STATO, OBBLIGHI DEL PROPRIO

STATES, OBLIGATIONS OF ONE'S OWN. — By "states" here we mean not only the immutable conditions of life by which we are bound toward others (states arising from Holy Orders, religious profession, or marriage), but also those other conditions of life that possess a certain stability. Understood in this way, states (professions, employments, services, and offices) are the positions assigned to each by God within the order of human society; they are not privileges, but sources of responsibility and talents for which an account must be rendered. Their multiplicity and variety, necessary for human social life and for the organization of the Church, derive from God, the author of nature and society.

Consequently: 1) all professions, whether necessary or useful for the common good, are morally good and in conformity with human dignity, even if they are manual or lucrative. This does not exclude the existence, among states, of a broad and complex hierarchy deriving from their origin and especially from the perfection, necessity, and difficulty of the various states, and, within the same state, from the particular demands of each person’s rank or activity; 2) Providence assigns each person to different states both by bestowing the natural and supernatural gifts necessary and by providing the means to carry out this providential plan. This implementation, however, ordinarily arises from the free choice of the individual. Two classes of duties may therefore be examined: the first, preliminary and related to the choice of state; the second, which are called duties of one’s own state in the strict sense and arise from the state already chosen and operative.

I. THE CHOICE OF STATE

State sometimes emerges from the very fact of birth, as in the case of son or subject; at other times from the circumstances of the individual or environment; at still others from the evident needs of civil or ecclesiastical society, as when one is called by the pope to the episcopate; and finally, from an extraordinary call of God, as in the case of Jeremiah or Jonah (cf. Jer. 1:6–10; Jon. 1:1 ff.). In the remaining cases, which are the most common, the will of God is more or less precise and must be discerned until one attains moral certainty proportionate to the gravity of the commitment to be undertaken. Such a choice and discernment require, in addition to seeking necessary enlightenment from God, careful and realistic knowledge and evaluation of the individual’s talents and abilities, as well as his inclinations; the actual possibility of realizing his desires in time and place—since even in the realm of professions and occupations one may speak of supply and demand, with consequent inflation or deflation; the nature and difficulty of the state both in itself and in relation to the individual, as well as the spiritual and material advantages and disadvantages it entails. The aim is not to ascertain the excellence of the state in itself, but to perceive to which state the individual is called.

The importance of this choice demands that it be made in a timely manner and that the Church, the family, the school, and professional associations contribute to it according to their means and within their spheres, fostering the guidance of individuals and the selection of members for various professions. Ultimately, however, the choice is the right and responsibility of the individual, who in this matter is not even subject to his parents (Pius XII, Christmas Radio Message 1942). This does not mean, of course, that the individual should not give due consideration to the advice of parents, superiors, and spiritual directors, nor that he may not be bound, even in the choice of state, by particular moral obligations (e.g., one could not abandon a home truly necessary for the life of one’s parents) or by the demands of the common good or by limits imposed by authority. Special circumstances may also sometimes advise the choice of a provisional state, pending the possibility of a change.

These criteria must guide not only the generic choice of state, such as a military or medical profession, but also the specific choice of rank, office, and the like: not all who are called to military service can serve in the same branch or rank, and different qualities are required of a public health officer in a large, isolated municipality than of a private practitioner; others are needed in a general practitioner and others in a specialist.

The choice imposes the obligation of preparation and education, sometimes of apprenticeship and training, according to the circumstances of the individual and the profession, and the laws that may be in force, which also bind in conscience.

As it is a sin of pusillanimity, i.e., against the virtue of fortitude, to refuse, without proportionate reason, offices imposed by superiors or desired by the common good (and in such a case only evident incapacity can be a sufficient motive), so it is a violation of justice to accept a task, whether private or public, of which one knows oneself to be incapable; those who urge or favor such acceptance become accomplices in the guilt: parents, superiors, examiners, electors. It may be permissible to elect, and for the individual to accept, someone less capable when the office is necessary and no better-prepared candidate is available.

The laws regulating the beginning of a profession or trade (examinations, registration in professional rolls, and the like) must also be observed; whoever obtains an employment or office through illicit means that are the determining cause of securing the office not only incurs the penalties established (cf. CIC, cann. 149, 153–54, 729, 2371, 2392–95, etc.; Italian Penal Code, arts. 316–24, 476–93), but must also, even if this should compromise his good name, relinquish the unjustly obtained position and make reparation for the harm done to others. Nor should the laws of charity be neglected, which sometimes require that one cede an office or superfluous livelihood to someone in grave need.

II. DUTIES OF ONE’S OWN STATE

It is not superfluous to note that these duties do not exempt one from those incumbent upon every person or deriving from another source; in cases of conflict of duties, the more grave and urgent ones must be preferred, according to the fundamental norms of morality. Therefore, the physician, the teacher, the craftsman, etc., must observe, along with the specific duties of their state, those common to every person, every citizen, every head of a family, etc. Indeed, the skill and ability presupposed and required in every state will serve as a guide and extension of common duties: the physician will practice charity especially toward the sick, while every intellectual should feel a more urgent call to instruct the ignorant, admonish, etc.

A fundamental duty common to all states is to perform one’s office with the diligence required by the public or private good and which has been, explicitly or implicitly, promised. Such a promise exists, at least implicitly, in the acceptance of the office, by which a work contract or service agreement is perfected (some see in it a mandate or an unnamed contract or a quasi-contract); hence arises an obligation of commutative justice toward the counterparty in private offices; toward society and also toward the citizens to whom the activity of that particular office is directed in public ones. Hence also the nature and obligation of repairing any damages caused.

This fundamental duty requires:

1) The expertise or theoretical and practical competence necessary for the proper fulfillment of one's own duties in a given state of life; common expertise, which at least suffices for ordinary and urgent cases according to the circumstances of the state and environment. This must be all the greater the more serious the subject's possibilities and the responsibilities of the office, and must extend not only to theoretical and practical, specific and technical knowledge, but also to the moral and religious norms that govern that state and which constitute the deontology of the magistrate, entrepreneur, etc. This expertise often requires avoiding what is foreign to one's own activity and must be kept alive and updated. Whoever knows or prudently doubts lacking this or another necessary quality not only sins by accepting the office but is obliged to resign or remedy the deficiency, meanwhile guarding against errors and damages for which he will be held accountable.

2) Ordinary and appropriate diligence in the exercise of one's activity. Diligence, like expertise, must be proportionate to the responsibilities arising from the state of life, and within that state, from the particular position or office. Gross negligence is a grave injustice that entails the burden of repairing damages. No intrinsic inconvenience of the profession excuses faithful fulfillment of its duties; in public offices, the common good must always prevail over private advantage, and even in private offices, those who exercise them are obliged to face the inconveniences and dangers, even unforeseen ones, that are by their nature connected with the office itself. One also violates justice who, without proportionate reason, abandons one's office before the agreed or fixed term.

Professional activity must be carried out in a way that does not prejudice the higher interests and duties of man; indeed, it must be considered as a means subordinate to higher spiritual exigencies: as a gift granted to serve Jesus Christ in one's neighbor, sharing with them the same gifts (cf. 1 Pt. 4:10).

It is a duty to feel, without sectarianism, but in full harmony and collaboration of all forces and associations, bonds of particular charity toward those belonging to the same state of life; to foster professional unions aimed at spiritual and material elevation, actively participating in their life.

Even the laws regulating the exercise of various states of life bind in conscience and must be known and observed (cf. Cod. civ. it., arts. 2060-2642); likewise, contracts regularly stipulated by associations or individuals, and the tariffs and fees set by competent bodies. One who holds a public office may demand nothing for the fulfillment of duty beyond what is established by law or legitimate custom; otherwise, restitution is owed. Nor may one accept what is offered spontaneously for an illicit purpose, nor what is forbidden by law or may cause scandal or encourage wrongdoing (cf. CIC, can. 736; Cod. pen. it., arts. 316-22).

Bibl.: Sum. Theol., 2:2-2e, qq. 183-86, with commentators, among whom stands out: P. M. Passerini, De hominum statibus et officiis, Lucca 1732; A. Vermeersch, Theol. mor., II, Rome 1928, n. 506 ff.; various authors, Professioni e vita morale, Naples 1935; A. Gemelli, L'opera nell'industria moderna, Milan 1944; F. Huert, De statibus, Rome 1946; V. Heylen, Tractatus de iure et institutis, Malines 1950, pp. 402-98; various authors, La spiritualità crist. nell'esser. delle profess., Rome 1951. Giuseppe Pistoni