RICORSO. – The term is used in the various branches of law with different meanings, which may nevertheless be summarized in a single one: as a means of appeal in substantive law. Indeed, the r. differs profoundly from the appeal, which is the means of appeal in procedural law and presupposes a judgment subject to appeal. The r., as a means of appeal in substantive law, does not ordinarily have suspensive effect, whereas it generally does have devolutive effect.
I. RECOURSE IN PROCEDURAL LAW
Against judgments from which no appeal is admissible, a party may have recourse to the supreme tribunal on account of any errors of law contained in the judgment. Indeed, in almost all civil procedural systems (e.g., the Vatican, Italian, and French systems), only one review on the merits is permitted and, after the judgment at second instance, res judicata is established. The supreme tribunal of the aforementioned legal systems has the task of verifying that, in proceedings on the merits, the rules of both substantive and procedural law have been observed. Given the regulatory function of this supreme tribunal, it is evident that this is not an appeal, since the tribunal does not possess the necessary authority to examine the case on its merits, but rather a recourse, in order to obtain a ruling on any errors contained in the judgment of the court that decided the case on its merits.Recourse is likewise had to the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, rather than an appeal being lodged: it is true that this tribunal also has decision-making powers on the merits, as, for example, in the case of can. 1603 § 1 n. 1° CIC, but, generally speaking, the Apostolic Signatura is a tribunal of law and not of fact. Before the CIC entered into force, it was possible to appeal not only against judgments of judges, but also against decrees of judges or of the Ordinary that might in some way burden a party, and this appeal was called extrajudicial. The CIC, on the other hand, uses the word appeal only in the case of a challenge to a judgment, while it calls every challenge to decrees a recourse. There are four cases in which recourse has suspensive effect and therefore shares certain features with an appeal. Of these four cases, one concerns procedural law (can. 1709: recourse against the rejection of the libellus).
II. THE R. IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. — Although the so-called separation of powers does not exist in the Church, nevertheless the jurisdictional authority is also found in canon law, that is, the authority comprising the tribunals and the Ordinary, as well as the administrative authority, comprising the Sacred Congregations and the Ordinary. In administrative law no appeal is admitted apart from the r. Against a decision of the Ordinary, whether following a regular administrative proceeding or outside such a proceeding, recourse must be had to the competent Sacred Congregation. Indeed, the CIC, in can. 1601, provides that there is to be no appeal or r. to the Sacred Rota against decrees of the Ordinaries, but that the Sacred Congregations alone are competent to hear r. against such decrees. The r., therefore, presupposes an administrative decision of the Ordinary and is directed against it; however, except in the cases referred to in cann. 647, 1465, 2153, 2243, and 2287, the r. does not have the effect of suspending the bishop’s decision. In other cases the r. has only devolutive effect. As for the administrative proceedings of which the CIC speaks in Book IV, Part 3, it should be recalled that the only remedy against the definitive decree is the r. to the Apostolic See and that, while the r. is pending, the Ordinary cannot validly confer permanently upon another person the parish or benefice of which the cleric has been deprived (can. 2146 §§ 1 and 3). It follows from this canon that in cases involving administrative proceedings, the r., although lacking suspensive effect, nevertheless prevents the Ordinary from having the post occupied by the removed appellant filled on a permanent basis.