Pia Foundation (Pious Cause)

PIOUS FOUNDATION (PIOUS CAUSE).

I. CONCEPT OF FOUNDATION

According to doctrine, a foundation or universitas bonorum is the juridical person constituted by a quantity of goods bound to a determined purpose, and in order better to attain that purpose the patrimony itself is regarded as the subject of rights.

It is distinguished from the juridical person of the corporation type, or universitas personarum, or collegium, which, as a subject of rights, is independent of the individual members who form it and survives them. The collegium has its life from the persons who first constitute it.

The foundation, by contrast, has its life from the unilateral will of its founder and is subject to his will as materialized in the act of foundation, which may be an act inter vivos or a disposition mortis causa.

It was the canonists first, and among them special mention must be made of Sinibaldo dei Fieschi, who became pope under the name Innocent IV (1243-54), who had the exact conception of the corporation as a universitas distinct both from the individual members composing it and from their totality, in conformity with the thought of the Roman jurisconsults.

Having conceived the Church as a corpus mysticum, they extended this concept to all corporate bodies, which were therefore regarded as persons, that is, as subjects capable of being holders of rights and duties, just like natural persons.

Subsequently this conception was upheld also by Bartolus (1314-57) and was then accepted by the other commentators and by all later jurists.

The concept of the foundation or institution likewise developed in a particular way through the work of canon law. Every ecclesiastical office, in fact, with a patrimony of its own was regarded as an autonomous entity. And with this the concept of the autonomous foundation was elaborated, a concept that then passed into modern law.

II. THE SO-CALLED «CAUSAE PIAE»

Foundations, the juridical expression of Christian charity, may also be called causae piae according to the purpose to which they are destined.

The term causa pia, used for the first time, albeit with a different meaning, in the legislation of Justinian (C. 1, 3, 45-46, C. 1, 2, 19, Nov. 131, c. 11, n. 3; Nov. 65) and which reveals the Christian imprint, recognized by Bonfante himself (op. cit. in bibl., p. 20), indicated a juridical transaction or any act whatsoever, inter vivos or mortis causa, which had as its principal purpose and motive the exercise of piety toward the needy and the practice of works of religion.

It cannot be said absolutely that at that time the purpose was already personified as the subject of the patrimony, that is, that the foundation was already recognized as a juridical person. But it is certain that, in the course of time, the purpose of the disposition, that is, the causa pia, came to be considered separately and individualized, rendering itself independent, so that the purpose made the disposition impersonal in the sense that it was destined to a purpose rather than to a person.

This was due especially to the multiplication of dispositions for the soul, in which the donee or legatee could not be regarded as the true recipients of the patrimony bound to the mystical purpose of the salvation of souls. Accordingly, once the purpose of the disposition had assumed an independent character, the patrimony that was its object was not confused with the Church or the legatee entity: with its special destination to a determined use, the concept of the foundation in the modern sense came into being.

Therefore, on the basis of Romano-canonical doctrine, the pia causa was recognized as a foundation and thus susceptible of becoming a juridical person by provision of the competent authority.

In the broader usual meaning, by ecclesiastical foundations are understood those moral entities that are juridically perfect and are characterized by the destination of their patrimony to purposes of worship and religion or otherwise proper to the Church.

The CIC now in force overcomes the theoretical difficulties arising from the division of juridical persons into corporations and foundations, but uses a more convenient distinction into the two categories of collegiate persons and non-collegiate persons.

Collegiate persons are constituted by a minimum of three natural persons with equality of rights (e.g., the college of cardinals, Orders, confraternities, cathedral and abbatial Chapters, religious houses and associations with or without vows that are recognized, etc.); non-collegiate persons comprise both institutes permanently created for the public good (e.g., the Holy See, bishoprics, offices, churches, parochial benefices, fabricae, institutes for missions, universities of studies, etc.) and patrimonial goods destined to a particular purpose of charity (causae piae: e.g., orphanages, hospitals, nosocomia) and of education (e.g., seminaries, schools for the poor, etc.).

Accordingly, under the designation of causae piae there are included, in a very broad sense, all those non-collegiate entities that canon law recognizes as subjects of law or moral persons or at least susceptible of becoming such, arising as a result of dispositions of will directed to religious or worship and charitable purposes (can. 1489 agg.).

These dispositions of will can be erected into moral persons by the local Ordinary, and by his decree they acquire juridical personality in the Church; two conditions must concur, namely that the purpose of the work be truly useful and that a endowment be constituted that can prudently be judged and foreseen sufficient for the established purpose (can. 1489 § 2).

Special norms concern the charters of foundation, the administration, the supervision and the suppression of such entities (cann. 1490-94).

Such pious institutions need recognition for civil effects by the State in order to exist as civil juridical persons, and are subject to governmental authorization for the acquisition of immovable property and the acceptance of donations, inheritances and legacies (art. 17 Cod. civ. it.).

III. BENEFICES, CHAPLAINCIES AND PIOUS LEGACIES OF CULT

Among the piae causae, that is, the foundations that involve the perpetual dedication of goods or revenues to religious or worship purposes, may be counted benefices, ecclesiastical and lay chaplaincies, and pious legacies of worship (v. LEGATO PIO).

A benefice is a foundation in which an ecclesiastical office, with its own endowment that must provide the invested ecclesiastic with adequate maintenance, is erected as a juridical person with the concurrence of the competent ecclesiastical authority, the Holy See or the Ordinary, a concurrence that is carried out through the erection of the benefice.

If the pious founder imposes on his donation or on the testamentary disposition the burden of spiritual offices that must be celebrated in a given chapel and at a given altar, there is an ecclesiastical chaplaincy.

The lay chaplaincy, on the other hand, is a foundation whose purpose is the celebration of Masses in a given chapel or at a given altar or the performance of other sacred functions, under the care of an ecclesiastic (chaplain) appointed by the founder or by his successors and removable by them at their pleasure, without any institution on the part of the bishop; the chaplain is maintained with private or family goods bound to the religious purpose.

Pious legacies of worship are analogous to lay chaplaincies. These dispositions of last will have as their purpose the burden of celebrating Masses and other religious offices, with the difference that, usually, the endowment of the pious legacy does not consist in the direct assignment of goods or of revenues from immovable property, considered as separate from the estate, but in the dedication to the purpose of an annual revenue to be paid by the heirs and successors of the deceased, without there being a chaplain and without a real charge imposed by him on the hereditary goods. In this case the legacy indicates the burden (modus) imposed by the testator on the heir or on the legatee to fulfill those same purposes.

However, the legacy may also result from the specific and exclusive dedication of determined immovable properties. In that case the goods on which the legacy rests are inalienable without determined formalities (can. 1530 ff.).

When the pious legacy has charity as its purpose, it is more properly called an "opera pia" (v.).

As regards lay chaplaincies and pious legacies of worship, their institutions came about through an extension of the concept of benefices to private and family patrimonies destined for works of religion, for the suffrage of souls, for ecclesiastical ceremonies.

In admitting such an extension, the principles that governed family foundations and fideicommissary institutions were also applied.

IV. FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF CULT

The question has arisen whether lay chaplaincies and pious legacies for worship are juridical persons, because according to many authors they should not be considered as moral persons, since they are merely a mass of goods which, remaining in the patrimony of the founder or his heirs, would form an autonomous mass with a specific destination. The reason for doubting this is therefore founded, for these authors, on the fact that the goods always remain in the availability, ownership and enjoyment of private individuals.

But from another doctrinal current it is pointed out that the equating of the said institutions with the Churches which were recognized as piae causae, that is, as foundations, carried as a consequence that they were considered as juridical persons under common canon and civil law.

The analogy that the said bodies had with family foundations, which by customary law were held to be juridical persons, meant that the said institutions too were recognized as such.

As regards the lack of formal recognition on the part of ecclesiastical and civil authority, it is further pointed out that this was held to be granted tacitly by the fact that the bishop had the right to act for the fulfillment of the obligations of worship, by force of common canon law. In fact the Council of Trent (sess. XXII, de reform., chaps. 8 and 9) had prescribed that bishops, also as delegates of the Apostolic See, should be the executors of all pious dispositions made both by acts of last will and by acts inter vivos; that they should have the right to visit all charitable bodies and lay pious places and to watch over all institutes destined for worship, for the salvation of souls and for the poor, taking cognizance of their respective statutes and providing for their execution, while the administrators of the said bodies had to render them an annual account of their management.

These are principles which the Church, faithful guardian of the pious wills of the faithful, has codified, reaffirming the principle that the Ordinaries are the executors of all pious wills made either by act inter vivos or by act of last will and therefore can watch to ensure that they are carried out (can. 1515 §§ 1 and 2); they have a right to the account, they can even repudiate foundations which the donor might wish to withdraw from the account to be presented to the local Ordinary, and they must hold as non-existent the clauses of the will contrary to the rights of the bishop (can. 1515 § 3).

This is admissible when the legacy is for the benefit of an ecclesiastical body subject to episcopal supervision; in other cases the right and duty to give effect to the wills of the disposers belongs to the executor of the will or to the heir or to anyone who has a juridical interest to assert. In Italian civil law there is lacking a provision similar to that of the decree of 27 May 1857 of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies which gave the bishop of the diocese an action for the fulfillment of the chaplaincy and of any legacy of worship (Scaduto, op. cit. in bibl., I, n. 219) and therefore, in the absence of such a provision, one cannot recognize in the bishop, by reason of his office, the faculty to act for the fulfillment of foundations of worship; nevertheless in art. 648 of the Italian Civil Code one may recognize a means placed at the disposal of the bishop, who will be able, in the case, to act as any private person whatever, interested in the fulfillment of the charge.

It is added that, among the other privileges which the piae causae enjoyed, there was the very important one according to which they could be instituted without essential formalities and by acts inter vivos or of last will through the simple declaration on the part of the donor or testator.

These provisions too were accepted and in part modified by the norms of the CIC, which regarding pious wills in general prescribes (can. 1513 § 1) that all those who by natural and ecclesiastical law can freely dispose of their own goods can also devote them to pious causes by donation inter vivos or mortis causa, by will or by legacy. In last wills, it adds, the formalities and solemnities prescribed by civil laws must as far as possible be observed too, but if these were omitted the heirs must be admonished that the will of the testator must equally be fulfilled (can. 1515 § 2), whenever such will appears in some certain manner. And this by reason of the fundamental principle according to which at the basis of juridical obligations there must be not so much the observance of forms as a true obligation of natural law, that is, of the human conscience.

The heirs, however, cannot be deprived of the legitime, and in disputed cases they can obtain a "composition" by recourse to the Penitentiary or to the Congregation of the Council.

The pious wills of the faithful must be fulfilled in the most scrupulous manner both as regards the substance and as regards the manner of administration and distribution of the goods (can. 1514).

As regards the patrimony, it is not decisive, again according to the other doctrinal current, for denying juridical personality, that the ownership, enjoyment and administration of the goods belong to the active patrons, to the heirs and to those having title from the founder, since substantially the goods belong to the body. Indeed if the endowment consists of a determinate immovable directly assigned to the chaplaincy or to the pious legacy, the immovable itself constitutes the endowment of the body and, for the purpose to which it is destined, is inalienable without the appropriate conditions required by the CIC (can. 1536), so that the ownership of the family is purely nominal. If the endowment consists of the income of given immovables, this rests as a real charge on the said goods which, though alienable, always retain charged upon them the obligation of Masses or of religious offices; an obligation which can be guaranteed by mortgage in case of alienation of the goods. And when the obligation rests on all the goods charged, the endowment consists of the income assigned to the purpose, which was considered virtually separated from the goods themselves in order to constitute the endowment of the body.

V. THE PIA FOUNDATION IN THE PROPER SENSE AND ITS REGULATION IN THE CIC

Different, according to the CIC, from the pious cause and therefore from all the various juridical figures that it can assume, is the pia foundation, which consists in temporal goods given in any manner to an ecclesiastical moral person with the perpetual burden, or for a notably long time, of celebrating Masses with their annual revenues or of performing ecclesiastical functions or determined works of charity and piety (can. 1544 § 1).

In order for there to be a pia foundation, canon law therefore requires that the patrimony not itself be constituted as a moral person, but be attributed by an act inter vivos or mortis causa to an ecclesiastical moral person with the burden of several works.

Pia foundations, in substance, are pious causes lacking juridical personality.

The religious or charitable character of the end is essential to the institution.

Besides the end, there is the essential element of the patrimony, which is given to an already existing moral person with the bond of destination to an end established and willed by the founder.

The burden entrusted to the moral person of celebrating Masses or of attending to those given functions or works willed by the founder must be perpetual or at least, according to some authors, of a duration not less than 50 years. This last relative perpetuity distinguishes pia foundations from legacies of Masses and from the "fiducia."

Absolute or relative perpetuity forbids conceiving the pious cause in relation to a physical person.

The assignment of goods to a moral person may be made by act inter vivos and by testament.

The moral person to which the goods are given for the attainment of the particular end of the foundation must accept the foundation. Since the burden is imposed together with the donation, the foundation does not exist without a bilateral contract, whence can. 1544 § 2 establishes that a foundation legitimately accepted creates a synallagmatic contract, de ut facias, which means that, in the case of unjustified non-fulfillment of the burden, one must interpret what the will of the disposer was and in that case apply the principles of civil law on the fulfillment of bilateral contracts.

Whereas before the Code the acceptance of a pia foundation, even if not preceded by the authorization of the Ordinary or of the religious superior, remained valid nonetheless, today, according to some authors, the acceptance must be authorized by the Ordinary and by the religious superior under penalty of nullity, since the acceptance of the pia foundation is an act exceeding ordinary administration; according to others, instead, the lack of the Ordinary's authorization does not annul the pia foundation, which can be rescinded only by the dissent of the Ordinary (S. Romana Rota, 6 July 1580).

There is therefore required the written consent of the Ordinary of the place, which he will give only after he himself has legitimately ascertained: a) that the moral person is able to sustain the new burdens imposed, without deterioration of those existing; b) that the new revenues correspond exactly to the new burdens according to the customs of the dioceses (can. 1546 § 1).

The Ordinary furthermore has the right to issue particular norms on the amount of the dowry sufficient for the different foundations and on the distribution of revenues (can. 1545).

The powers relating to the administration of pia foundations, for which the norms common to all ecclesiastical entities hold, are reserved to the bishops, except when it is a matter of pia foundations made to exempt religious, in which case they are exercised by the religious superior.

The Church, so that the wills of the faithful founders may be respected and given above all the end assigned to pia foundations, exercises a careful activity of control and supervision over the ecclesiastical entity that has accepted the foundation.

In fact, if the dowry of the foundation is constituted in money or in movable goods, it must be deposited in a safe place, upon the indication of the Ordinary; the money and the price of the movables must be invested and inventoried as soon as possible and with all opportune precautions for the benefit of the foundation, with the precise indication of the capital and of the related fruits, of the burdens of worship specifically determined, which must be provided for. The modes of investment are established by the Ordinary, after having heard the opinion of the interested parties and of the Council of diocesan administration (can. 1547). Special norms are indicated for the preservation of the related documents (cann. 1548-49).

Pia foundations cease when the adequate fund assigned by the founder has been exhausted.

The burdens constituting the foundation may then be reduced, as well as commuted or transferred to another moral person (can. 1551).

According to the Council of Trent, the bishops could provide for the reduction of such burdens iure proprio; the Code of canon law instead reserves every faculty in this regard to the Holy See, which can delegate the bishops with precise limitations concerning the manner in which the reduction must be carried out.

The reduction of burdens is a typical operation of pia foundations, just as for moral persons there are the special figures of suppression and union.

All this premised, the CIC distinguishes between pia foundation in the strict sense and pious will.

The pia foundation must be identified in the end and in the patrimony, that is, it must have its own patrimony that is not confused with that of the recipient entity and its own end that is not that of the entity itself.

The pious will is any human act that, by suitable means, seeks to attain an end of religion or of Christian charity.

In the case in which the pious will is elevated by the competent ecclesiastical authority to a juridical person, then there is the pious cause or foundation or institution.

Different from the pious cause and from the pia foundation is the fiducia, which does not rise to the figure of a recognized entity or burden, but consists in the transmission, by act inter vivos and by last will, of goods to an apparent heir who is however the executor of the will of the transmitter in favor of third parties.

Testamentary fiducia is regulated differently by the various civil legislations.

The CIC in can. 1516 establishes that the cleric or religious who has received goods in trust to be distributed or assigned to pious causes must notify the matter to the interested Ordinary, indicating all movable and immovable goods received in trust, with all the burdens attached; that if the disposer has manifested the will to oppose the fulfillment of this duty, those goods must be refused; the Ordinary must then require that the trust goods be placed in safety, supervising them according to the norm of law.

VI. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PIA FOUNDATION

In the earliest days of Christianity, no bequests of immovable property could be made to the Christian Church, since, being regarded as collegia illicita, it was forbidden to acquire by inheritance or by donation.

But it may be held that, even during the era of the catacombs, bequests of another kind must have been made ad pias causas, especially by patrician families converted to the new religion, and this not only to provide for the needs of worship, but also to succor the poor and the sick.

These were offerings given in trust to the priests, so that they might be disbursed for purposes of charity or religion.

Once the persecutions ceased, the emperor Constantine numbered the Christian Church also among the legitimate collegia, recognized its right to acquire and to possess, ordered that the goods of which it had been despoiled be restored to it, and himself wished to be generous in bequests to sacred places. Moreover, he attributed juridical validity to dispositions in favor of pious wills however they were made.

The emperors Valentinian, Marcian and Justinian likewise issued decrees aimed at favoring pious bequests.

The supreme pontiffs, in the face of the facilitations and privileges granted by the emperors to pious dispositions, turned their attention to giving a juridical configuration to the new institution, which was then gradually recognized by nearly all Christian states and which preceded the institution of ecclesiastical benefices (St. Cyprian, ep. LIV; Innocent I, ep. 25, chap. 2; etc.).

The Churches then began to have extensive acquisitions through legacies and donations, and religious piety was driven to such a point that most of the time pious testators neglected their relatives and often even their own children. But the Fathers of the Church never approved such dispositions to the detriment of children and closest relatives.

There arose at that time, and afterward multiplied, protected by the Church and favored by legislation, various institutions having as their purpose worship or charity (piae causae and pia foundations). Religion and charity proceeded together to come to the aid of orphans, the sick, the poor, the old, pilgrims, and thus there were founded those various institutions which, according to their different purposes, were named orphanotrophia, brephotrophia, gerontoconia, pterotrophia, nosoconia, xenodochia.

Liturprand, among the Lombards, and then Charlemagne and his successors, favored pious bequests, while also curbing their abuses, since many, whether through the religious influence of the times or to escape the oppressions of feudal lords, "commended" themselves and their goods to the Churches and convents; a custom that became more frequent toward the year 1000, also because possession and enjoyment of the goods remained with the pious testators.

Until the 13th century, worship and charity developed in tandem; and canon law, following in the footsteps of Justinian legislation, recognized juridical personality in the various institutions directed to those purposes. Doctors and canonists then increased the privileges of dispositions ad pias causas, recognizing that for their validity the sole will of the testator sufficed without need of formalities: sufficit ad bonorum suorum divisionem faciendum nuda voluntas testatoris (cf. the Commentaries of Bartolus of Sassoferrato, of Baldus and of Paul of Castro). But when civil power began to consider as its own function the supervision of charitable works, the causes more disciplined by the Church came to be limited to comprising exclusively those institutions that had worship as their purpose, which however embraced not only those erected with ecclesiastical title, but also all the various foundations that in any way were directed to a purpose of worship, such as ecclesiastical and lay chaplaincies and in general pious legacies with obligations of worship.

Meanwhile ecclesiastical immovable properties had greatly increased, and being withdrawn from commerce they were called "mortmain."

Already the emperor Phocas in the East had issued dispositions to limit such acquisitions, but if Roger of Sicily, Frederick II of Swabia and Frederick III of Aragon did likewise in Italy, the Angevins on the other hand favored ecclesiastical patrimonies by declaring them exempt from the payment of taxes.

The Italian Republics of Modena, of Padua and of Treviso and of other cities took harsh measures against ecclesiastical immovable property, burdening it with tax; Venice did likewise, provoking to its own detriment the famous interdict of 17 Apr. 1606 through the action of Pope Paul V.

In Naples in the 18th century several legislative dispositions were issued to prevent the growth of ecclesiastical property, so much so that from 1769 "mortmain" holdings were forbidden to acquire by act inter vivos or by last will, and in the years 1771 and 1776 it was provided that ecclesiastical goods be granted in emphyteusis.

Analogous laws were promulgated in Tuscany and in Lombardy, and all these measures were afterward reinforced by the doctrines of Italian economists and the French encyclopedists.

One of the first acts of the French Revolution was against "mortmain," the ordinance of 1780 forbidding the establishment of any "établissement de main-morte" and the law of 12 July 1792 on the civil constitution of the clergy, which suppressed benefices, chaplaincies and "praestimonia" of whatever nature and under whatever denomination, foundations of lay collation and perpetual foundations of Masses and other religious services, forbidding similar institutions also for the future, having remained famous.

The same happened in the Italian states into which the arms and ideas of France had penetrated.

With the reaction, however, ecclesiastical bodies recovered the freedom to acquire, and this was sanctioned in Naples in the Concordat concluded with the Holy See in 1818, until finally "mortmain" was entirely suppressed in Italy by the eversive laws of the ecclesiastical estate of 7 July 1866, no. 3036, and of 15 Aug. 1867, no. 3848.

By these laws there were suppressed, as moral bodies, foundations having worship as their object, even if not erected with ecclesiastical title. There was required, however, an object of worship properly so called in its ritual and liturgical manifestations, bodies with a different purpose remaining excluded from the suppression, even if connected with religion, such as institutes for sermons, missions, teaching of Christian doctrine, etc.

VII. THE DISCIPLINE IN ITALIAN LEGISLATION

The repealed Civil Code of 1865, providing for the future, established that testamentary dispositions ordered for the purpose of instituting or endowing simple benefices, lay chaplaincies and other similar foundations were null (art. 833), as were donations having the same object (art. 1075).

It was observed at the time that civil legislation, even when it prohibits autonomous foundations, that is, those constituted as moral persons for the attainment of a determined purpose of worship and charity, does not prohibit the purpose itself for which a foundation is constituted. In short, the suppression of certain entities of worship is not normally followed by the suppression of the related obligations of worship or charity, which some, now, are transferred on the basis of the aforementioned eversive laws to another moral person operating under the control of the State, that is, to the fund for worship, which carries out its task even in our own days. In fact, however, many obligations of worship no longer found anyone to satisfy them, and there was a strong decline in the generosity of the faithful.

In the Concordat concluded between the Holy See and Italy on 11 February 1929, it was established (art. 29 letter d) that foundations of worship of any kind are admitted provided that they correspond to the religious needs of the population and that no financial burden to the State derives from them. This provision also applies to foundations already existing in fact.

Naturally, the recognition by the State of the f. p. in the strict sense exercises no influence on the nature of institutes approved as juridical persons that have such foundations in canon law.

The recognition of the juridical personality of foundations of worship is regulated by art. 17 of the Regulation approved by Royal Decree 2 December 1929 no. 2252. Accordingly, the Ordinary has the faculty to request from the Minister of the Interior that foundations of worship, understood in the broadest sense, be recognized as juridical persons, attaching the documents from which it appears: a) that ecclesiastical approval has been given; b) that the foundation is endowed with its own patrimony destined for purposes of worship; c) that it corresponds to the religious needs of the population and d) that, finally, no financial burden to the State can derive from its recognition.

Before the entry into force of the current Civil Code of 1942, it was disputed whether arts. 833 and 1075 of the Civil Code of 1866 had been repealed by the Concordat and by the law of 27 May 1929, no. 838 on ecclesiastical entities. In fact, neither the Concordat nor the aforementioned law contained an express repeal of those articles.

Many authors therefore held that the provisions contained in arts. 833 and 1075 had to be reconciled with that cited from the Concordat itself, and since the latter admitted the recognition of the juridical personality of foundations of worship, which before the Concordat could never have occurred by effect of art. 1, no. 6 of the law of 1867, one had to infer from the admissibility of erection into a moral entity also the validity of the private act aimed at obtaining the recognition of the foundation, a validity always subject to the condition that the foundation corresponded to the religious needs of the population.

A legacy or a donation, therefore, by which a patrimony was bound in perpetuity for a purpose of worship, without this corresponding to a religious need of the population, would have had to fall under the prohibition of arts. 833 and 1075, because the foundation would not have been admitted (art. 29 letter d) and could not have been recognized as a juridical person (art. 17, regulation of 2 December 1929). Since the foundation was not admitted, the legacy or donation would be juridically ineffective.

But the controversy, with the entry into force of the Civil Code of 1942, is no longer arguable, since the current code, reorganizing the entire matter of private law, has implicitly repealed arts. 833 and 1075, no longer making mention of the prohibitions contained in the cited articles.

Francesco Ercolani