TopiciLibro II

Latino

Sunt autem problematum haec quidem universalia, illa vero particularia: universalia quidem, ut omnis voluptas bonum est, et nulla valuptas bonum; particularia vero, ut aliqua voluptas bonum, et aliqua voluptas non bonum. Sunt autem ad utraque genera problematum communia universalia, et constructiva, et destructiva. Ostendentes enim quod omni inest, et quod alicui inest ostendentes erimus; similiter autem et si quod nulli inest ostenderimus, et quod non omni inest ostendentes erimus. Primum ergo de universalibus destructivis dicendum, eo quod communia sint hujusmodi ad universalia et particularia, et quia magis positiones afferant in eo quod inest, quam non, disputantes autem destruant. Est autem difficillimum converti ab accidente propriam nominationem. Nam aliquo modo et non universaliter in solis contingit accidentibus, a definitione enim, et proprio, et genere necessarium est converti, ut si inest alicui animal gressibile bipes esse, convertentem verum erit dicere, quoniam illud animal gressibile bipes est. Similiter autem a genere, nam si animal inest alicui, animal est. Eodem autem modo et in proprio est; si enim alicui inest grammatices susceptivum esse, grammatices susceptivum erit. Nam nihil horum contingit secundum quid inesse, vel non esse, sed simpliciter vel inesse, vel non inesse. In accidentibus autem nihil prohibet secundum quid inesse, ut albedinem, vel justitiam. Quare non sufficit ostendere quoniam inest albedo, vel justitia, ad ostendendum quod albus, vel justus est, nam habet dubitationem, quoniam secundum quid albus, vel justus est: quapropter non necessarium est in accidentibus converti. Determinare autem oportet et peccata quae sunt in problematibus, nam sunt duo, vel in eo quod falsum dicunt, vel in eo quod transgrediuntur positam locutionem. Falsum etenim dicentes, et qui quod non inest inesse alicui dicunt, peccant, et qui extraneis nominibus res appellant (ut Platanum hominem), transgrediuntur positam nominationem.

Inglese

108b35Of problems some are universal, others particular. Universal problems are such as ‘Every pleasure is good’ and ‘No pleasure is good’ ; particular problems are such as ‘Some 109apleasure is good’ and ‘Some pleasure is not good’, The methods of establishing and overthrowing a view universally are common to both kinds of problems; for when we have shown that a predicate belongs in every case, we shall also have shown that it belongs in some cases. Likewise, also, 109a5if we show that it does not belong in any case, we shall also have shown that it does not belong in every case. First, then, we must speak of the methods of overthrowing a view universally, because such are common to both universal and particular problems, and because people more usually introduce theses asserting a predicate than denying it, 109a10while those who argue with them overthrow it. The conversion of an appropriate name which is drawn from the element ‘accident’ is an extremely precarious thing; for in the case of accidents and in no other it is possible for something to be true conditionally and not universally. Names drawn from the elements ‘definition’ and ‘property’ and ‘genus’ are bound to be convertible; e. g. if ‘to be an animal that walks on two feet is an attribute of S’, then it 109a15Will be true by conversion to say that ‘S is an animal that walks on two feet’. Likewise, also, if drawn from the genus; for if ‘to be an animal is an attribute of S’, then ‘S is an animal’. The same is true also in the case of a property; for if ‘to be capable of learning grammar is an attribute of S’, then ‘S will be capable of learning grammar’. For none 109a20of these attributes can possibly belong or not belong in part; they must either belong or not belong absolutely. In the case of accidents, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent an attribute (e.g. whiteness or justice) belonging in part, so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is an attribute of a man in order to show that he is white or just; for it is open to dispute it and say that he is 109a25white or just in part only. Conversion, then, is not a necessary process in the case of accidents.

109a27We must also define the errors that occur in problems. They are of two kinds, caused either by false statement or by transgression of the established diction. For those who make false statements, and say that an attribute belongs to 109a30a thing which does not belong to it, commit error; and those who call objects by the names of other objects (e.g. calling a plane-tree a ‘man’) transgress the established terminology.

Owen 1853

Of problems, some are universal but others particular, the universal then, as that all pleasure is good, and that no pleasure is good, but the particular, as that a certain pleasure is good, and a certain pleasure is not good. To both genera, however, of problems, those things are common which universally construct and subvert, for having shown that a thing is present with every, we shall also have proved that it is present with a certain individual, and in like manner, if we have shown that it is present with no individual, we shall also have proved it not present with every. We must first speak, then, of those which are universally subversive, both because such are common to universal and particular (problems), and because men rather introduce theses in the affirmative than in the negative, but the disputants subvert them. Nevertheless, it is most difficult to convert an appropriate appellation (derived) from accident, for (to be inherent) partly, and not universally, is possible to accidents only, since it is necessary to convert from definition, property, and genus, as if it is present with a certain thing to be an animal, pedestrian, biped, it will be true for the person who has converted it, to say, that it is an animal, pedestrian, biped. Likewise from genus, for if it is incident to a thing to be an animal, it is an animal; and it is the same with property, for if it is present with any to be capable of grammar, it will be capable of grammar, since nothing of these can be partly present or not present, but simply present or not present. Yet there is nothing to prevent accidents from being partly present, for instance, whiteness or justice,¹ so that it is not enough to show that whiteness or justice is inherent, in order to show that a man is white or just, since it is doubtful, because he may be partially white or just, so that conversion is unnecessary in accidents.

Again, we must determine the errors occurrent in problems, that they are two, either from false assertion, or a departure from the established mode of speaking. For both false assertors err, from saying that what is not present, is present with a certain thing, and those who call things by foreign names, as a plane tree a man, transgress the established nomenclature.

Latino

Unus autem locus est inspicere si quid secundum aliquem alium modum inest, ut accidens assignavit. Peccatur autem maxime id circa genera, ut si quis albo dicat accidere colorem esse, non enim albo colorem esse accidit, sed genus ejus color est. Contingit autem et secundum nominationem determinare eum qui ponit, ut quod accidit justitiae virtutem esse. Saepe autem et cum non determinet, manifestum quod genus ut accidens assignavit, ut si quis albedinem colorari dixerit, vel ambulationem moveri. A nullo enim genere denominative praedicatio de specie dicitur, sed omnia univoce genera de speciebus praedicantur, nam et nomen et rationem generum suscipiunt species; qui igitur coloratum dixit album, neque genus assignavit, quoniam denominative dixit, neque ut proprium vel ut definitionem, nam definitio et proprium nulli alii inest: sunt autem colorata et pleraque aliorum, ut lignum, lapis, homo, equus. Manifestum igitur quoniam ut accidens assignavit. Alius locus est inspicere ea quibus inesse aut omnibus aut nulli dictum est, et considerare secundum species, et non in infinitis. Nam transitu magis et in paucioribus consideratio, oportet autem considerare et incipere a primis, deinde consequenter usque ad individua, ut si oppositorum eamdem disciplinam quis dixerit esse, perspiciendum si eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, et contrariorum, et quae secundum privationem et habitum et quae secundum contradictionem dicuntur, eadem fit disciplina et si in his nondum manifestum est, rursum ea dividendum usque ad individua, ut si justi vel injusti, vel dupli vel dimidii, vel coecitatis vel visus, vel esse vel non esse. Nam si in aliquo ostendatur quod non eadem, interimentes erimus problema, similiter autem et si nulli inest. Iste autem locus convertitur ad construendum et destruendum. Si enim in omnibus videatur cum divisionem proferimus, nihil in pluribus, postulandum est autem universaliter ponere, aut instantiam ferre in aliquo non sic esse; nam si neutrum horum faciat, absurdus apparebit, qui non ponet. Alius est, definitiones facere accidentis, et ejus cui accidit, aut utriusque de utroque, aut alterius, deinde considerare si quid non verum in definitionibus perinde ac verum sumptum sit. Ut si est Deum injustitiam facere, quid injustitiam facere. Si enim nocere sponte, manifestum quoniam non est Deum injustitiam facere, non enim contingit nocere Deum; et si invidus sit studiosus, quis invidus, et quae invidia. Nam si invidia est tristitia in apparenti prosperitate alicujus proborum, manifestum est quod studiosus non est invidus, pravus enim esset; et si indignans invidus, quis uterque eorum: sic enim manifestum erit utrum verum an falsum sit, quod dictum est, ut si invidus quidem sit qui tristatur in bonorum prosperitatibus, indignans autem qui in malorum prosperitatibus tristatur, manifestum quod non erit invidus indignans. Sumere autem et pro iis (quae in definitionibus sunt) nominibus definitiones, et non desistere donec ad notum deventum sit; nam saepe cum tota quidem definitio assignata sit, non manifestum est quod quaeritur, pro aliquo autem eorum (quae in definitione sunt) nominum definitione dicta, manifestum fit. Amplius, problema propositionem sibi facientem instare. Nam instantia erit argumentum ad positionem. Est autem locus hic pene idem ei quo considerare quibus inesse, vel omnibus, vel nulli dictum est, differt autem modo. Amplius, determinare quae oportet dicere ut plures, et quae non. Utile enim et ad construendum, et ad destruendum, ut quod nominationibus quidem res nuncupandum ut plures, quae autem sunt, taliane, an non talia, non amplius attendendum ad plures: ut salubre quidem dicendum effectivum sanitatis, ceu plures dicunt. Utrum autem propositum effectivum sit sanitatis, an non, non amplius ut plures dicendum, sed ut medicus.

Inglese

109a34Now one commonplace rule is to look and see if a man 109a35has ascribed as an accident what belongs in some other way. This mistake is most commonly made in regard to the genera of things, e.g. if one were to say that white happens (accidit) to be a colour—for being a colour does not happen by accident to white, but colour is its genus. The assertor 109bmay of course define it so in so many words, saying (e. g.) that ‘Justice happens (accidit) to be a virtue’; but often even without such definition it is obvious that he has rendered the genus as an accident; e.g. suppose that one were to say that whiteness is coloured or that walking is in 109b5motion. For a predicate drawn from the genus is never ascribed to the species in an inflected form, but always the genera are predicated of their species literally; for the species take on both the name and the definition of their genera. A man therefore who says that white is ‘coloured’ has not rendered ‘coloured’ as its genus, seeing that he has used an inflected form, nor yet as its property or as its 109b10definition: for the definition and property of a thing belong to it and to nothing else, whereas many things besides white are coloured, e. g. a log, a stone, a man, and a horse. Clearly then he renders it as an accident.

109b13Another rule is to examine all cases where a predicate has been either asserted or denied universally to belong to something. Look at them species by species, and not 109b15in their infinite multitude: for then the inquiry will proceed more directly and in fewer steps. You should look and begin with the most primary groups, and then proceed in order down to those that are not further divisible: e. g. if a man has said that the knowledge of opposites is the same, you should look and see whether it be so of relative opposites and of contraries and of terms signifying the privation or presence of certain states, and of contradictory 109b20ao terms. Then, if no clear result be reached so far in these cases, you should again divide these until you come to those that are not further divisible, and see (e. g.) whether it be so of just deeds and unjust, or of the double and the half, or of blindness and sight, or of being and not-being: for if in any case it be shown that the knowledge of them is not the same we shall have demolished the problem.¹ Likewise, also, if 109b25the predicate belongs in no case. This rule is convertible for both destructive and constructive purposes: for if, when we have suggested a division, the predicate appears to hold in all or in a large number of cases, we may then claim that the other should actually assert it universally, or else bring a negative instance to show in what case it is not so: for if he does neither of these things, a refusal to assert it will make him look absurd.

109b30Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and of its subject, either of both separately or else of one of them, and then look and see if anything untrue has been assumed as true in the definitions. Thus (e.g.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god, ask what is ‘to wrong’? For if it be ‘to injure deliberately’, clearly it is not possible for a 109b35god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured. Again, to see if the good man is jealous, ask who is the ‘jealous’ man and what is ‘jealousy’. For if ‘jealousy’ is pain at the apparent success of some well-behaved person, clearly the good man is not jealous: for then he would be bad. Again, to see if the indignant man is jealous, ask who each of them is: for then it will 110abe obvious whether the statement is true or false; e.g. if he is ‘jealous’ who grieves at the successes of the good, and he is ‘indignant’ who grieves at the successes of the evil, then clearly the indignant man would not be jealous. A man 110a5should substitute definitions also for the terms contained in his definitions, and not stop until he comes to a familiar term: for often if the definition be rendered whole, the point at issue is not cleared up, whereas if for one of the terms used in the definition a definition be stated, it becomes obvious.

110a10Moreover, a man should make the problem into a proposition for himself, and then bring a negative instance against it: for the negative instance will be a ground of attack upon the assertion. This rule is very nearly the same as the rule to look into cases where a predicate has been attributed or denied universally: but it differs in the turn of the argument.

110a14Moreover, you should define what kind of things should 110a15be called as most men call them, and what should not. For this is useful both for establishing and for overthrowing a view: e.g. you should say that we ought to use our terms to mean the same things as most people mean by them, but when we ask what kind of things are or are not of such and such a kind, we should not here go with the multitude: e.g. it is right to call ‘healthy’ whatever tends 110a20to produce health, as do most men: but in saying whether the object before us tends to produce health or not, we should adopt the language no longer of the multitude but of the doctor.

Owen 1853

One place then is, to consider whether he (the respondent) has given as an accident, that which is inherent, according to some other mode; which error, indeed, especially obtains about genera, as if some one should say, that it was accidental to whiteness to be a colour, since it is not accidental to whiteness to be a colour, but colour is its genus. Therefore, it is possible that he who lays down a thesis, may define according to denomination (the genus as an accident), e. g. that it is accidental to justice to be a virtue; frequently, however, without definition, it is evident that he has given the genus as an accident, as if any one should have said, that whiteness is coloured, or that walking is moved, for the predication of species is paronymously¹ asserted from no genus, but all genera are predicated of species synonymously, since species receive the name and definition, of genera. Whoever, therefore, says that whiteness is coloured, has neither explained it as genus, since he has spoken paronymously, nor as property, nor as definition, since definition and property are present with nothing else, while many other things are coloured, as wood, stone, man, horse; wherefore he evidently gives it as accident.

Another (topic) is, to regard those with which, either all or none, a thing is said to be present, and to consider according to species and not in infinites, (individuals,) for the investigation (will be) more in the way and in fewer things.² Still we must consider and begin from first things, and then (proceed) as far as individuals, for instance, if a man said that there is the same science of opposites, we must consider if there is the same science of relatives, of contraries, and of those which are enunciated according to privation and habit, and according to contradiction, and if it should not yet be evident in these, we must divide them again as far as individuals, as whether (there is the same science) of the just and the unjust, or of the double and the half, or of blindness and sight, or of entity and nonentity. For if it should be proved that there is not the same in respect of a certain thing, we shall have subverted the problem, likewise also if it should be present with none. Now this place converts to confirmation and refutation, for if, when they have introduced division, it should appear (present) with all, or with many, things, it must be required to admit it universally, or to object some (instance) wherein it is not so, and if (the opponent) does neither of these, he will appear absurd from not conceding it.

Another (topic) is, to make definitions, both of accident and of that to which it is accidental, either of both severally, or of one of them, then to consider whether any thing has been assumed as true, which is not true, in the definitions; thus if the (problem) is, that we can injure God, (we must consider) what it is, to injure, for if it be, to hurt voluntarily, it is evident that God cannot possibly be injured, since it is impossible that God can be hurt. Again, if the worthy man is envious, who is the envious, and what is envy, (must be considered,) for if envy be pain at the apparent success of some worthy person, it is evident that a worthy man is not envious, for if so, he would be depraved, and if the man prone to indignation be envious, (we must explain) who each of these is, for thus it will be evident whether what is said is true or false, e. g. if he is envious who is grieved at the success of the good, but he is prone to indignation who is grieved at the success of the bad, it is clear that the envious will not be the indignant man. We must also assume definitions, instead of the names in definitions, and not desist until we arrive at what is known; since often the question is not yet clear, when, indeed, the whole definition has been given, but it becomes evident, if the definition is given, instead of some name placed in the definition.

Moreover, the problem must be changed into a proposition and then objected to, for the objection will be an argument against the thesis: this place, indeed, is almost the same as seeing, with what, either all or none, a thing is said to be present, but it differs in the mode.³

Further, we must define what kind of things we ought, and what we ought not, to denominate as the multitude do, for this is useful both for confirmation and subversion, as that things are to be called by the same names as the multitude use, but that we are no longer to attend to the multitude, as to the quality of things, whether they be such or such. For instance, that is to be called salubrious, which is productive of health, as the multitude say, but whether the thing proposed be productive of health or not, is no longer to be decided by what the multitude, but by what the physician declares.

Latino

Amplius, si multipliciter dicatur, positum autem sit quoniam inest, aut quoniam non inest, alterum monstrare eorum quae multipliciter dicuntur, si non utraque contingat. Utendum autem in iis quae latent, nam si non lateat multipliciter dictum instabit, quoniam non monstratum est id quod ipse dubitabat, sed alterum. Hic autem locus convertitur et ad construendum et ad destruendum, nam construere volentes ostendemus quoniam alterum inest, si non ambo poterimus: destruentes autem quoniam non inest alterum ostendemus, si ambo non poterimus: verumtamen destruenti quidem nihil oportet ex concessione disputare, neque si omni, neque si nulli dictum sit inesse; nam si ostenderimus quoniam non inest quodcunque id sit, interimentes erimus omni inesse; similiter autem et si ostenderimus inesse, interimemus nulli inesse. Construentibus autem praeconfitendum quod cuivis inest omni inest, si verisimile sit postulatum. Non sufficit enim, ad ostendendum quod omni inest, in uno disputasse, ut si hominis anima immortalis est, propter hoc anima omnis immortalis; quare praeconfitendum quod si quaecunque anima immortalis, omnis immortalis. Hoc autem non semper faciendum, sed quando non facile possumus communem in omnibus unam rationem dicere, quemadmodum geometer, quod triangulus duobus rectis aequos habet tres angulos. Si autem non lateat quod multipliciter dicitur divisum, quotupliciter dicitur et interimendum et construendum. Ut si dicens est utile, aut honestum, tentandum ambo construere, vel interimere de proposito, ut quod honestum et quod utile, vel quod neque honestum neque utile. Si autem non contingat utraque, alterum ostendendum, adnotato quod hoc quidem est, illud autem non, eadem autem ratio, etiam si plura sint in quae dividitur. Rursum quaecunque non secundum aequivocationem dicuntur multipliciter, sed alio modo. Ut disciplina una plurium, aut ut finis, aut ut ejus quod ad finem, ut medicina ejus quod sanitatem facit, ut quod cibat, aut ut amborum finium velut contrariorum eadem disciplina (nihil enim magis finis alterum altero) aut ut ejus quod per se est, et ejus quod per accidens. Ut per se quidem quod triangulus duobus rectis aequales habet tres angulos, per accidens autem quod aequilaterus, quoniam enim accidit triangulo aequilaterum triangulum esse, per hoc cognoscimus quod duobus rectis aequales habet. Si ergo nullo modo contingit eadem esse plurium disciplinam, manifestum quoniam omnino non contingit esse, aut si aliquo modo contingit, manifestum quod contingit. Dividere autem quotupliciter, utile, ut si voluerimus construere: talia praestatuenda sunt quaecunque contingunt, et dividendum in ea tantum quaecunque utilia sunt ad construendum. Si autem destruere quaecunque non contingunt, reliqua vero omittenda. Id autem faciendum in iis cum latuerit quotupliciter dicuntur, et esse hoc quidem hujus aut non esse ex eisdem locis astruendum, ut disciplinam, hujus quidem aut ut finis, aut ut eorum quae sunt ad finem, aut ut eorum quae sunt secundum accidens, vel rursum non esse aliquid secundum aliquem dictorum modorum, eadem autem ratio, et in desiderio, et quaecunque alia dicuntur plurium. Est enim desiderium hujus aut ut finis, ut sanitatis, aut ut eorum quae sunt ad finem, ut medicinae conficiendae, aut ut eorum quae sunt secundum accidens, ut in vino amicum dulce, non quia vinum, sed quia dulce est, nam per se dulce desiderat, vinum autem per accidens; si enim austerum fit, non amplius desiderat, per accidens ergo desiderabat. Utilis autem locus hic et in iis quae sunt ad aliquid, pene enim talia ea quae ad aliquid sunt.

Inglese

110a23Moreover, if a term be used in several senses, and it has been laid down that it is or that it is not an attribute of S, 110a25you should show your case of one of its several senses, if you cannot show it of both. This rule is to be observed in cases where the difference of meaning is undetected; for supposing this to be obvious, then the other man will object that the point which he himself questioned has not been discussed, but only the other point. This commonplace rule is convertible for purposes both of establishing and of overthrowing a view. For if we want to establish a statement, 110a30we shall show that in one sense the attribute belongs, if we cannot show it of both senses: whereas if we are overthrowing a statement, we shall show that in one sense the attribute does not belong, if we cannot show it of both senses. Of course, in overthrowing a statement there is no need to start the discussion by securing any admission, either when the statement asserts or when it denies the attribute universally: for if we show that in any case 110a35whatever the attribute does not belong, we shall have demolished the universal assertion of it, and likewise also if we show that it belongs in a single case, we shall demolish the universal denial of it. Whereas in establishing a statement we ought to secure a preliminary admission that if it belongs in any case whatever, it belongs universally, supposing this claim to be a plausible one. For it is not 110benough to discuss a single instance in order to show that an attribute belongs universally; e.g. to argue that if the soul of man be immortal, then every soul is immortal, so that a previous admission must be secured that if any soul whatever be immortal, then every soul is immortal. This is not to be done in every case, but only whenever we are 110b5not easily able to quote any single argument applying to all cases in common, as (e. g.) the geometrician can argue that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles.

110b7If, again, the variety of meanings of a term be obvious, distinguish how many meanings it has before proceeding either to demolish or to establish it: e.g. supposing ‘the 110b10right’ to mean ‘the expedient’ or ‘the honourable’, you should try either to establish or to demolish both descriptions of the subject in question; e.g. by showing that it is honourable and expedient, or that it is neither honourable nor expedient. Supposing, however, that it is impossible to show both, you should show the one, adding an indication that it is true in the one sense and not in the other. The same rule applies also when the number of senses into 110b15which it is divided is more than two.

110b16Again, consider those expressions whose meanings are many, but differ not by way of ambiguity of a term, but in some other way: e.g. ‘The science of many things is one’: here ‘many things’ may mean the end and the means to that end, as (e. g.) medicine is the science both of producing health and of dieting; or they may be both of them ends, 110b20as the science of contraries is said to be the same (for of contraries the one is no more an end than the other) ; or again they may be an essential and an accidental attribute, as (e.g.) the essential fact that the triangle has its angles equal to two right angles, and the accidental fact that the equilateral figure has them so: for it is because of the accident of the equilateral triangle happening 110b25to be a triangle¹ that we know that it has its angles equal to two right angles. If, then, it is not possible in any sense of the term that the science of many things should be the same, it clearly is altogether impossible that it should be so; or, if it is possible in some sense, then clearly it is possible. Distinguish as many meanings as are required: e.g. if we want to establish a view, we should bring forward all such meanings as admit that view, and 110b30should divide them only into those meanings which also are required for the establishment of our case: whereas if we want to overthrow a view, we should bring forward all that do not admit that view, and leave the rest aside. We must deal also in these cases as well with any uncertainty about the number of meanings involved. Further, that one thing is, or is not, ‘of’ another should be established by means of the same commonplace rules; e.g. that a particular 110b35science is of a particular thing, treated either as an end or as a means to its end, or as accidentally connected with it; or again that it is not ‘of’ it² in any of the aforesaid ways. The same rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that have more than one object. For the ‘desire of X’ may mean the desire of it as an end (e.g. the desire of health) or as a means to an end (e. g. the desire of being doctored), or as a thing desired accidentally, as, in the case of wine, the sweet-toothed person desires it not because it is wine but because it is sweet. For essentially he desires the sweet, 111a5and only accidentally the wine: for if it be dry, he no longer desires it. His desire for it is therefore accidental. This rule is useful in dealing with relative terms: for cases of this kind are generally cases of relative terms.

Owen 1853

Moreover, if a thing be multifariously predicated, but is laid down as inherent, or as non-inherent, we must prove one of the things multifariously predicated, if we cannot prove both. This must be used, however, in those things which are latent, for if what is multifariously predicated is not latent, the opponent may object, that what he is in doubt about, is not the subject of dispute, but something else. This topic, indeed, converts both for confirmation and subversion, for when we desire to confirm we shall show that one is inherent, if we cannot both; but when we subvert, we shall show that one is not inherent, if we cannot both. Nevertheless, there is no need for the subverter to dispute from compact, neither if a thing be said to be present with every individual, nor if it be said to be so with none, since if we show that it is not present with any individual whatever, we shall have subverted its being with every individual, likewise also if we should prove it present with one, we shall have subverted its presence with nothing. Still, in confirming, we must previously acknowledge, that if it is present with any whatever, it is present with every thing, if the axiom be probable, since it is not enough to discourse about one thing, in order to prove that it is present with every thing, as if the soul of man is immortal, that¹ every soul is immortal, wherefore, it must be previously taken for granted, that if any soul whatever is immortal, every soul also is immortal. This, however, is not always to be done, but when we cannot supply one common reason in all, as a geometrician (proves by one common reason, that a triangle has angles equal to two right).

Yet if a thing is not latent, being predicated in many ways, we must subvert and confirm, having distinguished in how many ways it is predicated; thus, if the becoming is the advantageous or the beautiful, we must try to confirm or subvert, both about the proposed (problem), e. g. that it is beautiful and advantageous, or that it is neither beautiful nor advantageous. Still if we cannot prove both, we must prove one, of them, showing that the one is, but the other not; but the reasoning is the same, though there should be more members in the division. Again, (we must consider) those things which are not equivocally predicated in many ways, but in some other way, thus science is one of many, either as belonging to the end, or to that which pertains to the end, as medicine (is the science) of producing health, and of prescribing diet, or as belonging to both ends, as of contraries there is said to be the same science, (since the one) is no more an end than the other, or as belonging to that which is per se, and to that which is accidental, as (we know) per se that a triangle has angles equal to two right, but according to accident, that it is equilateral, for because it happens to an equilateral triangle to be a triangle, according to this we know that it has angles equal to two right. If then it is by no means possible that there should be the same science of many things, it is clearly altogether impossible, or if in a certain respect it is possible, it is clear that it is possible. Nevertheless, we must distinguish in how many ways it is useful; for instance, if we desire to confirm we must introduce such things as are possible, and we must divide them into those only which are useful to confirmation; but if we would subvert, (we must introduce) such things as are impossible, and omit the rest. This too must be done in these, when it is latent in how many ways they are predicated, that this also belongs to that, or does not belong, must be confirmed from the same places; as that this science is of this thing, either as belonging to the end, or to those things which pertain to the end, or as to those which are accidental, or on the other hand, that a thing is not according to any of the above-mentioned modes. The same reasoning also subsists about desire and such other things as are said to belong to many, for desire belongs to this thing either as to the end, as to health, or as to those things which pertain to the end, as to the taking medicine, or as to that which is from accident, as in wine, he who loves sweetness (desires wine), not because it is wine, but because it is sweet, since he desires sweetness per se, but wine accidentally, since if it should be sour, he no longer desires it, therefore he desires it from accident. This place however is useful in relatives, for almost all such things as these, belong to relatives.

Latino

Amplius, transferre ad evidentius nomen. Ut pro exacto in opinione clarum, et pro curiositate cupiditas superfluarum rerum, evidentiori enim facto quod dictum est, bene argumentabilis est positio. Est autem hic locus ad utrumque communis, ad construendum et ad destruendum. Ad ostendendum autem contraria circa idem inesse, considerandum in genere. Ut si volumus ostendere quod est circa sensum rectitudo et peccatum, sentire quidem judicare est; judicare autem est recte et non recte, et circa sensum erit rectitudo et peccatum. Nunc ergo ex genere circa speciem demonstratio fit, nam judicare est genus sentire; qui namque sentit, aliquo modo judicat. Rursum ex specie generi: quaecunque enim speciei insunt, et generi. Ut si disciplina prava est, et studiosa, et dispositio prava, et studiosa, nam dispositio disciplinae genus. Primus autem locus falsus est ad construendum, secundus autem verus; non enim necessarium quaecunque generi insunt, et speciei inesse, nam animal est volatile et quadrupes, homo autem non. Quaecunque vero speciei insunt, necessario et generi: si enim homo studiosus, et animal studiosum est. Ad destruendum autem et primus quidem verus, secundus autem falsus, quaecunque enim generi non insunt, neque speciei, quaecunque vero speciei non insunt, non necesse est generi non inesse. Quoniam autem necessarium de quibus genus praedicatur, et specierum aliquam praedicari, et quaecunque habent genus, vel denominative dicuntur a genere, et specierum aliquam habere necesse est, vel denominative ab aliqua specierum dici. Ut si de aliquo disciplina praedicatur, et grammatica, vel musica, vel aliqua disciplinarum aliarum praedicabitur, et si aliquis habet disciplinam, vel denominative a disciplina dicitur, et grammaticam habebit, aut musicam, aut aliquam aliarum disciplinarum, vel denominative ab aliqua earum dicetur, ut grammaticus, vel musicus; si igitur aliquid dictum a genere quoquo modo ut animam moveri, considerandum est secundum aliquam specierum motus contingit animam moveri, ut augeri, vel minui, vel corrumpi, vel generari, aut quaecunque aliae motus species sunt: nam si secundum nullam, manifestum est quod non movetur. Hic autem locus communis ad utrumque, et ad construendum, et ad destruendum; si enim secundum aliquam speciem movetur, perspicuum est quoniam movetur, et si secundum nullam specierum movetur, manifestum quod non movetur. Cum autem facultas non adsit argumentationis ad positionem, intendendum ex definitionibus aut quae sunt propositae rei, vel quae videantur, et si non ab una, etiam a pluribus. Facile enim definientibus argumentari erit, nam ad definitiones facilis argumentatio. Considerandum autem in proposito, quoniam existente necesse est positum esse, aut quid est ex necessitate, si propositum est. Construere quidem volenti quo existente propositum erit ex necessitate, nam si illud ostendatur esse, et propositum ostensum erit, destruere autem volenti quid est si propositum est, nam si ostenderimus consequens propositum non esse, interimentes erimus propositum. Amplius, ad tempus inspiciendum si alicubi dissonat. Ut si quod nutritur dixerit quis ex necessitate augeri; nutriuntur enim semper animalia, augentur autem non semper. Similiter autem et si scire dixerit quis reminisci, hoc enim praeteriti temporis est, illud autem praesentis, et futuri; scire enim dicimur praesentia, et futura, ut quoniam erit solis defectus, reminisci autem non contingit aliud quam praeteritum.

Inglese

111a8Moreover, it is well to alter a term into one more familiar, e.g. to substitute ‘clear’ for ‘exact’ in describing a conception, 111a10and ‘being fussy’ for ‘being busy’: for when the expression is made more familiar, the thesis becomes easier to attack. This commonplace rule also is available for both purposes alike, both for establishing and for overthrowing a view.

111a14In order to show that contrary attributes belong to the 111a15same thing, look at its genus; e.g. if we want to show that rightness and wrongness are possible in regard to perception, and to perceive is to judge, while it is possible to judge rightly or wrongly, then in regard to perception as well rightness and wrongness must be possible. In the present instance the proof proceeds from the genus and relates to the species: for ‘to judge’ is the genus of ‘to perceive’; for 111a20the man who perceives judges in a certain way. But per contra it may proceed from the species to the genus: for all the attributes that belong to the species belong to the genus as well; e.g. if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and a good disposition: for ‘disposition’ is the genus of knowledge. Now the former commonplace argument is fallacious for purposes of establishing a view, while 111a25the second is true. For there is no necessity that all the attributes that belong to the genus should belong also to the species; for ‘animal’ is flying and quadruped, but not so ‘man’, All the attributes, on the other hand, that belong to the species must of necessity belong also to the genus; for if ‘man’ is good, then animal also is good. On the other hand, for purposes of overthrowing a view, the 111a30former argument is true while the latter is fallacious; for all the attributes which do not belong to the genus do not belong to the species either; whereas all those that are wanting to the species are not of necessity wanting to the genus.

111a33Since those things of which the genus is predicated must also of necessity have one of its species predicated of them, and since those things that are possessed of the genus 111a35in question, or are described by terms derived from that genus, must also of necessity be possessed of one of its species or be described by terms derived from one of its species (e.g. if to anything the term ‘scientific knowledge’ be applied, then also there will be applied to it the term ‘grammatical’ or ‘musical’ knowledge, or knowledge of one of the other sciences; and if any one possesses scientific 111bknowledge or is described by a term derived from ‘science’, then he will also possess grammatical or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the other sciences, or will be described by a term derived from one of them, e.g. as a ‘grammarian’ or a ‘musician’) ‘therefore¹ if any expression be asserted that is in any way derived from the genus 111b5(e. g. that the soul is in motion), look and see whether it be possible for the soul to be moved with any of the species of motion; whether (e. g.) it can grow or be destroyed or come to be, and so forth with all the other species of motion. For if it be not moved in any of these ways, clearly it does not move at all. This commonplace rule is common for both purposes, both for overthrowing and for establishing a 111b10view: for if the soul moves with one of the species of motion, clearly it does move; while if it does not move with any of the species of motion, clearly it does not move.

111b12If you are not well equipped with an argument against the assertion, look among the definitions, real or apparent, of the thing before you, and if² one is not enough, draw 111b15upon several. For it will be easier to attack people when committed to a definition: for an attack is always more easily made on definitions.

111b17Moreover, look and see in regard to the thing in question, what it is whose reality conditions the reality of the thing in question, or what it is whose reality necessarily follows if the thing in question be real: if you wish to establish a view inquire what there is on whose reality the reality of 111b20the thing in question will follow (for if the former be shown to be real, then the thing in question will also have been shown to be real); while if you want to overthrow a view, ask what it is that is real if the thing in question be real, for if we show that what follows from the thing in question is unreal, we shall have demolished the thing in question.

111b24Moreover, look at the time involved, to see if there be any 111b25discrepancy anywhere: e.g. suppose a man to have stated that what is being nourished of necessity grows: for animals are always of necessity being nourished, but they do not always grow. Likewise, also, if he has said that knowing is remembering: for the one is concerned with past time, whereas the other has to do also with the present and the future. For we are said to know things present and future 111b30(e.g. that there will be an eclipse), whereas it is impossible to remember anything save what is in the past.

Owen 1853

Again, a change must be made into a name more known, as, for instance, the clear instead of the accurate in notion, and the love of employment instead of being engaged in various occupations, for the assertion being more known, the thesis is more easily opposed. This place also is common to both confirmation and subversion.

In order however to show that contraries are present with the same thing, it is necessary to attend to the genus; thus if we desire to prove that there is rectitude and error about sense, since sensibly to perceive, is to judge, but it is possible to judge rightly and not rightly, about sense also, there will be rectitude and error. Now, then, from the genus the demonstration is concerning the species, since to judge is the genus of sensible perception, for he who sensibly perceives, in some way judges.

Again, from species to genus, for whatever things are present with species are also with genus, as if science is bad and good, disposition also is bad and good, for disposition is the genus of science. The former place therefore is false indeed for confirmation, but the latter is true, since it is not necessary that whatever things are present with genus, should also be present with species, since animal is winged and quadruped, but man is not, yet whatever things are present with species, are necessarily also with genus, for if man is good, animal also is good. Still for subversion, the former is true, but the latter false, as whatever are not present with genus, neither are with species, but it is unnecessary that whatever are not with species, should not be present with genus.

Notwithstanding, since it is requisite that of what things genus is predicated, some species also should be predicated, and whatever things possess genus, or are paronymously denominated from genus, have necessarily a certain species, or are paronymously demonstrated from some species, as if science is predicated of some certain thing, grammar also, or music, or some other science, will be predicated (of it); and if any one has science, or is paronymously denominated from science, he will also possess grammar, or music, or some other science, or will be paronymously called from some one of them, as, for instance, a grammarian or musician;—if then any thing should be laid down which is in any way denominated from genus, as that the soul is moved, we must consider whether it is possible for the soul to be moved according to any species of motion, as to be increased, or corrupted, or generated, or such other species of motion.*¹ For if by none (may it be moved), it is evident that it is not moved: this place also pertains in common to both subversion and confirmation, for if it is moved according to any species, it is evident that it is moved, and if according to no species, it is evidently not moved.

He however who is not well provided with arguments about the thesis, must consider from the definitions, either real or apparent, of the proposed thing, and if he cannot from one, (definition, he must obtain an argument) from many, for it will be easy to argue when they have defined,² since opposition³ to definitions is easier.

We must also consider in the proposed (problem) to what thing it belongs, or what will necessarily be if the proposition subsists. The person who wishes to confirm, must consider to what the proposition will belong, (for if that be shown to exist, the proposition will also have been proved,) but he who wishes to subvert, (must consider) what will be the consequence if the proposition subsists, for if we can show that the consequent to the proposition does not subsist, we shall have subverted the proposition.

Besides, we must attend to time if it is any where discrepant, as if a person said that what is nourished, is of necessity increased, for animals are always nourished, yet do not always increase. Likewise, if he said that to know scientifically, is to remember, for the one belongs to past time, but the other to the present and the future,⁴2 for we are said to know scientifically things present and future, as that there will be an eclipse, but it is impossible to remember any thing except the past.

Latino

Amplius, sophisticus modus ducere ad id ad quod plurimum habemus argumentorum facultatem. Hoc autem erit quandoque quidem necessarium, quandoque autem apparens necessarium, quandoque autem neque apparens neque necessarium, necessarium quidem, quando negante eo qui respondet aliquid utilium ad positionem, ad illud rationes facit, contingit autem id talium esse ad quae copiosam argumentorum facultatem habemus. Similiter autem et quando inductionem ad aliquid per positum faciens, interimere conatur, hoc enim interempto, et propositum interimitur. Apparens autem necessarium est, quando videtur quidem utile et accommodum positioni, non est autem ad id ad quod fiunt disputationes, sive negante eo qui disputationem sustinet, sive ab inductione probabili, per positionem ad idem factam, interimere conetur idipsum; reliquum vero quando nec necessarium est nec apparens ad id ad quod fiunt disputationes, et sine causa accidit redarguere respondentem. Oportet autem devitare postremum dictorum modum, omnino enim semotus et extraneus videtur esse a dialectica. Quare oportet et respondentem non graviter ferre, sed ponendo quae non utilia sunt ad positionem significare quaecunque non videntur: ponit tamen, nam magis perplexos esse ut plurimum contingit eos qui interrogant, quando omnia hujusmodi ab eis posita fuerint, si non concludunt. Amplius, omnis qui dixit unumquodvis, quodam modo multa dixit, eo quod plura unicuique ex necessitate consequentia sunt (ut qui hominem dixit esse, et quod animal est dixit, et quod animatum, et quod bipes, et quod mentis, et disciplinae susceptivum); quare quovis uno consequentium interempto, interimitur et quod in principio est, cavere autem oportet in hujusmodi difficilioris assumptionem facere: nam quandoque facile est consequens interimere, quandoque id ipsum propositum.

Inglese

111b31Moreover, there is the sophistic turn of argument, whereby we draw our opponent into the kind of statement against which we shall be well supplied with lines of argument. This process is sometimes a real necessity, sometimes an apparent necessity, sometimes neither an apparent nor a real 111b35necessity. It is really necessary whenever the answerer has denied any view that would be useful in attacking the thesis, and the questioner thereupon addresses his arguments to the support of this view, and when moreover the view in question happens to be one of a kind on which he has a good stock of lines of argument. Likewise, also, it is really necessary whenever he (the questioner) first, 112aby an induction made by means of the view laid down,}¹ arrives at a certain statement and then tries to demolish that statement: for when once this has been demolished, the view originally laid down is demolished as well. It is an apparent necessity, when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed appears to be useful, and relevant to the thesis, without being really so; whether it be that 112a5the man who is standing up to the argument has refused to concede something, or whether he (the questioner) has first reached it by a plausible induction based upon the thesis² and then tries to demolish it. The remaining case is when the point to which the discussion comes to be directed is neither really nor apparently necessary, and it is the answerer’s luck to be confuted on a mere side issue. You 112a10Should beware of the last of the aforesaid methods; for it appears to be wholly disconnected from, and foreign to, the art of dialectic. For this reason, moreover, the answerer should not lose his temper, but assent to those statements that are of no use in attacking the thesis, adding an indication whenever he assents although he does not agree with the view. For, as a rule, it increases the confusion of 112a15questioners if, after all propositions of this kind have been granted them, they can then draw no conclusion.

112a16Moreover, any one who has made any statement whatever has in a certain sense made several statements, inasmuch as each statement has a number of necessary consequences: e. g. the man who said ‘X is a man’ has also said that it is an animal and that it is animate and a biped and capable of 112a20acquiring reason and knowledge, so that by the demolition of any single one of these consequences, of whatever kind, the original statement is demolished as well. But you should beware here too of making a change to a more difficult subject: for sometimes the consequence, and sometimes the original thesis, is the easier to demolish.

Owen 1853

It is also a sophistical place,¹ to bring (the adversary) to that, against which we are well provided with arguments, and this will sometimes indeed be necessary, at others, appear to be so, but sometimes neither apparent, nor necessary. Now it is necessary, when the respondent, denying some one of those things which are useful to the thesis, the arguments are directed against this,² which happens to be a thing of that kind, against which it is possible to abound with arguments. In like manner, when some one by making an abduction³ to a certain thing, through what is laid down, endeavours to subvert (that thing), for this being subverted, the proposition is also subverted. On the other hand, it appears to be necessary when it seems indeed useful and appropriate to the thesis, yet is not so to that against which the arguments are adduced, whether he who sustains the argument denies, or whether by a probable abduction through the thesis against it, he endeavours to subvert it. The remainder is when that against which the arguments are advanced, is neither necessary nor appears to be so,⁴ but it happens that the respondent is sophistically confuted in another respect.⁵⁶ We must however be cautious about the last of the above-mentioned modes, for it seems to be altogether remote and foreign from dialectic, wherefore the respondent must not be displeased, but should admit whatever are not useful to the thesis, signifying what do not appear to him to be true, though he admits them; for it happens generally that those who interrogate are more perplexed, when every thing of this kind is admitted, if they do not conclude.

Further, every one who states any thing, in some way states many things, since many are consequence to something else; if such transition be made without any reason of justice, it is entirely sophistical, because it is neither necessary, nor seems to be so; otherwise it is dialectic. quent of necessity, upon each; for instance, he who states that man is, states also that animal is, and that animated, and that biped, and that what is capable of intellect and science (are), so that any one of these consequents being subverted, the original proposition also, is subverted. Still we must be careful lest we make a transition to what is more difficult,⁷ for sometimes it is easier to subvert the consequent, and at others the proposition itself.

Latino

Quibuscunque autem necesse est alterum tantum inesse, vel non inesse, ut homini aegritudinem, vel sanitatem, si ad alterum facile poterimus disputare quod inest, vel non inest, et ad reliquum facile poterimus. Hoc autem convertitur ad utrumque. Ostendentes enim quod inest alterum, quod non inest reliquum ostendentes erimus; si autem quod non inest ostendamus, reliquum inesse ostendentes erimus; manifestum igitur quod ad utrumque utilis hic locus est. Amplius argumentari transferendo nomen in orationem, cum longe magis consentaneum visum fuerit transsumere quam ut ponitur nomen. Ut magnanimum non fortem (ut ponitur), sed magnum animum habentem, quemadmodum fidentem, bona sperantem. Similiter autem et ingeniosum, cujus fuerit genius studiosus. Quemadmodum Xenocrates inquit ingeniosum eum esse qui animam sortitus est studiosam, ipsam enim unicuique esse genium. Quoniam autem rerum aliae quidem sunt ex necessitate, aliae autem ut in pluribus, aliae vero utrumlibet, si quod ex necessitate est, ut in pluribus ponatur, aut quod ut in pluribus, ex necessitate, aut ipsum aut contrarium ei quod est ut in pluribus semper dat locum argumentationis. Nam si quod ex necessitate est ut in pluribus ponatur, manifestum quoniam non omni dicit inesse, cum insit omni; quare peccavit, sive quod ut in pluribus dicitur ex necessitate dixit, omni dixit inesse, cum non insit omni: similiter autem et si contrarium ei quod in pluribus est ex necessitate dixit, semper enim in paucioribus dicitur contrarium ei quod est ut in pluribus, ut si ut in pluribus pravi homines, boni in paucioribus; quare multo magis peccavit, si bonos ex necessitate dixit esse: similiter autem et si quod utrumlibet est ex necessitate dixit, vel ut in pluribus, neque enim ex necessitate utrumlibet, neque ut in pluribus; contingit autem et si non determinans dixerit utrum ut in pluribus, an ex necessitate dixit, si autem res ut in pluribus, disputare ut ex necessitate is dixerit. Ut si pravos exhaereditandos dixit esse, non determinans, tanquam ex necessitate is dixerit, disputare. Amplius, et si idem sibi accidens posuerit ut alterum, eo quod alterum sit nomen. Quemadmodum Prodicus dividebat voluptates in gaudium, et jucunditatem, et laetitiam, haec enim omnia ejusdem (id est voluptatis) nomina sunt; si ergo aliquis gaudere ei quod est laetari ponat accidere, idem utique sibi ipsi dicet accidere.

Inglese

112a24In regard to subjects which must have one and one only 112a25of two predicates, as (e: g.) a man must have either a disease or health, supposing we are well supplied as regards the one for arguing its presence or absence, we shall be well equipped as regards the remaining one as well. This rule is convertible for both purposes: for when we have shown that the one attribute belongs, we shall have shown that the remaining one does not belong; while if we show that the one does not 112a30belong, we shall have shown that the remaining one does belong. Clearly then the rule is useful for both purposes.

112a31Moreover, you may devise a line of attack by reinterpreting a term in its literal meaning, with the implication that it is most fitting so to take it rather than in its established meaning: e.g. the expression ‘strong at heart’ will suggest not the courageous man, according to the use now established, 112a35but the man the state of whose heart is strong; just as also the expression ‘of a good hope’ may be taken to mean the man who hopes for good things. Likewise also ‘well-starred’ may be taken to mean the man whose star is good, as Xenocrates says ‘well-starred is he who has a noble soul¹. For a man’s star is his soul.

112b1Some things occur of necessity, others usually, others however it may chance; if therefore a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually, or if a usual event (or, failing such an event itself, its contrary) has been stated to occur 112b5of necessity, it always gives an opportunity for attack. For if a necessary event has been asserted to occur usually, clearly the speaker has denied an attribute to be universal which is universal, and so has made a mistake: and so he has if he has declared the usual attribute to be necessary: for then he declares it to belong universally when it does not so belong. Likewise also if he has declared the contrary 112b10Of what is usual to be necessary. For the contrary of a usual attribute is always a comparatively rare attribute: e.g. if men are usually bad, they are comparatively seldom good, so that his mistake is even worse if he has declared them to be good of necessity. The same is true also if he has declared a mere matter of chance to happen of necessity or 112b15usually; for a chance event happens neither of necessity nor usually. If the thing happens usually, then even supposing his statement does not distinguish whether he meant that it happens usually or that it happens necessarily, it is open to you to discuss it on the assumption that he meant that it happens necessarily: e.g. if he has stated without any distinction that disinherited persons are bad, you may 112b20assume in discussing it that he means that they are so necessarily.

112b21Moreover, look and see also if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself, taking it to bea different thing because it has a different name, as Prodicus used to divide pleasures into joy and delight and good cheer: for all these are names of the same thing, to wit, Pleasure. If then any one says 112b25that joyfulness is an accidental attribute of cheerfulness, he would be declaring it to be an accidental attribute of itself.

Owen 1853

In those things, with which it is necessary one thing alone, should be present, as with man, disease or health, if we are well furnished with arguments against one, that it is present or not, we shall also be well provided against the other. This, however, converts with regard to both, for when we have proved one of them present, we shall have proved that the other is not present, but if we have proved that it is not present, we shall have proved the other present; wherefore the place is evidently useful for both.

Again, we must argue by transferring the name to the meaning, as being more appropriate to assume, than as the name is placed, for instance, (to take) well-animated, not brave, as it is now placed, but (as signifying) one who has his soul well, as also hopeful of good, one who hopes good things, and in like manner, good-fated,|| one whose demon is good, just as Xenocrates says, that he is happy who has a worthy soul, for that this is each man's demon.¹ Since, however, some things are from necessity, others subsist generally, but others casually, if what is from necessity is laid down as general, or what is general as from necessity, either itself, or the contrary to what subsists generally, it always affords a place for argument. For if what is of necessity be laid down as for the most part, it is evident that a person states it to be present, not with every individual, when it is, so that he commits an error; also, if he says, that what is for the most part is from necessity, since he states that to be present with every individual which is not; similarly, if he says that the contrary to the general is from necessity, for the contrary to the general is always asserted of the fewer, for instance, if men are generally bad, good men are few, so that he makes a still greater error if he says that men are of necessity good. Likewise, if he should say that what happens casually, is from necessity, or for the most part, for the casual, is neither necessary, nor general; if, however, a person has not defined, whether he says a thing is general, or of necessity, but the thing should subsist as for the most part, it is possible to dispute, as if he had said, it was of necessity, e. g. if he had said, that those without heritage were bad, without defining them (who they are), it might be argued as if he had said (they were so), from necessity.

Moreover, we must consider whether he has placed a thing accidental, as if different, to itself, from the name being different, as Prodicus divided pleasures into joy, delight, and hilarity, for all these are names of the same thing, pleasure; if then any one should say that joy happens to hilarity, he would say that the same thing happens to itself.

Latino

Quoniam autem contraria connectuntur quidem sibi invicem sex modis, contrarietatem autem faciunt quadrupliciter complexa, oportet accipere contraria quocunque modo utile fuerit et destruenti et construenti. Quod autem sex modis complectuntur, manifestum: nam aut utrumque contrariorum utrique contrariorum connectitur, hoc autem dupliciter, ut amicis benefacere et inimicis male, vel econverso amicis male et inimicis bene: aut quando utraque de uno, dupliciter autem et hoc, ut amicis benefacere et amicis male, vel inimicis benefacere et inimicis male: aut unum de utrisque, et hoc quoque dupliciter, ut amicis bene et inimicis bene, vel amicis male et inimicis male. Primae autem duae dictae complexiones non faciunt contrarietatem, nam id quod est amicis benefacere ei quod est inimicis malefacere non est contrarium, utraque enim eligenda sunt et ejusdem moris; neque quod id est amicis male ei quod est inimicis bene, nam et haec utraque fugienda et ejusdem moris. Non videtur autem fugiendum fugiendo contrarium esse, nisi hoc quidem secundum superabundantiam. Illud autem secundum defectum dictum sit. Nam superabundantia fugiendorum videtur esse, similiter autem et defectus. Reliqua vero quatuor omnia faciunt contrarietatem, nam id quod est amicis benefacere, ei quod est amicis male contrarium, nam a contrario more sunt, et illud quidem eligendum, hoc autem spernendum Similiter autem et in aliis. Nam in unaquaque conjugatione unum eligendum et alterum fugiendum, illud quidem boni moris, hoc autem pravi. Manifestum igitur ex iis quae dicta sunt quod eidem plura contraria accidunt fieri, nam ei quod est amicis benefacere, id quod est inimicis benefacere, et id quod est amicis male, contrarium est.

Similiter autem et aliorum singulis quibusque eodem modo considerantibus duo contraria apparebunt, accipere igitur contrariorum quodcunque erit ad positionem utile. Amplius si est aliquid contrarium accidenti, considerandum est si inest ei cui dictum est accidens inesse. Nam si hoc inest, illud non erit, impossibile enim simul contraria eidem inesse. Aut si quid tale dictum est de aliquo, quod cum sit necesse est contraria inesse, ut si ideas in nobis quis dixerit esse. Nam et moveri et quiescere easdem accidet, et etiam sensibiles et insensibiles esse. Nam videntur ideae quiescere, immobiles et intelligibiles esse iis qui ponunt ideas esse. Attamen cum sint in nobis, impossibile es immobiles esse. Nam motis nobis, necessarium est et quae in nobis sunt omnia simul moveri. Manifestum autem quoniam et sensibiles, si in nobis sunt, nam per sensum qui circa visum est eam quae in unoquoque est formam cognoscimus. Rursum si positum est accidens cui est aliquid contrarium, considerandum si et contrarii susceptivum quod et accidentis est. Nam idem contrariorum susceptivum, ut si odium haerere irae quis dixerit, erit odium in furoris specie, illic enim ira; inspiciendum igitur si et contrarium in furoris specie, an in concupiscentia, nam si non, sed in concupiscibili est, non cohaeret odium irae. Similiter autem et si concupiscibile, ignorare dixerit, nam erit et disciplinae susceptivum, siquidem et ignorantiae; quod quidem non videtur, concupiscibile susceptivum esse disciplinae. Destruenti ergo quemadmodum dictum est utendum, astruenti vero quod inest quidem accidens non utilis locus, quod autem contingit inesse utilis. Ostendentes enim quod non susceptivum est contrarii, ostendentes erimus quod neque inest accidens, neque contingit inesse. Si autem ostenderimus quod inest contrarium, aut quod susceptivum est contrarii, nondum ostendentes erimus quod et accidens inest, sed quod contingit inesse in tantum solum ostensum erit.

Inglese

112b27Inasmuch as contraries can be conjoined with each other in six ways, and four of these conjunctions constitute a contrariety, we must grasp the subject of contraries, in order that it may help us both in demolishing and in establishing 112b30a view. Well then, that the modes of conjunction are six is clear: for either (I) each of the contrary verbs will be conjoined to each of the contrary objects; and this gives two modes: e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil to enemies, or per contra to do evil to friends and to do good to enemies. Or else (2) both verbs may be attached to one object; and 112b35this too gives two modes, e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil to friends, or to do good to enemies and to do evil to enemies.¹. Or (3) a single verb may be attached to both objects: and this also gives two modes; e.g. to do good to friends and to do good to enemies, or to do evil to friends and evil to enemies.

113a1The first two then of the aforesaid conjunctions do not constitute any contrariety; for the doing of good to friends is not contrary to the doing of evil to enemies: for both courses are desirable and belong to the same disposition. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to the doing of 113a5good to enemies: for both of these are objectionable and belong to the same disposition: and one objectionable thing is not generally thought to be the contrary of another, unless the one be an expression denoting an excess, and the other an expression denoting a defect: for an excess is generally thought to belong to the class of objectionable things, and likewise also a defect. But the other four all constitute 113a10a contrariety. For to do good to friends is contrary to the doing of evil to friends: for it proceeds from the contrary disposition, and the one is desirable, and the other objectionable. The case is the same also in regard to the other conjunctions: for in each combination the one course is desirable, and the other objectionable, and the one belongs to a reasonable disposition and the other to a bad. Clearly, then, from what has been said, the same course has more 113a15than one contrary. For the doing of good to friends has as its contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the doing of evil to friends. Likewise, if we examine them in the same way, we shall find that the contraries of each of the others also are two in number. Select therefore whichever of the two contraries is useful in attacking the thesis.

113a20Moreover, if the accident of a thing have a contrary, see whether it belongs to the subject to which the accident in question has been declared to belong: for if the latter belongs the former could not belong; for it is impossible that contrary predicates should belong at the same time to the same thing.

113a24Or again, look and see if anything has been said about something, of such a kind that if it be true, contrary predicates 113a25must necessarily belong to the thing: e.g. if he has said that the ‘Ideas’ exist in us. For then the result will be that they are both in motion and at rest, and moreover that they are objects both of sensation and of thought. For according to the views of those who posit the existence of Ideas, those Ideas are at rest and are objects of thought; while if they exist in us, it is impossible that they should be unmoved: for when we move, it follows necessarily that 113a30all that is in us moves with us as well. Clearly also they are objects of sensation, if they exist in us: for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize the Form present in each individual.

113a33Again, if there be posited an accident which has a contrary, look and see if that which admits of the accident will admit of its contrary as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. 113a35Thus (e.g.) if he has asserted that hatred follows anger, hatred would in that case be in the ‘spirited faculty’: 113bfor that is where anger is. You should therefore look and see if its contrary, to wit, friendship, be also in the ‘spirited faculty’: for if not—if friendship is in the faculty of desire —then hatred could not follow anger. Likewise also if he has asserted that the faculty of desire is ignorant. For if 113b5it were capable of ignorance, it would be capable of knowledge as well: and this is not generally held—I mean that the faculty of desire is capable of knowledge. For purposes, then, of overthrowing a view, as has been said, this rule should be observed: but for purposes of establishing one, though the rule will not help you to assert that the accident actually belongs, it will help you to assert that it may possibly belong. For having shown that the thing in question will not admit of the contrary of the accident asserted, we shall 113b10have shown that the accident neither belongs nor can possibly belong; while on the other hand, if we show that the contrary belongs, or that the thing is capable of the contrary, we shall not indeed as yet have shown that the accident asserted does belong as well; our proof will merely have gone to this point, that it is possible for it to belong.

Owen 1853

Since contraries are united to each other in six ways, but produce contrariety when united in four, we must assume contraries in such a method as may be useful, both to the subverter and constructor. Now that they are involved six ways is clear, for either each will be connected with each of the contraries, and this in a twofold respect, as to act well by friends and ill by enemies, or, on the contrary, to act ill by friends and well by enemies: or when both are about one thing, and this in two ways, as to act well by friends and ill by friends, or well by enemies and ill by enemies: or one thing about both, and this in a twofold respect, as to act well by friends and well by enemies, or ill by friends and ill by enemies.

The first two conjunctions named, do not, indeed, produce contrariety, since to act well by friends is not contrary to acting ill by enemies, as both are eligible¹ and proceed from the same character.‡² Nor is the injuring friends contrary to the benefiting enemies, for both these are to be avoided and proceed from the same character, but what is to be avoided does not seem contrary to what is to be avoided, unless the one is spoken according to excess, but the other according to defect, for excess appears to be of the number of things to be avoided, and similarly also defect.

All the remaining four, however, produce contrariety, for to benefit friends is contrary to injuring friends, for they are both from contrary character, and the one is to be chosen and the other avoided. In like manner, also, as to other things, for according to each connexion, the one is eligible, but the other to be avoided, and the one belongs to a worthy, but the other to a depraved character, so that it is clear from what we have said, that many things happen to be contrary to the same thing; for to benefit enemies, and to injure friends, are contrary to benefit-ing friends, and similarly to each of the others, there will appear two contraries, to those who consider them after the same manner, nevertheless, whichever contrary is useful to the thesis should be assumed.

Moreover, if any thing is contrary to accident, we must see whether it is present with what the accident is said to be present with; for if this is present, that cannot be, since contraries can-not possibly be at the same time with the same thing.

Also whether such a thing has been predicated of any, which existing, contraries must necessarily be inherent; thus if any one said that ideas are in us, for it will happen that they will both be moved and be at rest;³§ also be both sensible and intelligible. For ideas, to those who admit their existence, appear to rest, and to be|| intelli-gible; but if they are in us, they cannot be im-movable, for since we are moved, it is necessary that all things in us should be moved together with us, it is also clear that they are sen-sible if they are in us, for through the sense of sight we know the form which is in every thing.⁴

Again, if accident is laid down to which there is a certain contrary, we must consider whether it is also susceptible of the contrary which con-tains the accident, for the same thing is capable of contraries; thus if any one said that hatred followed anger, hatred would be in the irascible (part of the soul), for anger is there. We must consider then whether the contrary also is in the irascible part, friendship, for if not, but friendship is appetitive, hatred would not follow anger. Likewise, also, if he said that the appetitive part of the soul was ignorant, for it will be capable of science, if indeed it is of ignorance, which does not seem to be the case, that the appetitive part should be capable of science. Whoever therefore subverts, should, as we have said, use this place, but it is not useful to one who confirms that accident is inherent, though it is useful to show that it is possible to be inherent. For when we have shown that it is not susceptible of the contrary, we shall have shown that accident is neither, nor can be, inherent; but if we have shown that the contrary is inherent, or that it is susceptible of the contrary, we shall not yet have shown that accident also is inherent, but it will only be so far proved that it may be inherent.

Latino

Quoniam autem oppositiones sunt quatuor, considerandum ex contradictionibus, econverso ex consequentia, et interimenti et construenti. Sumere autem est ex inductione, ut si homo animal, non animal non homo; similiter autem et in aliis. Hic enim econverso consequentia, nam hominem animal sequitur, non hominem autem, non animal nequaquam; sed econverso, non animal, non homo. In omnibus igitur tale est existimandum, ut si bonum, suave, et non suave, non bonum; si autem non hoc, nec illud, similiter autem et si non suave, non bonum, bonum suave. Manifestum igitur quod utrumque convertitur, quae secundum contradictionem est consequentia econverso facta. In contrariis autem considerandum si contrarium contrarium sequatur, an contra seipsa consequentia, an econverso, et interimenti et construenti. Sumere autem et talia est ex inductione quantum utile est, contra ipsum consequentia est, ut in fortitudine et timiditate; nam illam quidem sequitur virtus, hanc autem vitium, et illam quidem sequitur eligendum, hanc autem fugiendum: igitur contra seipsa et horum consequentia, contrarium enim eligendum fugiendo, similiter autem et in aliis. Econverso autem consequentia, ut bonam quidem habitudinem sanitas sequitur, malam autem habitudinem aegritudo nequaquam, sed aegritudinem mala habitudo, manifestum igitur quoniam econverso in his consequentia fit. Raro autem econverso accidit in contrariis, sed in pluribus in seipsa consequentia; si ergo neque contra seipsa contrarium sequitur contrarium, neque econverso, manifestum quoniam neque eorum quae dicta sunt alterum sequitur alterum, si autem in contrariis, et in iis quae dicta sunt necesse alterum sequi alterum. Similiter autem contrariis, et in privationibus, et habitibus respiciendum. Verumtamen non est in privationibus econverso, sed contra seipsa consequentiam necessarium est semper fieri, veluti visum sequi sensum, caecitatem autem insensibilitatem; opponitur enim sensus insensibilitati, ut habitus et privatio, nam illud horum quidem habitus, hoc autem privatio est. Similiter autem habitui et privationi, et in iis quae sunt ad aliquid, utendum, contra seipsa enim, et horum consequentia, ut si triplum multiplum, et subtriplum submultiplum dicitur: dicitur enim triplum quidem ad subtriplum, multiplum autem ad submultiplum. Rursus, si scientia opinio, et scibile opinabile, et si visus sensus, et visibile sensibile. Instantia, quod non necesse est in iis quae sunt ad aliquid consequentiam fieri quemadmodum dictum est, nam sensibile scibile est, sensus autem non est scientia. Non tamen vera instantia videtur esse, multi enim non dicunt sensibilium esse scientiam. Insuper autem ad contrarium non minus utile quod dictum est, ut quod sensibile non est scibile, neque enim sensus scientia.

Inglese

113b15Seeing that the modes of opposition are four in number, you should look for arguments among the contradictories of your terms, converting the order of their sequence, both when demolishing and when establishing a view, and you should secure them by means of induction—such arguments (e.g.) as that ‘If man be an animal, what is not an animal is not a man’: and likewise also in other instances of contradictories. For in those cases the sequence is converse: 113b20for ‘animal’ follows upon ‘man’, but ‘not-animal’ does not follow upon ‘not-man’, but conversely ‘not-man’ upon ‘not-animal’. In all cases, therefore, a postulate of this sort should be made, (e.g.) that ‘If the honourable is pleasant, what is not pleasant is not honourable, while if the latter be untrue, so is the former’. Likewise, also, ‘If what is not pleasant be not honourable, then what is honourable is 113b25pleasant’. Clearly, then, the conversion of the sequence formed by contradiction of the terms of the thesis is a method convertible for both purposes.

113b27Then look also at the case of the contraries of S and P in the thesis, and see if the contrary of the one follows upon the contrary of the other, either directly or conversely, both when you are demolishing and when you are establishing a view: secure arguments of this kind as well by means of 113b30induction, so far as may be required. Now the sequence is direct in a case such as that of courage and cowardice: for upon the one of them virtue follows, and vice upon the other; and upon the one it follows that it is desirable, while upon the other it follows that it is objectionable. The sequence, therefore, in the latter case also is direct; for the desirable is the contrary of the objectionable. Likewise also in other cases. The sequence is, on the other hand, converse in such 113b35a case as this: Health follows upon vigour, but disease does not follow upon debility; rather debility follows upon disease. In this case, then, clearly the sequence 114ais converse. Converse sequence is, however, rare in the case of contraries; usually the sequence is direct. If, therefore, the contrary of the one term does not follow upon the contrary of the other either directly or conversely, clearly neither does the one term follow upon the other in 114a5the statement made: whereas if the one followed the other in the case of the contraries, it must of necessity do so as well in the original statement.

114a7You should look also into cases of the privation or presence of a state in like manner to the case of contraries. Only, in the case of such privations the converse sequence does not occur: the sequence is always bound to be direct: e.g. as 114a10sensation follows sight, while absence of sensation follows blindness. For the opposition of sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the presence to the privation of a state: for the one of them is a state, and the other the privation of it.

114a14The case of relative terms should also be studied in like manner to that of a state and its privation: for 114a15the sequence of these as well is direct; e.g. if 3/1 is a multiple, then 1/3 is a fraction: for 3/1 is relative to 1/3, and so is a multiple to a fraction. Again, if knowledge be a conceiving, then also the object of knowledge is an object of conception; and if sight be a sensation, then also the 114a20object of sight is an object of sensation. An objection may be made that there is no necessity for the sequence to take place, in the case of relative terms, in the way described: for the object of sensation is an object of knowledge, whereas sensation is not knowledge. The objection is, however, not generally received as really true; for many people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation. Moreover, the principle stated is just as useful for the contrary purpose, e.g. to show that the object of sensation is not an 114a25object of knowledge, on the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.

Owen 1853

As oppositions are four, we must consider (whether we can derive an argument) from contradictions, the consequence being inverse both for subversion and confirmation, and we must assume from induction, as if a man is animal, what is not animal is not man, likewise in other things; for here the consequence is inverse, since animal is consequent to man, but what is not animal is not consequent to what is not man, but inversely what is not man is consequent to what is not animal. In all cases then such must be admitted, as if the beautiful is pleasant, the unpleasant is not beautiful, and if this is not, neither will that be; likewise also if the unpleasant is not beautiful, the beautiful is pleasant, wherefore it is clear that the consequence according to contradiction being inverted, converts to both.

In contraries indeed, both the subverter and the constructers must consider, whether the contrary follows the contrary directly, or inversely, but must also assume such things, as far as it is useful, from induction. The consequence then is direct, for instance, to bravery and timidity, for to the one, virtue, but to the other, vice, is consequent, and the eligible follows the one, but what is to be avoided, the other, therefore the consequence of these also is direct, since the eligible is contrary to what is to be avoided, and similarly in other things. But the consequence is inverse, as health indeed follows a good habit of body, but disease does not, a bad habit, but a bad habit of body is consequent to disease, wherefore it is clear that the consequence in these, is inverse. Nevertheless, the inverse rarely occurs in contraries, but in most of them the consequence is direct; if then the contrary follows the contrary, neither directly nor inversely, it is manifest that neither in what is asserted, is the one, consequent to, the other, but if in contraries, in the assertions¹ also, it is requisite, that the one should be consequent to the other.

As in contraries, so also must we consider in privations and habits, except that in privations the inverse does not occur, but the consequence must of necessity always be direct, just as sense follows sight, and privation of sense, blindness, for sense is opposed to the privation of sense, as habit and privation, since one of these is habit, but the other is privation.

Relatives also, we must use in a similar way to habit and privation, for their consequence is direct, as if the triple is multiple, the sub-triple also is sub-multiple, for the triple is referred to the sub-triple, and the multiple to the sub-multiple. Again, if science is opinion, the object of science will also be the object of opinion, and if vision is sense, the visible also, is sensible. It is objected (perhaps), that it is not necessary there should be a consequence in relatives, as we have said, for the sensible is an object of science, but sense is not science, yet the objection does not appear to be true, for many deny that there is science of sensibles. Besides, what has been said is no less useful for (proving) the contrary, as that the sensible is not an object of science, since neither is sense, science.

Latino

Rursus in conjugatis et in casibus, et interimenti et construenti. Dicuntur autem conjugata hujusmodi, ut justa, et justus justitiae, et fortia, et fortis fortitudini. Similiter autem effectiva et conservativa, conjugata illi cujus sunt effectiva et conservativa, ut sanativa sanitatis, habituativa habitudinis, eodem autem modo et in aliis: conjugata igitur talia solent dici. Casus autem, ut juste, et fortiter, et sanative, habitative, et quaecunque eodem modo dicuntur. Videntur autem et quae sunt secundum casus, conjugata esse, ut juste justitiae, et fortiter fortitudini. Conjugata autem dicuntur secundum eamdem conjugationem omnia, ut justitia, justus, justum, juste; manifestum igitur quoniam uno quovis ostenso eorum quae secundum eamdem conjugationem dicuntur, ut bono, vel laudabili, et reliqua omnia ostensa sunt, ut si justitia est laudabilium, et juste, justus, justum laudabilium; dicetur autem juste et laudabiliter secundum eumdem casum (nam a laudabili) quemadmodum juste a justitia. Considerandum autem non solum in eo quod dictum est, sed et in contrario contrarium. Ut quod bonum non ex necessitate suave, neque enim malum triste, ut si hoc et illud, et si justitia scientia, et injustitia ignorantia, et si quod juste est, scienter et experienter est, quod injuste est, ignoranter et experienter est, si autem haec non nec illa, velut in hoc quod nunc dictum, nam magis utique apparebit, quod injuste experienter quam inexperienter. Hic autem locus dictus est prius in contrariorum consequentiis, nihil enim aliud nunc ostendimus quam contrarium sequi contrarium. Amplius in generationibus, et corruptionibus, et effectivis, et corruptivis, et interimenti, et astruenti. Quorum enim generationes bonae sunt, et ipsa bona sunt, et si ipsa bona sunt, et generationes bonae; si autem generationes malae, et ipsa mala. In corruptionibus autem econtrario, nam si corruptiones bonae, ipsa mala; si autem corruptiones malae, ipsa sunt bona. Eadem ratio et in effectivis, et corruptivis: quorum enim effectiva bona, et ipsa bona; quorum vero corruptiva bona, ipsa mala.

Inglese

114a26Again look at the case of the co-ordinates and inflected forms of the terms in the thesis, both in demolishing and in establishing it. By ‘co-ordinates’ are meant terms such as the following: ‘Just deeds’ and the ‘just man’ are coordinates of ‘justice’, and ‘courageous deeds’ and ‘the ‘courageous man’ are co-ordinates of ‘courage’. Likewise also things that tend to produce and to preserve anything 114a30are called co-ordinates of that which they tend to produce and to preserve, as e.g. ‘healthy habits’ are co-ordinates of ‘health’ and a ‘vigorous constitutional’ of a ‘vigorous constitution —and so forth also in other cases. ‘Co-ordinate’, then, usually describes cases such as these, whereas ‘inflected forms’ are such as the following: ‘justly’, ‘courageously’, ‘healthily’, and such as are formed in this way. It is usually 114a35held that words when used in their inflected forms as well are co-ordinates, as (e.g.) ‘justly’ in relation to justice, and ‘courageously’ to courage; and then ‘co-ordinate’ describes all the members of the same kindred series, e.g. ‘justice’, ‘just’, of a man or an act, ‘justly. Clearly, then, when any one member, whatever its kind, of the same kindred series 114bis shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all the rest as well come to be shown to be so:¹ e.g. if ‘justice’ be something praiseworthy, then so will ‘just’, of a man or thing, and ‘justly’ connote something praiseworthy. Then ‘justly’ will be rendered also ‘praiseworthily’, derived by the same 114b5inflexion from ‘the praiseworthy’ whereby ‘justly’ is derived from ‘justice’.

114b6Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in the case of its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue that good is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or that, if the latter be the case, so is the former. Also, if justice be knowledge, then injustice is 114b10ignorance: and if ‘justly’ means ‘knowingly’ and ‘skilfully’, then ‘unjustly’ means ‘ignorantly’ and ‘unskilfully’: whereas if the latter be not true, neither is the former, as in the instance given just now: for ‘unjustly’ is more likely to seem equivalent to ‘skilfully’ than to ‘unskilfully’. This commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence of contraries;² for all we are claiming now 114b15is that the contrary of P shall follow the contrary of S.

114b16Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing, and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it, both in demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose modes of generation rank among good things, are themselves also good; and if they themselves be good, so also are their modes of generation. If, on the other hand, their modes of generation be evil, then they themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of destruction 114b20the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank as good things, then they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if the modes of destruction count as evil, they themselves count as good. The same argument applies also to things tending to produce and destroy: for things whose productive causes are good, themselves also rank as good; whereas if causes destructive of them are good, they themselves rank as evil.

Owen 1853

Again, we must both in subversion and construction, attend to elementary co-ordinates, and to cases, and such things are called co-ordinates, as just things, and a just man, with justice, and courageous deeds, and a courageous man, with courage. Likewise, also, things efficient, and conservative, are co-elementary with that, of which they are efficient, or conservative, as the salubrious, with health, and the productive of a good habit, with a good habit, of body. In the same manner with other things, whence it is usual to call such, co-ordinates, but cases, are such as justly, and courageously, and healthily, and whatever are spoken after this manner. Those also which are according to cases, seem to be co-ordinate, as justly with justice, and courageously with courage; but all those are called co-ordinate, which are in the same affinity, as justice, a just man, a just thing, justly. It is clear then, that when any one of these which are in the same affinity, is proved good or laudable, all the rest also have been shown so, as, if justice is one of things laudable, the just man, and the just thing, and the justly, are also of the number of things laudable, but justly, and laudably, will be enunciated according to the same case, from the laudable, as justly from justice.

Not only however is the contrary to be considered in what has been said, but also in the contrary, as that the good is not necessarily pleasant, for neither is the evil (necessarily) painful, or if this is, that also is,¹ or so if justice is science, injustice is ignorance, and if justly, is scientifically, and skilfully, the unjustly, is ignorantly, and unskilfully, and if these are not, neither are those,² as in the case just now stated,³ for what is unjustly, would rather appear skilfully, than unskilfully, (done). Now this place has been mentioned before,⁴ in the consequences of contraries, for we do not now lay down any thing else, as a principle, than that the contrary follows the contrary.

Moreover, both by the subverter and the constructor, (arguments are to be derived) in generations and corruptions, efficients and destructives. For those things of which the generations are good, are themselves also good,⁵ and if they are good, the generations are too;⁶ but if the generations are of the number of things evil, the things themselves also are of evil.⁷ In corruptions, indeed, it is the contrary, for if corruptions are among the number of things good, the things themselves (corrupted) are evil,⁸ but if the corruptions are amongst things evil, the things themselves are good.⁹ The same reasoning indeed prevails in the case of efficients and destructives, for those things, of which the efficients are good, are themselves also good, but those, whose destructives are good, are themselves amongst things evil.¹⁰

Latino

Rursum in similibus si similiter se habent. Ut si disciplina una plurium, et opinio, et si visum habere est videre, et auditum habere et audire, similiter autem et in aliis, et in his quae sunt, et in iis quae videntur. Utilis autem hic locus ad utrumque, nam si in aliquo similium sic se habet, et in aliis similibus, si autem in aliquo non, nec in aliis similibus. Considerandum autem et in uno, et in pluribus si similiter se habet. Aliquoties enim dissonat, ut si scire est cogitare, et multa scire est multa cogitare, hoc autem non verum. Contingit enim plura scire, cogitare autem non; si autem non hoc, nec illud quod in uno quod scire est cogitare. Amplius, ex magis et minus. Sunt autem ejus quod est magis loci quatuor. Unus quidem si magis sequitur magis, ut si voluptas bonum, et magis voluptas, magis bonum; et si injuriam facere malum, et magis injuriam facere, magis malum. Utilis autem ad utrumque hic locus, nam si sequatur ad subjecti incrementum, accidentis incrementum, quemadmodum dictum est, manifestum quod accidit; si autem non sequatur, non accidit, hoc autem inductione sumendum. Alius, uno de duobus dicto, si cui magis videtur inesse non inest, nec cui minus, et si cui minus videtur inesse inest, et cui magis. Rursum, duobus de uno dictis, si quod magis videtur alii inesse non inest, neque quod minus, aut si quod minus videtur inesse inest, et quod magis. Amplius, duobus de duobus dictis, si quod alteri magis videtur inesse non inest, nec reliquum reliquo, aut si quod minus videtur alteri inesse inest, et reliquum reliquo. Amplius, ex eo quod similiter inest, vel videtur inesse tripliciter, quemadmodum in eo quod magis, ut in posterioribus tribus dictis locis dicebatur. Sive enim unum quoddam duobus similiter inest, aut videtur inesse, si alteri non insit, nec alteri; si autem alteri inest, et reliquo. Sive duo eidem similiter, si alterum non insit, nec reliquum; si autem alterum, et reliquum. Eodem autem modo et si duobus duo similiter insunt, nam si alterum alteri non inest, nec reliquum reliquo; si autem inest alterum alteri, et reliquum reliquo. Ex eo igitur quod est magis et minus, et quod est similiter, tot modis contingit argumentari.

Inglese

114b25Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and see if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight be to see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also in the case of other things, both those which are and those which are generally held to be like. The rule in question is useful for both purposes; 114b30for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing, it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if it be not so in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the case of the others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a discrepancy. Thus, if to ‘know’ a thing be to ‘think of’ it, then also to ‘know many things’ is to ‘be thinking of many things’; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking 114b35of them. If, then, the latter proposition be not true, neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to ‘know’ a thing is to ‘think of? it.

114b38Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to greater degrees! there are four commonplace rules. One is: See whether a greater degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater good: and 115aif to do a wrong be evil, see whether also to do a greater wrong is a greater evil. Now this rule is of use for both purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows an increase of the subject, as we have said, clearly the accident 115a5belongs; while if it does not follow, the accident does not belong. You should establish this by induction. Another rule is: If one predicate be attributed to two subjects; then supposing it does not belong to the subject to which it is the more likely to belong, neither does it belong where it is less likely to belong; while if it does belong where it is less likely to belong, then it belongs as well where it is more likely. Again: If two predicates be attributed to one subject, then if the one which is more generally thought to belong does not 115a10belong, neither does the one that is less generally thought to belong; or, if the one that is less generally thought to belong does belong, so also does the other. Moreover: If two predicates be attributed to two subjects, then if the one which is more usually thought to belong to the one subject does not belong, neither docs the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject; or, if the one which is less usually thought to belong to the one subject does belong, so too does the remaining predicate to the remaining subject.

115a15Moreover, you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs, or is generally supposed to belong, in a like degree, in three ways, viz. those described in the last three rules given in regard to a greater degree.* For supposing that one predicate belongs, or is supposed to belong, to two subjects in a like degree, then if it does not belong to the one, neither does it belong to the other; while if it belongs to the one, it belongs to the remaining one as well. Or, supposing two predicates to belong in a like degree 115a20to the same subject, then, if the one does not belong, neither does the remaining one; while if the one does belong, the remaining one belongs as well. The case is the same also if two predicates belong in a like degree to two subjects; for if the one predicate does not belong to the one subject, neither does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject, while if the one predicate does belong to the one subject, the remaining predicate belongs to the remaining subject as well.

Owen 1853

Again, (it should be observed,) whether the same thing happens with similars, as if science is one of many, whether opinion also is, and if to possess sight is to see, whether to possess hearing also is to hear, and likewise of the rest, both in the case of the real and of the apparent. This place indeed is useful for both, for if it is so with any similar, it will be also with other similars, but if not with some, neither with the others. Still we must consider both, whether the same occurs in one thing and in many, for sometimes there is a discrepancy; thus, if to know scientifically is to energize with the intellect, to know many things scientifically is intellectually to energize about many things, but this is not true, for we may know much scientifically without energizing the intellect; if then this is not (true), neither is that (which was asserted) in one thing, viz. that to know scientifically is to energize the intellect. Besides, we must take arguments from the more and less; now there are four places of the more, one is, if the more follows the more, as if pleasure is good, the greater pleasure is the greater good, and if to injure is evil, the greater injustice is the greater evil. This place indeed is useful for both, for if the addition of the accident is consequent upon the addition of the subject, as was stated, it is evident that it happens, but if it is not consequent it does not happen, but this must be assumed by induction. Another place is, when one thing § is predicated of two,|| if it is not present with what it is more probable to be present, neither (will it be) with what (it is) less (probable),¹ and if it is present with what it is less probable to be present, (it is) also with what (it is) more (probable).² Again, when two things are predicated of one, if what appears more present is not present, neither will the less, or if that which appears to be less present is present, that which is more (will be). Once more, when two things are predicated of two, if what appears more present with the one is not present, neither will the remainder be with the remainder; or if what appears less present with the other is present, the remainder also (will be) with the remainder.³ Again, (there is an argument) from what is similarly present, or appears to be present, triply, just as was said in that, which was more (present), in the three last-mentioned places. For whether one thing is similarly present with two, or appears to be so, if it is not with the one, neither is it with the other, but if it is with the one it will be also with the remainder; or two things similarly present with the one, if the one is not present, neither will the other be, but if the one, (then) also the other. In the same way if two things are similarly present with two, for if one is not present with the other, neither will the remaining one (be) with the remainder, but if the one is present with the other, the remainder (will be) also with the remainder.

Latino

Amplius autem ex appositione, si alterum ad alterum appositum faciat bonum, vel album, cum non fuerit prius album, vel bonum, quod appositum est erit album, vel bonum, quale revera et totum facit. Amplius autem si id ad quod est appositum aliquid facit magis tale quale erat, et ipsum erit ejusmodi, similiter autem et in aliis. Utilis autem non in omnibus hic locus, sed in quibus ipsius magis crementum accidit fieri. Iste vero locus non convertitur ad destruendum, nam si non facit quod appositum est, bonum, nondum manifestum, si ipsum non bonum. Nam bonum malo appositum, non ex necessitate bonum totum facit, nec album nigro, nec dulce amaro. Rursum, si quid magis et minus dicitur, et simpliciter inest. Quod enim bonum vel album non est, neque magis et minus bonum vel album dicetur; nam malum de nullo magis, vel minus bonum, sed magis malum vel minus dicetur. Non convertitur autem hic locus ad destruendum, multa enim eorum quae non dicuntur magis, simpliciter insunt; nam homo non dicitur magis et minus, sed non propter hoc non est homo. Eodem autem modo considerandum et in iis quae secundum quid, et quando, et ubi. Nam si secundum quid contingit, et simpliciter contingit, similiter autem et quando, et ubi: nam quod simpliciter est impossibile, neque secundum quid, neque secundum ubi, neque secundum quando contingit. Instantia, quoniam secundum quid quidem sunt natura studiosi (ut liberales, vel casti), simpliciter autem non sunt natura studiosi, nam nullius natura prudens. Similiter autem et quando contingit corruptibilium aliquid non corrumpi, simpliciter autem non contingit non corrumpi. Eodem autem modo et ubi expedit quidem tali observantia victus uti, ut in morbosis locis, simpliciter autem non expedit adhuc autem, alicubi quidem unum tantum possibile est esse, simpliciter autem non possibile unum tantum esse. Eodem autem modo et alicubi bonum est quidem patrem significare, ut in Tribalis, simpliciter autem non bonum. An in hoc quidem non ubi significat, sed quibusdam, nihil enim refert ubicunque sint, ubique enim erit eis bonum in Tribalis. Rursus quidem expedit medicari, ut quando aegrotat, simpliciter autem non. An neque hoc quando significat, sed in eo quod afficitur aliquo modo, nihil enim refert quandocunque, dummodo sic affectus sit. Simpliciter autem est quod nullo addito dicis quod bonum est, aut contrarium, ut patrem sacrificare non dicis bonum esse, sed quibusdam bonum esse; non ergo simpliciter bonum, sed deos honorare bonum dicis nihil addens, simpliciter enim bonum est. Quare quod nullo addito videtur esse honestum, vel turpe, vel aliquid talium, simpliciter dicetur.

Inglese

115a25You can argue, then, from greater or less or like degrees of truth in the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover, you should argue from the addition of one thing to another. If the addition of one thing to another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly it was not white or good, then the thing added will be white or good—it will possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. Moreover, 115a30if an addition of something to a given object intensifies the character which it had as given, then the thing added will itself as well be of that character. Likewise, also, in the case of other attributes. The rule is not applicable in all cases, but only in those in which the excess described as an ‘increased intensity’ is found to take place. The above rule is, however, not convertible for overthrowing a view. For if the thing added does not make the other good, it is 115a35not thereby made clear whether in itself it may not be good: 115bfor the addition of good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good, any more than the addition of white to black makes the whole white.

115b3Again, any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less degrees belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good or of white will not be attributed to what 115b5is not good or white: for a bad thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of goodness than another, but always of badness. This rule is not convertible, either, for the purpose of overthrowing a predication: for several predicates of which we cannot speak of a greater degree belong absolutely: for the term ‘man’ is not attributed in greater 115b10and less degrees, but a man is a man for all that.

115b11You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a given respect, and at a given time and place: for if the predicate be possible in some respect, it is possible also absolutely. Likewise, also, is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is absolutely impossible is not possible cither in any respect or at any place or time. An 115b15objection may be raised that in a given respect people may be good by nature, e.g. they may be generous or temperately inclined, while absolutely they are not good by nature, because no one is prudent by nature. Likewise, also, it is possible for a destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time, whereas it is not possible for it to escape absolutely. In the same way also it is a good thing at 115b20certain places to follow such and such a diet, e.g. in infected areas, though it is not a good thing absolutely. Moreover, in certain places it is possible to live singly and alone, but absolutely it is not possible to exist singly and alone. In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one’s father, e.g. among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is 115b25all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi. Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g. when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely. Or possibly this again may indicate a relativity not to a certain time, but to a certain state of health: for it is all the same whenever it occurs, if only one be in that state. A thing is ‘absolutely’ so which 115b30without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the contrary. Thus (e.g.) you will deny that to sacrifice one’s father is honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not therefore honourable absolutely. On the other hand, to honour the gods you will declare to be honourable without adding anything, because that is honourable absolutely. So that whatever without any addition is generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or 115b35anything else of that kind, will be said to be so ‘absolutely’.

Owen 1853

It is possible then to argue in so many ways from the more, the less, and the similar; also indeed from addition, if one thing being added to another makes that good or white, which before was not white or good, what is added will be (such) a whiteness or good, as in fact it causes the whole to be. Further, if a certain thing being added to what is inherent, makes it more such than it was, itself also will be of a similar kind;¹ and the same with other things. Still this (place) is not useful in all cases, but in those, in which there happens to be an excess of the more. This place too, does not convert for the purpose of subversion, for if what is added does not produce good, it is not yet manifest whether itself be not good, since good added to evil, does not of necessity render the whole good, nor white (added) to blackness. Again, if a thing is said to be more and less, it is likewise simply, for what is not good nor white, will neither be said to be more or less good or white, for evil is not more or less good, than any thing, but will be said to be more or less evil. Yet neither does this place convert for the purpose of subversion, since many things which are not said to be more, subvert simply, for man is not called more and less, yet not on this account is he not man.

In the same manner we must pay attention to that which subsists according to something, and at some time, and in some place; for if it is possible as to something, it is also simply possible, and in like manner the when or the where, for what is simply impossible, is neither possible as to any thing, nor any where, nor at any time. It is objected (perhaps) that worthy men are naturally (so), as to a certain thing, for instance, liberal or temperate, but simply they are not naturally worthy. Likewise it is possible at some time that something corruptible may not be corrupted, but simply it is impossible that it should not be corrupted: in the same way also it is beneficial to use a certain kind of diet some where, for instance, in unhealthy places, but simply it is not beneficial. Moreover, in a certain place, it is possible for one only to be, but simply it is not possible that one only should be; in the same way also at a certain place, it was good to sacrifice a father, e. g. among the Tribali, but simply it is not good. Now does not this indeed signify not a certain place, but to certain people? for it makes no difference where they may be, since every where it will be a noble action with them, (as) Tribali. Again, at some time it is beneficial to take medicine, as when a man is ill, but simply it is not (beneficial), may we not say that neither does this signify a certain time, but refers to one disposed in a certain way, for it does not signify at all when (it is done), if only he be thus disposed. But that is simply, which, when nothing is added, you may declare to be good or the contrary, e. g. you would not say that to sacrifice a father is good, but that it is good amongst certain persons, it is not therefore simply good. On the contrary, you will say that to reverence the gods is good without any addition, for it is simply good; hence that which without any addition appears to be good, or base, or any thing else of the kind, will be said (to be so) simply.