PIOUS FOUNDATION (CAUSA PIA).
SUMMARY:
I. Concept of a foundation
II. The so-called causae piae
III. Benefices, chaplaincies, and legacies principally for worship
IV. Fulfilment of acts of worship
V. The f. p. in the proper sense and its regulation in the CIC. - VI. Historical development of the f. p. - VII. Regulation in Italian legislation.I. CONCEPT OF FOUNDATION
According to doctrine, a foundation or universitas bonorum is the juridical person constituted by a quantity of property bound to a specific purpose, for the better attainment of which the patrimony itself is regarded as the subject of rights.It is distinguished from the juridical person of the corporate type, or universitas personarum or collegium, which, as a subject of rights, is independent of the individual members who constitute it and survives them. The collegium derives its life from the persons who initially constitute II.
The foundation, on the other hand, derives its life from the unilateral will of its founder and is subject to his will as embodied in the act of foundation, which may be an act inter vivos or a disposition «mortis causa».
It was first the canonists, among whom Sinibaldo dei Fieschi, who became pope under the name of Innocent IV (1243–54), deserves particular mention, who arrived at the correct conception of the corporation as a universitas distinct both from the individual members who compose it and from their totality, in conformity with the thinking of the Roman jurists.
Having conceived the Church as a corpus mysticum, they extended this concept to all corporate entities, which therefore came to be regarded as persons, that is, as subjects capable of holding rights and duties, on a par with physical persons.
Later, this conception was also upheld by Bartolo (1314–57) and subsequently accepted by the other commentators and by all later jurists.
The concept of the foundation or institution likewise developed in a particular way through the work of canon law. Every ecclesiastical office, in fact, with its own patrimony, came to be regarded as an autonomous entity. Thus the concept of the autonomous foundation was elaborated, a concept that subsequently passed into modern law.
II. THE SO-CALLED «CAUSAE PIAE»
Foundations, the juridical expression of Christian charity, may also be called causae piae, according to the purpose for which they are intended.The term causa pia, used for the first time, although with a different meaning, in the legislation of Justinian (C. 1, 3, 45–46, C. 1, 2, 19, Nov. 131, c. 11, n. 3; Nov. 65), and revealing the Christian imprint acknowledged by Bonfante himself (op. cit. in bibl., p. 20), designated a juridical transaction or any act, inter vivos or mortis causa, whose principal purpose and motive was the exercise of pity toward those in need and the practice of works of religion.
It cannot be said absolutely that at that time the purpose was already personified as the subject of the patrimony, that is, that the foundation was recognized as a juridical person. But it is certain that, as time went on, the purpose of the disposition, that is, the causa pia, came to be considered in isolation and individualized, becoming independent; thus the purpose rendered the disposition impersonal, in the sense that it was intended not so much for a person as for a purpose.
This was due especially to the repeated occurrence of dispositions for the soul, in which the donee or legatee could not be regarded as the true recipient of the patrimony bound to the mystical purpose of the salvation of souls. Consequently, once the purpose of the disposition had acquired an independent character, the patrimony that was its object was not confused with the Church or with the legatee entity: through its special assignment to a specific use, the concept of the foundation in the modern sense came into being.
Thus, on the basis of Roman-canonical doctrine, the pia causa was recognized as a foundation and therefore as capable of becoming a juridical person through a measure of the competent authority.
In the broader usual sense, ecclesiastical foundations are understood to mean those juridically perfected entities characterized by the assignment of their patrimony to purposes of worship and religion or, in any event, to purposes proper to the Church.
The current CIC overcomes the theoretical difficulties arising from the division of juridical persons into corporations and foundations, but employs a more convenient distinction between the two categories of collegiate persons and non-collegiate persons.
Collegiate persons are constituted by a minimum of three physical persons with equal rights (e.g., the College of Cardinals, Orders, confraternities, cathedral and abbey Chapters, recognized religious houses and associations, with or without vows, etc.); non-collegiate persons include both institutions permanently created for the public good (e.g., the Holy See, bishoprics, offices, churches, parochial benefices, church fabric funds, institutions for missions, universities, etc.) and patrimonial assets assigned to a particular purpose of charity (causae piae: e.g., orphanages, hospitals, infirmaries) and education (e.g., seminaries, schools for the poor, etc.).
Therefore, under the designation causae piae, in a very broad sense are included all those non-collegiate entities that canon law recognizes as subjects of law or moral persons, or at least as capable of becoming such, arising from dispositions of the will directed toward religious or worship-related and charitable purposes (can. 1489 as amended).
These dispositions of the will may be erected as moral persons by the local Ordinary and, by his decree, acquire juridical personality in the Church; two conditions must concur, namely, that the purpose of the work be truly useful and that an endowment be constituted that may prudently be judged and anticipated as sufficient for the established purpose (can. 1489 § 2).
Special norms concern the foundation charters,
the administration, supervision, and suppression of such entities (cann. 1490–94).
These pious institutions require recognition by the State for civil purposes in order to exist as civil juridical persons, and are subject to governmental authorization for the acquisition of immovable property and the acceptance of donations, inheritances, and legacies (art. 17 Italian Civil Code).
III. BENEFICES, CHAPLAINCIES, AND PIOUS BEQUESTS FOR WORSHIP
Among the piae causae, that is, foundations involving the perpetual assignment of property or income to religious or worship-related purposes, may be included benefices, ecclesiastical and lay chaplaincies, and pious bequests for worship (v. LEGATO PIO).A benefice is a foundation in which an ecclesiastical office, with its own endowment, which must provide the ecclesiastic appointed to it with an adequate livelihood, is established as a juridical person with the concurrence of the competent ecclesiastical authority, the Holy See or the Ordinary, a concurrence expressed through the institution of the benefice.
If the pious founder attaches to his donation or testamentary disposition the burden of spiritual offices to be celebrated in a particular chapel and at a particular altar, there is an ecclesiastical chaplaincy.
A lay chaplaincy, on the other hand, is a foundation whose purpose is the celebration of Masses in a particular chapel or at a particular altar, or the performance of other sacred functions by an ecclesiastic (chaplain) appointed by the founder or by his successors and removable by them at their pleasure, without any institution by the bishop; the chaplain is maintained with private or family property bound to the religious purpose.
Pious bequests for worship are analogous to lay chaplaincies. These testamentary dispositions have as their purpose the obligation to celebrate Masses and other religious offices, with the difference that, ordinarily, the endowment of the pious bequest does not consist in the direct assignment of property or income from immovables regarded as separate from the inheritance, but in the allocation for this purpose of an annual income to be paid by the heirs and successors of the deceased, without there being a chaplain or any real encumbrance imposed by him on the inherited property. In this case, the bequest denotes the burden (modus) imposed by the testator on the heir or legatee to fulfil these purposes.
The bequest, however, may also arise from the specific and exclusive allocation of particular immovables. In that case, the property burdened by the bequest is inalienable without certain formalities (can. 1530 ff.).
When the pious bequest has charity as its purpose, it is more properly called an « opera pia » (v.).
As regards lay chaplaincies and pious bequests for worship, their institutions arose from an extension of the concept of benefices to private and family estates devoted to religious works, the intercession for souls, and ecclesiastical ceremonies.
In admitting this extension, the principles governing family foundations and fideicommissary institutions were also applied.
IV. FULFILMENT OF RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS
The question has arisen whether lay chaplaincies and pious religious bequests are juridical persons, since, according to many authors, they should not be regarded as moral persons, being merely a mass of assets which, while remaining in the patrimony of the founder or his heirs, would form an autonomous mass with a specific purpose. For these authors, the reason for doubt is therefore based on the fact that the assets always remain at the disposal, in the ownership and enjoyment, of private persons.Another doctrinal current, however, observes that the assimilation of the said institutions to Churches, which were recognized as piae cansae, that is, as foundations, entailed that they were regarded as juridical persons under common canon and civil law.
The analogy that these entities bore to family foundations, which under customary law were considered juridical persons, meant that the said institutions too were recognized as such.
As regards the lack of formal recognition by ecclesiastical and civil authority, it is also observed that such recognition was considered tacitly granted by the fact that the bishop had the right to act for the fulfilment of religious obligations, by virtue of common canon law. Indeed, the Council of Trent (sess. XXII, de reform., chaps. 8 and 9) had prescribed that bishops, also as delegates of the Apostolic See, should be the executors of all pious dispositions made both by acts of last will and by acts inter vivos; that they should have the right to visit all charitable entities and lay pious places and to supervise all institutions intended for worship, the salvation of souls and the poor, examining their respective statutes and providing for their execution, while the administrators of those entities were required to render them an annual account of their administration.
These principles, which the Church, the faithful guardian of the pious wishes of the faithful, has codified by reaffirming the principle that the Ordinaries are the executors of all pious wishes made either by an act inter vivos or by last will and may therefore supervise their execution (can. 1515 §§ 1 and 2); they have the right to receive an account, may even repudiate foundations that the donor wished to exempt from the account to be submitted to the local Ordinary, and must regard as nonexistent the clauses of a will contrary to the rights of the bishop (can. 1515 § 3).
This is admissible when the bequest benefits an ecclesiastical entity subject to episcopal supervision; in other cases, the right and duty to execute the wishes of the disponers belongs to the executor of the will, the heir, or anyone having a legal interest to assert. Italian civil law lacks a provision similar to that of the decree of 27 May 1857 of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which gave the diocesan bishop the right to bring an action for the fulfilment of a chaplaincy and of any religious bequest (Scaduto, op. cit. in bibl., I, no. 219); consequently, in the absence of such a provision, the bishop cannot, by reason of his office, be recognized as having the power to act for the fulfilment of religious foundations. Nevertheless, art. 648 of the Italian Civil Code may be regarded as providing the bishop with a means of action, enabling him, where appropriate, to proceed as any private person interested in the fulfilment of the charge.
It should be added that, among the other privileges enjoyed by the piae cansae, there was the very important one whereby they could be established without essential formalities and by acts inter vivos or acts of last will, through the mere declaration of the donor or testator.
These provisions too were adopted and partly modified by the norms of the CIC, which, concerning pious wishes in general, prescribes (can. 1513 § 1) that all those who, under natural and ecclesiastical law, may freely dispose of their own property may also devote it to pious causes by donation inter vivos or mortis causa, by testament or by bequest. In last wills, it adds, the formalities and solemnities prescribed by civil laws should, where possible, also be observed; but if these have been omitted, the heirs must be admonished that the testator’s wishes must nevertheless be fulfilled (can. 1515 § 2), whenever those wishes are established with certainty in any manner. This follows from the fundamental principle that the basis of legal obligations should not be so much observance of formalities as a genuine obligation of natural law, that is, of human conscience.
The heirs, however, may not be deprived of their legitimate portion and, in disputed cases, may obtain a « composition » by applying to the Penitentiary or to the Congregation of the Council.
The pious wishes of the faithful must be fulfilled with the utmost scrupulousness, both as regards their substance and as regards the manner in which the assets are administered and expended (can. 1514).
As regards the patrimony, according to the other doctrinal current, the fact that ownership, enjoyment and administration of the assets belong to the active patrons, the heirs and successors in title of the founder is not decisive for denying juridical personality, since, in substance, the assets belong to the entity. Indeed, if the endowment consists of a specific immovable property directly assigned to the chaplaincy or pious bequest, the immovable itself constitutes the endowment of the entity and, by reason of the purpose to which it is devoted, is inalienable without the appropriate conditions required by the CIC (can. 1536), so that the family’s ownership is purely nominal. If the endowment consists of the income from specified immovable properties, this constitutes a real charge upon those assets which, although alienable, always retain the burden of Masses or religious services; that burden may be secured by a mortgage in the event that the assets are alienated. And when the burden affects all inherited assets, the endowment consists of the income assigned to the purpose, which was considered virtually separated from the assets themselves in order to constitute the endowment of the entity.
V. LA F. P. IN SENSO PROPRIO E LA SUA REGOLAMENTAZIONE NEL CIC. - According to the CIC, distinct from the causa pia and therefore from all the various juridical forms it may assume, is the f. p., consisting of temporal goods given in any manner to an ecclesiastical juridical person, with the perpetual burden, or one lasting for a notably long period, of celebrating Masses from their annual revenues or of performing ecclesiastical functions or specified works of charity and piety (can. 1544 § 1).
For there to be an f. p. under canon law, it is therefore required that the patrimony should not itself be constituted as a juridical person, but should be assigned, by an act inter vivos or mortis causa, to an ecclesiastical juridical person with the burden of several works.
The f. p., essentially, are causae piae lacking juridical personality.
The religious or charitable character of the purpose is essential to the institution.
Besides the purpose, there is the essential element of the patrimony, which is given to an already existing juridical person, subject to the obligation of being assigned to a purpose established and intended by the founder.
The burden entrusted to the juridical person of celebrating Masses or attending to those particular functions or works desired by the founder must be perpetual or, at least, according to some authors, of a duration not less than 50 years. This latter relative perpetuity distinguishes the f. p. from pious legacies and from the « fiducia ».
Absolute or relative perpetuity precludes conceiving the causa pia in relation to a physical person.
The assignment of goods to a juridical person may be made by an act inter vivos or by testament.
The juridical person to which the goods are given in order to attain the particular purpose of the foundation must accept the foundation. Since the burden is imposed together with the donation, there can be no foundation without a bilateral contract; hence can. 1544 § 2 establishes that a legitimately accepted foundation creates a synallagmatic contract, de ut facias, which means that, in the event of unjustified non-fulfilment of the burden, it is necessary to interpret what the will of the disposer was and, where appropriate, to apply the principles of civil law concerning the fulfilment of bilateral contracts.
Whereas before the Code the acceptance of an f. p., even if not preceded by authorization from the Ordinary or the religious superior, nevertheless remained valid, today, according to some authors, acceptance must be authorized by the Ordinary and the religious superior, on pain of nullity, since acceptance of the p. f. is an act exceeding ordinary administration; according to others, however, the absence of authorization from the Ordinary does not nullify the f. p., which may be rescinded only by the dissent of the Ordinary (S. Romana Rota, 6 July 1580).
Written consent is therefore required from the Ordinary of the place, who shall give it only after having himself legitimately ascertained: a) that the juridical person is capable of bearing the new burdens imposed without detriment to those already existing; b) that the new revenues correspond exactly to the new burdens according to diocesan custom (can. 1546 § 1).
Moreover, the Ordinary has the right to issue particular norms concerning the amount of the endowment sufficient for the various foundations and the distribution of revenues (can. 1545).
The powers relating to the administration of the f. p., for which the norms common to all ecclesiastical bodies apply, are reserved to the bishops, except where f. p.
have been made to exempt religious orders, in which case they are exercised by the religious superior.
In order that the wishes of the faithful founders may be respected, and especially in view of the purpose assigned to the f. p., the Church exercises careful control and supervision over the ecclesiastical body that has accepted the foundation.
Indeed, if the endowment of the foundation consists of money or movable goods, it must be deposited in a safe place, following the directions of the Ordinary; the money and the proceeds from the movable goods must be invested and recorded as soon as possible, with every appropriate precaution, for the benefit of the foundation, with a precise indication of the capital and its respective income, and of the specifically determined obligations of worship which are to be provided for. The methods of investment are established by the Ordinary, after hearing the opinion of those concerned and of the Council of diocesan administration (can. 1547). Special norms are prescribed for the preservation of the relevant documents (cann. 1548-49).
The f. p. cease when the adequate fund assigned by the founder has been exhausted.
The burdens constituting the foundation may also be reduced, as well as commuted or transferred to another juridical person (can. 1551).
According to the Council of Trent, bishops could provide for the reduction of such burdens iure proprio; the Code of Canon Law, on the other hand, reserves all authority in this regard to the S. Sede, which may delegate bishops with precise instructions concerning the manner in which the reduction is to be effected.
The reduction of burdens is an operation characteristic of the f. p., just as juridical persons have the special forms of suppression and union.
With all this understood, the CIC distinguishes between the f. p. in the strict sense and the pious will.
The f. p. must be identifiable in its purpose and patrimony; that is, it must have its own patrimony, not to be confused with that of the recipient body, and its own purpose, distinct from that of the body itself.
The pious will is any human act which, by suitable means, seeks to attain a purpose of religion or Christian charity.
Where the pious will is raised by the competent ecclesiastical authority to juridical personality, there then arises the causa pia, or foundation, or institution.
Distinct from the causa pia and the f. p. is the fiducia, which does not attain the status of a recognized body or burden, but consists in the transfer, by an act inter vivos or by last will, of goods to an apparent heir who is, however, the executor of the transferor's will in favour of third parties.
Testamentary fiducia is regulated differently by the various civil legislations.
The CIC, in can. 1516, establishes that a cleric or religious who has received in trust goods to be distributed or assigned to causae piae must notify the matter to the Ordinary concerned, indicating all movable and immovable goods received in trust, together with all attached burdens; if the disposer has manifested the intention of opposing the fulfilment of this duty, those goods must be refused. The Ordinary must then require that the fiduciary goods be placed in safekeeping, supervising them in accordance with the law.
VI. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE F. P. — In the earliest days of Christianity, bequests of immovable property could not be made to the Christian Church, since, being considered collegia illicita, it was forbidden to acquire property by inheritance or donation.
It may nevertheless be held that, even during the era of the catacombs, bequests of another kind must have been made ad pias causas, especially by patrician families converted to the new religion, and this not only to provide for the needs of worship, but also to assist the poor and the sick.
These were offerings entrusted to priests, so that they might be disbursed for charitable or religious purposes.
Once the persecutions had ceased, the emperor Constantine included the Christian Church among the lawful collegia, recognized its right to acquire and possess property, ordered that the goods of which it had been despoiled be restored to it, and himself wished to be generous in bequests to sacred places. Moreover, he attributed legal validity to dispositions in favour of pious purposes, however made.
The emperors Valentiniano, Marciano, and Giustiniano continually issued decrees intended to favour pious bequests.
In view of the facilities and privileges granted by the emperors to pious dispositions, the supreme pontiffs directed their attention to giving a juridical form to the new institution, which was subsequently recognized, little by little, in almost all Christian States and which preceded the institution of ecclesiastical benefices (s. Cipriano, ep. LIV; Innocenzo I, ep. 25, cap. 2; etc.).
The Churches then began to receive extensive acquisitions through legacies and donations, and religious piety was carried to such a point that pious testators most often neglected their relatives and frequently even their own children. But the Fathers of the Church never approved such dispositions to the detriment of children and closest relatives.
At that time there arose, and subsequently multiplied, under the protection of the Church and with the favour of legislation, various institutions intended for worship or charity (pias canae and f. p.). Religion and charity proceeded together in order to aid orphans, the sick, the poor, the aged, and pilgrims; thus were founded those various institutions which, according to their differing purposes, were called orphanotrophia, brephotrophia, gerontoconia, pterotrophia, nosoconia, xenodochia.
Liturprendo, among the Longobardi, and later Carlomagno and his successors, favoured pious bequests, while also restraining their abuses, since many, whether through the religious influence of the times or in order to escape the oppression of feudal lords, “commended” themselves and their goods to Churches and monasteries; a practice which became more frequent toward the year 1000, also because possession and enjoyment of the goods remained with the pious testators.
Until the thirteenth century, worship and charity developed together; and canon law, following the example of Justinian legislation, recognized juridical personality in the various institutions directed toward those purposes. Doctors and canonists then increased the privileges of dispositions ad plas canae, recognizing that for their validity the mere will of the testator was sufficient, without need of formalities: sufficit ad bonorum suorum divisionem faciendum nuda voluntas testatoris (cf. Comment. by Bartolo da Sassoferrato, Baldo, and Paolo di Castro). But when the civil power began to regard supervision of charitable works as one of its own functions, the causes more closely regulated by the Church came to include exclusively those institutions having an object of worship; these, however, comprised not only those erected under an ecclesiastical title, but also all the various foundations in whatever manner directed to purposes of worship, such as ecclesiastical and lay chaplaincies and, in general, pious legacies burdened with obligations of worship.
Meanwhile, ecclesiastical immovable property had greatly increased; being withdrawn from commerce, it came to be called “dead hand.”
The emperor Foca had already issued provisions in the East to restrict such acquisitions; and although Ruggero di Sicilia, Federico II di Svevia, and Federico III di Aragona did likewise in Italy, the Angioini, on the contrary, favoured ecclesiastical estates by declaring them exempt from the payment of taxes.
The Italian Republics of Modena, Padova, Treviso, and other cities adopted severe measures against ecclesiastical landed property, imposing taxes upon it; Venezia did the same, thereby provoking to its own detriment the famous interdict of 17 April 1606 imposed by Pope Paolo V. Napoli, in the eighteenth century, several legislative provisions were issued to prevent the increase of ecclesiastical property, so that from 1769 the “dead hands” were prohibited from acquiring property by inter vivos acts or testamentary disposition; and in the years 1771 and 1776 it was ordered that ecclesiastical property be granted in emphyteusis.
Analogous laws were promulgated in Toscana and Lombardia, and all these measures were subsequently reinforced by the doctrines of Italian economists and French Encyclopaedists.
One of the first acts of the French Revolution was directed against the “dead hand”; famous in this regard were the ordi-
nance of 1780, which prohibited the establishment of any “établissement de main-morte,” and the law of 12 July 1792 on the civil constitution of the clergy, which suppressed benefices, chaplaincies, and “praestimonia” of every kind and under every designation, foundations under lay patronage, and perpetual foundations for Masses and other religious services, while prohibiting similar institutions also for the future.
The same occurred in the Italian States into which the arms and ideas of France had penetrated.
With the reaction, however, ecclesiastical bodies recovered their freedom to acquire property; this was sanctioned at Napoli in the Concordat concluded with the S. Sede in 1818, until the “dead hand” was wholly suppressed in Italy by the laws suppressing ecclesiastical property of 7 July 1866, no. 3036, and 15 Aug. 1867, no. 3848.
By these laws, foundations having an object of worship were suppressed as juridical persons, even when not erected under an ecclesiastical title. A properly religious object, however, in its ritual and liturgical expressions, was required; consequently, bodies having a different purpose, even if connected with religion, were excluded from suppression, such as institutions for preaching, missions, the teaching of Christian doctrine, etc.
VII. DISCIPLINE IN ITALIAN LEGISLATION
The abrogated Civil Code of 1865, making provision for the future, established that testamentary dispositions ordered for the purpose of establishing or endowing simple benefices, lay chaplaincies, and other similar foundations were null (art. 833), as were donations having the same object (art. 1075).It was observed at the time that civil legislation, even when it prohibits autonomous foundations, that is, those constituted as juridical persons for the achievement of a specific purpose of worship and charity, does not prohibit the purpose itself for which a foundation is established. In short, the suppression of certain religious institutions does not ordinarily entail the suppression of the corresponding obligations of worship or charity; some of these are now transferred, on the basis of the aforementioned suppressive laws, to another juridical person operating under State control, namely, the fund for worship, which continues to perform its task even today. In fact, however, many obligations of worship no longer found anyone to fulfill them, and there was a marked decline in the liberality of the faithful.
In the Concordat concluded between the Holy See and Italy on 11 February 1929, it was established (art. 29, letter d) that foundations for worship of any kind are permitted, provided that they meet the religious needs of the population and do not entail any financial burden for the State. This provision also applies to foundations already existing in fact.
Naturally, the State’s recognition of the f. p. in the strict sense has no influence whatsoever on the nature, in canon law, of the institutions possessing juridical personality that have such foundations.
The recognition of the juridical personality of foundations for worship is regulated by art. 17 of the Regulations approved by Royal Decree no. 2252 of 2 December 1929. Accordingly, the Ordinary has the power to ask the Minister of the Interior that foundations for worship—understood in the broadest sense—be recognized as juridical persons, appending documents demonstrating: a) that ecclesiastical approval has been granted; b) that the foundation possesses its own patrimony designated for purposes of worship; c) that it meets the religious needs of the population; and d) finally, that its recognition cannot entail any financial burden for the State.
Before the entry into force of the Civil Code currently in force, of 1942, it was disputed whether arts. 833 and 1075 of the Civil Code of 1866 had been abrogated by the Concordat and by Law no. 838 of 27 May 1929 concerning ecclesiastical institutions. Neither the Concordat nor the aforementioned law contained an express abrogation of those articles.
Many authors therefore held that the provisions contained in arts. 833 and 1075 had to be reconciled with that cited in the Concordat itself; and since the latter permitted the recognition of the juridical personality of foundations for worship—which, before the Concordat, could never have taken place as a result of art. 1, no. 6, of the law of 1867—it was necessary to infer from the admissibility of erection as a juridical person the validity of the private act aimed at obtaining recognition of the foundation, a validity always subject to the condition that the foundation meet the religious needs of the population.
But with the entry into force of the Civil Code of 1942, the controversy can no longer be raised, since the code currently in force, reorganizing the entire field of private law, implicitly abrogated arts. 833 and 1075 by making no further mention of the prohibitions contained in those articles.