FAME. — By this term is understood “the good opinion that one has of a person in a certain environment on account of the qualities with which one believes him to be endowed.” It therefore requires some diffusion, unlike esteem, which may be limited to a single person. It can pertain to both moral qualities (i.e., those founded upon the use of free will) and physical and intellectual qualities; it can be either common or special, depending on whether qualities commonly possessed at a given time are attributed. It can also pertain to exceptional qualities.
Fame can be acquired either by the dissemination of qualities truly possessed or by the dissemination of fictitious qualities. The same applies to its loss. The attribution of bad qualities that one does not possess constitutes the specific fault of calumny; the attribution of real defects is called detraction (v.) and is sometimes also referred to as slander. All of this can be done even by a mere gesture, a pause, a silence, a smile, a movement of the head, shoulders, or eyes, an interrogation, or an insinuation; but the great means of acquiring or destroying fame remains speech, whether oral or written, especially given the power of dissemination afforded by the press, cinema, radio, and the entire range of advertising and propaganda. To this end, it is worth reading and heeding the numerous biblical passages concerning the tongue and its efficacy in building up or destroying fame.
The importance of fame is immense both in itself and for the social and economic consequences it can entail. Scripture says that a good name is to be preferred to riches (Prov 22:1); hence it exhorts great care for it: “Length of days is in her right hand; in her left are riches and honor. Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace” (Prov 3:16). This is especially true for professions founded essentially upon trust (e.g., that of the physician, the priest, the lawyer, etc.). Good or bad fame can determine the fortune or ruin of a person. In any case, it is an indispensable condition of influence and a necessary element of success.
For these reasons, even the most elementary reflection allows one to conclude that everyone has a right to fame and, consequently, that those who destroy or endanger it, whether gravely or lightly, according to the manner and measure of the injury, commit a sin. In this sense, Holy Scripture speaks (cf., e.g., Ps 14:3; 33:14; Prov 20:10; 30:10; Wis 1:11ff.; 1 Tim 3:2; Rom 1:30; 2 Cor 12:20; Jas 4:11, etc.) and so does the patristic tradition (especially the commentaries of the Fathers on the biblical passages cited).
These assertions have absolute value insofar as they refer to and exclude calumny; in the case of detraction, they presuppose that the preservation of a person’s good reputation is not harmful to others. Casuistry has abundantly developed this latter point, providing a long series of situations in which it is lawful to reveal the defects of others (revealing to parents or superiors the defects of children or subjects in order to facilitate their correction; revealing to fiancés, to those intending to entrust certain persons with positions of trust, revealing to experts in order to obtain advice, etc.).
The social importance of good reputation has led the legislator to protect it by the force of law.
The Code of Canon Law states: “If anyone… by words or in writing or in any other way… damages another’s good name, he is not only bound, in accordance with can. 1628, 1938, to make due satisfaction and repair damages, but is also to be punished by fitting penalties and penances, not excluding, if clerics are involved and the case warrants it, suspension or removal from office and benefice” (can. 2355). The Italian Penal Code addresses this in articles 595–599. These state that “whoever… by communicating with more than one person, offends another’s reputation is punished by imprisonment for up to one year or by a fine of up to ten thousand lire” (art. 595). Excluded are only the offenses contained in writings presented or speeches made by the parties or their advocates in proceedings before a judicial authority or administrative body when the offenses concern the object of the case or appeal” (art. 598). The penalties are increased “if the offense consists in the attribution of a specific fact,” or “if the offense is committed by means of the press or any other means of publicity, or in a public act,” or “if the offense is committed against a political, administrative, or judicial body, or one of its representatives, or an authority constituted as a collegial body” (art. 595). Such offenses are punishable only upon complaint by the aggrieved party…” (art. 597) and for them “the guilty party… is not permitted to prove, even by producing witnesses, the truth or notoriety of the fact attributed to the aggrieved party” (art. 596).
Given the nature of the fault of defamation, it is evident that it also entails the duty to repair all damages unjustly caused. See pl. LXVII.