CLEMENTE ALLESSANDRINO

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. - Greek ecclesiastical writer.
SUMMARY:

I. Person

II. Works

III. Doctrine.

I. PERSON

1. Life

Titus Flavius C., surnamed the Alexandrian, was born about the middle of the 2nd century. Little information about his life is found in ancient writers. As to the place of his birth, tradition vacillates between Alexandria and Athens (Epiph., Haer., 32, 6). Modern critics prefer Athens in view of his Greek culture; but recently strong doubts have been raised against this opinion (F. Quatember, Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens V. II., Vienna 1946, pp. 18-23). Of his family only the gentile name is known, which indicates a relationship (perhaps of freedmen?) with the famous Flavian family.
It seems that C. was educated in paganism and then converted (Euseb., Praep. evang., II, 2, 64) after an anxious search for truth, during which he became acquainted with the various philosophical and religious currents of his time. Having become a Christian, he wished to deepen his knowledge of the Church’s teachings. For this purpose he undertook long journeys to hear the most celebrated Christian teachers (Strom., I, 12, 1): in Greece an Ionian, in southern Italy a Syrian and an Egyptian, in the East another Syrian, in Palestine a converted Jew, and finally in Egypt the last and dearest, whom he recalls with words of great esteem (ibid., I, 11). According to Eusebius (Hist. eccl., VI, 6), this teacher was Pantaenus, head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. It must be said that almost nothing is known of this catechetical school. In any case, C. developed intellectually in Alexandria and there taught Christian doctrine under circumstances that cannot be precisely determined.
When the persecution broke out under Septimius Severus (in 202), he took refuge in Cappadocia with one of his disciples, Bishop Alexander. In 211 he is still found with him, zealously exercising his ministry. Indeed, in that year the holy bishop, having been imprisoned, sent a letter to the Church of Antioch through the “blessed presbyter C.,” who “had strengthened and enlarged the Church of God” in Cappadocia (Euseb., ibid., II, 11, 6). The same Alexander, who later became Bishop of Jerusalem, in a letter written to Origen, speaks of “the holy C.” as his “lord and benefactor” (Euseb., ibid., II, 14, 9), already dead, without mentioning anything about the place or circumstances of his death.

2. Environment and culture

Besides doctrine, the cultural environment of Alexandria exercised a decisive influence on C.’s intellectual development. At that time Alexandria was the second city of the Roman Empire, where men of different nationalities met, but it was also a center of Hellenistic culture, a rival of Athens. Although the famous library of the Mouseion, with its 400,000 volumes—the largest in the world at that time—had been destroyed by the fire during the capture of the city by Julius Caesar (in 47 B.C.), by the time of C. it had already been rebuilt and replenished with new copies; there was also the library of the Serapeum, and intellectual interest was in full vigor. The ancient city of the Ptolemies was not only a meeting place for merchants of all nations but also for philosophers, scientists, and literary men of various schools and tendencies. The Mouseion itself, whose head was appointed by the emperor, gathered the most distinguished scholars.
There is no document proving a direct relationship between C. and the scholars of the Mouseion such as to speak of an influence on him of Greco-Hellenistic culture; yet it cannot be seriously doubted

The frequency with which he consulted the great libraries is attested by the large number of citations of philosophers and literary figures in his works (O. Stählin, in his index, records about 350 profane authors cited by CLEMENT). It is now beyond doubt that he made use of anthologies and compilations then in vogue at Alexandria, but this does not justify the conclusion that he was a mere compiler who copied his citations uncritically, for example, from the *Ilavro-danzi* (the *Apology* of Favorinus, as J. Gabrielsson claimed (*Über die Quellen des Klemens Al.*, I, Uppsala 1906; II, 1919, p. 437). Alongside the superficial and sometimes misunderstood citations of philosophers and poets, there are pages that bear witness to his vast erudition, the fruit of assiduous study. Among Greek philosophers—citing only the most frequently mentioned—he knew Heraclitus, Aristotle, Chrysippus, and Musonius Rufus in addition to Plato, his favorite author; among literary figures: Homer, Herodotus, Hesiod, and Euripides. Nor should one overlook the fact that, as can be gleaned from his writings, his audience was largely drawn from the intellectuals of his time, who, having passed through the slender and striking education of the age, expected the Christian teacher to keep abreast of the scientific questions then debated in Alexandria.

No less important for Clement’s thought was the influence of Jewish-Hellenistic culture. The ancient capital of the Ptolemies had for centuries been the cultural center of Hellenized Jews. There the Greek version of the Old Testament (the Septuagint) was produced, and the allegorical method of interpreting Sacred Scripture arose to harmonize Sacred History with Greek thought. Since the Christian teacher used the same sacred book, he could not fail to come into contact with the Jews. Indeed, Clement cites the Old Testament always according to the Septuagint and never according to the original text (cf. O. Stählin, op. cit. in bibliography). He knew the so-called deuterocanonical books, especially Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus. Moreover, he was familiar with many Jewish-Hellenistic writers, such as the historians Demetrius, Philo the Elder, Eupolemus, Josephus, the Peripatetic Jewish philosopher Aristobulus, the tragedian Ezekiel, the Jewish Sibyl, and others. But even more significant was the allegorical interpretation of Sacred Scripture. The most notable representative of this tendency was Philo, the philosopher. Clement made extensive use of his writings (more than 300 times), adapting himself to his method and applying it even to the New Testament. One example, however, suffices to reveal the originality of Clement’s Christian perspective: the entry of the High Priest into the Holy of Holies is interpreted by Philo and by Clement alike as the passage of the contemplative from the sensible world to the intelligible world, but for Clement this has the meaning of the imitation of Christ, the High Priest, who through His Passion opened the way to heaven (cf. G. Békés, *De continua oratione Clementis Alexandrini doctrina*, in *Studia Anselmiana*, 14 [1942], pp. 5-28).

To complete the picture of Clement’s culture, mention must also be made of his extraordinary knowledge of the New Testament and early Christian literature. The New Testament is cited or used freely by him about 2,000 times, the Old Testament about 1,500 times. According to A. Harnack, his knowledge of the Bible is extraordinary and personal (*Die Chronologie der altchristlichen Literatur*, Leipzig 1897-1904, p. 16). Clement also knew the Apostolic Fathers, the *Didache*, Tatian, Melito, Irenaeus, and the *traditiones* concerning the Apostles, as well as the apocrypha and Gnostic literature (cf. J. Ruwet, art. cit. in bibliography).

II. WORKS

Only a part of Clement’s work has survived, certainly the principal part. A list of Clement’s writings is provided by Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.*, VI, 13; cf. the “testimonia” in vol. I of the Stählin edition).

1) The *Protrepticus* (*Προτρεπτικός πρὸς Ἑλλήνους*) is an exhortation to the Greeks, and generally to adherents of pagan cults, to abhor idolatry and convert to the true religion, namely Christianity.

As to literary form, the *Protrepticus* belongs to the genre of *προτρεπτικοί*, hortatory and admonitory discourses, whose purpose is to persuade listeners to some noble endeavor, for example, to engage in philosophy. A famous example of this genre is found in Cicero’s *Hortensius*, which decisively influenced St. Augustine’s first step toward conversion (*Conf.*, III, 4). Clement appears to have known Aristotle’s lost *Protreptikos* (cf. G. Lazzati, *L’Aristotele perduto*, Milan 1938, p. 9 sq.).

With regard to content, the author, following Jewish and Christian apologists, employs the arguments familiar from popular Stoic philosophy against polytheistic religion, against myths and superstitious cults. In contrast to the folly and immorality of paganism, he demonstrates the divine wisdom, spiritual richness, and transcendent purity of the doctrine of the incarnate Logos: in this doctrine are realized all the noble aspirations of man concerning the knowledge of truth and the eternal salvation of the soul. It remains for man—this is the thought with which Clement concludes the *Protrepticus*—to choose between judgment and grace, between perdition and life (*Protr.*, 123, 2).

2) The three books of the *Paedagogus* (*Παιδαγωγός*) are a direct continuation of the *Protrepticus*, addressed to those who, following the exhortation, have converted to Christianity. The Divine Pedagogue, Christ Himself, sets forth in them the norms of a truly Christian life.

In Book I, general questions concerning the nature and method of the Divine Pedagogue are treated. Among the ancients, the pedagogue was distinguished from the schoolmaster: his task did not consist in imparting intellectual instruction but in forming the character of the child through moral education. This is precisely the task of the Divine Pedagogue toward the newly converted: He heals their souls of the passions, preparing them for the teaching of the Master (*Paed.*, I, 1, 4). All who have been freed from sin and reborn in Baptism to a new life are children to be educated by the Divine Pedagogue; this does not, however, mean that they are at a lower stage of Christian life, to which one might oppose the Gnostic life, as heterodox Gnosticism claimed (ibid., 25, 1). The Divine Pedagogue is full of goodness, yet He also employs justice when necessary: the two are not mutually exclusive (ibid., 62, 1-4). Even punishment is a means of education in His hands (ibid., 75, 1).

The practical teaching is expounded in Books II and III, which are genuine treatises on Christian morality. Clement details how the true Christian should conduct himself in baths, at banquets, in conversation, regarding household goods, clothing, adornments, married life, and so forth. Underlying these admonitions is the problem faced by a Christian in the midst of a rich pagan metropolis, where all manner of dissoluteness was commonplace. Clement does not preach an ascetic ideal: not total renunciation, but honesty of morals and wise moderation in the enjoyments of this life.

His doctrine is based on the moral precepts of the Old Testament, often interpreted allegorically, on the Sapiential books, and especially on Ecclesiastes. From the New Testament, he draws upon the moral teachings found in the paraenetic sections of St. Paul’s epistles and various passages from the Gospels. Yet Clement’s characteristic stance is most evident in his extensive use of Greek ethics. Many of his prescriptions are established with particular reference to Plato’s *Republic* and *Laws* and the moral writings of Plutarch; however, the fundamental conception of the principal problems of morality is owed to Stoic ethics (cf. J. Stelzenberger, op. cit. in bibliography). His dependence on Musonius Rufus is evident: entire passages in the *Paedagogus* parallel the extracts of his doctrine preserved by Stobaeus (cf. O. Hense, *C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae*, Leipzig 1905). It must not be forgotten, however, that these Stoic doctrines are always amalgamated, modified, and perfected with Christian teachings.

At the end of the *Paedagogus*, in the manuscripts, there is a fine hymn to Christ the Savior, who is the Logos of God and the Good Shepherd of men. Since its ideas correspond perfectly to those of the *Paedagogus*, its authenticity is no longer doubted.

3) The *Stromata* (*Τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀληθῆ φιλοσοφίαν*)

The Stromata are in eight books. The title means: coverings, woven fabrics, but perhaps at the time of CLEMENT it had the meaning of στρωματοσῆμα, a receptacle of coverings. Thus, in a metaphorical sense, the title would indicate a collection of various things without systematic order, a miscellany (cf. J. A. Hort-J. B. Mayor, *Clement of Al. Miscellanies Book VII*, London 1902, Introduction).

CLEMENT was not the only one to give this title to his writing; even in profane literature one encounters authors who wrote books under this title (e.g., Plutarch and L. Cestius Vindex). CLEMENT himself, to express the character of his writing, compares his title with others similar to it, such as those of *Prato*, *Peplos*, *Elocone*, *Alveare*, etc. (*Strom.*, VI, 2, 1).

Despite this fragmentary character, there is a certain plan, or more precisely, a concatenation of ideas, in the Stromata (cf. E. de Faye, op. cit. in bibl., p. 90). First of all, two main themes can be distinguished: one, the relation of Christianity to profane culture, especially to Greek philosophy; the other, the explanation of true gnosis and its fundamental principles, in continuous discussion with heterodox gnosis. The first theme is treated explicitly in Book I of the Stromata, but it also appears occasionally in other books. CLEMENT, in opposition to the attitude of Christians of his time, manifests a positive appreciation of profane culture, although he still maintains the thesis of the Jewish apologists on the famous "theft" of the philosophers.

The second theme infiltrates from Book II onward throughout the work. In Book II, faith and Christian virtues that lead to perfection, i.e., to divine likeness, are discussed; in Book III, there are polemics against heterodox gnosis and other heretical opinions. In Book IV, the ideal of the perfect Christian—the gnostic of CLEMENT—is presented as a living martyr. In Books V and VI, religious knowledge and true gnosis are treated; finally, in Book VII, there is a fine portrayal of the gnostic: the ideal of the religious man.

Consequently, due to the character of the literary genre, these themes do not develop systematically. Quotations from Holy Scripture or profane literature allow CLEMENT to make more or less lengthy digressions, often without direct connection to the main theme.

Book VIII, as it remains today, cannot be considered the continuation of the seventh and the conclusion of the work. It is rather a collection of notes largely already used in the preceding books. The same can be said of the two pieces appended to the Stromata: *Excerpta ex Theodoto* and *Eclogae propheticae*.

The three aforementioned writings of CLEMENT were considered as three parts of a trilogy until de Faye, who, by criticizing this thesis, sparked a discussion that still continues. Given that "the starting point for any literary research on the works of CLEMENT is the plan of the trilogy preserved in the *Paedagogus*, I, 1" (J. Munck, op. cit. in bibl., p. 25), it will be appropriate to touch upon the question. CLEMENT distinguishes a threefold activity of the Logos: to exhort to conversion, to educate the convert to salvation, to instruct the educated in gnosis. At the end of chap. 3, he summarizes these three tasks with the three expressions: προστρέπων, παιδαγωγῶν, ἐκδιδάσκειν (*Paed.*, I, 3, 3).

The first and second activities have doubtless been explained in the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*. The question of the trilogy concerns instead the third part, whose title would have been, according to critics: the Teacher (Διδάσκαλος). The question arises, therefore, whether the Stromata can be considered the realization of the projected Teacher, or whether, for some unknown reason, CLEMENT rather abandoned the realization of his plan.

De Faye first raised objections against the traditional conception. He considers the Stromata as an "hors d'oeuvre": neither the title nor the content corresponds to that of the projected book. The Stromata owe their origin to CLEMENT's concern, who, before writing the Teacher, wished to clarify the role of philosophy in matters of faith, given that, due to the abuses of heterodox gnosis, a general distrust of all profane wisdom had arisen among the faithful. His hypothesis was first criticized by C. Heussi (*Die Strom. des Kleines Al. und ihr Verhältnis zum Protrep. und Paed.*, in *Zeitschr. für Wiss. Theologie*, 45 [1902], pp. 465-512). He is of the opinion that the first four books of the Stromata were composed before the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*. After finishing Book IV, CLEMENT would have decided to compose the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*, then would have continued the Stromata, treating the material of the Teacher. Tradition would thus be correct: with a slight modification, we would have in the Stromata the third part of the trilogy. J. Munck, taking up the problem again, does not admit the priority of the first books of the Stromata, and maintains the traditional chronological order. He agrees with de Faye, seeing in the Stromata not the third part of the trilogy; he believes instead that CLEMENT abandoned, for unknown reasons, the execution of his original plan. Lazzati joins him, accepting no relation of the Stromata to the *Protrepticus* and the *Paedagogus*.

A new position of the problem results from the work of F. Quatember (op. cit.). He simply denies that CLEMENT intended to write a trilogy. His principle is that from chap. I of the *Paedagogus* one cannot draw the conclusion that modern authors generally draw about CLEMENT's intention. There, one always speaks of the economy of salvation, which is realized by the divine Logos through three successive stages: for the conversion of the soul from the world, for its purification and preparation for gnosis, for instruction in gnosis, up to perfection. The three stages indicate the project of the Logos himself, not that of CLEMENT. Certainly, having treated the first two stages in two books, one is led to the conclusion that the third book should have treated the third stage, or at least that this would have been CLEMENT's original plan. But such a conclusion comes only from a syllogism of modern authors. CLEMENT himself rather demonstrates his concern to hide the holy mysteries of the faith (cf. *Strom.*, I, 14, 3; 18, 1; 20, 4; 21, 2).

The opinion of Quatember may contribute much to the clarification of the problem. Perhaps the traditional opinion has some truth: CLEMENT described the economy of salvation, hiding the third stage, instruction in gnosis, in the Stromata.

4) The short writing: *Quis dives salvetur?*, the only one entirely preserved besides the three mentioned, is a so-called homily on Mk 10:17-31. In the first part, it addresses an interpretation too literal of evangelical poverty, as if wealth itself excluded the possession of salvation. The Lord rather invites us to the purification of the heart from the disordered love of wealth: to spiritual poverty. In the second part, he asserts that the practices of Christian charity, together with sincere repentance of sins, can lead even the rich to heaven. Finally, as an example of true repentance, he narrates the well-known story of the young man beloved by St. JOHN, who became a brigand, but was finally converted by the Apostle.

5) Lost works. — Among the lost writings of CLEMENT, the most important was a collection of notes on Holy Scripture in eight books, entitled *Hypotyposes* (Ὑποτυπώσεις, sketches). The fragments preserved by Eusebius and in the Commentaries of Euthymius, and the Latin version of a considerable part of them (the apostolic letters: 1 Pt., 1 and 2 Jn., and that of St. JUDE) are printed in vol. III of the edition by Stählin. Besides the books of Holy Scripture, the work also included the Letter of BARNABAS and the Apocalypse of PETER. Fatius says he found in these notes various errors, such as the eternity of matter, the conception of the Son as a creature, a Docetic conception of the Incarnation, metempsychosis, and the existence of different worlds before Adam. But the value of this testimony is highly questionable.

Other lost writings are: *Περὶ τοῦ πάσχα*, on the question of Easter; *Κανών ἐκκλησιαστικός*, on ecclesiastical canon (cf. Unnik, in *Nederl. Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, 1941, p. 49 sqq.); *Περὶ προνοίας*, on providence (not mentioned by Eusebius); *Προτρεπικὸς εἰς ἀπομνήμους ὑποστάσεις*

Clement of Alexandria directed numerous writings to catechumens and many letters. Of these writings only fragments remain, collected in vol. III of Stählin; nothing survives of a sermon on fasting or of another work on the prophet Amos.

As for the manuscripts and textual tradition, everything is found in vol. I of O. Stählin. There are also recorded the various editions of C.’s works. Here we mention only the most recent bilingual editions (Greek-Italian) of the *Protrepticus* (ed. Q. Cataudella [*Corona Patrum Sales*, Greek series, 2], Turin 1937) and of the *Paedagogus* (ed. A. Bontti [*ibid.*, 3], ibid. 1940); the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the *Protrepticus*, *Quis dives salvetur?*, and the fragment of the *Exhortation to Patience* in one volume, ed. G. W. Butterworth (*The Loeb Classical Library*), London 1919; the bilingual edition (Greek-English) of the *Excerpta ex Theodoto* by R. P. Casey, London 1934. Among recent translations are to be noted the French version of the *Protrepticus* by C. Mondsert (*Sources chrétiennes*, 2), Paris 1942; a florilegium translated and commented in French by G. Bardy, *Clément d’Al. Les chrétiens*, ibid. 1926; and the German version of the principal elementary writings by O. Stählin (*Bibliothek der Kirchenväter*, 2nd series, Munich 1934–38).

III. DOCTRINE
1. General Attitude: Relation to Philosophy and Gnosticism
Before indicating the main points of C.’s doctrine, one must consider his relation to philosophy and to gnosticism, which undoubtedly left its imprint on his thought.

According to F. Overbeck (*Über die Anfänge der patrist. Literatur*, in *Hist. Zeitschrift*, 48 [1882], p. 467), C.’s work in relation to philosophy may be called “the boldest literary enterprise in the history of the Church.” For C.’s attitude in this regard was contrary to that of most Christians of his time. The development toward a positive appreciation of philosophy had been strongly impeded for a time by heterodox gnosticism, which, with its syncretistic tendency, sought to introduce foreign elements—drawn from philosophical speculation and pagan myths—into the doctrine of Revelation. The struggle against this movement, which threatened the Church in its very existence, was fierce, and by the end of the second century, when the Church emerged victorious, it resulted in a general distrust in the souls of the faithful toward every kind of human wisdom. “They fear philosophy,” notes C., “as children fear spirits” (*Strom.*, VI, 80, 5; 89, 1; 93, 1).

His own opinion, however, is that without intellectual education no development of faith can be expected, just as no grapes can be harvested without the care of the vine (*ibid.*, I, 43, 1). Study is therefore very useful. To justify this view, C. first of all gives a new positive appraisal of philosophy. It is true that in him one still finds the theory of the Jewish apologists about the theft of the philosophers, namely that the Greek philosophers took fragments of truth from the “barbarian philosophy” (Holy Scripture) (*ibid.*, I, 81, 1; 87, 2; 100, 4; 135, 2; II, 1; V, 140), but the prevailing idea is rather that philosophy is a gift of God: just as the Law was given to the Jews, so God gave philosophy to the Greeks. It was granted to them almost as a Testament (*ibid.*, VI, 67, 1), which prepared them intellectually and morally for the “most royal way” of Christ’s doctrine (*ibid.*, I, 80, 6).

But C. does not stop here. He believes that the task of philosophy did not cease with the coming of Christ. Its preparatory significance remains unchanged: the study of philosophy prepares the Christian for the intellectual penetration and moral realization of his faith, that is, for true gnosis (*ibid.*, I, 28, 1; 30, 1; 99, 1; VII, 20, 2). This positive attitude toward philosophy, and generally toward secular culture, certainly seemed bold in C.’s time, but with his enlightened and balanced wisdom it finally prevailed in the Church.

Even more daring appears C.’s enterprise of presenting the understanding and realization of Christian doctrine under the title of gnosis. It must be remembered that Alexandria was one of the centers of heterodox gnosticism: there Basilides and Valentinus taught, making numerous converts among the faithful. The very word “gnosis” was enough to arouse serious suspicions about the orthodoxy of a Christian writer.

C.’s attitude should not surprise us: on the one hand, standing on the historical ground of the apostolic tradition of the Church, he had to reject the fantastic speculations and diluted spiritualism of the gnostics; on the other, he had to give a positive response to the spiritual needs from which gnosticism arose. As to the first task, C. admits no distinction (against Marcion) between the inferior Creator God and the Father of Jesus: no distinction between the just God who punishes and the good God who, through his providence, benefits (*Paed.*, I, 8) men; he teaches the creation by the Father God, despite the presence of evil in the world (various chapters of Book III of the *Stromata* [cf. *Strom.*, IV, 46, 5]); he rejects the essential distinction between spiritual and simple believers regarding personal responsibility (*Strom.*, II, 10–11); he excludes the strange coupling, connected with that distinction, of an unreal asceticism with moral dissoluteness (cf. the whole of Book III of the *Stromata*). As to the second task, C. opposes those Christians who, with heterodox gnosis, rejected every tendency toward deeper knowledge of divine truth, every development and perfection of faith. He wishes indeed to guide his disciples through intellectual and ascetical education from simple faith to true gnosis, and finally to the vision of God.

2. God
a) Natural Knowledge. In all men there has been instilled a certain divine effluence (*Protr.*, 68, 2), which is nothing other than the rational soul, breathed into the face of man on the day of creation (*Strom.*, V, 94, 3). By it all are capable of recognizing the existence of one God, eternal (*Protr.*, 68, 2), omnipotent (*Strom.*, V, 87, 2). This applies first of all to the philosophers, who, through a certain reflection and transparency of creation, have in fact succeeded in knowing the Creator (*Strom.*, I, 94, 1–7; V, 87, 2). The reason for this knowledge, on the one hand, is that in the wise constitution and harmonious order of the universe the divine rationality—the λόγος—is manifested; on the other, that man was created by the Logos in his own image, λογικός (*Protr.*, 98, 4; *Strom.*, V, 6, 2–3). Revelation teaches the possibility of knowing the existence of God from the created world (*Rom.*, 1:20), but in the explanation of this doctrine C. is under the influence of Stoicism: in fact the Stoics presented the universe as pervaded by a divine rationality knowable by all rational beings. The essential difference, however, lies in the diversity of his concept of God.

b) Nature of God. In opposition to Stoic immanentism (God identified with the vital force of the universe), C. speaks of a God who is absolutely transcendent (*Strom.*, II, 6, 1); moreover, above all names, all thoughts, all ideas (*ibid.*, V, 65, 2), simply invisible, incomprehensible to the human mind, and consequently ineffable, inexpressible in human concepts and words (*ibid.*, V, 78, 3; 81, 5; 82, 2).

Our ideas of him are formless (*ibid.*, II, 6, 1). He comprehends in his being the whole universe, yet he himself remains inaccessible and infinite (*ibid.*, V, 81, 3); he is one, but also beyond unity: ἐν δὲ ὁ θεός καὶ ἐπὶ κεῖνα τοῦ ἐνός καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸν μονάδα (*Paed.*, I, 71, 1).

When speaking of God, C. generally intends the first person of the Holy Trinity, namely the Father. This does not mean a denial of the divinity of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, nor

a secondary or tertiary divinity in the Arian sense, but it simply reflects that aspect of the Holy Trinity—as with the Greek Fathers—whereby the individual Persons are considered directly, following the economy of Revelation, while their consubstantiality is regarded only as a consequence (cf. Th. de Régnon, *Etudes de théol. posit. sur la S.le Trinité*, I, Paris 1898, p. 252). This is clearly evident from his doctrine on the Logos.

c) The Logos: true God, the essential revelation of the Father. The principal text on this point is found in ch. 5 of bk. VII of the *Stromata*, which treats of the excellence of the Son. There, doubtless, are expressions that bear a subordinationist flavor. Although the Son is presented as a most perfect being, above every creature, the true Lord of the universe, nonetheless His nature is said to be most closely akin to the Almighty (Strom., VII, 5, 3). This expression may seem, not without reason, very deficient when measured by modern terminology, but from the context one can easily be persuaded of Clement’s orthodoxy. Indeed, there the activity of the Logos is described: He is the excellent governor of the universe, because by contemplating uninterruptedly the arcane ideas of God, He brings to realization in every thing His will (ibid., 5, 4). Thus the Logos never separates Himself from the Father and, at the same time, is present everywhere, being “all intellect (νόος), all paternal light, all eye: He sees all, hears all, knows all” (ibid., 5, 5).

Clement’s understanding of the origin of the Logos is as a spiritual generation, that is, as an intellectual emanation (ibid., IV, 162, 5), since God, by His spiritual nature, is νόος, pure intellect. The Son, therefore, is a perfect being from the perfect Father (Paed., I, 25, 3), the image of God (Protr., 98, 4) formed from eternity (Strom., V, 38, 7; VI, 138, 1; VII, 7, 2); He is also pure intellect, that is, the idea of the divine intellect (ibid., V, 16, 3) emanated in the identity of the divine nature.

Other expressions likewise confirm this thesis: God and the Logos are ἕν ἅμα, ὁ θεός (Paed., I, 62, 4); the Father is in Him and He is in the Father (ibid., 24, 3; 53, 1); He is the “most manifest God, compared to the Lord of the universe” (Protr., 110, 1; cf. P. B. Pade, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 148–71).

Once the true divine nature of the Logos is established, one may consider His characteristic and essential role, namely, to be the essential revelation of the Father. This idea is already contained in the doctrine of the emanation of the Logos, and in the various names given to Him, such as Truth (Strom., I, 32, 4), Image of God (ibid., V, 38, 7), Face of God (Paed., I, 57, 2; Strom., V, 34, 1); but it is expressed directly by Clement when he says that the Father is not the object of our knowledge, whereas the Son, as Wisdom, Knowledge, and Truth, is directly the object of our knowledge (ibid., IV, 156, 1). Clement certainly is not thinking of the incarnate Logos, but of His divine nature. How, then, can one say, without falling into subordinationism, that the Father is not knowable directly but only in the Logos? One might conclude that the Logos is a being inferior to Him.

The explanation of this difficulty lies in Clement’s concept of God in His relation to the world. This concept results from the fusion, already effected by Philo, of Platonic Ideas with Stoic forces. The Platonic Ideas are the ideal and transcendental forms of the things of this world; the Stoic δυνάμεις, on the other hand, are the immanent and vital forces of the material world. Philo conceived his Ideas at once as active causes, operative forces in this world, and conversely the forces as Ideas. The transcendent point of encounter of the Ideas is God (cf. E. Bréhier, *Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie*, 2nd ed., Paris 1925, p. 157).

Clement conceives God as does Philo; God, in his view, is pure intellect, the “place of the Ideas” (γνωστός ὁδόν: Strom., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3) of Plato, in which the Ideas of all things pre-exist, so that in this sense he can say that God is all (Paed., I, 88, 1). But since God is omnipotent, these Ideas are also δυνάμεις, that is, active forces, efficient causes, which bring every being into existence in the world (ibid., 74, 1).

Now the Logos, proceeding from the paternal intellect as His perfect image, is, on the one hand, that infinite world of Ideas (the intellect of the Father) in an expressed Idea (Strom., V, 16, 3), and on the other hand, He is Himself omnipotent (Paed., III, 39, 4; Strom., V, 6, 3; 103, 1), that is, “the second cause of all beings, generated by the first” (Strom., VI, 78, 5), or the δυνάμις of the Father par excellence (ibid., V, 6, 3; VII, 9, 1), which contains within Himself all the active δυνάμεις of the universe (ibid., IV, 156, 1–2). In this sense Clement defines Him as πάντως ἕν: the one perfect Idea and δυνάμις of the Father, comprehending within Himself all the ideal forms of created beings and all the active forces that realize the life of these beings, and, in general, the origin and existence of the entire universe.

Thus God expresses His infinite fullness of Ideas and forces in His consubstantial Logos, making Him thereby His essential revelation.

d) The Holy Spirit: true God, divine force. In ch. 14 of bk. V of the *Stromata*, explaining a text of Plato, Clement understands it as an allusion to the Holy Trinity, in which, after the Father, the second is the Son, the third the Holy Spirit (cf. V, 103, 1). Moreover, He is glorified with the Father and the Son (Paed., III, 101, 2; *Quis dives?*, 42, 20), and—like Them—is one and at the same time omnipresent (Paed., I, 42, 1). He is the light of truth, that is, of the Logos, which, divided without division, illumines the faithful (Strom., VI, 138, 1–2) and pours itself into souls according to their capacity, being in Himself without limitation (ibid., 120, 2). He is the δυνάμις of the Logos, which penetrates the entire universe, and, like the attractive force of the magnet drawing iron filings, draws men to God according to their capacity and corresponding spiritual response (ibid., VII, 9, 4); He is the δυνάμις του Θεού, which is given by Christ (ibid., VII, 79, 4), or the ὕδωρ of the Logos, which penetrates the Christian soul, transforming it into a wholly spiritual being (ibid., V, 80, 9; cf. VI, 118, 1).

The Person of the Holy Spirit thus completes Clement’s conception of the Holy Trinity: the Father is the source of divinity, which in His absolute transcendence is not knowable except through His Son, the Logos, His genuine expression and essential revelation; the Logos, in turn, as creator and governor of the universe, manifests Himself through His providence in material and spiritual life, which is realized through the Holy Spirit. “O wondrous mystery,” exclaims Clement, “one is the Father of all, one also the Logos of all, and the Holy Spirit is one and the same everywhere…” (Paed., I, 42, 1).

3. The universe

a) Creation. The universe proclaims the great power of God (Protr., 63, 23). God created all things through the Logos: the exemplary Idea and the realizing force of the universe (ibid., 98, 3–4; Strom., VI, 58, 1; 78, 5). Clement’s conception of creation—with some reminiscences of Plato and Philo—is, on the whole, not erroneous. He admits neither the eternity of spirit nor the eternity of matter (Strom.,

The idea of creation from nothing (ibid., V, 92, 3). He also seeks to discover in Sacred Scripture the doctrine of Plato on the intelligible and sensible worlds (χάσμος νοητός, χάσμος αἰσθαντός), but identifies the intelligible world with God or rather with the Logos (ibid., V, 93, 4; cf. ibid., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3). Creation is a spiritual act of God: “With a simple act of will he creates, and the mere expression of his will is immediately followed by its realization” (Protr., 63, 3). The material world, and consequently the generation of man, are not essentially vitiated, as heterodox Gnosticism held (Strom., III, 12, 1-2). C. firmly rejects metaphysical dualism with its lascivious consequences in morals and extols the holiness of Christian marriage (ibid., III, 105-10).

b) The angels. Among God’s creatures, the most excellent is the angel, who, being even purer than the purest of men (i.e., the Christian gnostic, who is called ἰσάγγελος), participates more closely in eternal life in heaven (Strom., VII, 5, 2). Angels too pray to obtain divine Grace, though differently from men (ibid., VII, 39, 3). The fall of a part of the angels is due to concupiscence (Paed., III, 14, 2; Strom., III, 59, 2). The host of angels is subject to the Logos (Strom., VII, 5, 6): they are his ministers in the exercise of his providence over nations, cities, and even individuals (ibid., VI, 157, 3-5; VII, 6, 4). Angels are also ministers in the punishment of the wicked (ibid., V, 90, 6). C. holds that philosophy was communicated to the Greeks by (inferior) angels (ibid., VII, 6, 4).

c) Man. On earth, man is the fairest of all God’s creatures (Paed., I, 63, 1), personally formed by Him (ibid., 7, 1). He is composed of soul and body (Strom., IV, 9, 4): the body was formed from earth, while the rational soul was breathed into his face by God (ibid., V, 94, 3). C. rejects the opinion of Basilides, according to which the soul would be an extramundane thing (ibid., IV, 165, 4). He therefore does not admit the pre-existence of the soul, but only a pre-existence in idea of man himself in the divine mind, according to which he is formed by God (ibid., IV, 150, 2). The body is not a part of the soul, but rather its organ: that is, its seat and vehicle (ibid., IV, 163, 2). Being composed of soul and body, man has a rational part and an irrational part (τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ ἄλογον: ibid., IV, 9, 4). The rational part, the rational soul, is generally called the principal part of man (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν), or simply the intellect, νοῦς, the inner man, the true man (Protr., 98, 4). It was created “in the image of God and after his likeness,” that is, in the image of the Logos, and is therefore λογικόν (ibid., 7, 4; Strom., V, 94, 5). The rational soul vivifies the body and becomes the principle of its animal constitution (ibid., VI, 135, 2 and 4). Its effect is therefore the so-called vital spirit (ibid., 134, 2; 136, 1-2). Two characteristic manifestations of the vital spirit, which relate to the moral life of man, are irascibility and concupiscence (τὸ θυμικόν, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν). C. accepts the Platonic trichotomy (Paed., III, 1, 2), finding in anger and concupiscence all the animal passions of man, which should be subject to the rule of the ἡγεμονικόν (Strom., VI, 136, 1). In the present state of humanity, however, the tripartite soul, ἡ τρυμερὴς ψυχή, needs a new spiritual principle, the power of the Logos, to attain the ideal state of spiritual unity (ibid., V, 80, 9); but this question already belongs to the economy of salvation.

d) Providence. Providence, πρὸνοια, is so evident to C. that those who deny it are deemed by him unworthy of discussion, but rather of punishment (Strom., VI, 122, 3; V, 6, 2). It follows directly from the concept of God’s goodness, who wills to do good to men and cares for them (Paed., I, 8). It is immediately clear from this that Clement’s concept of Providence has nothing in common with Stoic fatalism: it is an authentically Christian conception. The root of Providence is God’s most universal knowledge, which extends to all things, to all times, to all space, and penetrates not only to individual things but also into the soul’s inmost being (Strom., VI, 156, 57). By means of this knowledge—employing the ministry of angels—God, or rather the Logos (ibid., VII, 5, 6; 8, 4), exercises his Providence.

The divine pedagogy of Providence appears especially in Greek philosophy (ibid., VI, 67, 1; 153, 1) and in the “barbarian philosophy,” that is, in Sacred Scripture, by which the human race is guided by divine Wisdom to faith in the Gospel and to salvation (ibid., VII, 11, 1-3). The difference between the two “philosophies,” however, is very great: philosophy was given to the Greeks through inferior angels (ibid., VII, 6, 4), whereas the Law was given through the Logos Himself, not yet incarnate but appearing as an angel (Paed., I, 7). Indeed, the Old Testament is closely connected with the New, forming with it a single divine order of salvation, since both are the work of the same Lord, the power and wisdom of God (Strom., I, 174, 3; II, 29, 2).

4. The economy of salvation

a) Christ. In Clement’s doctrine of Christ the Savior three aspects may be distinguished: He is the revealer of God, the redeemer from sin, and the regenerator and pedagogue of men unto immortality.

Revealer of God. As has been seen, God in His essence is not knowable to man, though He reveals Himself through the Logos in creating the universe. The reason is that in the created world the individual perfections (ideas-forces) of the Logos appear disjointed and scattered, and thus do not sufficiently represent Him for human knowledge (Strom., IV, 156, 1). These conditions were changed by the Incarnation. Before the Incarnation the divine Logos had no personal name among men (Paed., I, 57, 2). But God demonstrated His love for humanity by sending the Son as λόγος τῆς πίστεως, that is, as His personal Word, as the doctrine of faith (ibid., 8, 2; cf. also 22, 3-23, 1; Strom., V, 81, 3). By His Incarnation He became the face of the Father, that is, the personal revealer of God’s own nature (Strom., V, 34, 1; cf. VII, 58, 3); in Him and through Him God is seen and known (Paed., I, 57, 2). Christ alone is therefore both God and man (Protr., 7, 1): He is God in man, simply: God-man (ὁ ἄνθρωπος θεός: Paed., III, 2, 1). Now His divinity does not detract from the reality of His humanity, the truth of His sensible flesh. Against the opinion of Photius, there can be no doubt, even at this point, of C.’s orthodoxy. He asserts in all three of his works the reality of the Incarnation: the small, sensible, infant body of the Logos was generated by the Virgin-Mother (Strom., VI, 127, 1; cf. also Protr., 7, 1; Paed., I, 41, 3; III, 2, 2; Strom., III, 102, 1). He therefore assumed a body with the five senses (Strom., V, 34, 1).

The difficulty arises mainly from an apparently Docetist text that speaks of the Lord’s apotheia with some exaggeration (Strom., VI, 71, 2). Yet apotheia is not a denial of the reality of the body; otherwise it could not be proposed, in the same text, as the ideal perfection of the Christian gnostic.

Redeemer from sin. Beyond the revelation of God, the Incarnation also aimed to free humanity from sin and its consequences and to reconcile unfaithful children with their heavenly Father (Protr., 6, 1). This was accomplished through the Lord’s redeeming death, which C. expresses with the scriptural term: λύτρον, ransom (Mt. 20, 28; Mc. 10, 45), or with equivalent expressions (Paed., I, 85, 1-2; Strom., IV, 43, 2; Quis dives?, 23, 4; 33, 6; 37, 3-4). The ransom that the Lord gave for the redemption of humanity is concretely His precious blood (Paed., II, 19, 4; III, 85, 1; Strom., IV, 107, 8). Indeed Christ is a sacrifice of singular worth, an holocaust for us (Strom., V, 66, 5; 70, 4).

Regenerator and educator of immortality. Christ suffered for us so that we, through His Passion, might live (Strom., IV, 43, 2). Through His Passion, therefore, He regenerates those who believe in Him: “He Himself gave birth with the throes of the body, He Himself swathed with precious blood” (Paed., I, 42, 2) and new generations. All this takes place in a close union with Christ. The union is realized in kinship with Christ, effected by the regenerating power of His blood; in conformity with His sentiments, συμπάθεια, which is brought about through His word as spiritual nourishment, namely doctrine and the Eucharistic Sacrament (ibid., 42, 1–43, 4; II, 20, 1); finally in immortality, ἀφθαρσία (incorruption), to which He guides His faithful (ibid., I, 49, 4), since He possesses ἀφθαρσία and ἀφθαρσία, having freed His own flesh from death (ibid., III, 2, 2–3) and having entered into heaven (Strom., V, 34, 7).

b) The Church. C. sees in the Church the providential means for realizing Christ’s work, the salvation of men: “As the will of God is act, and this is called world, so His purpose is the salvation of men, and this is called Church” (Paed., I, 27, 2). It is one, as one is the Father, one the Son and the Holy Spirit (ibid., 42, 1). C. calls it Mother-Virgin because of its virginal purity and its loving maternal care (ibid.). Its task is the nurture of the faithful with spiritual nourishment, namely the Logos, which is divine doctrine and Eucharistic Sacrament in one person (ibid., 42, 2–43, 4; II, 20, 1), or rather it is itself an institution where the Logos nurtures His faithful unto salvation (ibid., III, 101, 3).

Other aspects present the Church as the heavenly Jerusalem, governed by the Logos, who is its law, so that in it the divine will is realized on earth as in heaven (Strom., IV, 172, 2; cf. Paed., I, 84, 3). It is a sacred temple, built by the divine will at great cost, namely with the blood of Jesus, to the honor of God; yet it is not a place but the community of the faithful themselves (Strom., VII, 29, 3–4).

The Gnostic (ibid., VII, 84, 1), who also knows the cause of his actions (ibid., VI, 103, 2).

The spiritual ascent of the Christian. The starting point of the Christian’s spiritual ascent is Baptism. The subjective effect of this sacramental union is a dim illumination (Paed., I, 28, 1), which produces in the soul a new faculty of spiritual knowledge (ibid., 8, 2, 2), rendering it capable of knowing God, that is, of possessing gnosis. In this sense C. says that gnosis is communicated in Baptism (ibid., 29, 3, 4). The new spiritual faculty first manifests itself in faith. C. calls it a compendious gnosis (Strom., VII, 57, 3), namely a knowledge of the most important religious truths, above all of the existence of God (ibid., 55, 2). This is also a persuasion that one must live a morally upright life (ibid., V, 86, 1; VII, 5, 1), observing God’s commandments. C., however, desires the perfection of this simple and fundamental faith, which is rather an obedience (Paed., I, 101, 1; Strom., II, 17, 3), an assent given to a superior (Strom., II, 27, 4), a cognition which they themselves call πρόκλητος, anticipation (ibid., 8, 4; 16, 3; cf. K. Prümm, art. cit. in bibl., pp. 23-24). Its developed form is gnosis (Strom., V, 2, 4-6; 5, 2; VII, 55, 3; 105, 6). Perfection is achieved in the intellectual sphere through the study of the encyclopedic disciplines and philosophy (ibid., I, 177, 3; VI, 82, 1-83, 2; 90, 4-91, 2), and through research into the person and doctrine of Christ in Holy Scripture and tradition (ibid., VI, 122, 1). Study turns attention from sensible things, subject to continual change, to spiritual, intelligible things, which have absolute value and an unchangingly true being (cf. J. Meifort, op. cit. in bibl., pp. 11-19). While exercising in these, the intellect acquires the acumen to penetrate the intelligible world and to remain in contemplation of τὰ νοητά (ibid., V, 39, 4; 40, 1; VI, 68, 1; VII, 82, 5). All this smacks strongly of Platonism. But it must not be forgotten that, according to C., the intelligible world is God Himself (ibid., IV, 155, 2; V, 73, 3), and that the spiritual ascent tending toward Him is an imitation of Christ’s ascension (ibid., V, 34, 7). Moreover, the person of Christ and His doctrine are the revelation of this “world.” Once the acumen of the intellect is acquired, the gnostic can attain—through research and study of Christ’s doctrine—a perfect spiritual science (ibid., VI, 68, 1-2), a contemplation of all revealed truths in the Logos, which becomes an intellectual, evident, and clear vision (ibid., VII, 13, 3) of the Logos Himself, and in Him a vision of God (cf. G. Békés, art. cit., pp. 50-61). Since gnosis is also a practical realization of the Lord’s doctrine, the intellectual ascent is, by its nature, accompanied by moral ascent. The turning from sensible things to spiritual things and to the Christian’s moral life involves separation from vices (Strom., IV, 12, 1) and from passions (ibid., V, 67, 1).

C. admits in relation to moral life the sadness of the soul. The intellect, the principal part, must by its nature have dominion over the irascible and concupiscible parts, seats of every passion. The intellect itself must be guided by God (Paed., III, 1, 2). Indeed, in the present state of humanity, after original sin, the intellect has lost its dominion and passions therefore dominate the soul (Strom., VI, 136, 1-2). The principal aim of the spiritual life is therefore the restoration of the soul, which becomes like God (ibid., IV, 40, 2). And it is precisely as the God of gnosis that He restores it, since spiritual knowledge of the Lord’s doctrine removes from the soul spiritual ignorance, the source of every passion of God, which arises (ibid., V, 67, 4). The ascent of the Lord, which the Christian learns, frees his soul from the body and from its passions (ibid., IV, 27, 1; VI, 60, 1-2). In this way his body ceases to be “flesh of sin” (ibid., IV, 137, 3), and he, in his body, dead to concupiscence, lives δακρύως (ibid., VII, 79, 3; 86, 7). This is precisely the state of αἰδέα, realized through gnosis (ibid., 86, 5) according to the model of Christ (ibid., V, 94, 5; VI, 71, 2): a spiritual death that leads to the life of “beneficence,” so that the Christian can say to the Lord: I live as You wish (ibid., VII, 71, 3).

It is clear that for C. apátheia does not mean insensitivity, but freedom from the disordered influence of the passions; otherwise, the special virtue of the gnostic could not be to do good to his neighbor for disinterested love (ibid., VI, 60, 2-3; IV, 29, 2; VII, 81, 3, 7).

All this ascent is realized in close union with Christ through faith, gnosis, and charity (ibid., VII, 56, 1), at different degrees, up to the highest, where Christ stands as High Priest of the universe (ibid., 9, 1-4; 56, 1-57, 2). In reality it is nothing other than the development of baptismal grace, that is, an initial and continued participation in the Logos, not by essence but by power (ibid., VI, 138, 4; 11, 5, 4), through the free cooperation of the gnostic Christian.

The perfection of the gnostic. The perfection of the gnostic Christian therefore consists, on the one hand, in perfect knowledge of the Logos, which reaches the degree of a synthetic intellectual vision, and on the other, in the state of apátheia joined with active love of neighbor. Now the actualizing force of this perfection in the gnostic himself is gnostic charity, which makes God loved by the loving soul (ibid., VII, 57, 4). While he occupies himself with God and his own perfection in ceaseless charity (ibid., VII, 3, 1), he becomes a purely spiritual being (ibid., 44, 5), fully assimilated to the purely One God (ibid., IV, 40, 1; cf. ibid., 138, 1; VI, 74, 1; VII, 5, 5; 10, 1; 88, 4). Finally, in this state he anticipates future beatitude (ibid., V, 13, 1; VI, 73, 3-4; 76, 4; 77, 1-6; 78, 4-6): he becomes an intelligent life (ibid., IV, 136, 4) which is not merely science and gnosis, but is science and gnosis (ibid., 40, 1), like the angels (δακρύως: ibid., VI, 105, 1; VII, 78, 6; 84, 2) and contemplates “face to face” God, that is, as a seeing face beholds the face of God, the Logos. It is logical that the gnostic at this degree of spirituality is in pure converse with God (ibid., IV, 40, 1), so that not only in acts of piety but also in the ordinary acts of daily life he is united with God (ibid., VI, 113, 3; VII, 80, 3). Indeed, his whole life has become a prayer and a continual converse with God (ibid., VII, 73, 1).

BIBL.:

in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie*, 56 (1932), pp. 173-89; K. Prümm, *Glaube und Erkenntnis im zweiten Buch der Stromata*, in *Scholastik*, 12 (1937), pp. 17-27; P. B. Pade, *Lágas Theós. Untersuchungen zur Logos-Christologie des Clemens von Alexandria*, Roma 1939.