etc.). Yet wealth is not the greatest good (cf. Mt 16:26). Indeed, it is such a grave danger that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven (Mt 19:24). The earnest warning against the dangers of wealth does not, therefore, imply an exaltation of poverty as such (cf. Prov 30:8-9).
It is now possible to respond to an objection that easily arises: that the Christian attitude toward wealth constitutes an obstacle to progress. Let us first observe that for us, progress means the approach to the human ideal and the conditions necessary to achieve it; for this ideal and for the approach to it, goods are a component—not the only one, nor the most important. The Christian distrust of wealth arises precisely from the fact that it does not constitute an incentive to work but rather an incentive to idleness; that is, instead of acting in a productive and progressive manner, it operates in an anti-productive and even regressive way.