Monologium, on the Being of God78 Chapter LXXVIII. The supreme Being may in some sort be called Three.

sant'Anselmo d'Aosta († 1109) · Monologion · 1075-1076

Chapter LXXVIII. The supreme Being may in some sort be called Three.

And so it is evidently expedient for every man to believe in a certain ineffable trinal unity, and in one Trinity; one and a unity because of its one essence, but trinal and a trinity because of its three—what? For, although I can speak of a Trinity because of Father and Son and the Spirit of both, who are three; yet I cannot, in one word, show why they are three; as if I should call this Being a Trinity because of its three persons, just as I would call it a unity because of its one substance.

For three persons are not to be supposed, because all persons which are more than one so subsist separately from one another, that there must be as many substances as there are persons, a fact that is recognised in the case of more men than one, when there are as many persons as there are individual substances. Hence, in the supreme Being, just as there are not more substances than one, so there are not more persons than one.

So, if one wishes to express to any why they are three, he will say that they are Father and Son and the Spirit of both, unless perchance, compelled by the lack of a precisely appropriate term, he shall choose some one of those terms which cannot be applied in a plural sense to the supreme Being, in order to indicate what cannot be expressed in any fitting language; as if he should say, for instance, that this wonderful Trinity is one essence or nature, and three persons or substances.

For these two terms are more appropriately chosen to describe plurality in the supreme Being, because the word person is applied only to an individual, rational nature; and the word substance is ordinarily applied to individual beings, which especially subsist in plurality. For individual beings are especially exposed to, that is, are subject to, accidents, and for this reason they more properly receive the name sub-stance. Now, it is already manifest that the supreme Being, which is subject to no accidents, cannot properly be called a substance, except as the word substance is used in the same sense with the word Essence. Hence, on this ground, namely, of necessity, that supreme and one Trinity or trinal unity may justly be called one Essence and three Persons or three Substances.

Ecce patet omni homini expedire ut credat in quamdam ineffabilem trinam unitatem, et unam Trinitatem: unam quidem et unitatem, propter unam essentiam; trinam vero et trinitatem, propter tres, nescio quid. Licet enim possim dicere Trinitatem, propter Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum, qui sunt tres; non tamen possum proferre uno nomine, propter quid tres; velut si dicerem propter tres personas; sicut dicerem unitatem, propter unam substantiam. Non enim putandae sunt tres personae; quia omnes plures personae sic subsistunt separatim ab invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias, quot sunt personae: quod in pluribus hominibus, qui quot personae, tot individuae sunt substantiae, cognoscitur. Quare in summa essentia, sicut non sunt plures substantiae; ita nec plures personae. Si quis itaque inde velit alicui loqui quid tres, dicet esse Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum, nisi forte indigentia nominis proprie convenientis coactus elegerit, aliquod ex illis nominibus, quae pluraliter in summa essentia dici non possunt ad significandum id quod congruo nomine dici non potest: ut si dicat illam admirabilem Trinitatem esse unam essentiam, vel naturam; et tres personas, sive substantias. Nam haec duo nomina aptius eliguntur ad significandam pluralitatem in summa essentia, quia persona non dicitur, nisi de individua rationali natura; et substantia principaliter dicitur de individuis, quae maxime in pluralitate subsistunt. Individua namque maxime substant, id est, subjacent accidentibus: et ideo magis proprie nomen substantiae suscipiunt. Unde jam supra manifestum est summam essentiam, quae nullis subjacet accidentibus, proprie non posse dici substantiam; nisi substantia ponatur pro essentia. Potest ergo hac necessitatis ratione irreprehensibiliter illa summa et una Trinitas, sive trina unitas, dici una essentia, et tres personae, sive tres substantiae.

Sidney Norton Deane (1878–1943), Chicago: Open Court, 1903. Fonte del testo digitale: English Wikisource transcription of the 1903 edition (each chapter checked against the OCR of the Internet Archive scan stanselmeproslog00anseuoft). Testo originale: Corpus Corporum (University of Zurich) TEI of the Patrologia Latina, via the CatholicCorpus mirror. Public domain in the US and Canada: published 1903; translator died 1943. Latin: Migne, PL 158 (1853), public domain.

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