ANALOGY. - Etymologically (from Greek ἀνά- "above" and λόγος "discourse, reason") analogy suggests the idea of a relationship between two terms, hence of proportion and similarity. As such, it underpins all our reasoning, which is composed of judgments (comparisons between two ideas), and therefore belongs in a particular way to the domains of philosophy, theology, and law.
I. ANALOGY IN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY
Philosophically, analogy is the affinity of concepts and terms (logic), grounded in the mutual relationship of various modes of being (metaphysics). According to the best Scholastic tradition, the notion of being, which is most universal, is not attributed in the same way to all things, because each thing differs from another in content, which is variously graded insofar as it is more or less rich in being. Therefore, being cannot be attributed to all things univocally (secundum eadem rationem), but only analogically (secundum rationem similem). Two main forms of analogy are usually distinguished: one called analogy of attribution, the other of proportionality. Analogy of attribution consists in attributing to two or more subjects a property that formally belongs to a subject of higher order, with which the others have a relation. For example, health properly belongs to the soul, but is also attributed to medicine and color, which are causes or signs of health in the soul. Analogy of proportionality expresses a property that exists in various subjects according to different proportions; for example, vision is attributed to the eye, to the human intellect, and to the intellect of God, but clearly, despite the similarity, there is a difference between these three modes of seeing. This analogy can be expressed mathematically as follows:eye : body = intellect : soul
If a property that formally belongs to one subject is attributed by metaphor to another, the analogy will be one of improper or metaphysical proportionality; for example, laughter, proper to man, attributed to a meadow.
In its various forms, analogy reveals the lofty tendency of the human intellect to unify the multiplicity of the real world and the logical world, grasping in things some common note.
It oscillates between equivocity (the same term attributed to two subjects in two entirely different senses, as for example "scorpion," said of an animal and of a constellation) and univocity (the same term attributed to multiple subjects in an absolutely unique sense, as for example "man," said of all individuals of the human species).
Analogy therefore consists in attributing to two or more subjects a quality with meanings that are neither entirely identical nor entirely different, but similar according to different degrees and modes. The analogates thus share a common formal reason, such as life in the plant, in the soul, and in the human spirit, but proportionally different according to the mode.
The importance of analogy increases in theological matters, especially in the fundamental problem of the value of our knowledge of God. From the 4th century this problem was debated in the Eunomian controversy (v. AETIUS) between Eunomius, who reduced divine attributes to empty words, incapable of expressing a transcendent God in any way, and St. Basil and St. Gregory of Nyssa, who maintained that the concepts we form about God are inadequate but neither false nor devoid of meaning.
The question resurfaced more strongly at the beginning of Scholasticism (11th century), when the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (d. 1204), in his *Guide for the Perplexed*, extolling the incomprehensibility and ineffability of God, adopted a nominalistic and agnostic stance in theology; for him every divine attribute merely indicated a quality caused by God and placed in creatures. Thus: "God is good" = "God is the cause of goodness"; but we do not know whether goodness is in God.
St. Thomas perceived the gravity of the problem and, gathering the scattered elements of previous centuries, opened a secure path to its solution through a thorough study of analogy. He begins from the Christian concept of creation, whereby God is the first cause of the universe. Between cause and effect there is naturally a bond of similarity, which in creatures has a generic and specific character and thus follows the line of univocity, as for example between father and son. But since God infinitely transcends all creation with its genera and species, between Him and the creature the similarity cannot be perfect, univocal, but approximate and thus analogical. The infinite, unique, and absolutely simple perfection of God is reflected, albeit faintly, and in a certain way refracted across the indefinite range of beings created by His omnipotence. From consideration of creatures, the human intellect legitimately rises to affirm not only God’s existence but also the uniqueness of His intimate essence, of which creatures are a distant imitation.
By this path are formed those concepts that constitute the divine attributes (goodness, wisdom, justice, etc.) and that imperfectly express the nature of God, just as created beings imperfectly represent Him. The attributes, though inadequate, retain their value because they signify qualities truly found in creatures and in God according to different proportions (v. DIVINE ATTRIBUTES).
In the light of Thomistic doctrine, the analogy of our knowledge of divine perfections can be reduced to these principles:
1. There is a relationship of similarity, founded on causality, between Creator and creatures, by virtue of which we can in some way know God through created nature.
2. The best expression of this relationship is proportionality not properly mathematical, that is,
\[
\frac{8}{4} = \frac{4}{2},
\]
but metaphysical and entitative, as
\[
\frac{GOD}{attributes} = \frac{creature}{properties}.
\]
3. A divine attribute expresses a property formally common to God and creatures, but different in mode of being, because whereas in the creature the property is distinct from essence and is therefore participated and limited, in God every property is identical with essence and thus exists in Him infinitely.
4. Not all properties of creatures can be attributed to God, because some, such as extension, are repugnant to His nature as Pure Act. There are properties whose formal concept does not include imperfections, such as goodness: these are formally attributed to God but in a higher mode than to creatures. There are then properties that include imperfections, such as life and knowledge, and these are attributed to God only when purified of every shadow of imperfection.
Therefore, theological language, based on the laws of analogy, expresses the divine essence either by negation, when it removes from God some created property that implies imperfection, or by affirmation, when it attributes to God a positive property found as perfection in the creature, or by eminence, when it corrects the affirmation by distinguishing the mode of being of a property in creatures from the superior mode according to which that same property exists in God. Thus we have this gradation:
God is incorporeal (negation of the imperfection of materiality);
God is wise (affirmation of a property formally present in God);
God is not wise (i.e., in the same way as the creature);
God is super-wise (in a mode infinitely superior to creatures).
Thus the Christian doctrine of analogy, eliminating agnosticism and anthropomorphism, vindicates human knowledge of God while also marking its limits in the face of divine transcendence.
Pietro Parente
2. ANALOGY IN LAW
When referred to the juridical field, analogy is nothing other than a logical instrument that serves to remedy the insufficiencies of the law; it resolves into a procedure by which, in the absence of any legal provision regarding a controversy, the interpreter resorts to the provisions that govern cases similar to the case in controversy, and applies them to it (R. De Ruggiero, s. V. in Dizionario pratico del diritto privato, pp. 603-607 [V. LACUNE DELLA LEGGE]). Article 12, paragraph 2, of the preliminary provisions of the Italian Civil Code provides in this regard: “If a controversy cannot be decided by a precise provision of law, regard shall be had to the provisions that govern similar cases or analogous matters; if the case remains doubtful, it shall be decided according to the general principles of the legal system of the State.” And can. 20 of the Code of Canon Law states: “If there is no express prescription of law, whether general or particular, concerning a certain matter, the norm is to be taken, unless it concerns the application of penalties, from laws enacted for similar cases; from the general principles of law, with due regard for canonical equity; from the style and practice of the Roman Curia; from the common and constant opinion of scholars.”
For the interpreter to be able to resort to the analogical procedure, the concurrence of three conditions is therefore necessary: a) the existence of a true and proper legislative gap, meaning that the controversial case to be decided has not been foreseen by the legislator either explicitly or implicitly; b) the similarity of the undecided case to that governed by the law; c) the absence of an express will on the part of the legislator to fill the legislative gap through analogy.
It should be noted that the substantial difference between analogy and extensive interpretation is based on the existence of the first condition: while the latter aims simply at reconstructing the legislator’s will, analogy seeks to fill a true and proper legislative gap; hence the expression “analogical interpretation,” used by some, appears improper. The distinction between extensive interpretation and analogy also hinges on the second condition, inasmuch as if the unforeseen case, instead of being similar to the foreseen one, were identical to it, the particular norm already contained in the law should logically be applied to it through extensive interpretation, not a different one; whereas, if it were entirely different, the interpreter should not resort to analogy, but rather to the general principles of law or to the other means contemplated in the aforementioned can. 20 of the Codex.
Depending on whether the interpreter, in resorting to analogy, refers to a specific law—that is, has regard for the provisions governing a specific institution or a specific group of institutions—or refers to the entire complex of positive law of a given people, that is, to the general principles of a particular legal system, one speaks of analogy of law (analogia legis) or analogy of law (analogy of right, analogia iuris). This distinction, which is much debated—especially with regard to the limits of the two categories—is nonetheless irrelevant from both a practical and theoretical standpoint.
The analogical procedure is not applicable to penal laws, which, moreover (cf. can. 19), must be interpreted restrictively; nor to norms that cannot be extended due to their intrinsic impossibility, such as exceptional norms (singular law); nor to fiscal norms and those that restrict the free exercise of rights. In this regard, in canon law, the principle contained in the XXVIII regula iuris of the Liber Sextus of Boniface VIII is recalled: “Quae a iure communi exorbitant nequaquam ad consequentiam sunt trahenda.” Thus, analogy is not applicable to penal laws (can. 20 and 2219, § 3), to laws establishing irregularities (can. 983), while it is controversial whether the analogical interpretation of laws that must be interpreted restrictively is admitted (cf. can. 19). Great caution is rightly advised for the interpreter in resorting to analogy when dealing with norms that are the fruit of the legislator’s arbitrium and do not derive from the intrinsic nature of things, such as some norms of procedural law, for example, those establishing terms or certain formalities (De Ruggiero, op. cit.).