STATE, DUTIES OF ONE'S OWN. - By state here are meant not only the unchangeable conditions of life by which we are bound toward others (state deriving from Holy Orders, religious profession, or marriage), but also those other conditions of life that possess a certain stability. Thus understood, states (professions, employments, services, and offices) are the places assigned to each person by God in the order of human society; not privileges, but sources of responsibility and talents for which an account must be rendered. Their multiplicity and variety, necessary for man's social life and for the organization of the Church, go back to God, author of nature and society.
Consequently: 1) all professions necessary or useful to the common good are morally good and consonant with human dignity, even if manual and remunerative. This does not exclude the existence among states of a broad and complex hierarchy deriving from the origin and especially from the perfection, necessity, and difficulty of the various states, and, within the same state, from the particular requirements of each person's rank or activity; 2) Providence assigns each person to different states both by bestowing the necessary natural and supernatural gifts and by providing the means to carry out this providential plan. This realization, however, as a rule arises from the free choice of the individual. Two classes of duties may therefore be considered: some preliminary and relating to the choice of one's state; others, called the duties of one's own state in the strict sense, which arise from the state already chosen and exercised.
I. THE CHOICE OF ONE’S STATE
One’s state sometimes arises from the very fact of birth, as that of child or subject; at other times from the circumstances of the individual or the environment; at still other times from an evident necessity of civil and ecclesiastical society, as when someone is called by the pope to the episcopate; and finally from an extraordinary call of God, as in the case of Geremia or Giona (cf. Ier. 1, 6-10; Ion. 1, 1 ff.). In the other cases, which are the more numerous, the will of God is more or less precise and must be investigated until moral certainty is attained, proportionate to the gravity of the commitment to be undertaken. Such choice and inquiry require, besides asking God for the necessary light, an attentive and realistic knowledge and assessment of the subject’s gifts and abilities, as well as inclinations; of the actual possibility of realizing one’s desires in a given time and place—for even in the field of professions and occupations one may speak of supply and demand, with consequent deflation and inflation; of the nature and difficulties of the state, both in itself and in relation to the subject, and of the spiritual and material advantages and disadvantages which it entails. The aim is to discover not so much the excellence of the state in itself as to perceive to which state the subject is called.The importance of the choice requires that it be made promptly and that the Church, the family, the school, and professional associations contribute to it, according to their means and within their respective spheres, by fostering the guidance of individuals and the selection of members in the various professions. But ultimately it is the right and burden of the subject, who in this matter is not subject even to his parents (Pio XII, Radiomessaggio per il Natale 1942). This does not mean, of course, that the subject need not give due consideration to their advice and to that of superiors and the spiritual director, nor that he may not be bound, even in the choice of his state, by prior particular moral obligations (for example, one who were truly necessary to the livelihood of his parents could not leave home), or by the requirements of the common good or by limits imposed by authority. Special circumstances may also sometimes recommend the choice of a provisional state, pending the possibility of a change.
These criteria should guide not only the general choice of a state, such as the military or medical profession, but also the specific choice of rank, office, and the like: not all those called to military service can serve in the same branch or at the same rank; different qualities are required in a medical officer in a large town isolated from urban centres and in a physician in private practice; different ones in a general practitioner and in a specialist in a particular field.
The choice entails the obligation of preparation and education, and sometimes of practical training and apprenticeship, according to the circumstances of the subject and the profession and according to any laws in force, which also bind in conscience.
Just as one sins by pusillanimity, that is, against the virtue of fortitude, who refuses, without a proportionate reason, offices imposed by superiors or required by the common good (in which case only evident incapacity can be a sufficient reason), so one violates justice who accepts, whether privately or publicly, a task for which one knows oneself to be incapable; those who urge or facilitate this—parents, superiors, examiners, electors—make themselves accomplices in the person’s fault. It may be lawful to elect, and for the subject to accept, one who is less capable, when the office is necessary and no one better prepared is available.
The laws governing entry into a profession or trade (examination, registration in professional rolls, and the like) must likewise be observed; whoever obtains employment or office by illicit means that are determining causes of obtaining that office must not only submit to the prescribed penalties (cf. CIC, cann. 149, 153-54, 729, 2371, 2392-95, etc.; Cod. pen. ital., artt. 316-24, 476-93), but must also, while safeguarding his good name, leave the post unjustly obtained and repair the damage caused to third parties. Nor should the laws of charity be neglected, for they sometimes require one to relinquish an office or superfluous bread to one who is in grave need.
II. DUTIES OF ONE’S STATE
It is not useless to point out that these duties do not exempt one from those incumbent upon every person or deriving from another source; in the event of conflicts between duties, the more serious and urgent are to be preferred, according to the fundamental norms of morality. Thus the physician, teacher, artisan, etc., must observe, along with the specific duties of their state, those common to every person, every citizen, father of a family, etc. Indeed, the skill and capacity presupposed and required in every state will provide orientation for, and extend, common duties: the physician will practise charity especially toward the sick, while every intellectual must feel the call to instruct the ignorant, admonish them, etc., with greater urgency.A fundamental duty common to all states is that of exercising one’s office with the diligence required by the public or private good and explicitly or implicitly promised. Such a promise exists, at least implicitly, in the acceptance of the office, by which a contract for services or a contract of work is perfected (others see in it a mandate or an innominate contract or a quasi-contract); hence arises an obligation of commutative justice in favor of the other party in private offices; in public offices, toward society and also toward the citizens to whom the activity proper to that particular office is directed. Hence also the nature of, and obligation to repair, the damages caused.
This fundamental duty requires:
1) The theoretical and practical expertise necessary for the proper fulfillment of the obligations of one’s state; common expertise, sufficient at least for ordinary and urgent cases and difficulties, according to the circumstances of the state and the environment. It must be the greater the more serious the subject’s capabilities and the responsibilities of the office, and must extend not only to specific and technical theoretical and practical knowledge, but also to the moral and religious norms governing that state and constituting the deontology of the magistrate, entrepreneur, etc. This expertise will often require avoiding what is foreign to one’s own activity, and must be kept alive and up to date. Whoever knows, or prudently doubts, that he lacks this or another necessary quality has not only sinned in accepting the office, but is obliged to resign or remedy his deficiency, in the meantime guarding against the errors and damages that he will meanwhile be obliged to repair.
2) Ordinary and appropriate diligence in the exercise of one’s activity. Diligence, like expertise, must be proportionate to the responsibilities arising from the state, and, within the same state, from the particular position or office. Serious negligence is a grave injustice entailing the burden of repairing the damages. No intrinsic inconvenience of the profession excuses one from its faithful fulfillment; in public offices the public good must always prevail over private advantage and, even in private offices, whoever exercises them is obliged to confront the inconveniences and dangers, including those not foreseen, that are by their nature connected with the office itself. Justice is also violated by anyone who, without proportionate reason, abandons his office before the agreed or established term.
Professional activity must be carried out in such a way as not to prejudice the higher interests and duties of the human person; indeed, it must be regarded as a means subordinated to higher spiritual demands: as a gift granted in order to serve Jesus Christ in one’s brothers and sisters, making them participants in those same gifts (cf. I Pt. 2, 10).
It is a duty to feel, without sectarianism, indeed in the full harmony and cooperation of all forces and associations, bonds of particular charity toward those belonging to the same state; and to promote professional unions tending toward spiritual and material advancement, by actively participating in their life.
The laws governing the exercise of the various states likewise bind in conscience and must be known and observed (cf. Cod. civ. it., artt. 2060-2642); so too do contracts regularly entered into by associations and private persons, as well as the tariffs and fees established by the competent bodies. Whoever holds a public office may demand nothing for the fulfillment of his duty beyond what is established by law or legitimate custom; otherwise he is obliged to make restitution. Nor may he accept what is spontaneously offered to him for an illicit purpose, or what is prohibited by law, or what may cause scandal or encourage malfeasance (cf. CIC, can. 736; Cod. pen. it., artt. 316-22).
BISL: Sum. Theol., 2°-2°, qq. 183-80, with the commentators, among whom the following stand out: P. M. Passerini, De hominum statibus et officiis, Lucca 1732; A. Vermeersch, Theol. mor., II, Roma 1928, n. 506 agg.; various authors, Professioni e vita morale, Napoli 1935; A. Gemelli, L'operato nell'industria moderna, Milano 1944; F. Huerth, De statibus, Roma 1946; V. Heylen, Tractatus de iure et initiatio, Malines 1950, pp. 492-98; various authors, La spiritualità crist. nell'esec. delle profesi, Roma 1951.