DEBUSSY, CLAUDE-ACHILLE. – Musician, b. at St-Germain-en-Laye (Paris) on 22 Aug. 1862, d. at Paris on 26 Mar. 1918. An artist of great originality, he is the most brilliant representative of the so-called musical impressionism, a label that, however, does not exhaust the multifaceted aspects of his work.
For the theatre he wrote *Pelléas et Mélisande* (Paris, 1902), drawn from the drama of M. Maeterlinck, and *Le Martyre de st Sébastien*, incidental music for the mystery play by G. d’Annunzio, a spectacle reproved by the archbishop.
DEBUSSY, CLAUDE-ACHILLE. – As a spiritual attitude in which were conflated the pessimism of Schopenhauer, the taste of Baudelaire (fascination with mystery, horror of reality, renunciation of action), and a strong current of metaphysical idealism, decadence established itself around 1880 in Parisian circles and found formulation of its literary and artistic programme in some youthful reviews in 1885–86.
Without abandoning the cult of Baudelaire, the decadents discovered and adopted as their poets Verlaine, Mallarmé, and later Rimbaud. From their circle emerged Laforgue, the symbolists Corbière, Tailhade, Samain, Guérin, Jammes, and the Flemish writers Maeterlinck, Rodenbach, and Verhaeren. Notable was the figure of the novelist Huysmans, who converted to Catholicism, and also that of the poet Le Cardonnel, likewise converted and a priest. In Germany, decadence, having penetrated philosophy, found in Nietzsche the theorist of the decline of European civilisation, as well as the advocate of the Übermensch, and arrived at the anguished being of Heidegger and the existence turned in upon itself of Jaspers. Representatives of decadence were: in England, O. Wilde, A. Symons, L. Johnson, E. Dowson, W. B. Yeats; in Spain, Rubén Darío; in Russia, Merezhkovsky.
In Italy the first intimations of decadentism were in the *Scapigliatura* movement, which developed in Milan between 1860 and 1880 and attempted uncertainly to free poetry from the moralistic residues of Risorgimento aesthetics and to affirm the autonomy of the writer’s personality. Clear and precise decadent elements, however, are found in the work of d’Annunzio, especially where it is most open to theoretical influences (*Poema paradisiaco* and the lyrical prose from *Contemplazione della morte* to *Libro segreto*). Decadent inflections are also present in the poets around *Il Convito*, directed by De Bosis, and finally in the crepuscular and intimist writers. They reveal themselves above all, however, in the religious unease latent in culture from the end of the century onwards, through the most thoughtful and meditative authors such as Fogazzaro, and in poetry, Graf, Aganoor Pompili, and Giulio Salvadori. In this sense decadence also deeply influenced the lyric poetry of G. Pascoli, who was the first to break with local literary tradition and turn towards a mystical conception of poetry.
DEBUSSY, CLAUDE-ACHILLE. – If it is vain to seek in canon law an expression proper to decadence, this does not mean that the institution of decadence lacks, even in canon law, a profile that distinguishes it from other related institutions and concepts, such as the generic loss of a right (*amissio iuris*) and, more specifically, extinctive prescription, peremption, and preclusion.
Decadence is a cause of loss of a right through the passage of time (*temporalitas iuris*, *limitatio iuris exercitii*).
Yet the temporal element does not in every case serve to distinguish decadence from related institutions. Even in extinctive prescription, the factor of time operates as a cause, so that the specific difference between the two institutions (extinctive prescription and decadence) must be sought elsewhere, namely in their source, juridical foundation, and function.
While the source of prescription is always in the law, decadence, besides being established by law, can also be established by a judicial decree or by an agreement of the parties. The foundation of decadence, moreover, rests on considerations of order that make it seem harmful, in certain cases and in relation to other institutions and exigencies of life, to allow a right to subsist beyond a fixed period, whereas extinctive prescription is inspired by the different criterion of not allowing a right to remain indefinitely in existence when it is not exercised through the inertia of its holder, to the detriment of certainty and the interest of others. Finally, in decadence the subjective factor (good or bad faith) is disregarded, whereas it is relevant in prescription (can. 1512).
From the different foundation there arises the different mode of operation of the two institutions: decadence, unlike extinctive prescription, as a rule admits neither interruption nor suspension, but can be avoided only by exercising the right within the term fixed by law, by a sentence, or by agreement.
With these notions in mind, as regards procedural decadence it is now easy to distinguish it from peremption (v.). If indeed both institutions are designed to accelerate the course of litigation (*ne immortales fiant lites*) and if, to avoid either peremption or decadence, a procedural act must be performed within a fixed period, here too the rational foundation and the effects of the two institutions are different. Whereas peremption results in the extinction of the process, though leaving open the possibility of bringing the right again, decadence, being limited to a single procedural act, no longer allows that act to be performed. And whereas the foundation of peremption rests on the presumed renunciation of the action and is not unrelated to the character of a sanction for supposed negligence, decadence disregards any consideration of negligence and looks to the objective fact of the failure to exercise the right within the fixed term.
It is precisely here that the conceptual affinity between decadence and preclusion is properly defined; yet whereas preclusion can also arise from the mere incompatibility between the activity performed and that which should have been performed, decadence, as has been said, is always tied to the temporal factor.
The institution of decadence is therefore strictly connected with the stipulation of peremptory terms – sometimes, when they are set by law (*fatalia legis*) and save for the exceptions specifically envisaged (cf., e.g., can. 177 § 1, 181 § 2, 183, 188), unextendable – which, if not respected, entail the “pertaining” of the right (can. 1634 § 1), or more precisely decadence.