ELEAZAR (Hebr. 'El'azar, 'God helps'). Name of various biblical figures.
1. — Third son of Aaron, brother of Moses (Ex. 6:25). He was consecrated priest by Moses together with his father and his three brothers, Nadab, Abihu (q.v.) and Ithamar (Lev. 8:1 ff.). From this point onward, E., along with the other members of the family, appears in the biblical narrative with priestly duties. After the tragic fate of his elder brothers (Lev. 10:1 ff.), E. received the right of primogeniture, which entailed succession to the high priesthood after his father Aaron. He ascended to this office at Aaron’s death (Num. 20:26 ff.) and exercised it under Moses’ guidance until his own death, which occurred at Gabaath (Josh. 24:33), after the Israelites under Joshua had already entered the Promised Land. He was succeeded by his son Phinehas.
2. — Son of Abinadab, guardian of the Ark of the Covenant in his father’s house at Kiriath-jearim (1 Sam. 7:1).
3. — Son of Dodo the Ahohite, one of David’s most valiant warriors (2 Sam. 23:9; 1 Chron. 11:12).
4. — Son of Phinehas, a Levite entrusted by Ezra (Ezra 8:23) with verifying the weight of the gold, silver, and vessels brought back from Babylon.
5. — A priest who participated in the solemn dedication of the walls of Jerusalem in the time of Nehemiah (Neh. 12:42).
6. — Father of Jason (1 Macc. 8:17), hardly identifiable with the son of Mattathias (q.V. Maccabees).
7. — One of the leaders of the Jewish rebellion against Rome (66–70 A.D.). Taking refuge in the fortress of Masada by the Dead Sea, he ceased resistance only after a long siege. To avoid falling into the hands of the Roman commander Flavius Silva, he took his own life along with his fanatical companions (Flavius Josephus, *Bell. Jud.* 7.253 ff.).
8. — A celebrated scribe or doctor of the Law who suffered martyrdom during the persecution of Antiochus IV Epiphanes (167 B.C.). A detailed account of his death is given in 2 Macc. 6:18–37.
---
ELEEMOSYNA (Lat. *eleemosyna*, from Gk. *ἐλεημοσύνη*, ‘alms’). The assistance given to those in need; it therefore embraces both material and spiritual aid. In its most common usage, it refers specifically to material assistance to those in need.
II. OBLIGATION
Sacred Scripture presents the obligation to help those in need, even materially. The Old Testament expressly contains this, for example in Deut. 15:11; Tob. 4:7–12; Ps. 40:1–4; it proclaims blessed those who come to the aid of the poor (cf., e.g., Ps. 111:5–9; Prov. 14:21; 22:9); it affirms that almsgiving obtains all graces, not excluding the cancellation of sins (cf., e.g., Tob. 4:7–9; 12:9; Ecclus. 3:33; 7:36; Dan. 4:24); it is preferable to sacrifices (cf., e.g., Isa. 1:11–17; 58:5–7). Indeed, the Old Testament also establishes certain concrete forms of assistance to the poor (cf., e.g., Lev. 19:9–10; 23:22; Deut. 14:28; 24:20).The Gospel returns to these concepts, not only with its precept to love one’s neighbor in deed, but also with explicit indications (cf. the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke 16:19–31; of the unjust steward, Luke 16:1–13; the final judgment, Matt. 25:31–46), emphasizing that aid must be given to all, even to strangers and enemies (parable of the Good Samaritan, Luke 10:30–37), and without ostentation (Matt. 6:2–4). Above all, Jesus Christ gave powerful new impetus to such material assistance, declaring that whatever is done even to the least of His brethren is done to Him (Matt. 25:40) and proposing the surrender of all goods to the poor as one of the prerequisites for perfection (Luke 18:18–23).
In line with the Gospel is the apostolic preaching (cf., e.g., 1 Tim. 6:17–19; Jas. 2:13; 1 John 3:17) and the entire teaching of the Fathers and the popes. For the former, see, e.g., Hermas, *Shepherd* 2.2; Tertullian, *Apology* 39; PL 1:470–78; St. Cyprian, *De opere et eleemosynis* 1.30–34; PL 4:602–22; St. Augustine, *Sermons* 36, 41, 42, 60, 61, 85, 86; PL 38:215–17; 247–51; 251–54; 400–09; 409–14; 520–23; 523–30; St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* 21.16–17; PL 76:204–05; Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* 3.6; PG 8:603–07; *Stromata* 2.18; PG 8:1055–39; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses* 15.26; PG 3:907; St. Gregory Nazianzen, *De pauperum amore*; Ps. 35:858–910. For the popes, see especially the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum* of Leo XIII and *Quadragesimo Anno* of Pius XI.
Theological reflection has further deepened the obligation of almsgiving, clarifying its motive and extent: some hold that it is merely a duty of charity (cf., e.g., Soto, *De iustitia et iure* I.V, q.3, a.4; L. Lessius, *De iustitia et iure* I.V, q.3, a.4; among modern authors, M. Zara, *Et motiva de la limosna*, in *Fomento Social* 3 [1948], pp. 421–26); others speak of a social justice (cf., e.g., Cajetan, *De eleemosynae praecepto*; and among moderns, C. Damen, *De recto usu bonorum superfluorum*, in *Miscellanea Vermersch* I, Rome 1935, pp. 63–79). Some even go so far as to speak of commutative justice, at least regarding superfluous goods (cf., e.g., A. Horváth, *Eigentumsrecht nach dem hl. Thomas von Aquin*, Graz 1929).
The extent of the duty, theologians hold, depends on the resources of the one who must give aid and the degree of necessity of the one to be aided. They usually distinguish three degrees of necessity: common, grave, and extreme (q.V. SUPERFLUOUS GOODS). To these correspond three forms of superfluous goods: superfluous to the individual, i.e., what is not strictly necessary for living; superfluous to the person, i.e., what is not indispensable for a certain development of one’s faculties; superfluous to the state, i.e., what is not necessary for the complete development of one’s life according to the demands of one’s state and condition. According to some, one is obligated to give only in cases of extreme necessity; according to others, also in cases of grave necessity (cf., e.g., L. Lessius, *De iustitia et iure*).
Centuries added to ensure the Church the means to achieve its ends, other sources of revenue from public and private law patrimonial assets, free offerings have always retained an important part, and sometimes a pre-eminent one, in the economy of the Church itself. Of such offerings or gifts — which in a broad sense would include all free and spontaneous donations of things not owed, for supernatural purposes, and therefore also all gratuitous transactions for pious causes, whether inter vivos (donation) or mortis causa (will) — the canon law particularly regulates the offerings or oblations (in the stricter sense), consisting of manual donations made for the benefit of ecclesiastical persons or entities, or for purposes of worship or charity, but which do not give rise to a permanent juridical entity (institution, foundation), and where the relationship between the offerer and the recipient, exhausted in the handing over of the thing offered, does not entail subsequent juridical effects. As a general rule, the CIC, with the exception of religious for whom specific norms are laid down, establishes the principle that it is forbidden for any private individual, cleric or lay, to solicit or collect (stipem cogere) for any ecclesiastical or pious institution or purpose without the apostolic approval, or without the written permission of his own Ordinary and the Ordinary of the place (can. 1503). It is however held that local customs may legitimize other quests and collections, in church or at home, on the occasion of special circumstances, or for given pious works (Propagation of the Faith, Holy Childhood, etc.).
Even pious associations cannot collect, unless their statutes allow it or there is express authorization from the Ordinary (can. 691). Parish priests, on the other hand, are free to collect, within the limits of their parish, to meet the needs of the works entrusted to them, subject to the obligation to administer and distribute the things according to the will of the donors (can. 415 § 2 n. 5; 630 § 4). The administration of oblations is subject to the control of the local Ordinary, whether the oblations are for the benefit of parishes, missions or other churches (can. 182), or for pious associations (can. 691).
As for religious, only the mendicant Orders (regulares, qui ex instituto mendicantes vocantur; can. 621 § 1; that is, mendicants in the strict sense, such as the Friars Minor and the Capuchins), have the right to solicit alms, i.e., to collect, within the territory of the diocese where their house is located. For this purpose, the permission of their respective religious superiors is sufficient. Outside the diocese, the permission of the local Ordinary is also required (can. 621).
Non-mendicant religious, on the other hand, cannot collect alms without a special privilege of the Holy See, if they are religious of pontifical right; for religious of diocesan right, the written permission of the Ordinary of the place where their house is located and of the place where they intend to collect is required (can. 622). Special instructions of the Holy See (decree De eleemosynis, 21 June 1908; Singulari quidem, 27 March 1896), to which the CIC refers (can. 623-24), rigorously regulate the procedures to be observed for the collection of alms by religious; among these, it is noteworthy that they are ordinarily forbidden to collect alms individually; exceptions, allowed for male religious of excellent reputation, are not admitted for religious women.
A particular kind of oblation is that which is given for the celebration or application of Masses. This is also technically designated by the term stipendium, which the Code itself takes as equivalent to that of oblation (v. LIBIA. III P. I, tit. III, a IV, De Missarum eleemosynis seu stipendii). This terminology, which goes back to the Latin usage of calling stipendium what was given to every soldier for his maintenance (and thus also St. Paul in the famous passage: *quis militat suis stipendiis umquam?... Nescitis quoniam qui in sacrario operatur, quae de sacrario sunt, edunt; et qui altari deserviunt cum altari participant? Ita et Dominus ordinavit his, qui Evangelium annuntiant, de Evangelio vivere*: 1 Cor 9:7-14), whence the term stipendium came to be applied to everything that ministers of the altar received for their maintenance, already in a certain way highlights the justifying element of the performance in question. An element that is identified in the purpose of providing the celebrant with a means of sustenance, excluding, as is indeed generally the case for all performances given to the priesthood on the occasion of acts of his spiritual ministry (v. DIRITTI di), any concept of payment of a price or, even less, of pecuniary consideration for the sacrifice celebrated or applied.
Stipends for Masses originated from the offerings that, from the very earliest times, the faithful made for the celebration of the Eucharistic Sacrifice, and from which, when there was a surplus after the bread and wine necessary for the Eucharistic banquet had been taken, was destined to support the poor and for the maintenance of the clergy. From this form of arrangement there then derived — it is uncertain whether only at the end of the 7th and beginning of the 8th century or earlier — the form of the specific oblation for the Mass, so that it might be celebrated according to the wishes and the application of the offering faithful. With the spread of the practice of stipends for Mass, wide-ranging theological controversies developed alongside it, in which, while the doctrine on the fruit and application of the Eucharistic Sacrifice was being determined, the nature and lawfulness of the stipend for the Mass was discussed, and in particular the crucial question of whether it should not be seen as simoniacal. This point was, among others, thoroughly examined by St. Thomas, who, having posed the question of the lawfulness of pecuniary giving for Sacraments, answered that the priest does not receive money as if it were the price of the Eucharistic consecration of the Mass sung (for this would be simoniacal), but as a stipend for his sustenance (Sum. Theol., 2-2, q. 87, art. 2).
With its spread, beginning especially from the 12th century, the practice of stipends for Masses was not without giving rise, because of the greed for gain and the corruption of temples, to notable abuses. Such was the generalizing of the use of celebrating a single Mass to satisfy various stipends together; such were the so-called "dry Masses," i.e., shortened Masses, without consecration and communion and lacking many prayers, by which an attempt was made to satisfy the various obligations assumed; the accumulation of an enormous number of Masses, etc. Abuses which lent themselves widely to attacks by heresiarchs of the Middle Ages — among them especially the Englishman J. Wyclif — which also provoked repeated energetic interventions by the popes (Innocent III, c. 3, X, III, 41; Honorius III, c. 12 ibid.) and councils (Paris 1215; Ravenna 1311; Toulouse 1325), until the Ecumenical Council of Constance (1414-18), condemning the Wycliffite heresy with the decree *Fidei catholicae*, later confirmed by Martin V, consolidated the institution of the stipend for the Mass in canon law. With the Council of Trent (sess. XXII, Decree on what is to be observed and avoided in the celebration of Mass) and the subsequent declarations of the Congregation of the Council and the Pontiffs (in particular may be recalled in the constitution *Auctorem fidei* of Pius VI, 28 Aug. 1794, against the errors of the Synod of Pistoia, which among other things had contested the validity of special applications of the Mass — the possibility of enjoying the fruit of the Mass by paying an oblation), the discipline on the matter was fully elaborated, which finally found definitive systematization in the CIC (can. 824-5).
The fundamental norms established by canon law regarding stipends for Masses—whether these be the so-called manual stipends (i.e., those paid each time by the faithful upon requesting the celebration or application of Masses), the founded stipends (i.e., those derived from the income of foundations), or finally the intermediate category of stipends *ad instar manualium* (i.e., those of Masses founded which can no longer be applied as stipulated in the foundation tables and must therefore be paid to other priests who wish to do so)—are as follows. It is absolutely forbidden for a priest, except in the case of the three Masses of Christmas, to receive stipend for more than one Mass per day, even if he celebrates multiple times. To eliminate abuses, it is further prohibited:
1) to apply a Mass in accordance with a future application request (or for stipends in themselves), and to receive an offering subsequently for a Mass already applied;
2) to accept the offer of a Mass that must be celebrated and applied for another purpose (e.g., *pro populo*);
3) to accept a double stipend for both the celebration and the application of the same Mass, unless it is certain that one offering was made solely for the celebration without application.
The amount of the offering is established by decree of the Ordinary, or in its absence by the custom of the diocese; however, the priest may receive either a greater amount voluntarily offered or a lesser amount if the Ordinary does not object. Other detailed norms regulate the procedures for fulfilling the obligations of Mass arising from the payment and acceptance of stipends, the oversight of which is entrusted to the local Ordinary and, for churches of religious orders, to their respective superiors. Finally, any form of trafficking or negotiation regarding Mass offerings is strictly forbidden, and canonical penalties are provided for those who contravene this prohibition or fail to celebrate or apply the Masses for which they have received an offering, even if it is a small amount (cf. cann. 2324, 827, 828).
Much has been debated regarding the legal nature of the relationship that arises, following the payment of a Mass stipend, between the offerer and the accepting priest, particularly whether it constitutes an obligatory relationship enforceable by law in the event of non-performance. In this regard, a distinction is made between the case in which the offerer requests the application of the special fruit of the Holy Sacrifice (cf. *MESSA*) according to his intentions, and the case in which the offerer requests the celebration, with or without application. In the first case, it is generally held that no obligatory relationship arises in law, since the act requested—application—is an interior and secret act that cannot be legally compelled. Thus, the obligation reduces to a simple manual donation from which no action for fulfillment arises. In the second case, however, where the request concerns the celebration, since the object of the relationship is an extrinsic act—namely, the external activity that the priest must perform in the celebration—a bilateral agreement may be recognized between the offerer and the celebrant. However, the precise legal classification of this contract remains uncertain. Some authors speak of a contract of locatio operis or a contract of *uti facias*, similar to what the *Codex Iuris Canonici* expressly states for pious foundations (can. 1534, § 2); others consider it a contract of mandate; still others (an opinion that seems preferable) regard it as a modal donation. Recent theories, however, tend to classify the relationship under the concept (analogous to that of *stola* rights) of an ecclesiastical tax or tribute, though it may be objected that there is no public element in the relationship between the offerer and the celebrant to justify its classification as a tax.
In the Italian positive legal system, apart from what may fall under the general discipline of public assistance and charity (cf. *ISTITUZIONI ED OPERE DI BENEFICENZA*), or relate to phenomena addressed by norms penalizing social interests (cf. *MENDICITÀ*), and limiting ourselves here to the offering as an act of religious content, it is worth recalling Article 2 of the Concordat, which provides that ecclesiastical authorities may, without any interference from civil authorities, collect offerings inside and at the entrance of churches and in buildings of their property. It should be noted, however, that an identical concession is granted to ministers of non-Catholic cults by Royal Decree No. 289 of February 28, 1930, for collections conducted inside and at the entrance of buildings intended for their worship. — See pl. XV.